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 Introduction 
 
 
 
Covid-19 presents one of the gravest, acute challenges our world has faced for many 
years. The pandemic impacts a vast array of areas of life across the globe. It also raises a 
multitude of very urgent questions for law and human rights. This volume provides a series 
of scholarly responses to many of the questions Covid-19 raises for the theory and practice 
of law and human rights. The assembled papers in this volume collectively seek to engage 
with academic and practitioner communities alike and the volume aims to positively 
contribute to our collective attempts to “build back better” once a globally available vaccine 
for Covid-19 has been produced and distributed.    
 
The volume emerged from a hastily convened Zoom meeting of over thirty colleagues 
based within the Human Rights Centre and the School of Law at the University of Essex. 
The purpose of the meeting was to gauge ongoing research related to Covid-19 and the 
breadth and array of responses led to this project. It quickly became apparent that many 
academic colleagues were extremely interested in contributing their expertise on a very 
broad range of multidisciplinary Covid-19 related topics and issues. The combination of 
contributors’ enthusiasm for the project and our editorial efforts has enabled us to produce 
this volume in a very timely manner. A mere three months has elapsed from the first 
meeting to the final publication!  
 
The contents of this volume span a very comprehensive range of topics, questions and 
expertise. The volume is purposefully multidisciplinary. It is also intended to be accessible 
to a relatively broad readership who, one imagines, is nevertheless united by an interest 
in the role which expertise has to play in confronting and overcoming the very many legal, 
social, philosophical and political challenges which Covid-19 entails.  
 
             
 
 
The editors   
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Some Conceptual Framings 
 
Some Conceptual Framings: A Discussion 
Eliana Cusato, Koldo Casla, Andrew Fagan Emily Jones and Ozan Kamiloğlu, University of Essex School 
of Law and Human Rights Centre [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_001] 
 
Several colleagues came together to discuss some of the themes arising in the papers for 
this section of the publication.  
 
A first theme that colleagues explored is whether existing theories of human rights are 
sufficient to explain and provide a basis for the response to Covid-19, or, whether the 
theoretical tools that we tend to resort to, need to be re-conceptualised or considered 
afresh. There is a temptation to seek to re-conceptualise the existing normative resources 
we have at our disposal, or even to go further by looking for new approaches, and 
sometimes this will be vital, even essential. However, there was debate about whether the 
act of re-conceptualising is actually required, or whether it would simply serve as a 
distraction from the “real” problems. Also, if it is required, what would or could a re-
conceptualisation look like?  
 
Some expressed caution about the risks of re-conceptualising, indeed whether by doing 
so, one might fall victim to the trap of conceiving of the pandemic as an “unprecedented” 
event somehow requiring or justifying a complete break with the values and approaches 
we adopt for the “normal”. This “common enemy of humanity” approach, which privileges 
the need to defend the world from extraordinary shocks, is something we have often seen 
before, and does not work for all persons within societies. It is also somewhat patronising 
and ironic; while on the one hand we are progressively losing our societal bonds, on the 
other hand our leaders are claiming that the approaches they are taking which are 
responsible for these ruptures are in the name of defending humanity. For example, the 
feminist critiques of the use of the peace and security language and architecture to respond 
to Covid-19 underscores why securitisation and militarisation of health and welfare issues 
end up protecting the economic and neo-liberal status quo.  
  
Instead, perhaps what is required is a “re-balancing”, as well as a greater focus on positive 
obligations; seeking out a new equilibrium for how rights can be understood and 
implemented. The critique of mainstream human rights discourse is vital to this task, 
including its failure to engage effectively with the social ills caused by austerity. One can 
see very clearly during this pandemic the inadequacy of the liberal tradition of negative 
liberty – “so long as each person can be left alone, that is good enough.” Indeed, more 
equal societies have proven themselves to be much more resilient to the pandemic.  
 
Instead of securitised or militarised logic, there is a need to place greater attention on the 
“violence of the everyday”, and to understand how Covid-19 and many states’ neo-liberal 
responses to it feed into this violence, perpetually. The pandemic is an important wake-up 
call by bringing to the fore an array of pre-existing challenges that remain unaddressed. It 
puts into stark focus the intersectional ways in which different groups are being 
disproportionately affected, not only by the pandemic but by the unequal societies in which 
they live. Our political and economic systems have contributed significantly to these 
societal failings.  
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Another important theme is the relationship between different theories or conceptions of 
rights – those which privilege the individual and others which adopt more communitarian 
or collective perspectives. Both Casla and Kamiloglu, in their papers, for instance call for 
a much greater attention to be placed on collective rights, and indeed, both share a more 
communitarian or communal vision of how rights ought to be articulated and respected. 
Indeed, Casla’s focus on individuals’ civic responsibilities – what defines an individual’s 
relationship with others and the wider community -, highlights the sense that all individuals 
are members of a political community. He sees the need to place greater emphasis on the 
needs of the community, and particularly, those most vulnerable within it. This was seen 
as particularly important, given the unequal and intersecting impacts of the virus. However, 
the notion of “vulnerability” is not neutral. There is also a tendency to see vulnerability as 
a common denominator of resistance; and using it in this way requires us to think about 
resistance to those in power. In contrast, notions of “care” are slightly different as they can 
be indifferent to power.  
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The Reach of Rights in the Crisis 
Sheldon Leader, Professor, University of Essex School of Law and Human Rights Centre, Member, Essex 
Human Rights Centre and Essex Business and Human Rights Project [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_002] 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores some central challenges to bringing domestic and international 
human rights principles to bear on the provision of health care in this pandemic. It looks at 
the ways in which policy aims to balance a variety of competing rights and demands. Some 
involve competition for access to scarce resources in hospitals, where the competition 
might be between possessors of the same right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of 
health:1 a gain for one might require a loss for another.2 Other situations involve a 
competition between a human right that might conflict with institutional demands that do 
not themselves rank as implementing human rights, but are nevertheless demands that 
are sometimes considered legitimate and which can exercise considerable downward 
pressure on the ability to give full effect to the human rights in question. This happens in 
the present pandemic, for example, when orders, backed by the threat of dismissal, are 
given by some enterprises to their workforces to return to work despite evidence that this 
return can jeopardise their health. While the enterprise cannot usually claim to be making 
a human rights-based demand in an order  to return to work, there is here a recognisable 
competition between the right to health and the demand to stimulate the economy.    
 
Downward pressure from a demand that is itself not based on a human right, but is 
sometimes found to prevail over the claim of right to health, can also arise within the 
network of a state’s international relations. For example, this could happen when a member 
state of the WTO wants to ban an import on grounds of jeopardy to public health, and the 
WTO resists the import ban on the grounds that a reasonably available alternative exists 
that would have a less limiting effect on trade and would also protect health.3 
 
II. Configuring a Human Right When it is Up Against Competition 
 
How can one navigate here? There are several principles that aim to flesh out what it 
means to “balance” rights against competing claims in these situations. These are the 
requirement that the purpose behind these limitations not be itself independently 
 
1 cf International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 12(1). 
2 cf. Shaheen Azmi, Lorne Foster and Lesley A Jacobs (eds), Balancing Competing Human Rights in a 
Diverse Society: Institutions, Policy, Principles (in cooperation with the Ontario Human Rights Commission) 
(Irwin Law: 2012). See also, Sheldon Leader, ‘Integration, Federation, and the Ethics of Rights’, in Monique 
Costillo (ed), Morale et politique des Droits de l’homme (Georg Olms Verlag: 2003) p. 63. 
3 Albeit to a possibly lesser extent than would a full ban. Contrast on this issue, Thailand - Restrictions on 
Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT decision - November 7, 1990, and Brazil – 
Measures Affecting imports of re-treaded tyres AB-2007-4. The latter gives greater latitude to a state to fix 
the level at which it aims to protect public health from the pressures of trade than does the former. 
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identifiable as illegal,4 proportionality,5 necessity,6 and what is here labelled “reversibility”. 
The focus here is on the last two: necessity and reversibility. They are particularly relevant 
to the task of configuring the dimensions of a human right in the circumstances of this 
health crisis. 
 
a) Necessity  
 
A limitation on the enjoyment of a human right may be imposed if it is established that it is 
necessary for the purposes of the institution or practice imposing it, and that institution or 
practice is not otherwise illegal. While there are several interpretations of this requirement, 
they converge on the need to adjust the limitation on the right against the virtues of allowing 
that limitation by following a “least negative impact” principle. Courts have asked whether 
a proposed limitation of a human right arising from a cross-cutting limiting objective is the 
least damaging to that right from among reasonably available alternatives.  
 
The direction of adjustment is important to note here: it runs from the impact on the right 
as its benchmark, against which the merits of a proposed adjustment are assessed. So, 
as in the example of the call to return to work, one should ask if there are reasonably 
available alternative ways of conducting the return that would have less of an impact on 
the health of those returning. Via this route, human rights would be applicable in both hiring 
and firing. The legitimacy of both in this crisis should be anchored in the need to do least 
damage to the basic rights of those in work, to those wanting work, and to those losing it.  
 
For our purposes, it is important to note that this “least damage” requirement, informing 
the adjustment between human rights and their legitimate limitation, can actually run in two 
different directions: it can insist on showing least damage to the human right, or it can insist 
on showing least damage to the resources and efficacy of the institution aiming to limit that 
right. Both approaches aim at establishing what they consider to be appropriate space for 
the human right and appropriate space for the competing objective. But the outcomes of 
taking one or the other route can be very different. The first will allow the right to be 
overridden in a narrower range of circumstances than does the second. The first allows a 
limitation only if it can be shown that the competing objective cannot be reached in any 
way other than one that places a yet greater limitation on the right. The second does the 
opposite. It is more open to finding justified limitation on the right and correspondingly 
greater room for other, competing objectives to prevail.7 
 
These competing directions of adjustment are particularly noticeable when institutions with 
narrower mandates than the state possesses are concerned. When a body such as the 
 
4 As would happen, for example, if a  a hospital intentionally excludes on grounds of their religion, race, etc 
those who would otherwise receive help . 
5 This requirement has several components, which include but are wider than necessity. The relevant 
elements are:  i): that the means chosen for achieving an objective that competes with the requirement that 
one respect the fundamental right in question, be suitable; ii): that the objective be a legitimate one, and; 
iii): if (i) and (ii) are satisfied, that the means chosen, and/or the objective as interpreted, impinge on the 
exercise of a fundamental right no more than is necessary. See Sheldon Leader, Proportionality and the 
Justification of Discrimination in Janet Dine and Robert Watt (eds) Discrimination: Concepts, Limitations 
and Justifications (London: Longmans, 1996) 11, and Aharon Barak, Proportionality (CUP: 2012). 
6 See, Aharon Barak, Proportionality (CUP: 2012)  Ch 11.  
7 See, Sheldon Leader, ‘Inflating Consent, Inflating Function, and Inserting Human Rights’ in Janet Dine 
and Andrew Fagan (eds), Human Rights and Capitalism: A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Globalisation 
(Edward Elgar, 2006). 
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WTO gives priority to facilitating world trade, or a commercial enterprise considers its 
central mission to engage in profitable production of goods and services, both take 
measures that can also put pressure on the human rights of those affected, including the 
right to health, but they are often said to be acting within their mandates in doing so.  These 
mandates, it is often argued, necessarily lead these bodies to reject adjustment in the 
direction of least negative impact on the human right, even though they may have formally 
added respect for such rights to their agendas.  
 
b) Hidden priorities  
   
We need to distinguish between ultimate priority accorded to a basic right when it faces 
competition, and priorities in the adjustment of that right against the demands of those 
competitors. Ultimate priority is what one sees when it is clear that the values promoted 
by, say, the right to health will win over right to trade if one has to choose between them. 
The right to life is more important than is the right to trade, and more important than the 
right of investors to their share of corporate profit – more important in the sense that 
ultimately, if one had to be totally sacrificed to the other, the right to health would win. 
 
However, this ultimate priority is different from the priority that can emerge when the space 
for the enjoyment of that same right is reduced by asking how it can be adjusted against 
the requirements  of the least negative impact test. A private provider of badly needed 
medical equipment, for example, might be subject to a government order that it produce 
this equipment for public use is likely to have several pricing options. One will be to choose 
a price that puts least burden on the purchasing options of those needing to use the 
equipment, allowing a larger number to benefit from it, while also making room for the 
provider to avoid a total loss from the production. An alternative would be for the provider 
to charge a higher price, making the equipment available to fewer users, but still available 
to some. The first option looks for the least negative impact on the human right, while the 
second looks for the least negative impact on commercial returns. Both take some account 
of the priorities of the other party, but each considers the other to be wrongly focused.   
 
A fully consistent commitment to priority for human rights in this example will line them up 
in the same direction: it could assign them both ultimate priority and priority-in-adjustment. 
However, these priorities can sometimes be split. A human right might then look as if it has 
ultimate priority when in fact that status is undermined by a protocol for adjustment that 
asks: how can we allow a human right to health to be protected in a way that least perturbs,  
least reduces financial return to investors, or the flow of trade. The right to health, despite 
appearances, is then marginalised.   
 
c) Reversibility  
 
When two or more human rights compete, there is another issue that arises in public 
debate about priorities: there is a quality of reversibility about directions of adjustment 
made between such rights. To illustrate this feature from a domain apart from but relevant 
to health, consider the right to life as it competes with the right to freedom of movement. 
Preservation of life is ultimately more important than is the interest in freedom of movement 
along the highway. But it does not follow that each and every level of risk of death is more 
important to prevent than is any given level of freedom of movement.8  
 
8 See, Jeremy Waldron, ‘Rights in Conflict’ (1989) 99 Ethics 503, esp. 509-512, 516-18.   
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For example, evidence might show that the death rate on highways is reduced by a 
significant but decreasing number for every mile per hour of reduction in permitted speed. 
Assume that the annual reduction is 2,000 deaths in a given population for a reduction of 
permitted speed from 100 and 90 mph; a reduction of 1000 deaths if the speed limit drops 
from 90 to 50 mph; a saving of 100 lives if it falls from 50 to 40, and 10 lives would probably 
be saved if the speed limit falls from 20 to 5 mph. Even though the preservation of life is 
ultimately more important than is freedom of movement along the highway, it does not 
follow that the right to freedom of movement must always be adjusted downwards so as to 
have the least impact on the death rate. At a certain point a polity may reverse the direction 
of compromise. In this example, it will at a certain point adjust the attention paid to the risk 
of death in favour of greater concern for the right to freedom of movement, even though 
clearly a certain number of reduced deaths will result from a further reduction in speed limit 
to 5 mph.  
 
This does not mean that the right to life falls out of the picture at all: it still functions to 
constrain and channel society’s obligations to its members. What does happen is that when 
human rights compete with one another, as does the right to life with the right to freedom 
of movement, priorities might at some point legitimately shift. The point at which that shift 
should happen is a potential matter for legislatures, with appropriate coordination from the 
executive and judiciary. This should help us to further pin down what is involved in moving 
a human right towards being a central rather than marginal concern for adequate health 
provision. There may well be points at which a marginal gain in health care is outweighed 
by a severe loss of resource in other domains of human rights concern. But this throws 
into relief the situations on the other side of the line, in which the right to health should win 
out over competing rights.  
 
III. Providers 
 
These points can also indicate a particular challenge in working out the legitimate role for 
private providers of health care when they are called on to help meet the demands of 
human rights in this crisis. It is increasingly accepted that human rights principles should 
be deployed to shape the role of all private commercial enterprises.9 This can include 
acceptance by these enterprises that human rights have what we have called ultimate 
priority when they compete with other demands on that enterprise.   
 
However, that status can once again be undermined when priorities-in-adjustment come 
up for consideration. At that point it is quite possible that the private provider sets as a 
condition for the provision of its service which the government has asked it to provide, that 
it be able to work with a guideline that makes the least possible negative impact on the 
right of its shareholders to a return on their investment.  
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
The present crisis brings into focus some longstanding issues. A sharp division between 
public and private provision of goods and services is increasingly blurred. All are called on, 
and all are rightly accountable to human rights requirements. At the same time, as these 
 
9 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Geneva 2011) passim.  
See, Sheldon Leader, ‘Integration, Federation, and the Ethics of Rights’, in Monique Costillo (ed), Morale et 
politique des Droits de l’homme (Georg Olms Verlag: 2003) p. 63. 
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rights extend their reach, their potential can transform into frustration. This is as true of the 
human right to an adequate standard of health provision as it is true in many other areas 
of social justice. The questions generated throw into relief the need to appreciate what can 
be delivered by a full recognition of the central role that human rights can play in this area, 
rather than a marginal role that they might acquire by default. 
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Rights and Responsibilities: Protecting and Fulfilling Economic and 
Social Rights in Times of Public Health Emergency 
Koldo Casla, Lecturer, School of Law and Human Rights Centre [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_003] 
 
Abstract 
This chapter introduces human rights and civic responsibilities as mutually reinforcing 
ideas in times of public health emergency. Based on rights and responsibilities, and taking 
the human rights principle of non-retrogression as a starting point, it is necessary to define 
positive obligations to protect and fulfil economic and social rights when responding to a 
serious public health crisis. Among other things, I argue that societies should be able to 
use privately owned resources and facilities, as it is sometimes not only legitimate but 
necessary to interfere with private property. 
 
Keywords 
Economic and Social Rights; Emergency; Human Rights; Private Actors; Responsibility; 
Vulnerability. 
 
 
I. Rights and Responsibilities in Times of Public Health Emergency 
 
We are all interconnected, for better and for worse.1 If the nodes were not so densely linked 
in multiple ways, the virus would not have gone global so quickly. At the same time, if the 
connections between us are not sufficiently strong, we will not be well equipped to deal 
with it successfully. 
 
We, society and the human rights community, need a holistic response where individuals 
take responsibility as members of a collective that resembles a beehive more than a 
massive rack of billiard balls. 
 
The pandemic is testing our resilience individually and socially. We have been asked to 
act together to flatten the infection curve, preserve the public healthcare system and save 
lives. We need to wash our hands and we have kept a safe physical distance from each 
other, not to protect ourselves, but to protect others, not even relatives and neighbours, 
but people we don’t even know. 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic is teaching us a lesson about the role of human rights in the 
“broadband network” that is society.2 Isolated shipwreck survivors have rights, but we are 
not isolated shipwreck survivors. We are interconnected and interdependent. As 
individuals and members of a community, ‘in which alone the free and full development of 
(our) personality is possible’,3 we hold responsibilities vis-à-vis each other. 
 
I am not using the word “responsibility” as a legal duty, but as a civic duty to do what we 
can so others in the political community we are part of can enjoy their rights. The breadth 
of that political community will differ depending on context, personality, politics and other 
 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at online meetings organised by ESRAN-UKI (April 
2020), the Health Law Cluster of the School of Law of the University of Essex (April 2020), and the 
Northern UK Human Rights Academic Network (May 2020). I am indebted to Andrew Fagan, Carla 
Ferstman, Eliana Cusato, Emily Jones and Ozan Kamiloğlu for their detailed comments. 
2 William Davies,  ‘Society as a Broadband Network,’ (April 2020) 42(7) London Review of Books  11. 
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Article 29(1). 
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factors. For some, it might be humanity as a whole, irrespective of borders. For many, the 
community will have some national dimension they identify with. Possibly for everyone, the 
community will at least partly be local, close to home, ‘where universal human rights begin’, 
said Eleanor Roosevelt.4 
 
Hannah Arendt observed that a political community is a precondition to make rights 
concrete, real and meaningful.5 Civic responsibility derives from our membership to that 
political community as well. Responsibility complements rights and both notions reinforce 
each other in society. Responsibility does not need to be at odds with international human 
rights law. As shown by Berdión del Valle and Sikkink, even though UN and European 
human rights systems evolved in a different direction, 19th century Latin American 
constitutionalism and 20th century Inter-American and African regional human rights 
systems reflected the idea that individuals are members of communities and have both 
rights and responsibilities.6 
 
The 1998 UN Declaration on Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals loosely talks about 
an individual responsibility to safeguard and promote democracy, human rights and a 
social and international order where human rights can be materialised.7 The wording of 
the UN declaration echoes the way many human rights defenders take injustice personally. 
Their commitment is commendable, particularly when they work in very difficult 
circumstances putting their lives at risk. But my idea of responsibility is slightly different. I 
am not saying we should all become human rights activists, as desirable as that would be. 
I am arguing that we should become citizens (members of a political community 
irrespective of nationality, migration status or any other personal circumstances) and 
accept and embrace the rights and responsibilities that come with it. 
 
This broad idea of citizenship is helpful to make sense of the difference between a legal 
duty and the civic duty presented here. As individuals, we are legally entitled to certain 
rights and obliged to respect the rule of law, also when the law limits our rights because it 
is necessary and proportionate to do so. We are not legally obliged to be virtuous citizens, 
neither should we be in exchange for human rights. The risks of a totalitarian turn if this 
requirement existed would be unendurable.8 However, above and beyond the realm of 
individual legal responsibility and duties, there is room to make for civic duty, interpreted 
as a meaningful contribution so other members of the political community can see their 
rights fulfilled. 
 
Reason and freedom from the yoke of religion and tradition were significant advances in 
history, but modernity’s liberal orthodoxy is not enough to ensure human rights for 
 
4 Eleanor Roosevelt,  ‘Where do Human Rights Begin?’, in Allida M. Black (ed), Courage in a Dangerous 
World(NY: Columbia University Press, 1999), 190. 
5 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland and NY: World Publishing Company, 2nd 
Edition, 1958), 290-302. 
6 Fernando Berdión del Valle and Kathryn Sikkink,  ‘(Re)discovering Duties: Individual Responsibility in the 
Age of Rights’, (2017) 26(1) Minnesota Journal of International Law. 
7 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and 
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 53/144 of 9 December 1998, Article 18. 
8 Isaiah Berlin,  ‘Two concepts of liberty’, in Four Essays On Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969), 118-172. 
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everyone: We need the State.9 One of the civic duties must be to sustain and defend 
resourceful and universal public services that prioritise the attention of most vulnerable 
individuals in a more equal and caring society. Our personal and economic fortune 
depends on others. This proposition is anchored in the tradition of civic republicanism. It 
can be found in Rousseau: ‘No citizen be so very rich that he can buy another, and none 
so poor that he is compelled to sell himself’.10 Within this tradition, Thomas Paine pointed 
out,  
 
personal property is the effect of society; and it is as impossible for an individual to acquire personal 
property without the aid of society, as it is for him to make land originally… All accumulation, 
therefore, of personal property, beyond what a man’s own hands produce, is derived to him by living 
in society; and he owes on every principle of justice, of gratitude, and of civilization, a part of that 
accumulation back to society from whence the whole came.11 
 
Civic republicanism is looking for a non-individualistic version of rights, in line with T. H. 
Marshall’s notion of “social citizenship”.12 Marshall understood social rights as essential 
ingredients of citizenship and advocated an egalitarian form of welfare that required 
reciprocal responsibilities between members of society in a precise historical and cultural 
context.13  
 
As a matter of responsibility and social citizenship, I think those of us who believe in human 
rights can do more to advance meaningfully towards a society where justice is distributed 
in such way that there is real freedom for all. And with the adjective real I mean a 
democratic commitment to non-domination, beyond negative liberty,14 and I mean in 
particular the material conditions to be free, for which socio-economic rights are essential. 
When the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was 
drafted in the 1960s, the promotion of “general welfare in a democratic society” was 
presented as a potential “limitation” to these rights.15 I would argue, however, that 
embracing both rights and responsibilities would not see “general welfare”, as such, as a 
limitation of rights, but rather as one of the goals of enhancing socio-economic rights in 
law and policy. This does not mean that there would no longer be conflicts between 
individual rights and collective interests. It would be foolish to believe that social citizenship 
would simply overcome a 200-year tension between individual liberalism and utilitarianism. 
But it can help us to identify a holistic response that takes rights and responsibilities as the 
two sides of a single coin, as opposed to rights versus responsibility, or individual interests 
versus collective needs. 
 
 
9 Samuel Moyn, ‘Reclaiming the language of duty in an age of human rights’, ABC Religion & Ethics 
(August 2019). 
10 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract: Or Principles of Political Right (Translated by G. D. H. 
Cole, Constitution Society, 1762), Book II.11.  
11 Thomas Paine,  ‘Agrarian Justice (1797)’, in J. Cunliffe and G. Erreygers (eds) The Origins of Universal 
Grants: An Anthology of Historical Writings on Basic Capital and Basic Income(London: Palgrave, 2004), 
13. 
12 T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in Citizenship and Social Class 
(London: Pluto Press, 1992), 1-52. 
13 Julia Moses,  ‘Social citizenship and social rights in an age of extremes: T. H. Marshall’s social 
philosophy in the longue durée’, (2019) 16(1) Modern Intellectual History 158. 
14 Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, Article 4. 
 14 
 
II. Protecting and Fulfilling Economic and Social Rights in Times of Public Health 
Emergency 
 
Both rights and responsibilities are necessary to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic 
effectively and fairly.16 The virus and the lockdown brought challenges to everybody’s daily 
lives, but many of us could and should accept the limitation of some of our rights as a 
matter of responsibility while the healthcare system was struggling to cope. The lockdown 
and many of the emergency measures that came with it were not simply limitations of our 
rights. They were also essential steps to protect and fulfil human rights. 
 
We are all vulnerable to Covid-19, but not equally so. While this pandemic has happened 
to all of us at the same time, it has not affected all of us the same way. Older persons and 
those with pre-existing health conditions and compromised immune systems are at greater 
risk. At the same time, the disease has a disproportionate socio-economic impact on low-
income families, children in poverty, rough sleepers, refugees and asylum seekers, among 
others. Evidence from the UK shows that historically embedded regional, social class and 
ethnic inequalities are strong indicators of vulnerability to this disease.17 
 
This crisis begs for a bailout for the most vulnerable, a sort of people’s quantitative easing. 
Developed during the global economic crisis beginning in 2008, the human rights principle 
of non-retrogression establishes that, in times of economic and financial crisis, assuming 
the adoption of regressive measures becomes unavoidable, States must ‘ensure that the 
rights of the disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups are not 
disproportionately affected’.18 Taking the principle of non-retrogression as a starting point, 
I believe we need to move from the mere formulation of (negative) limits of what 
governments are allowed to do to the identification of (positive) requirements to prioritise 
the preservation of rights of the most vulnerable.  
 
When people are required to stay away from each other, geographically and socially 
isolated, some individuals struggle more than others. Together with transport for 
essentials, healthcare and social services, public broadcasters have proved indispensable. 
Equally, social media and the online world are vital to keep people connected. Narrowing 
the digital gap becomes an even more urgent priority when we have no alternative but to 
communicate through webcam. Universal broadband and the right to internet access are 
now more important than ever.19 
 
In those countries with sufficiently advanced economies, public authorities should ensure, 
among other things, an adequate income for those who lose their jobs, which may include 
an emergency basic income, and guaranteeing that people will return to work if they are 
temporarily laid off. Conditionality in social benefit payments must be lifted and delays 
shortened drastically. In this regard, in their Covid-19 statement, the UN Committee on 
 
16 Sections II and III are partly based on Koldo Casla, ‘Coronavirus: beyond human rights’, Open 
Democracy, 19 March 2020, and ‘New policies for a new crisis’, Open Global Rights, 14 April 2020. 
17 Rowland Atkinson,  ‘UK coexists with coronavirus’, (June 2020) 2006 Le Monde Diplomatique – English 
Edition, 16. See papers by Caroline Bald and Sharon Walker, and by Andrew Fagan, in this publication. 
18 Chairperson of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ’Letter to States parties to 
ICESCR,’ 16 May 2012. 
19 Lorna McGregor and Ahmed Shaheed, ‘The Covid-19 pandemic: Five urgent principles for leaving no 
one behind through technology’, Universal Rights Group blog, 19 May 2020. 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) recommended ‘subsidizing the costs of 
essential foodstuffs and hygiene products to ensure that they are affordable to the poor’.20 
 
Gas and electricity supply ought to be secured unconditionally to safeguard the minimum 
core of an adequate standard of living. In line with States’ general obligations in the context 
of business activities, providers of public services, regardless of their public or private 
nature, must be required to guarantee universal coverage, quality control and continuity of 
the service.21  
The roles and responsibilities of private actors are, I believe, one of the central issues that 
should be considered as part of a discussion on positive obligations to protect and fulfil 
economic and social rights in times of global public health emergency. No country has 
enough public resources to face a crisis of the scale of Covid-19. As an indicator, the 
weight of public expenditure within the OECD ranges from 25.2% of the GDP in Chile to 
56.8% in France.22 In accordance with international human rights law, governments are 
required to make use of the “maximum of available resources” to satisfy economic, social 
and cultural rights.23 Responding to a crisis of this magnitude requires the use of privately 
owned resources and facilities. It is sometimes not only legitimate but necessary to 
interfere with private property. In his ‘urgent appeal for a human rights response to the 
economic recession’ that is following Covid-19, the UN Independent Expert on Foreign 
Debt and Human Rights rightly observed that ‘property rights are not absolute and, if duly 
justified, States should be able to take the necessary economic and legal measures to 
more effectively face the current health crisis’.24 
Private hospitals should serve the general interest in a public health emergency. As 
expressed by the UN CESCR in their Covid-19 statement, both public and private health 
resources should be ‘mobilised and shared among the whole population to ensure a 
comprehensive, coordinated healthcare response to the crisis’.25 Private providers would 
be entitled to a just compensation from the State, but measures should be taken to prevent 
profiteering from the crisis. The avoidance of net losses and furloughs would be a 
benchmark of appropriateness. 
 
Private labs and tools should also serve the collective goal of finding a cure and relief to 
the disease. For example, without medical reason, when there is a shortage, it is hard to 
understand how anyone could be tested privately before any rough sleeper, healthcare 
professional, home-delivery rider, supermarket cashier, porter, bus driver, person over 70, 
professional cleaner, scientist or political leader dealing with the pandemic and showing 
the symptoms.  
 
 
20 UN CESCR, ’Statement on the Covid-19 pandemic and economic, social and cultural rights’, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2020/1, 17 April 2020 , para. 17. 
21 UN CESCR, ’General Comment No. 24: State obligations under ICESCR in the context of business 
activities,’ UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/24, 10 August 2017, para. 21. 
22 OECD Dataset on general government spending: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-
spending.htm (data from 2015). 
23 ICESCR, Article 2(1). 
24 UN Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations 
of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Juan 
Pablo Bohoslavsky, ’Covid-19: Urgent appeal for a human rights response to the economic recession,’ 15 
April 2020, 10. 
25 UN CESCR, ‘Statement on Covid-19,’ (n. 20) para. 13. 
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Privately owned resources can serve a very necessary purpose to protect particularly 
vulnerable individuals. Empty hotels can be mobilised to host rough sleepers and 
healthcare personnel, as necessary. And both hotels and unused buildings can be 
converted into safe spaces for victims of domestic violence. 
 
Considering the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, evictions should be suspended, 
and rent and mortgage payment deferment options introduced, with extra requirements for 
corporate landlords. This recommendation is consistent with some of the most progressive 
interpretations of international human rights principles. In relation to non-emergency 
situations, the CESCR has declared that the assessment of proportionality of an eviction 
in the private sector requires ‘making a distinction between properties belonging to 
individuals who need them as a home or to provide vital income and properties belonging 
to financial institutions’,26 and presumably other corporate landlords as well. 
 
Many countries have taken unprecedented measures to support households, preserve 
employment and help businesses.27 As early as March 2020, governments pledged a 
collective investment of no less than $4.5 trillion,28 equivalent to the whole of Japan’s 
economy, or the combined GDPs of France and Italy. On top of that, in March the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development called for a $2.5 trillion package for the Global 
South.29 Since the early 1980s, governments in advanced economies have increasingly 
relied on public debt at the expense of taxation, lowering the pressure on the wealthiest 
strata while diminishing the size of the welfare state.30 With historically low interest rates, 
governments are undoubtedly going to get into debt to pay for emergency and palliative 
measures during this crisis and in its aftermath. This approach has a number of risks, not 
only for finance but also for democracy and human rights. Governments are accountable 
to those they rely on for revenue. That’s why it is essential for a healthy democracy that 
people sustain their government through a fair tax system. The payment of the bill should 
not be deferred in its entirety to future generations. Progressive taxes will be needed to 
make sure that the wealthy pay their fair share and that income and wealth inequalities do 
not rise even further as a result of the pandemic. 
 
III. Concluding Remarks 
 
Life is changing quickly, and it is incumbent upon us to find the place of human rights in 
this exceptional era. 
 
It is important to be epistemically humble. Human rights researchers and activists may 
have some ideas, but we don’t have all the answers, possibly we don’t even have the 
answers to the most important questions. Human rights policy analysis was not invented 
for policies that change radically in a matter of days or even hours. 
 
 
26 UN CESCR, López-Albán v. Spain, UN Doc. E/C.12/66.D/37/2018, 11 October 2019, para. 11.5. 
27 OECD, ‘Tax and Fiscal Policy in Response to the Coronavirus Crisis: Strengthening Confidence and 
Resilience,’ 15 April 2020. 
28 Jonathan Guthrie, ‘Get ready for the $4.5tn takeover’, Financial Times, 25 March 2020. 
29 UNCTAD,  ‘The Covid-19 Shock to Developing Countries: Towards a “whatever it takes” programme for 
the two-thirds of the world’s population being left behind,’ UNCTAD/GDS/INF/2020/2, March 2020. 
30 Wolfgang Streeck,  ‘How Will Capitalism End?’, (2014) 84 New Left Review 35. 
 17 
 
As well as humble, we should be self-critical. Most of us outside China only started to take 
this threat seriously in March. Let’s remember that when we assess what governments 
should be doing or should have done to anticipate the pandemic. 
 
With epistemic humility and a self-critical spirit, in this chapter I have argued that society 
and the human rights community need both rights and responsibilities to tackle this and 
future public health emergencies with effectiveness and fairness. The Covid-19 pandemic 
and its aftermath must be a time to focus our attention on the rights of people in poverty 
and at greater risk of harm, disadvantage and discrimination. The human rights principle 
of non-retrogression sets limits to what States are allowed to do when they intend to 
implement measures that could result in lesser enjoyment of socio-economic rights. Taking 
this principle as a starting point, I have argued in favour of moving from the mere 
formulation of (negative) limits of what governments are allowed to do towards the 
identification of (positive) requirements of what they should do to protect and fulfil 
economic and social rights of most vulnerable individuals in public health emergencies. 
Since private property is not an absolute right, protecting and fulfilling economic and social 
rights in a health crisis must include, when necessary, making use of privately owned 
resources and facilities to respond with a collective and synchronised effort of society as 
a whole.  
 
We cannot return to business as usual when we go back to normal, whatever normal 
means after this epoch-defining experience. There will be other crises and more equal 
societies will be better equipped to weather them. This pandemic is also a wake-up call for 
us in the international human rights community. What can we do with our policy and 
advocacy tools to contribute to the reversal of 40 years of regressive taxation, privatisation 
of public services and diminishing protection of workers’ rights? 
 
Let future us remember the coronavirus pandemic as the time when we hunkered down, 
rediscovered kindness and responsibility, preserved what we valued the most, and 
became bolder about what needed to change. 
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Rethinking Minimum Guarantees after the Pandemic: The Invisible 
Violence of Neoliberal Rationality 
Ozan Kamiloğlu, Lecturer, School of Law and Human Rights Centre [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_004]  
 
Abstract 
This essay suggests that the pandemic brings unprecedented economic and social 
challenges while simultaneously opening the door for the renegotiation of minimum 
guarantees that human rights discourses conceptualise. The particular conditions of the 
pandemic have the potential to crystallise slow and structured forms of violence, and widen 
our imagination of the possibilities for human rights discourses. This is especially the case 
because neoliberal rationality doesn’t have the hegemony over social movements and 
human rights imagination,  as it may have done in the 90s.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
During the pandemic, states have effectively closed their borders and declared various 
kinds of emergency measures and derogations from treaties. They have put in place 
lockdowns and other exceptional measures impacting upon the rights to life, liberty and 
security, health, education, food, shelter and work as well as freedoms of movement and 
association. The world is experiencing one of the harshest economic crises to date, leading 
to spikes in unemployment rates and global poverty. Simultaneously, the pandemic has 
signalled a time of “returning to the state” with emergency powers given to governments. 
In many countries, governments have responded with power which human rights 
frameworks have been incapable of tempering. In the UK, the Coronavirus Act 2020 in 
addition to changes to the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, has introduced 
provisions which will have a severe impact on vulnerable individuals.1  
 
What is striking is how utilitarianism and the technocracy of experts seem to have become 
the dominant policy making principle, which inevitably brings disproportionate 
consequences for those who are already vulnerable, including people with mental health 
challenges, women in gendered spaces, as well as poor and racially marginalised 
communities. Utilitarianism for the “common good” against individual rights, invites “herd 
management.” This kind of management might be necessary in some emergency 
situations, however, in such a complex global crisis of unknown duration, it is difficult to 
stop the momentum it creates, which reverberates far beyond the immediate challenges 
brought on by the pandemic. This pushes us away from simple crisis management, 
towards a situation in which we are being forced to negotiate new norms in the new normal 
of an emergency state together with what Andrew Ross calls ‘planetary management’.2 
Consequently, for human rights practitioners and activists there is an ongoing 
reconsideration and negotiation on “minimum guarantees” of social and individual 
protection and arguments over proportionality.  
 
This paper aims to return to debates over what is not visible to the “minimum guarantees” 
of liberal human rights discourses while focusing on historical construction of the terms 
 
1 Alex Ruck Keene, ‘Capacity in the Time of Coronavirus’, (2020) 70 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry. 
2 Andrew Ross, Strange Weather: Culture, Science and Technology in the Age of Limits (New York: Verso, 
1991), 207–212.  
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parallel to that of neoliberalism. I will argue that, the current crisis makes what used to be 
invisible, visible, and allows us to reconsider historical negotiation over what minimum 
guarantees human rights can provide. This debate has been traditionally between 
economic and social rights on one side and political rights on the other, however there are 
also other forms of violence and violations at play, that used to be invisible and which are 
now apparent. The historical debate over austerity and the global administration of debt is 
where my focus lies, in order to make the claim for the need for a wider debate about the 
purpose of human rights. 
 
II. The Minimal Utopia of Human Rights  
In order to develop a discourse that can claim to be globally valid and legally instrumental, 
agreeing on a certain set of minimal rights has always been necessary. On its way to 
becoming a part of the dominant language of global governance, actors keep negotiating 
over the limits of that minimum content and measure of rights. Samuel Moyn argues that, 
when it comes to social and economic rights, human rights oscillate between an 
understanding of rights that offer minimum guarantees for formal equality and substantive 
equality aiming at social welfare. Similarly, Goldman demonstrates that the 1970s marks 
the basic (human) needs approach with an egalitarian concept of economic, social and 
cultural rights, and during these years human rights ‘lent themselves as a comprehensive 
framework for contesting austerity in the name of redistributive equality.’3 In the following 
decade, the 1980s, after the debt crisis in the Global South, austerity measures demanded 
structural adjustments from states by the International Monetary Fund, and rarely have 
been contested with rights discourses. Towards the end of the 1990s, the ‘IFIs 
[International Finance Institutions] avoided the issue of human rights, but reacted by 
adding “social” components to austerity that aligned with their focus on efficiency and 
growth and further entrenched sufficiency.’4 Finally following the crisis of 2008, some 
progress has been made in regards to mitigating the effects of austerity with human rights 
standards.  
These oscillations regarding the relationship between social and economic rights and the 
minimum standards of human rights discourses, brings us back to much wider political 
questions. As Wendy Brown referring to human rights, reminds us, ‘all such projects are 
situated in political, historical, social, and economic contexts with which they dynamically 
engage.’5 The genealogy of human rights discourses discloses this situatedness of 
minimal rights, which has, depending on the wider context, validity and leverage over 
financial institutions. Nonetheless, this is not only a question of “what kind of rights” but 
also how do we quantify and monitor the violations and suffering caused by state actions. 
Methodologically, human rights measurement requires some kind of quantification, and 
during these debates economic and social rights are considered indeterminate.6 Moreover, 
other forms of violence are entirely invisible to current methods applied by states and 
human rights organisations. Thus, the genealogy of what are the minimum guarantees the 
 
3 Matthias Goldmann, ‘Contesting Austerity: Genealogies of Human Rights Discourse’, (2020) Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law Research Paper Series No. 2020-09. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Wendy Brown, ‘The Most We Can Hope For...’: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism', Wronging 
Rights? (Routledge 2012), 452. 
6 Rosga and Satterthwaite highlight that ‘ESC [economic, social and cultural] rights have been perceived to 
be more indeterminate than civil and political rights.’ See, AnnJanette Rosga and Margaret L. 
Satterthwaite, 'The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights', (2009) 27 Berkeley J Int'l Law 253. 
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human rights paradigm can offer at a particular conjunction is also that of, whose voice is 
heard, whose death is “grievable” or who is visible from the point of view of “planetary 
management”. A telling example is John Rawls’ liberal concept of human rights that he 
defines as ‘a special class of urgent rights’ while trying to theorise the limits of liberal 
pluralism, however there is no explanation as to why freedom from torture is a part of the 
minimum standards of liberal societies, but in contrast, a minimum basic income is not.7 
Talal Asad, highlights that ‘financial pressures can have effects that are more far-reaching 
than many military adventures’ which are rarely on the radar of human rights organisations, 
and usually not the subject of obligations set out in any international treaty.8  
If there is one lesson to be taken from the state response to the pandemic, it is how it 
exposes a system of structural violence over citizens, emphasising the structural 
hierarchies of race, class and gender in both spatial and temporal registers. 
Simultaneously, the pandemic also exposes the limits of human rights discourses that were 
developed predominantly to tackle immediate and personal forms of violence, while 
historically not able or less able to articulate on or respond to other forms of violence such 
as “slow violence”. Rob Nixon, referring particularly to environmental crisis, defines “slow 
violence” as ‘a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed 
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically 
not viewed as violence at all.’ It is different from violence ‘as an event or action that is 
immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant 
sensational visibility’, but instead ‘incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions 
playing out across a range of temporal scales.’9 It is not spectacular, often invisible, ‘not 
just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier’. Violence that is 
invisible to language of “victory and defeat” and “victims and saviours” and degrades the 
lives of those who have no voice, the dispossessed classes and races, while unfolding 
over years.  
 
As the pandemic continues it loses its event value, and simultaneously, how to organise 
daily life and economy during the pandemic becomes the territory of struggle. This exposes 
how structural violence couples with slow violence such as prisons with insufficient health 
and architectural capacities; refugees who are trapped at the external borders of the EU, 
subjected to deliberately insufficient public health conditions; the urban poor living in 
insufficient and crowed dwellings that costs them their health and even their lives; the 
workers of the gig economy and other precarious work contracts who cannot refuse to 
work even if they fall within the identified risk groups; women facing different forms of 
domestic violence systemically over years; air pollution that deteriorates human life 
gradually, and so on. The minimum guarantees offered by the current human rights 
framework are able to respond some of these challenges, however when coupled with and 
viewed from the intersecting lenses of class, race and gender, some of these forms of 
violence are perhaps, maybe for the first time, strikingly visible.  
 
My claim is that the “ethicisation” of the violence during the 1980s and 90s shaped and 
severely limited the forms of violence that human rights instruments are able to address 
under neoliberal governmentality, and consequently, which forms of violence are out of 
 
7 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (Harvard University Press 
2001). 
8 Talal Asad, 'What do Human Rights Do? An Anthropological Enquiry' (2000) 4 Theory & Event. See also, 
Jessica Whyte, 'Human rights and the Collateral Damage of Neoliberalism' (2017) 20 Theory & Event 137. 
9 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Harvard University Press 2011). 
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reach. The Covid-19 crisis demonstrates the limits and potential of rights discourses to 
protect vulnerable people when the underlying structures of violence behind the neoliberal 
governmentality are exposed so clearly. I will briefly set out a short history of neoliberal 
governance and austerity programmes, to be able to make the argument that during the 
pandemic era, human rights movements and their scope are extremely important.  
 
III. Human Rights and the Empire 
 
The transformations in the structures of capitalist accumulation that began in the 1970s 
after the infamous “Washington Consensus” had different names. Fredrick Jameson calls 
it “multinational capitalism”, whereas others termed it “late capitalism”, and in the 
contemporary literature it is described as neoliberalism.10 One of the most well-developed 
theses in critical human rights studies is to show how current human rights discourses not 
only lack the tools to resist capitalism and its various permutations but instead, manage to 
contribute and reinforce capitalism.11 Most of such accounts focus on how human rights 
serves to “civilise” the projects of Western states in order to permit them to pursue their 
economic interests and global domination. Many claim that human rights discourses are 
instruments of Western capitalism to justify its structures of exploitation and intervention.12 
Mutua, for example, describes human rights as ‘the moral guardians of global capitalism’ 
which is indebted to certain forms of market democracy.13 Others, like Samuel Moyn, 
suggest that human rights and neoliberalism have shared a ‘kindred trajectory’ and reject 
the claim that human rights have played a causal role in ‘abetting the free market victory 
of the neoliberal age.’ In Moyn’s view, human rights are actually a ‘powerless companion’ 
that has proved inadequate to the task of ‘civilising’ neoliberalism; they are ‘an empty 
vessel’.14 The link between the economic model being followed and the discourse of 
human rights is ‘chronological simultaneity, negative conditions, and vague descriptive 
affinity.’15 A third line of thought finds a gradual “marketisation” in the human rights field 
that appropriates methods and structures of the market in classical liberalism and neo-
liberalism. Thus, the logic of the market changes the human rights discourses accordingly 
and the way human rights activism is being developed. According to Baxi, this is the 
conversion of the human rights movements into human rights ‘markets’ and according to 
Joseph Slaughter, ‘human rights of individuals arguably are, in their essence and effects 
 
10 For a detailed discussion see, Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, World-systems Analysis: An Introduction 
(Duke University Press 2004). 
11 For some of these critical works, see, Pheng Cheah, Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and 
Human Rights (Harvard University Press 2006); Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism; Upendra Baxi, Human rights in a Posthuman World: Critical Essays 
(Oxford University Press 2009); Mark Goodale, Human Rights at the Crossroads (Oxford University Press 
2012); Jose-Manuel Barreto, Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and 
International law (Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2013); Makau Mutua, Human rights: A Political and 
Cultural Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press 2008). 
12 See, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press 2006); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, 'Human Rights in a 
Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises' (2005) 110 American Journal of Sociology 1373; 
Zachary Manfredi, 'Recent Histories and Uncertain Futures: Contemporary Critiques of International 
Human Rights and Humanitarianism' (2013) 22 Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 3. 
13 For a detailed account of these critical approaches see: Ben Golder, 'Beyond redemption? 
Problematising the Critique of Human Rights in Contemporary International Legal Thought' (2014) 2 
London Review of International Law 77. 
14 Samuel Moyn, 'A Powerless Companion: Human Rights in the Age of Neoliberalism' (2014) 77 Law & 
Contemp Probs 147; Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Belknap 2010), 51. 
15 Samuel Moyn, A Powerless Companion: Human Rights in the Age of Neoliberalism, (2015) 77 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 147-169. 
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(for better and worse), neoliberalized human rights.’16 Similarly, for Orford, human rights 
law replicates the World Trade Organization and its process of dispute resolution, through 
which collective rights and interests are being subordinated to the logic of the market, 
which itself structures the ‘responsible subject of capitalist economics.’17 
 
At this point it is important to turn back to some old questions. In Ben Golder’s words, 
perhaps the correct question to ask is ‘[w]hy is it that the supposed openness of human 
rights discourse […] can so comfortably subsist with a very predictable and quite rigid 
outcome: the prioritised protection of a familiar set of rights functional to the operation of 
market exchange?’18 As I have tried to show, the ‘familiar set of rights’ reflects wider 
transformations of the society and at the end of the day the market and human rights 
discourses operate together, and the conditions and structure of this ‘work together’ 
reflects wider transformations of the society. What these minimum rights, their scope, 
definition and measurement, reveal is the politics of rights struggles. Consequently, the 
relationship between human rights discourses and neoliberal rationality can only be 
conceptualised by looking at particular periods of history in a wider picture of events, with 
methods that go beyond any causal relationship.  
 
To define what neoliberalism is, I follow Wendy Brown, who talks about a ‘neoliberal 
reason’ that is ‘ubiquitous today in statecraft and the workplace, in jurisprudence, 
education, culture, and a vast range of quotidian activity is converting the distinctly political 
character, meaning, and operation of democracy’s constituent elements into economic 
ones.’19 This follows arguments of an early neoliberal and law professor, Franz Böhm, who 
stresses that ‘[w]e wish to bring scientific reasoning, as displayed in jurisprudence and 
political economy, into effect for the purpose of constructing and reorganizing the economic 
system.’20 I will later claim that from the period starting with the crises of 2008, the 
pandemic marks the collapse of various tenets of neoliberal reasoning, and opens space 
for progress in the protection of economic and social rights and also other less visible forms 
of perpetual violence. Here I will briefly address the period during which economic and 
social rights struggles have lost ground following the 70s. This will allow me to further 
expound on the disappearance of various form of protections from the purview of human 
rights discourses, and the potential for their re-emergence. 
 
IV. Human Rights at the End of the Bipolar World 
 
The second half of 1989 represented an earthquake or shattering for world politics. The 
Cold War represented a constitutive divide of the world between two forms of 
governmentality. The discourse in the USA during the Cold War focused on imagining the 
Soviets as an aggressive, expansionist enemy. With Reagan and the neoliberalisation of 
the economy following the ‘crisis of capital accumulation’ during the 1970s, the belief that 
 
16 Joseph Slaughter, 'Hijacking Human Rights: Neoliberalism, the New Historiography, and the End of the 
Third World' (2018) 40 Human Rights Quarterly 735. 
17 Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2003) 210. 
18 Ben Golder, 'Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique of Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Legal Thought' (2014) 2 London Review of International Law 77. 
19 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution, (MIT Press 2015) 17. 
20 Franz Böhm, Walter Eucken and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, The Ordo Manifesto of 1936, Germany’s Social 
Market Economy: Origins and Evolution (Springer 1989). 
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marketisation and democracy are ‘one and the same’ become dominant.21 Following the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the USA military complex had to quickly rearrange its enemies, 
and construct new national threats and evils to protect its society from. Meanwhile, the 
dogmas of neo-liberal economy and marketisation became further entrenched. While 
neoliberal rationality was taking over, the discourse of American governance turned to the 
protection of humanity as a whole against the evil that is this time unexpected, catastrophic 
and shocking.22 This change from the ideological warfare of the bipolar world to the 
monopolar construction of the bio-political – and later surveillance regime,23 had the effect 
of instrumentalising the discourse of human rights for the purposes of humanitarian 
intervention.24 Here again, human rights instruments have been prodded to develop 
around a language and practice of the war against evil, with its ever innocent victims, 
unforgivable perpetrators, and bystanders.25  
 
The years during which the utopias of the 60s and 70s are lost and human rights struggles 
takes a particular ethical form, are also the years when economic and social rights 
struggles lost most of their ground. Following bold claims for a New International Economic 
Order during the 70s, the year 1985 marks the start of the large debt programmes of the 
IMF and the adoption of the Baker Plan ‘the creed that debtor states should outgrow their 
debt crises in a grit-your-teeth-and-get-to-it mode.’26 Following Wendy Brown, “neoliberal 
rationality” corresponds to the entanglement of loss of the political into a particular ethics 
with the global administration of economy. 
 
Chantal Mouffe once observed that:  
 
What we are witnessing with the current infatuation with humanitarian crusades and ethically correct 
good causes is the triumph of a sort of moralizing liberalism’ and this is because ethics and morality 
are ‘filling the void left by the collapse of any project of real political transformation.27  
 
Likewise Judith Butler refers to a return to ethics during the 1990s and worries that this 
return ‘constituted an escape from politics’, and ‘it has meant a certain heightening of 
moralism.’28 Alain Badiou, describes this turn as an ‘ethical ideology’, the endemic 
tendency of the Western world to conceive humanity as powerless and in need of 
protection from evil.29 In Jacques Rancière’s words, it is judgment that is humbled by the 
law, and it is law that leaves no place for any alternative consideration of justice.  
 
The “us against them” rhetoric inherited from the Cold War era, posits a homogenised 
community that needs to be protected, along with an incontestable meaning of justice in 
the post-Soviet era.30 Consequently, there needs to be evils, to “fight against”, and each 
 
21 Andre Gunder Frank. ‘No End to History! History to No End?’; ‘No End to History! History to No End?’ 
(1990) Social Justice 17, no. 4 (42) 7. 
22 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (London: Penguin, 2008). 
23 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press 2000). 
24 Nico Krisch, ‘Legality, Morality and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Interventions After Kosovo’, (2002) 
13(1) European Journal of International Law 323–35. 
25 Rober Meister, After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights (Columbia University Press 2010). 
26 Matthias Goldmann, ‘Contesting Austerity: Genealogies Of Human Rights Discourse’, (2020) Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law Research Paper Series No. 2020-09. 
27 Chantal Mouffe, “Which Ethics for Democracy?”, The Turn to Ethics (Routledge 2013) 85. 
28 Judith Butler, ‘Ethical Ambivalence’, in Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, and Rebecca L Walkovitz (eds), 
The Turn to Ethics (Routledge 2001) 15-28. 
29 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (Verso 2002) 13. 
30 Jacques Rancière, 'The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics' (2006) 7 Critical Horizons 1. 
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fight becomes a means to advance and reproduce the neoliberal agenda in different ways 
and in different forms. This includes, privatisation of public resources and public health and 
reductions in social protections, deregulation of finance and “flexibilisation” of labour, in 
addition to the expansion of the neoliberal model to previously uncharted territories from 
Eastern Europe to the Amazon. Neoliberal governmentality produces subjectivities in 
complex ways that include “ethicisation” of interventions, wars, extraction and 
accumulation. In the notorious words of Margaret Thatcher to defend neoliberal economic 
policies, ‘There is no alternative’31 when the threat is constructed as targeting the society 
as a whole, and policies as inevitable utilitarian answers to that evil.  
 
Those years presents us with probably the most stark example of how neoliberal rationality 
and its technocratic solutionism was uncontested by human rights discourses. Following 
the financial crisis of 2008 and following the cruel effects of austerity programmes, 
neoliberal rationality is not unchallenged anymore and together with social movements 
also human rights movements are energised. Nevertheless, international financial 
institutions presents us with another story, as has been seen with the grave human 
suffering caused by austerity measures put in place by the troika and IMF in Greece.32 The 
IMF and its adjustment programmes are still indifferent to the suffering they impose, and 
human rights instruments have not been successful in their challenges. The IMF’s own 
report on Greece concluded that ‘the burden of adjustment was not shared evenly across 
society.’33 In the case of Koufaki and Adedy v. Greece, the European Court of Human 
Rights left a very large margin of appreciation to the government regarding austerity 
induced wage cuts, although it was not the government but external actors imposing the 
austerity.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
During the first months of the pandemic, borders and states regained their hegemony over 
the imagination of societies that look for protection, as something all of a sudden 
remembered or imagined from the past. Again ironically, the neoliberal state didn’t hesitate 
to nationalise key industries, and redistribute the wealth in different ways such as through 
furlough schemes to save the economy. Nevertheless, the millions of new unemployed 
throughout the world are on the way to reaching record highs. Ruling elites don’t seem to 
be able to produce consent to lead the vulnerable to their deaths to save the economy, 
although not without trying. The negotiation to find the highest degree of ‘affordable harm’ 
continues as the burden of the crisis falls on the care workers and various other working 
classes and minorities. The imagination of the neoliberal state seems to be limited with 
finding ways to turn back to the pre-pandemic market economy, while society at large is 
faced with both the unequal consequences of the current capitalist arrangement and the 
need for a change in what has been presented for a long time as the only way, primacy of 
economy over the social. 
 
Recently announced, the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) of the 
European Central Bank (ECB), seems to be aimed at a similar problem of who will take on 
 
31 Speech at Conservative Women's Conference, 21 May 1980. 
32 Margot E. Salomon, ‘Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions’, (2015) European Law 
Journal, 21: 521-545. 
33 Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand‐By Arrangement , IMF Country 
Report No. 13/156, May 2013, para 47.  
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the burden of the crisis at the European level.34 Exceptionally, PEPP allows for the 
purchase of Member States’ debts without any limit (the usual 33% limit does not apply). 
This means that soon countries in the North of Europe, particularly Germany, will be 
sending funds to the South through debt purchases. PEPP aims to protect the European 
Monetary Union that is under stress from the crisis. It seems that a European level 
redistribution and homogenisation of the economy can only result with the implementation 
of fiscal union.  
 
This is not a Chinese or European pandemic however, but a global one, and it is not only 
Southern Europe but the Global South that lacks instruments to buffer the effects of the 
crisis and also lacks policy autonomy. Thus, the crisis demands the redistribution of wealth 
globally. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Secretary-General Angel Gurría recommended a ‘global effort akin to the last century’s 
Marshall Plan and New Deal – combined’ aimed at those who were already in physical, 
economic and social precarity.35 However, as it is even in doubt whether the public and 
institutions of Northern Europe will be convinced to share the burden of the crisis with 
Southern European countries, how can we expect a redistribution plan to support 
developing countries and the Global South, in general? A recent decision of the German 
Constitutional Court upheld complaints against the Public Sector Purchase Programme 
(PSPP), and found the European Central Bank programme ultra vires.36 Consequently, 
decision puts PEPP at risk.37 It is not difficult to foresee, during the global economic crisis 
a new wave of IMF programmes will hit the Global South, to “save their economies”. 
However, the ethical turn or loss of the political of the 80s and 90s isn’t the valid currency 
of exchange anymore. Austerity regimes imposed by neoliberal states and international 
financial institutions but without its depoliticising discourses, allows human rights 
discourses to renegotiate the minimum guarantees with the hegemonic powers. In addition 
to the crisis in public health, the World Trade Organization38 reports that developing 
countries face distinct and unprecedented challenges and the International Labour 
Organization,39 anticipates devastating job contraction following the pandemic. This will 
inevitably lead to social movements of various sorts, unbound by an ethical construction 
of neoliberalism. This unprecedented crisis will therefore bring onto the table both 
economic and social rights and also other previously invisible forms of violence. We must 
seize the opportunities that this confluence of factors presents. 
 
  
 
34 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020D0440&from=EN 
35 https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-secretary-general-coronavirus-war-demands-joint-action.htm 
36 See, paper by Tom Flynn in this publication. 
37 Theodore Konstadinides, ‘The German Constitutional Court’s decision on PSPP: Between Mental 
Gymnastics and Common Sense’, UK Const L Blog, 14 May 2020, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/.  
38 WTO, ‘Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy’, 8 April 2020, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm. 
39 ILO, ‘ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work’, 2nd ed., 7 April 2020. 
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Global, Regional and Comparative Perspectives: A Discussion 
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Lecturer, School of Law; Onyeka Osuji, Reader, School of Law; Clara Sandoval Villalba, Professor, School 
of Law and Human Rights Centre [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_005] 
 
 
The pandemic raises a variety of governance issues which can be considered from global, 
regional and comparative perspectives. Several of the authors in this section and some 
other colleagues had the opportunity to discuss these different perspectives. This space 
for dialogue provided an opportunity to reflect upon commonalities (and differences) 
between regional systems and the similar challenges faced by citizens when seeking to 
engage with their governments about the adequacy of responses to Covid-19.  
 
The pandemic brings to the fore the importance of global health governance, global 
solidarity and collaboration but these objectives have been largely thwarted by the wider 
trends of declining multilateralism, to which the global health sector has not been immune. 
The capacity for the WHO to respond effectively to the pandemic by, for example, 
promoting cross border efforts to tackle the spread of the virus and working to find a 
vaccine, have been made difficult by the organization’s dependence on State collaboration 
under the International Health Regulations and by its restricted budget. But in other 
respects, international organizations have shown a greater willingness to think outside of 
their usual toolboxes (they tend to focus on delineating state obligations). Whilst 
increasingly providing a space for a multilateralist response, they have also shown unusual 
creativity in identifying the variety of roles that actors additional to states can play to 
address health and related needs, and in recognising the importance of transboundary 
collaboration. 
 
Authoritarian and populist tendencies have fed off of the decreased interest in engagement 
with multilateral organizations. Many states have responded introspectively, some even 
nationalistically, to the virus, preferring to see Covid-19 as something which has come from 
outside, developing or fostering a narrative of “us versus them.” This focus on stopping the 
virus from coming in, as a foreign “invader,” is exemplified by the rush to close borders. 
The focus was in many ways a false narrative, given than the virus was already spreading 
within countries. All it managed to do was to deflect political attention away from what 
countries were doing (or failing to do) internally to prevent the spread of the disease and 
to afford essential health care.   
 
But the narrative is slightly more complex, than a simple picture of waning support for 
multilateral institutions. Some countries like China have stepped up their bilateral support 
to African states as well as to the WHO, and there are many examples around the world 
of ad hoc bilateral support (sending medical teams; hospital equipment and protective 
gear).  
 
The anti-multilateralist tendencies, as well as other unrelated, unresolved debates about 
the relationship between the European Union legal order and that of Member States, have 
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complicated and arguably weakened the capacity of the EU to adopt and implement 
successfully, European-wide pandemic responses, and at the same time to address the 
authoritarian tendencies of several Member States. This problem was less apparent in 
Africa, where the recent experiences with Ebola underscored for states the need to work 
collectively to address effectively global health challenges.  At the same time, weak internal 
governance, a culture of coloniality and dependence as well as the failings of the 
international economic system to help countries to emerge from poverty, have impeded 
the effectiveness of responses to Covid-19 in many African countries.    
 
The Inter-American human rights institutions have played an important role in framing 
states’ responses to Covid-19 in human rights terms, not only giving meaning to the right 
to health but also articulating states’ due diligence obligations to protect particularly 
vulnerable sectors of society. This is mirrored to an extent in Europe by both EU and 
Council of Europe human rights machinery, though less so, perhaps in Africa, where 
responses to Covid-19 have been framed (almost exclusively) by the African Union’s 
African Centre on Disease Control.  
 
Both Sandoval and Fujita explored another set of governance concerns, linked to the 
relationship of the state with its citizens, access to justice, truth and equality. Sandoval, 
focused on the special measures the Colombian Special Jurisdiction for Peace should put 
in place to enable conflict victims to participate in transitional justice proceedings in the 
context of Covid-19. Even before the pandemic, access to justice for conflict victims – 
some of the most marginalised in Colombian society – was a difficult prospect. While there 
are huge technical challenges to use virtual hearings during the pandemic, Sandoval note 
that technology also provides important opportunities for victims to participate if key 
measures, explored in the paper, are put in place.  
 
Fujita explored citizens’ challenges to access information in Japan, exacerbated by Covid-
19. Part of the challenge relates to the lack of independence of the media, which has been 
made worse by the emergency situation, coupled with the failings of the Japanese 
government to provide clear, accessible and transparent information. Not only does this 
lead to confusion, it also can contribute to deaths if individuals do not know when they 
should go to the hospital or how to get tested. Part of the worry is that the Government’s 
efforts to safeguard the possibility to host the Olympic Games in 2021 and to address the 
International Olympic Committee’s concerns, overtook its commitment to supply 
transparent public health information to Japanese citizens. The concerns about media 
independence foreshadow wider worries about the government’s tendency towards the 
securitisation of public health in its approach to states of emergency, a problem also made 
very apparent in Marique’s paper.   
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I. Introduction 
 
The rapid spread of, and devastation caused by, Covid-19 worldwide reflects not only its 
viral properties, but the dichotomy between a globalised world profoundly connected by 
trade and travel and the absence of global solidarity and coordination in the response to 
the pandemic. Challenging a rising disengagement from multilateral governance, the UN 
Secretary General, the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) have all called for global solidarity and 
international assistance and cooperation to be at the heart of the Covid-19 response.1 In 
this paper, we explore what this means for global health, giving particular attention to two 
core components of global health law that provide legally binding obligations regarding 
Covid-19: the commitments to global governance under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) and obligations of international assistance and cooperation towards the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Situating the 
global pandemic response in the context of the contemporaneous decline of 
multilateralism, our article takes a critical look at the international institutions and 
frameworks and their role during pandemic responses, and the imperative of a more 
cosmopolitan approach to global governance, embracing solidarity and international 
cooperation in a way that serves low-income countries and rights holders everywhere.  
 
II. The Rise and Fall of Multilateralism in Global Health 
 
Institutions of global health and human rights have brought the world together in 
unprecedented cooperation since the end of World War II. The rise of multilateralism in 
global health reflects the broader cosmopolitan worldview that gave birth to global 
governance in the aftermath of World War II, embedding global solidarity and cooperation 
within an increasingly interconnected world. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the 
spread of infectious disease began to unify states in shared vulnerability, with international 
cooperation recognised as necessary to prevent disease transmission through regulatory 
coordination, with early efforts to control specific infectious disease outbreaks evolving to 
become a standing international public health bureaucracy through WHO.2 The WHO 
Constitution (1946), proclaiming for the first time a human right to ‘the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health,’ encompassed the normative aspirations of WHO’s 
mandate for international health governance to realise the right to health, developing ‘the 
broadest and most liberal concept of international responsibility for health ever officially 
promulgated.’3 Despite increasing multilateral integration in the decades that followed, the 
 
1 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘Statement on the Coronavirus Disease 
(COVID-19) Pandemic and Economic, Social and Cultural rights’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2020/1, 9 April 2020; 
World Health Organisation, Addressing Human rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response, 21 April 2020, 
https://www.who.int/publications-detail/addressing-human-rights-as-key-to-the-COVID-19-response. 
2 David P. Fidler, International Law and Infectious Diseases (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
3 Charles E. Allen, ‘World Health and World Politics,’ (1950) 27(4) International Organization 27-43. 
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global vision for the WHO has been undermined by the rising reluctance of States to 
adequately support global health governance, a reluctance driven by the resurrection of 
nationalism.  
 
In a direct attack on the shared goals of a globalising world, nationalism has spurred 
isolationism and has sought to retrench nations inwards. Right-wing populists have directly 
challenged multilateral institutions, including those in the area of global health and human 
rights. Some nations have retrenched and withdrawn from multilateral partnerships and 
international organisations. For example, nationalist governments have withdrawn from 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in recent years,4 and the USA 
government, seeing health and human rights as oppositional to traditional nationalist 
values, has slashed funding to the United Nations Population Fund and other institutions 
of global governance.5 These right-wing nationalist governments have further attacked 
human rights, undermining the global work of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) whilst turning increasingly autocratic through attacks on minority 
populations, independent media outlets, and civil society organizations.6  Such counter-
cosmopolitan retrenchment is leading to a rejection in some quarters of global governance 
and human rights as a basis for global health, threatening progress that has been made, 
jeopardising the health and human rights of vulnerable populations worldwide and raising 
obstacles to future institutional progress.7 This new global order, detached from the 
science of public health and the obligations of human rights, is the context into which 
Covid-19 emerged. The response to the pandemic is illustrative of the nationalist tenor, 
undermining global health and human rights through a rejection of multilateralism. 
 
 III. The Emergence of Covid-19 into a Nationalist World 
 
The rapidity and scale of transmission of Covid-19 is testimony to the enduring nature of 
our shared global vulnerability in an increasingly interconnected and globalised world.  
However, many State responses have shunned transboundary cooperation.  While still in 
the early stages of this devastating pandemic, such actions not only exert negative 
repercussions on global public health and well-being; in impeding (and at times 
undermining) multilateralism, they also risk rebounding on nations by inhibiting coordinated 
strategies to address a virus that has no respect for national borders. For example, in 
responding to this emergency, States have adopted widespread unilateral travel 
restrictions in an attempt to interrupt transmission. Amounting to a violation of the IHR, the 
WHO has cautioned that they also have a perverse public health effect by diverting action 
away from health system and surveillance preparation. Undercutting the foundations of a 
human rights-based world, these nationalist actions have broader consequences on health 
and livelihoods worldwide by undercutting a collective response through compromising the 
global movement of essential medical supplies and personnel to fight the pandemic, as 
well as undermining humanitarian assistance more broadly  and causing economic 
disruptions.8 With an unmet burden of need for medical equipment, as well as protective 
 
4 Jina Moore, ‘Burundi Quits International Criminal Court,’ The New York Times, 27 October 2017.   
5 ‘U.S. withdraws funding for U.N. Population Fund,’ Reuters, 3 April 2017, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-un-populattionfund-idUSKBN17600T. 
6 Alison Brysk, The Future of Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019). 
7 Lawrence O. Gostin, Andrés Constantin, and Benjamin Mason Meier, ‘Global Health and Human Rights in 
the Age of Populism,’ in Lawrence O. Gostin and Benjamin Mason Meier (eds) Foundations of Global Health 
and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020) 439-458. 
8 Sharmilla Devi, ‘Travel Restrictions Hampering COVID-19 Response,’ (2020) 395 The Lancet  1331. 
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clothing for frontline staff, and with spiralling costs, countries have turned to an agenda of 
self-reliance and protectionist curbs on exports. Even as states recognize that the 
pandemic will not come to an end without an effective and universally-shared vaccine, 
some states have continued to take nationalist approaches to vaccine development and 
distribution.9 Such approaches create particular anxieties in terms of the equitable 
distribution of a future vaccine, leading to calls for a “People’s Vaccine” that would be 
available to all.10  
 
At the same time, multilateralism has been undermined by the failure of some States, 
particularly the most powerful, to engage with those institutions best-placed to mount a 
multilateral and coordinated response. The Government of China received widespread 
condemnation for suppressing information about Covid-19 in the weeks after its 
emergence, where Chinese efforts to conceal a disease outbreak from WHO (to limit 
domestic economic damage) harmed the ability of the world to prepare for a pandemic 
under the International Health Regulations.11 The US Government’s unprecedented and 
unjustified withdrawal of funding from the WHO,12 driven by domestic political 
considerations, is denying the organisation vital resources when they are most needed to 
coordinate a global response, as well as to maintain its other vital programmes across the 
world. This US action has emboldened other countries to neglect global solidarity in the 
face of the pandemic, with Brazil now also threatening to withhold funding from WHO,13 as 
the European Union (EU) and UK squabble over the British financial contribution to the 
EU’s coronavirus emergency fund.14 Such financial wrangling is undermining cooperative 
health efforts: as the pandemic took hold, the EU mounted an initially weak public health 
response as its member states, overwhelmed by the quickly escalating crisis, focused on 
domestic responses.15 Perhaps most disturbingly, the US has continued to block the 
passage of a Security Council resolution calling for a global ceasefire to support delivery 
of aid in the context of Covid-19 to conflict regions which are particularly vulnerable.16  
 
With nationalist responses predominating, their practical ramifications for the well-being 
not only of those beyond States’ own borders, but those within them too, presents a 
paradox in that they have undermined not only global health governance, but also national 
self-interest – linking national security with global solidarity. These linkages are a stark 
reminder of the original goals, and continued relevance, of global health law as a 
foundation of multilateral governance in the Covid-19 response.    
 
9 Michael Peel, Leila Abboud, and Hannah Kuchler, ‘EU to Spend Billions to Secure Coronavirus Vaccine,’ 
Financial Times, 12 June 2020. 
10 The People’s Vaccine: Available to All, in all Countries, Free of Charge, Open Letter. See UNAIDS, 
‘Uniting behind a People’s Vaccine against COVID-19’, 14 May 2020, 
https://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2020/may/20200514_covid19-vaccine-
open-letter. 
11 Lawrence O. Gostin, Roojin Habibi, and Benjamin Mason Meier, ‘Has Global Health Law Risen to Meet 
the COVID-19 Challenge? Revisiting the International Health Regulations to Prepare for Future Threats’, 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (Forthcoming, 2020). 
12 Madhukar Pai, ‘U.S. Withdrawal from WHO is Sad for Global Health and Bad for America,’ Forbes, 3 
June 2020.  
13 Lisandra Paraguassu and Ricardo Brito, ‘Bolsonaro threatens WHO exit as COVID-19 kills “a Brazilian 
per minute”,’ Reuters, 5 June 2020.  
14 Charlie Cooper, ‘UK and EU clash over British share of Covid fund,’ Politico, 4 June 2020. 
15 Jacint Jordana and Juan Carlos Triviño-Salazar, ‘Where are the ECDC and EU-Wide Responses in the 
COVID-19 Pandemic?’ (2020) 395 The Lancet 1611. 
16 J. Borger, ‘US blocks Vote on UN’s Bid for Global Ceasefire over Reference to WHO’, The Guardian, 8 
May 2020.  
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IV. Global Health Law   
 
As globalisation has presented challenges to national disease prevention and health 
promotion efforts, global health law, offering the promise of addressing transboundary 
health challenges and promoting global health with justice,17 describes evolving 
multilateral efforts to address: 
  
● New health threats – including non-communicable disease, injuries, mental 
health, dangerous products, and other globalised health threats, 
● New health actors – including transnational corporations, private philanthropists, 
civil society, and other non-state actors, and 
● New health norms – including “soft law” instruments, human rights obligations, 
global justice, and other normative standards of global health policy.18 
 
Global health law instruments codify public health obligations across the global health 
landscape, seeking to realise both global health and human rights within and among 
nations through a multilateral response. Yet, global health law has been challenged by the 
Covid-19, with State responses falling short of global health law obligations. The scale and 
nature of the crisis has led for calls for strengthening and reform of the multilateral laws 
and institutions of global health. 
 
d) Global Health Governance: The International Health Regulations 
 
Drawing from the long history of international health law, the 1946 WHO Constitution 
provided WHO with the multilateral authority to propose conventions, regulations, and 
recommendations on any public health matter – with regulations, once adopted by the 
World Health Assembly, automatically binding on all WHO member states unless explicitly 
rejected. With this broad international legal authority to regulate public health, WHO 
assumed governance over the International Sanitary Regulations (1951); yet, with their 
revision and consolidation into the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969, the 
scope of these provisions was limited to only three select diseases (cholera, plague, and 
yellow fever). As the world faced a continuous stream of emerging and re-emerging 
diseases, the principal international legal instrument for preventing, detecting, and 
responding to infectious disease outbreaks was increasingly seen as inadequate.19   
  
The 2005 revision of the IHR sought to codify a contemporary global health governance 
system under WHO – to prevent, protect against, control, and respond to the international 
spread of infectious disease through public health measures that avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade.20 States bear an obligation under the IHR 
to notify the WHO within 24 hours of all detected events within their territory which may 
constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), which is any 
extraordinary event which is determined to: 
  
 
17 Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin Mason Meier, ‘Introducing Global Health Law’ (2019) Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics. 
18 Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law (Harvard University Press, 2014). 
19 David P. Fidler, ‘Germs, Governance, and Global Public Health in the Wake of SARS,’ (2004) 113 J Clin 
Invest 799. 
20 Lawrence O. Gostin and Ana S. Ayala, ‘Global Health Security in an Era of Explosive Pandemic Potential,’ 
(2017) 9 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 53. 
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1) constitute a public health risk to other states and 
2) potentially require a coordinated international response.  
 
Based upon information received from both state and non-state sources (e.g., media, civil 
society, and other states), the WHO Director-General has the authority to determine 
whether an event constitutes a PHEIC.21  This PHEIC declaration has since been employed 
by WHO six times to control the international spread of infectious disease – most recently 
in the ongoing global struggle against Covid-19.22 
  
However, the Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp focus the limitations of the IHR 
in (1) reporting public health risks to WHO; (2) declaring a PHEIC where necessary to the 
international response; (3) coordinating national responses commensurate with public 
health risks; and (4) supporting national capacity for infectious disease control. 
 
From the initial outbreak in China, delayed reporting hampered WHO’s ability to 
understand the scope of the threat and coordinate the public health response. Legitimate 
questions remain as to what Chinese authorities knew, when they learned it, and whether 
they reported this knowledge to WHO in a “timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed” 
manner in accordance with the IHR.23 Since the IHR does not give WHO unilateral 
authority to investigate events independently, it must continue to rely on states’ “request 
for assistance,” leaving WHO with insufficient information to declare a PHEIC without state 
support.   
 
China notified WHO of this potential threat on 31 December 2019, but even with this 
notification, the IHR did not facilitate the timely declaration of a PHEIC. With inadequate 
reporting and a split in expert opinion, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus convened an Expert Committee on three occasions in late January 2020 to 
advise on the declaration of a PHEIC.24 A PHEIC was finally declared on 30 January 2020, 
by which point the coronavirus was well on its way to becoming a pandemic. Global health 
scholars have often questioned WHO’s tentative approach to declaring a PHEIC;25 
however, WHO has remained hesitant to exercise its authority to declare a PHEIC, 
apprehensive of a declaration that could devastate the economies of powerful states, and 
this reticence has delayed global preparations for a pandemic.   
 
Following the PHEIC declaration, states have responded—in contravention of WHO 
guidance26—with overwhelming restrictions on international traffic, individual rights, and 
global commerce. Whereas responses are generally expected to adhere to WHO’s 
temporary recommendations and other IHR parameters, states are permitted to deviate 
from WHO guidance in only limited circumstances: where the different measures achieve 
 
21  International Health Regulations (IHR) (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005). 
22 WHO, Statement on the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency 
Committee regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), 30 January 2020, 
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-
health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov). 
23 Matthew M. Kavanagh, ‘Authoritarianism, Outbreaks, and Information Politics,’ (2020) 5(3) The Lancet 
Public Health, E135. 
24 Mark Eccleston-Turner, ‘COVID-19 Symposium: The Declaration of a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern in International Law,’ Opinio Juris Blog, 31 March 2020.  
25 Richard Horton, ‘The Politics of PHEIC’, (2019) 393 The Lancet 2470.  
26 World Health Organisation, ‘Updated WHO advice for international traffic in relation to COVID-19 
outbreak’, 29 February 2020. 
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equal or greater health protection than the IHR and WHO’s recommendations and where 
they are based on scientific principles, and are not more invasive to persons nor more 
restrictive of international traffic than reasonably available alternatives, and implemented 
with full respect for human rights.27 However, a number of countries rapidly implemented 
violative health measures—including traveller restrictions, flight suspensions, visa 
restrictions, and border closures—bringing the world to a standstill.28    
 
Further undermining the IHR through these nationalistic measures, states are actively 
undercutting global solidarity by sidelining their common and shared responsibility to 
‘collaborate...to the extent possible’ in ensuring that every state achieves minimum core 
public health capacities to detect and respond to outbreaks.29 Neglecting the IHR duty of 
international assistance, states have taken advantage of these ambiguities to limit, at their 
own peril, their field of vision to national frontiers and neglect their international 
responsibilities. This nationalistic short-sightedness amidst the Covid-19 pandemic is 
exposing the majority of the world to the threat of staggering humanitarian upheaval, 
economic instability, and health insecurity.   
 
e) Human Rights Governance: The ICESCR 
  
In addressing a global pandemic, international human rights law is uniquely placed in that 
it comprises a legally binding set of universally applicable norms to guide an equitable and 
effective response by States to Covid-19. The central place of human rights for pandemic 
responses is duly reflected in the IHR, which embed human rights at the heart of its 
approach to infectious disease prevention, control and treatment. International human 
rights law supports multilateralism for global health because it provides a shared and 
legally binding framework for action among States as well as recognising duties for other 
actors, and because it gives rise to multilateral and global obligations, as well as individual 
and domestic obligations, for the right to health.  
 
Like global health governance, international human rights governance emerged at the 
conclusion of World War II, and is equally infused with ambitions of global solidarity and a 
cosmopolitan outlook. The Charter of the United Nations includes a commitment by 
member states to take joint and separate action for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedom on the basis of non-discrimination and equality.30 The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, which recognises that ‘all individuals are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights’,  recognised the right to an ‘international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’ and a right through international 
cooperation to economic, social and cultural rights.31 Translating this vision into 
internationally binding obligations on States, the ICESCR (and subsequent international 
human rights treaties) have given rise to an obligation of international assistance and 
cooperation on States to realise economic, social and cultural rights, which include the 
rights to health, to an adequate standard of living and to the enjoyment of the benefits of 
 
27  World Health Organisation, International Health Regulations, (2005) Art. 43, para. 1(b). 
28 Roojin Habibi et al., ‘Do Not Violate the International Health Regulations During the COVID-19 Outbreak,’ 
(2020) 395 Lancet 664. 
29 WHO, International Health Regulations, (2005) Art. 44, para. 1(a). 
30 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, articles 55 and 56. 
31 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
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science.32 These rights give rise to obligations on States parties to take steps not only at 
the domestic level but also through international assistance and cooperation for, amongst 
other things, the ‘prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases’ and to assure ‘medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness.’33  
 
Because persistent poverty and global inequity (reinforced by the actions and 
arrangements of globalised institutions) hinder low-income State governments from fully 
realising the right to health of their people without foreign resources, international 
obligations of assistance and cooperation provide a means to call on the international 
community for cooperation and assistance in realising the right to health.  The international 
community thus becomes a duty-bearer under the right to health, responsible for 
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling all the economic, social, and cultural rights that underlie 
health through coordinated, legally accountable responses.34 As clarified by the CESCR, 
this international assistance and cooperation requires a range of actions from States in the 
context of Covid-19, including: ‘sharing of research, medical equipment and supplies, and 
best practices in combating the virus; coordinated action to reduce the economic and social 
impacts of the crisis; and joint endeavours by all States to ensure an effective, equitable 
economic recovery.’35  It also means that States should refrain from ‘imposing limits on the 
export of medical equipment, that result in obstructing access to vital equipment for the 
world’s poorest victims of the pandemic’36 and refraining from unilateral border measures 
that ‘hinder the flow of necessary and essential goods, particular staple foods and health 
equipment’,37 as well as lifting sanctions that interfere with medical equipment 
procurement, debt relief and the use of flexibilities under international trade law to allow 
universal access to diagnostics, medicines and vaccines.38     
 
Whilst not naming all specific international institutions and initiatives, the CESCR 
Statement is indicative of the variety of global health governance institutions and laws that 
provide pathways for global cooperation and solidarity, grounded in human rights, to 
effectively and equitably address Covid-19. The central role of the WHO is recognised in 
global health governance; yet, looking across the global governance landscape, States 
should ‘use their voting powers in International Financial Institutions to alleviate the 
financial burden of developing countries in combating the pandemic,’39 and promote 
flexibilities in the World Trade Organisation intellectual property regimes ‘to allow universal 
access to the benefits of scientific advancements relating to Covid-19 such as diagnostics, 
medicines and vaccines.’40   
 
 
32  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (1966),  
Art. 2.1. 
33 Ibid,  Art. 12. 
34 Ashley Fox and Benjamin M. Meier, ‘International obligations through collective rights: Moving from 
foreign health assistance to global health governance,’ (2010) 12(1) Health and Human Rights 61. 
35 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘Statement on the coronavirus diseases 
(COVID-19) pandemic and economic, social and cultural rights’. UN Doc. E/C.12/2020/1, 17 April 2020, para. 
19. 
36 Ibid, para. 20. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., paras. 19-23.  
39 Ibid. para. 21.  
40 Ibid. See also Chuang-Feng Wu and Chien-Huei Wu, ‘International Trade, Public Health, and Human 
Rights,’ in Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin Mason Meier (eds), Foundations of Global Health & Human 
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020) 351-372. 
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Further, the UN has established a range of global initiatives that are intended to facilitate 
global solidarity for health in responses, providing new pathways for multilateral 
cooperation, most notably: a Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan, led by the 
WHO;41 a Global Humanitarian Response Plan, led by the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, particularly focused in the 63 countries facing a humanitarian or 
refugee crisis;42 and the UN Socio-economic Framework, led by the UN Development 
Program to mitigate the social and economic impact of Covid-19.43 Yet beyond these 
important, forward looking examples of multilateral governance for global health, as shown 
by examples highlighted above, including actions to protect and preserve vaccines for 
domestic populations,44 the withholding of scientific knowledge and funds from the WHO, 
45  and travel restrictions,46 States responses appear to conflict with their obligations under 
the ICESCR. 
 
These failures of compliance are indicative of a broader disconnect between the valuable 
normative framework of international human rights law for more equitable global health 
responses through international assistance and cooperation, and a range of shortcomings 
that militate against the realisation of this vision.47 The obligation on States of international 
assistance and cooperation is contested, with high income countries approaching it as a 
moral, rather than a legally binding obligation.48 Further, while exerting binding legal 
obligations on States, international human rights law does not directly bind other important 
global health actors, including the private sector and philanthropic organisations, which 
have important roles to play in the context of Covid-19. The CESCR and other human 
rights actors support legally binding obligations on international organisations such as the 
International Financial Institutions, but this position is strongly contested by those 
organisations.49 Further, despite a range of global accountability procedures, State 
compliance with international human rights law is often weak.50 The challenges of Covid-
19 for human rights across borders illustrate why scholars have called for a rethinking of 
international human rights, as well as other global health governance institutions, including 
the IHR,51 to render them fit for purpose to effectively address global challenges, 
 
41 World Health Organisation, 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV): Strategic Preparedness and Response 
Plan, Draft of 3 February 2020. 
42 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Global Humanitarian Response Plan: 
COVID-19’, 28 March 2020. 
43 United Nations, ‘A UN Framework for the Immediate Socio-Economic Response to COVID-19’, April 2020. 
44 Jon Cohen, ‘Unveiling “Warp Speed,” the White House’s America-first push for a coronavirus vaccine’, 
Sciencemag, 12 May 2020. 
45 Pien Huang, ‘Trump and WHO: How Much Does The U.S. Give? What’s The Impact Of A Halt In 
Funding?’ NPR, 15 April 2020. 
46 Benjamin Mason Meier, Roojin Habibi and Y. Tony Yang, ‘Travel restrictions violate international law’, 
(2020) 367(1485) Science 1436. 
47 See, for example, Elena Pribytkova, ‘What Global Human Rights Obligations Do We Have?’ (2020) 20(2) 
Chicago Journal of International Law 664. 
48 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report of the Open-Ended Working Group to Consider Options 
Regarding the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights on its Second Session’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/52, 10 February 2005, para. 76.  
49 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘Statement on Public Debt, Austerity 
Measures and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2016/1, 
22 July 2016, para. 8. 
50 See, for example, Valentina Carraro, ‘Promoting Compliance with Human Rights: the Performance of the 
United Nations’ Universal Periodic Review and Treaty Bodies,’ (2019) 63(4) International Studies Quarterly 
1079-1093. 
51 Allyn Taylor, Roojin Habibi, Gian Luca Burci et al., ‘Solidarity in the Wake of COVID-19: Reimagining the 
International Health Regulations’, The Lancet, 19 June 2020. 
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stakeholders and relationships that determine the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights worldwide.52 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Covid-19 is a global public health crisis that calls for global solidarity and coordinated 
action, yet many States have responded with nationalist approaches that ignore the need 
for collective action in facing this common threat. With infectious diseases providing the 
original impetus for the global cooperation in health, Covid-19 is a reminder of why global 
solidarity must be preserved and enhanced, including through strengthening global 
institutions to oversee a robust response.  Following this unprecedented pandemic 
response, global health law will need to be revised to reflect the weaknesses highlighted 
by the Covid-19 pandemic and the need for global solidarity in facing future threats – 
bringing together human rights law with global health governance.   
 
Over time, however, we are witnessing some movements towards cooperation and 
solidarity. With UN-led initiatives being established, countries including the UK and China 
enhanced contributions to the WHO, whilst  € 7.4 billion was raised at an EU-hosted virtual 
pledging conference to fund the development of Covid-19 vaccines. Further, the African 
Union and African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention have been praised for 
collaborative efforts.53 However, much more is needed, particularly more financing, for 
vaccine development, the global distribution of treatment and diagnostics for Covid-19, 
and to support both national and global responses to and preparedness for the 
pandemic.54  
 
Multilateral efforts remain a crucial health and human rights imperative, and States must 
continue to build up their international assistance and cooperation obligations under 
international human rights law, as well as their obligations under the International Health 
Regulations.  As policymakers increasingly recognise that this pandemic will only truly end 
with the development of an effective vaccine, human rights obligations—at the intersection 
of the right to health and the right to benefit from scientific progress—international 
assistance and cooperation will be crucial in progressively realising universal access to 
the necessary benefits of this scientific breakthrough, bringing the world together to assure 
the highest attainable standard of health for all. 
 
  
 
52 Pribytkova (n. 47). 
53 Matthew Kavanagh, Ngozi A. Erondu, Oyewale Tomori et al, ‘Access to Lifesaving Medical Resources 
for African countries: COVID-19 Testing and Response, Ethics, and Politics,’ (2020) 395(10238) The 
Lancet 1735-1738. 
54 Marco Schäferhoff and Gavin Yamey, ‘Ending The COVID-19 Pandemic Requires Effective 
Multilateralism’, Health Affairs Blog, 27 May 2020, 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200522.123995/full/. 
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In the context of responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, the paper examines the African 
regional regime for public health crises and disasters. Using the combined analytic lenses 
of Capability Approach, Institutional Theory, Constructivism, New Regionalism Approach 
and Actor Network Theory, it focuses on the opportunities offered by, and limitations of, 
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I. African Union, Public Health and Covid-19 
 
Article 16(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 recognised a 
human right to ‘the best attainable state of physical and mental health’ well before the right 
entered the mainstream of the current global discourse, as exemplified by resolutions 
2002/31 and 2005/24 of the Commission on Human Rights and resolutions 6/29, 15/22 
and 24/6 of the Human Rights Council. An African Union (AU) coordinated approach to 
public health crises, however, emerged only recently in the regional order. It took some 
time for the AU to concretise the wish in the preamble to its Constitutive Act for addressing 
‘multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, 
economic and political changes taking place in the world.’ The AU’s potential role in public 
health is further buttressed by references in Article 3(n) and other objectives enumerated 
in Article 3(k),(j),(m) of the Constitutive Act.  
 
Nonetheless, just like any other public institution,1 the AU’s legitimacy and acceptability 
may be inter-linked with its ability to undertake effective crisis management, particularly 
the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic that presents unprecedented challenges. Although the 
incidence of infections and deaths are relatively low in Africa compared to trajectories in 
some parts of the world, Covid-19 potentially disproportionately affects African countries 
due to peculiar circumstances such as inadequate public health infrastructure and weak 
economies. In addition to health impacts, the World Bank reported that Covid-19 could 
potentially cause ‘economic and social devastation’ to African countries through 
considerable reductions in commodity trade and export prices, foreign investments and 
remittances, tourism and travel disruptions, and constraints on economic activities from 
lockdowns and restrictions.2 Covid-19 also constrains the debt repayment and servicing 
ability of African countries many of which are already part of the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries debt relief programme of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF offered 
19 African countries debt relief in the sense of freezing interest payments for six months.3 
 
1 Arjen Boin, Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius, The Politics of Crisis Management: Public 
Leadership under Pressure (Cambridge: CUP, 2005); OECD, The Changing Face of Strategic Crisis 
Management (Paris: OECD, 2015).  
2 Ceasar Calderon, Gerard Kambou, Calvin Z. Djiofack, Megumi Kubota, V. Korman and Catalina Cantu 
Canales, ‘Assessing the Economic Impact of Covid-19 and Policy Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
Africa’s Pulse, No. 21 (April), (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2020). 
3 Matthew Davies, ‘Coronavirus in Africa: “No time for half measures in helping the economy”,’ 16 April 
2020. 
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Against the backdrop of Covid-19, this paper therefore examines the African regional 
regime for public health crises on the basis that ‘better’4 responses relate to ‘issues of 
authority, legitimacy and power that are inextricably connected to the way in which crises 
are defined and handled’.5 Using the combined analytic lenses of Capability Approach, 
Institutional Theory, Constructivism, New Regionalism Approach and Actor Network 
Theory, the paper focuses on the opportunities offered by, and limitations of, the AU legal 
order to enable in the assessment of the “ideological-institutional complex”6 of its 
existence.  
 
The key pan-African body for tackling Covid-19 is the Africa Centres for Diseases Control 
and Prevention (ACDC). Following the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic in West African 
countries, the 26th Ordinary Assembly of AU Heads of State in January 2016 agreed to 
establish the ACDC as a specialised technical institution permitted by Article 9(1)(d) and 
Article 14 of its Constitutive Act. Launched on 3 January 2017, the ACDC aims to enhance 
the capacity and capability of AU member states’ public health institutions and to undertake 
evidence-based collaborative interventions and programmes for rapid and effective 
disease detection and response.7 In addition to working with AU member states, the ACDC 
operates five regional collaborating centres for Central, Eastern, Northern, Southern and 
Western Africa which appear to reflect existing sub-regional political and economic 
groupings. 
 
The ACDC produced a continental Covid-19 strategy document on 5 March 20208 
prioritising the limitation of transmission and minimisation of harm from social and 
economic disruptions. As such, ACDC outlined twin objectives of coordination with 
partners within and outside Africa and promotion of evidence-based practices which are 
implemented mainly through the operational units of the Africa Task Force for Coronavirus 
(AFTCOR) and ACDC’s Incident Management System. ACDC collaborations underlined 
by Article 3(n) of the AU Constitutive Act include Partnership for Evidence Based 
Response to COVID-19 (PERC) and Institute Pasteur Dakar, Senegal. The Institute, which 
studies viral pathogens, is the co-lead of AFTCOR’s laboratory and subtyping working 
group.9 Furthermore, in collaboration private organisations, the AU and ACDC launched 
the Africa Covid-19 Response Fund to raise US$150 million for transmission limitation 
measures and US$400 million for procuring equipment and supplies, deploying rapid 
responders and supporting Africa’s vulnerable populations.10  
 
4 Christopher Ansell and Martin Bartenberger, Pragmatism and Political Crisis Management: Principle and 
Practical Rationality during the Financial Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 4. 
5 Paul ‘t Hart, ‘Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management,’ in Arjen Boin 
(ed), Crisis Management. Volume III, (London: Sage, 2008), 84–104, 100. 
6 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of 
Universality (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
7 ‘About Us,’ ACDC, accessed 7 May 2020, https://africacdc.org/about-us/; ‘Our Work,’ ACDC, accessed 7 
May 2020, https://africacdc.org/our-work/. 
8 ACDC, ‘Africa Joint Continental Strategy for Covid-19 Outbreak,’ last modified 5 March 2020, 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/38264-doc-africa_joint_continental_strategy_for_covid-
19_outbreak.pdf. 
9 ‘Wellcome and DFID Support Africa COVID-19 Continental Response with €2.26 million’, ACDC, 
accessed 7 May 2020, https://africacdc.org/news-item/wellcome-and-dfid-support-africa-covid-19-
continental-response-with-e-2-26-million/. 
10 Aloysius Uche Ordu, ‘The Coming of Age of the Africa Centres for Disease Control,’ last modified 15 
April  2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/15/the-coming-of-age-of-the-africa-
centers-for-disease-control/. 
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To facilitate the implementation of the continental strategy, the ACDC in conjunction with 
the AU Commission launched the Partnership to Accelerate COVID-19 Testing (PACT): 
Trace, Test & Track (CDC-T3)11 for strengthening testing capacities with a view to testing 
10 million Africans by October 2020.  PACT is complemented by a surveillance protocol12 
issued by the ACDC to inform Covid-19 detection by AU member states and a detailed 
stepwise guidance.13 Differentiated in Phase 0 (no Covid-19 case) and Epidemic Phases 
1 (early stage outbreak), 2 (expanding outbreak), 3 (advancing outbreak) and 4 (outbreak 
with nationwide transmission),  the stepwise guidance also contains helpful definitions of 
key terminologies such as contact tracing, social distancing, isolation and quarantine. The 
ACDC regularly provides outbreak briefs, fact sheets, brochures and policy updates14 and 
provides manuals, guidelines and framework documents on assessment, monitoring and 
movement restrictions,15 community social distancing16 and contact tracing,17 and 
recommendations on meetings and travel.18 
 
The ACDC’s coordinated response has largely influenced AU member states’ Covid-19 
policy directions. PERC reported that most African governments swiftly imposed public 
health and social measures.19 Tanzania is, however, a notable exception. Tanzania’s 
president rejected social distancing and other ACDC guidelines and even encouraged 
economic and religious activities involving large gatherings of people.20 President Magufuli 
questioned the credibility of testing while asserting that the country’s Covid-19 cases were 
exaggerated and supporting an unproven Madagascan herbal remedy.  A few other African 
countries have placed orders for the product. The AU sought the technical data of the 
 
11 ‘AU and Africa CDC Launch Partnership to Accelerate COVID-19 Testing: Trace, Test and Track,’ 
ACDC,  last modified 21 April 2020, https://africacdc.org/news-item/african-union-and-africa-centres-for-
disease-control-and-prevention-launch-partnership-to-accelerate-covid-19-testing-trace-test-and-track/. 
12 ACDC, ‘Protocol for Enhanced Severe Acute Respiratory Illness and Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance 
for COVID-19 in Africa,’ accessed 7 May 2020, file:///F:/38350-
doc%20protocol%20for_enhanced_sari_and_ili_surveillance_for%20covid-19%20in%20africa_eng.pdf. 
13 ACDC, ‘Recommendations for Stepwise Response to Covid-19 by African Union Member States,’ 
accessed 7 May 2020, https://africacdc.org/download/recommendations-for-stepwise-response-to-covid-
19/. 
14 ‘Resources: Documents and publications from Africa CDC,’ ACDC, accessed 7 May 2020, 
https://africacdc.org/our-work/. 
15 ACDC, ‘Guidance for Assessment, Monitoring, and Movement Restrictions of People at Risk for COVID-
19 in Africa,’ 5 March 2020, http://www.africacdc. org/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-
and-resources/guidelines-policies/africa-cdc-guidance-for-assessment-monitoringand-movement-
restrictions-of-people-at-risk-for-covid-19-in-africa-pdf/detail.  
16 ACDC, ‘Guidance on Community Social Distancing During COVID-19 Outbreak,’ 17 March 2020, 
http://www.africacdc.org/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-
policies/africa-cdcguidance-on-community-social-distancing-during-covid-19-outbreak-pdf/detail. 
17 ACDC, ‘Guidance for Contact Tracing for the COVID-19 Pandemic,’ 24 March 2020, 
http://www.africacdc.org/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-and- resources/guidelines-
policies/detail. 
18 ACDC, ‘Policy Recommendation for African Union Meetings and Travel During COVID-19 Outbreak,’ 15 
March 2020 http://www.africacdc.org/covid-19-and-resources/guidelines-policies/covid-19-and-
resources/guidelines-policies/africa-cdc-policy-recommendation-for-african-union-meetings-and-travel-
during-covid-19-outbreak-pdf/detail. 
19 PERC, ‘Responding to Covid-19 in Africa: Using Data to find Balance,’ 5 May 2020, 
https://preventepidemics.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/PERCRegional5-6-2020.pdf, 6. 
20 ‘Coronavirus: Tanzanian President Promises To Import Madagascar’s “Cure”,’ BBC,  4 May 2020. 
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unproven21 herbal remedy from Madagascar for efficacy and safety review by the ACDC22 
but until the date of writing, the country’s government and the Malagasy Institute of Applied 
Research that produced the remedy have not addressed the request nor shared the data 
with anyone else.23 Evidence of the product’s efficacy, if provided, will no doubt 
demonstrate the need for considering African traditional remedies within the framework of 
public health capacity and capability in addition to enhancing the self-confidence of public 
and private research organisations and promoting regional collaboration and coordination.    
 
The public health visibility and coordinated approach of the AU acting through the ACDC 
contrasts sharply with its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity. While the OAU 
coordinated efforts against colonialism and apartheid, at best it recorded ‘terse’24 
achievement in areas such as good governance and development. Nonetheless, this 
emergent interest in continental public health coordination appears to mask deep structural 
and institutional limitations impeding African countries and the regional order to overcome 
public health challenges and resultant socioeconomic consequences. The following 
observation in the ACDC’s continental strategy document raises fundamental capacity and 
capability questions:  
 
Since 2003, the volume, velocity, and variety of travel between the rest of the world and Africa has 
increased dramatically, which will result in initial and continuous introductions of infected persons 
from areas with COVID-19 transmission. Africa’s baseline vulnerability is also high, given its 
relatively fragile health systems, concurrent epidemics of vaccine-preventable and other infectious 
diseases, inadequate water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure, population mobility, and 
susceptibility for social and political unrest during times of crisis.25  
 
II. Situating Capacity and Capability 
 
To understand the drivers of public health capacity and capability, the Actor-Network 
Theory may be useful as it suggests that society is a complex and fluid diversified collection 
of relationships and alliances.26 Society is shaped not by predetermined and fixed systems 
but by contingent and potentially transformative interaction of actors and events. One 
lessons from the Actor-Network Theory is consideration of dynamic social relations and 
events to gain understanding of society which suggests the need for investigating wider 
political and socioeconomic dimensions of crisis management in the AU regional order and 
their intersection with public health.  Accordingly, the following structural and institutional 
factors may be relevant in determining African countries’ public health capacity and 
capability. 
 
 
 
21 ‘Coronavirus: Caution urged over Madagascar’s “Herbal Cure”,’ BBC, 22 April 2020.. 
22 ‘COVID-19: African Union in discussions with Madagascar over herbal remedy,’ AU, last modified 4 May 
2020, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20200504/covid19-african-union-discussions-madagascar-over-
herbal-remedy. 
23 ‘AU Silence Greets Madagascar President’s Claim of COVID-19 “cure”,’ Medical Brief, 13 May 2020, 
https://www.medicalbrief.co.za/archives/au-silence-greets-madagascar-presidents-claims-of-covid-19-
cure/; Aryn Baker, ‘“Could It Work as a Cure? Maybe.” A Herbal Remedy for Coronavirus is a Hit in Africa, 
But Experts Have their Doubts’, Time, 22 May 2020, https://time.com/5840148/coronavirus-cure-covid-
organic-madagascar/. 
24 Olufemi Babarinde ‘The EU as a Model for the African Union: The Limits of Imitation,’ (2007) 7(2) Jean 
Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 1-12, 3. 
25 ACDC, ‘Africa Joint Continental Strategy,’ (n. 8), 2.  
26 Bruno Latour, Re-Assembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: OUP, 2005). 
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a) Funding 
 
While it has made some progress, the ACDC requires more funding and resources in 
addition to the need to establish it autonomous operational and execution capacity to 
promote public health.27 The ACDC’s precarious funding mirrors the position in many 
African states where political and economic institutions have persistently failed to develop 
public health capacity through improved funding.  This is reflected in the varied picture of 
Covid-19 responses by AU member states. Countries like South Africa28 responded 
relatively quickly and instituted public health and social measures but some others have 
been impeded in their responses by minimal capacity.29 
 
Instructively, the AU 2001 Abuja Declaration required 15 percent of annual national 
budgets to be ringfenced for health, however only one country met the target in 2011 and 
many others remained a long way behind.30 The average per capital health budget of 34 
of Africa’s 45 countries is below US$200 with many hovering around US$50.31 These 
levels of health spending make it almost impossible to procure and maintain public health 
facilities and equipment and employ healthcare professionals. No wonder Africans 
constitute a significant proportion of health professionals in the West,32 a brain drain on 
the continent’s public health capacity and capability.  
 
b) Good governance 
 
Lack of good governance is another self-induced debilitating factor. The role of corruption, 
for instance, as being “often a symptom of overall institutional weakness”33 with adverse 
impacts on public health34 and other development indicators in African states is widely 
acknowledged. Initiatives like the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
2003, New Partnership for Africa’s Development and African Peer Review Mechanism 
have had modest success in changing the governance profiles. While Article 3(g) of AU 
Constitutive Act refers to good governance, efforts should be undertaken by the AU to 
more than symbolic.  
 
A new approach is necessary to curtail prebendalism,35 patrimonialism,36 corruption and 
other impediments to good governance in African countries. To this end, the AU may 
 
27 Ordu, ‘Coming of Age’ (n. 10).  
28 Andrew Harding, ‘South Africa’s Ruthlessly Efficient Fight Against Coronavirus,’ BBC, 3 April 2020.. 
29 ACDC, ‘Partnership to Accelerate’ (n. 11). 
30 “Abuja Declaration: Ten Years On,” WHO, accessed 7 May 2020, 
https://www.who.int/healthsystems/publications/abuja_report_aug_2011.pdf?ua=1. 
31 Abiy Ahmed, ‘A Pledge for Africa,’ 1 May 2020, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pledging-
conference-to-help-africa-fight-covid19-by-abiy-ahmed-2020-05.  
32 Oleosi Ntshebe. ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’s Brain Drain of Medical Doctors to the United States: An 
Exploratory Study,’ (2010) 2(2) Insight on Africa 103-111; Kingsley Ighobor, ‘Diagnosing Africa’s Medical 
Brain Drain,’ accessed 7 May 2020, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-
2017/diagnosing-africa%E2%80%99s-medical-brain-drain. 
33 Melaku Geboye Desta and Moshe Hirsch, ‘African Countries in the World Trade System: International 
Trade, Domestic Institutions and the Role of International Law,’ (2012) 61(1) Intl & Comp L Q 127, 161. 
34 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health,’ UN Doc. A/72/137, 14 July 2017. 
35 Richard A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second 
Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
36 Anne Pitcher, Mary Moran and Michael Johnston, ‘Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism 
in Africa,’ (2009) 52(1) African Studies Review 125. 
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formulate a good governance code enjoying equal status as the nascent continental 
aversion to unconstitutional takeover of government expressed in Article 4(p) of its 
Constitutive Act. A public health good governance code may include matters such as 
minimum health spending as a percentage of GDP, tax transparency, promotion of public-
private partnerships, prohibition of health tourism by public officials and genuine distaste 
for corruption and illicit financial flows. The existence of such a code can provide a 
benchmark for African people to assess and compare the performance of governments. 
Public officials or governments violating the code may be penalised, for example, through 
sanctions.  
 
c) Dependence   
 
While the Ebola experience attests to the potential ability and initiative of African countries 
to tackle public health crises, the region intriguingly appears to lack the necessary self-
confidence resulting in a habit of dependence on others.   This dependence is epitomised 
by the call by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed for developed countries to come to 
the continent’s aid, including through debt relief and financial assistance.37 He also sought 
assistance for African countries in the Global Health Pledging Conference starting on 4 
May 2020.38 The Africa Covid-19 Response Fund launched by the AU and the ACDC 
similarly relies on external donations. 
 
The ACDC does not seem different in approach notwithstanding that the Institute Pasteur 
Dakar, Senegal pioneered the isolation of the yellow fever causing arbovirus.39  For 
example, PERC, which to support evidence-based Covid-19 responses, is a partnership 
between the ACDC and a private initiative (Resolve to Save Lives), multilateral agencies 
(World Health Organisation and World Economic Forum), external public health agency 
(UK Public Health Rapid Support Team) and private market research and data analysis 
companies (Ipsos and Novetta Mission Analytics). The lack of involvement of African 
organisations in PERC suggests the need for a more confident regional approach towards 
developing capacity and capability.   
 
To move away from dependence, it is important to recall that Constructivism asserts “that 
the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than 
material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by 
these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”40  Likewise, the New Regionalism 
Approach underscores the need for “more spontaneous processes, that often emerge from 
below and from within the region itself, and more in accordance with its peculiarities and 
problems.”41  An attitudinal change is therefore imperative. The AU can, for instance, step 
up in facilitating funding of inter-institutional collaboration between African and foreign 
researchers. 
 
 
 
 
37 Ahmed, ‘Pledge’ (n. 31).  
38 ‘Coronavirus Global Response: International Pledging Event,’ European Commission, 4 May 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2020/05/05-04-2020-coronavirus-global-response-
international-pledging-event. 
39 ACDC, ‘Wellcome’ (n. 9).  
40 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 1. 
41 Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, ‘The New Regionalism Approach,’ (1998) 17(3) Politeia  6-21, 7. 
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d) Coloniality and neoliberalism 
 
While colonialism has been implicated in the continent’s weak governance and 
development profiles,42 the Covid-19 pandemic confirms a long-standing attitude of African 
states to look up to former colonial powers for solutions to socioeconomic problems despite 
years of political independence. Apart from Ethiopia, African countries were colonised by 
Western European countries (and the United States in Liberia’s case). Even the 
establishment of the ACDC was facilitated by external institutions, notably the 
governments of USA and China, despite African states’ acknowledgment of the need for a 
regional health body by 2013.43 The ACDC is loosely modelled after the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control, an agency of the European Union which, in turn, 
provided the template44 for the AU. 
 
Africa’s Covid-19 containment measures seem to mirror that of Western European 
countries.  Lockdowns imposed by African governments, for example, did not quite 
consider unique socioeconomic circumstances like the dominant informal economy, non-
existent social welfare and inadequate power and internet infrastructures. Concerns 
include the impact of social distancing measures on the informal sectors and urban poor45 
and exacerbation of gender, education and social inequalities.46 The reality is highlighted 
in a PERC survey of residents of 28 cities in 20 African countries which reported significant 
food shortages and financial difficulties if lockdowns were imposed for 14 days or more.47  
 
Related to coloniality is the adoption of neoliberal orientations by African states which 
resulted in social welfare and infrastructural deficits. The IMF-devised Structural 
Adjustment Programme imposed on African countries is a particularly harmful neoliberal 
experiment with ‘devastating and debilitating effects’48 including significant funding 
healthcare gaps. Neoliberal developmentalism49 has clearly not improved the fortunes of 
African economies.  
 
 
42 Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (London: Bogle L-Ouverture, 1972); Peter E. Ekeh, 
‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement,’ (1975) 17(1) Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 91-112. 
43 Callie Aboaf, ‘U.S.-China Collaboration in Creating and Supporting the Africa Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention,’ accessed 7 May 2020, 
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/china/trs-04-us-china-collaboration-africacdc.pdf. 
44 Babarinde, ‘The EU as a Model,’ 8-9, 11 (n. 24). 
45 Addisu Lashitew, ‘Social Distancing Unlikely to hold up in Africa without a Safety Net for 
Microentrepreneurs,’ 9 April 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/04/09/social-
distancing-unlikely-to-hold-up-in-africa-without-a-safety-net-for-microentrepreneurs/; Zachary Barnett-
Howell and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak,  ‘Should Low-Income Countries Impose the Same Social Distancing 
Guidelines as Europe and North America to Halt the Spread of COVID-19?’, 2 April 2020, 
https://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/mushifiq-howell-v2.pdf. 
46 ‘Joint Solidarity Letter to the African Union: The Impact of COVID-19 on Girls’ Education and Child 
Marriage,’ Global Partnership for Education, 30 April 2020, https://www.globalpartnership.org/news/joint-
solidarity-letter-african-union-impact-covid-19-girls-education-and-child-marriage. 
47 PERC, ‘Responding,’ 6 (n. 19).  
48 Simon Springer, ‘Fuck Neoliberalism,’ (2016) 15(2) ACME: An International Journal for Critical 
Geographies 285–292, 285. 
49 Sam Adelman, ‘The Sustainable Development Goals, Anthropocentrism and Neoliberalism,’ in 
Sustainable Development Goals: Law, Theory and Implementation, ed. Duncan French and Louis J. Kotzé 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018), 15-40, 18. 
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Contrary to coloniality and neoliberalism in the African context, the institutional theory 
suggests that the pronounced socioeconomic disparities between African and Western 
countries50 highlight the need for an African perspective wherever possible. PERC similarly 
noted growing peaceful resistance and protests against public health and social measures 
in African countries and stressed the need for adaptation to “local needs” with context-
specific mitigation of adverse effects to enhance compliance levels and even prevent 
unrests and violence.51  Just like some researchers are increasingly rejecting the conflation 
of Western ideas as universal benchmarks,52 there is therefore the need for decolonisation 
of the African approach to public health and its political and socioeconomic dimensions. 
 
e) International economic system   
 
While the impediments discussed above are largely self-inflicted, the contemporary 
international economic system is an external determinant of public health capacity and 
capability. Noteworthy are neoliberal ideas like free trade and liberalisation championed 
by the World Trade Organisation, the IMF and the World Bank.53 While conventional 
neoliberal wisdom suggests that Africa can pursue foreign investments and trade its way 
out of socioeconomic problems, the unequal international economic system obstructs fair 
competition between developing African countries and developed economies. Existing 
objections to the international economic system’s neoliberal foundations and domination 
by developed economies54 include the UN General Assembly Resolution 3171,55 New 
International Economic Order,56 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States57 and 
Declaration on the Right to Development58 and Third World Approaches to International 
Law.59 
 
An illustrative segment is international trade and investment law which establishes a 
system of “winners and losers” by having ‘rules [that] determine who will benefit, who will 
lose and, perhaps more importantly, who will adapt to whom so as to render the policy 
 
50 ‘Africa Progress Report: Power, People, Planet: Seizing Africa’s Energy and Climate Opportunities,’ 
Africa Progress Panel, accessed 7 May 2020, 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/APP_REPORT_2015_FINAL_low1.pdf. 
51 PERC, ‘Responding,’ 3, 6 (n. 19).  
52 Pahuja, ‘Decolonising’ (n. 6); Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonising Methodologies: Research and 
Indigenous Peoples 2nd Ed (London: Zed, 2012); Eve Darian-Smith, Laws and Societies in Global 
Contexts: Contemporary Approaches. (Cambridge: CUP, 2013). 
53 Sarah Babb and Alexander Kentikelenis, ‘International Financial Institutions as Agents of Neoliberalism,’ 
in Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, Martijn Konings and David Primrose (eds), The SAGE Handbook of 
Neoliberalism (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2018), 16-27. 
54 B.S. Chimni, ‘Capitalism, Imperialism and International Law in the Twenty-First Century,’ (2012) 14(1) 
Oregon Rev Intl L 17-45; Kate Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law: Empire, Environment 
and the Safeguarding of Capital, (Cambridge: CUP, 2013); John Linarelli, Margot E. Salomon, and 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The Misery of International Law: Confrontations with Global Injustice in 
the Global Economy, (Oxford: OUP, 2018). 
55 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (17 December 1973) UNGA Res 3171 (XXVIII). 
56 Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (1 May 1974) UNGA A/RES/S-
6/3201. 
57 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (12 December 1974) UNGA Res 3281 (XXIX). 
58 Declaration on the Right to Development (4 December 1986) UNGA Res 41/128. 
59 Usha Natarajan, John Reynolds, Amar Bhatia and Sujith Xavier, ‘Introduction: TWAIL- on Praxis and the 
Intellectual,’ (2016) 37(11) Third World Quarterly 1946-1956. 
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goals of trade and investment rules most efficacious’.60 Critical international political 
economy61 therefore spotlights the role of international trade and investment law in 
sustaining disparities and inequalities between states and regions, for instance between 
the Global North and the Global South.  Hickel, for example, suggested the need for “real 
justice” in the global economy to tackle global poverty and growing inequality between 
countries.62   
 
The adverse effects of the international economic order on African countries’ capacity and 
capability63 are manifest in different ways. Corruption and poor governance in African 
countries are often endorsed by multinational enterprises and other actors from developed 
economies64 that are equally the recipients of the proceeds of corruption. African countries 
are unable to invest on healthcare, which is partly a legacy of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes,65 the Washington Consensus on neoliberalism, heavy debt burden and 
unfavourable international trade. Richer countries have access to cheaper loans that are 
handy for Covid-19 stimulus packages, but African countries66 are charged considerably 
more interest plus other stringent conditions.  
 
The unbalanced international economic system contrasts starkly with the Capability 
Approach and its emphasis on access to opportunities and resources and ability to make 
informed choices and achieve valued objectives.67 Fundamental changes are needed in 
the international economic order to promote fair and accessible opportunities that will 
enable African economies to develop and sustain public health capacity and capability.  
 
III. Conclusion: Reinvigorating Capacity and Capability  
 
Against the backdrop of the current Covid-19 pandemic and with insights from the 
Capability Approach, Institutional Theory, Constructivism, New Regionalism Approach and 
Actor Network Theory, this paper demonstrates the need for appropriate investment and 
fostering an institutional climate for public health in the African continent and indeed 
globally.  A refocused AU for public health is evident in the ACDC-led regional response 
to Covid-19. While the ACDC represents a marked departure from fragmented approaches 
to tackling infectious diseases and demonstrates a viable pan-African approach, the 
 
60 Nicolás M. Perrone and David Schneiderman, ‘International Economic Law’s Wreckage: Depoliticization, 
Inequality, Precarity,’ in Emilios Christodoulidis, Ruth Dukes and Marco Goldoni (eds), Research 
Handbook on Critical Legal Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 446-472, 446. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Jason Hickel, The Divide: Global Inequality from Conquest to Free Market, (London: Heinemann, 2017). 
63 Julio Faundez and Celine Tan, International Economic Law, Globalization and Developing Countries, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010). 
64 Onyeka K. Osuji, ‘Fluidity of Regulation-CSR Nexus: The Multinational Corporate Corruption Example,’ 
(2011) 103(1) Journal of Business Ethics 31–57. 
65 Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Thomas H. Stubbs and Lawrence P. King, ‘Structural Adjustment and Public 
Spending on Health: Evidence from IMF Programs in Low-Income Countries,’ (2015) 126 Social Science 
and Medicine 169–176; Alexander E. Kentikelenis, ‘Structural Adjustment and Health: A Conceptual 
Framework and Evidence on Pathways,’ (2017) 187 Social Science and Medicine 296–305. 
66 Thomas Stubbs, Alexander Kentikelenis, David Stuckler, Martin McKee and Lawrence King, ‘The Impact 
of IMF Conditionality on Government Health Expenditure: A Cross-National Analysis of 16 West African 
Nations,’ (2017) 174 Social Science and Medicine 220–227; Thomas Stubbs and Alexander Kentikelenis. 
‘Targeted Social Safeguards in the Age of Universal Social Protection: The IMF and Health Systems of 
Low-Income Countries,’ (2018) 28(2) Critical Public Health 132–139. 
67 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Oxford: OUP, 1999); Amartya Sen, ‘Elements of a Theory of 
Human Rights,’ (2004) 32(4) Philosophy and Public Affairs 315-356. 
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fragility of public health institutions and socioeconomic environments seriously question 
African countries’ capacity and capability. Self-induced obstacles include inadequate 
health funding, poor governance and a culture of dependence that includes coloniality and 
neoliberalism.  
 
The AU can play vital roles in developing workable African public health perspectives and 
strengthening the capacities of regional, sub-regional and national authorities. The 
preamble to the AU Constitutive Act similarly calls for ‘necessary measures to strengthen 
our common institutions and provide them with the necessary powers and resources to 
enable them discharge their respective mandates.’ The consideration of institutions serves 
a wider purpose since these are critical to economic development even in the case of 
public health.68 It has been shown that disease burdens impede development in African 
countries. Improvements in public health capacity and capability can therefore assist in 
reducing poverty and promoting development in African countries.  
 
On the other hand, the neoliberal international economic system is an external trigger for 
the region’s public health vulnerability. The global community needs to address underlying 
structural issues in the international economic system affecting African countries’ public 
health capacity and capability. Covid-19 has demonstrated that ineffective health 
infrastructure in a country or region potentially exposes the rest of the world to crises of 
disastrous proportions. 
 
 
  
 
68 John Gallup and Jeffrey Sachs, ‘The Economic Burden of Malaria,’ (2001) 64(1-2) The American Journal 
of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 85-96; Jeffrey Sachs and Pia Malaney, ‘The Economic and Social 
Burden of Malaria,’ (2002) 415(6872) Nature 680-685. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The global Covid-19 pandemic arrived at a time of pre-existing and overlapping 
constitutional crises in the European Union, and exacerbated them. Two are the particular 
subjects of this contribution. First, several Member States had been sliding into 
authoritarianism long before the pandemic hit.1 The rise of ‘post-fascism’2 in Hungary in 
particular was already a matter of serious concern, as was the EU’s failure to respond to 
it. Covid-19 has made this crisis worse, as Hungary has responded with a law suspending 
its Constitution and allowing the government to rule by decree, while the EU has continued 
to merely wag its finger. This calls into question the Union’s commitment to its claimed 
foundational values, amongst which are democracy and the rule of law.3  
 
Secondly, tensions between ‘northern’ and ‘southern’4 Member States over fiscal discipline 
and economic solidarity have remained unresolved since the last Eurozone crisis. The 
EU’s response to the crisis beginning in 2008 revealed the deep conflicts between the 
debtor and creditor states of Europe, and raised complex legal and political questions as 
to how the Union could and should assist Member States in financial distress. These 
questions have now resurfaced in the context of Covid-19, with ill-tempered arguments 
between the so-called ‘frugal four’ (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden) and 
hard-hit states such as Italy and Spain as to how the Union should respond to the pandemic 
in monetary, financial, and economic terms. 
 
Just as the pandemic (or at least its first wave) looked to have peaked in Europe, the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG) delivered a 
significant judgment5 that ties these two threads together. The BVerfG found in Weiss that 
the European Central Bank (ECB) had exceeded its authority by embarking, since 2015, 
 
1 See, generally, Wojciech Sadurski, Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown (OUP 2019); András L Pap, 
Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy (Routledge 2018); Nor is such 
backsliding confined to Central Europe, as demonstrated by the recent electoral success of the far-right in 
France and Italy. 
2 Gáspár Miklós Tamás, ‘On Post-Fascism’ (Boston Review, 1 June 2000) 
<https://bostonreview.net/world/g-m-tamas-post-fascism>. This is a term I altogether prefer to the more 
common, more reductive, and less helpful ‘populism’, and to the ‘illiberalism’ preferred by Viktor Orbán 
himself. 
3 Art 2 TEU. 
4 This is itself a problematic binary, with undercurrents of stereotyping and sectarianism. For an example of 
such bigotry, see the sentiments expressed by Jelte Wiersma, ‘Geen Stuiver Extra naar Zuid-Europa’ [‘Not 
Another Penny for Southern Europe’] Elsevier Weekblad (Amsterdam, 28 May 2020) 
<www.elsevierweekblad.nl/economie/achtergrond/2020/05/geen-stuiver-extra-naar-zuid-europa-
207225w/>, and the accompanying illustration, which was also the front cover of that week’s edition. 
5 German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, 2 
BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15, available in English at 
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/2020/05/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.pdf
?__blob=publicationFile&v=5>. In this paper, the judgment is referred to as Weiss, or Weiss (BVerfG) 
where necessary to distinguish it from the CJEU’s earlier ruling in the same proceedings, which will be 
referred to as Weiss (CJEU). 
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on a programme of purchasing Member State assets in an attempt to tackle low inflation 
rates; and that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) had not properly 
supervised the ECB’s design and implementation of this programme. Weiss goes against 
the CJEU’s conception of the doctrine of the primacy of EU law: that EU law trumps 
national law—including national constitutional law—in cases of conflict between them in 
the areas of the Union’s competence; and that national courts cannot tell EU institutions 
what to do. The decision also complicates the EU’s two ongoing constitutional and 
institutional crises, outlined above. First, critics allege—I think wrongly—that the judgment 
provides cover for democratic backsliding in Member States such as Hungary and Poland: 
if the BVerfG can challenge the primacy of EU law, then why can’t the courts of other 
Member States do the same? Secondly, it calls into question the legal and political viability 
of attempts by the Union—and in particular by the ECB—to provide assistance to states 
badly economically hit by the pandemic. In this way, Covid-19 has provided yet more 
evidence of the unsuitability and unsustainability of the current legal, institutional, and 
constitutional architecture of the Eurozone. 
 
This contribution therefore seeks to place the Covid-19 crisis in the context of a Union well-
used to crisis, and already dealing with at least two when the pandemic hit. Will the Union 
muddle through as it has historically done, or do the structural tensions at work mean that 
a more radical rethink is needed? It begins by outlining the Hungarian government’s 
response to the crisis: an ‘Enabling Act’, allowing for rule by decree. This approach, and 
in particular the cowardly European response, is here portrayed as a significant threat to 
democracy and the rule of law throughout the Union. Next, it deals with the effect of the 
BVerfG’s judgment holding the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of the ECB 
ultra vires.6 The judgment would have been a bombshell at the best of times, but its arrival 
during the pandemic threw things into even sharper relief: if the PSPP was ultra vires, there 
is no way that the ECB’s new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) is 
within the Union’s powers, and this raises serious questions about the ability of the Union 
and its Member States to mitigate the economic chaos wrought by the pandemic. The 
judgment is in many respects theoretically coherent and compelling (which is why those 
who accuse the BVerfG of giving succour to autocrats are mistaken), but its worrying 
political background raises serious questions about the ability of the Union to provide and 
co-ordinate the kind of action needed to stave off or alleviate post-Covid economic crisis.  
Finally, a way forward is sketched, involving the Union finally having the honesty properly 
to grapple with the inherent structural flaws of the Union in general, and the Eurozone in 
particular. In short, the Treaties7 must be amended, and it should not have taken a deadly 
pandemic to prove it. 
 
II. On the Hungarian Enabling Act and the Democratic Crisis in the Union 
 
The Hungarian Fundamental Law of 20118 regularly contemplates its own negation: 
Articles 48–54 establish a total of six ‘special legal orders’ through which ‘normal’ 
constitutional rules can be set aside. These are the ‘state of national crisis’, the ‘state of 
 
6 Or, more accurately but less directly, holding the CJEU’s decision to classify the PSPP as lawful ultra 
vires. 
7 Two treaties form the legal and constitutional basis of the EU: the Treaty on European Union (TEU, 
originally the Treaty of Maastricht) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, 
originally the Treaty of Rome). 
8 A document of highly questionable democratic credentials: see Gábor Attila Tóth (ed), Constitution for a 
Disunited Nation: On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law (CEU Press 2012). 
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emergency’, the ‘state of preventative defence’, the ‘terror-threat situation’, ‘unexpected 
attacks’, and the ‘state of danger’. It is through this last provision, defined as ‘a natural 
disaster or industrial accident endangering life and property’ that Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz9 
party initially channelled its legal response to the Covid-19 pandemic. However, chafing 
under Article 53 (3)’s imposition of a 15-day limit on decrees under the ‘state of danger’, at 
the end of March Orbán used his two-thirds parliamentary majority to pass what we can 
rightly call an Enabling Act,10 allowing him to rule by decree for an indefinite period. Others 
have written cogently of the Act as a ‘constitutional moment’;11 of how it fits perfectly with 
Orbán’s long-established patterns of behaviour;12 and of the dim prospects of EU law being 
any use against it, at least in the short- to medium-term.13 What is important for present 
purposes is to contrast the brilliant opportunism of Orbán’s move with the lumpen 
foolishness of the European response.  
 
On 31 March, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen tweeted that: 
 
[i]t’s of outmost importance that emergency measures are not at the expense of our 
fundamental principles and values. Democracy cannot work without free and independent 
media. Respect of freedom of expression and legal certainty are essential in these 
uncertain times.14 
 
She added that the Commission: 
 
will closely monitor, in a spirit of cooperation, the application of emergency measures in all 
Member States. We all need to work together to master this crisis. On this path, we’ll 
uphold our European values & human rights. This is who we are & what we stand for.15 
 
Such dishwater platitudes are to be expected from a President who owes her position to 
the votes of MEPs from Fidesz and from Poland’s ideologically-related ruling PiS16 party, 
and who thought it a clever idea to try to appoint a Commissioner for ‘Protecting Our 
European Way of Life’,17 a post later made no less nonsensical and insulting by being 
changed to one of ‘promoting’ this alleged ‘way of life’. 
 
Only very slightly less disappointing was the following day’s joint statement from 17 
Member States expressing ‘deep concern’ about ‘the risk of violations of the principles of 
 
9 Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, ‘Alliance of Young Democrats’. Founded as a liberal student activist 
movement in the late 1980s, the party has shifted dramatically to the right. 
10 Krista Kovács, ‘Hungary’s Orbánistan: A Complete Arsenal of Emergency Powers’, Verfassungsblog, 6 
April 2020, <https://verfassungsblog.de/hungarys-orbanistan-a-complete-arsenal-of-emergency-powers/>. 
11 Renáta Uitz, ‘Pandemic as Constitutional Moment’, Verfassungsblog, 24 March 2020, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/pandemic-as-constitutional-moment/>. 
12 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Orbán’s Emergency’, Verfassungblog, 29 March 2020, 
<https://verfassungsblog.de/orbans-emergency/>. 
13 Niels Kirst, ‘How a Public Health Crisis Became an Aggravation of the Rule of Law Crisis in the 
European Union’, DCU Brexit Institute Blog, 2 April 2020, <http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2020/04/how-a-
public-health-crisis-became-an-aggravation-of-the-rule-of-law-crisis-in-the-european-union/>. 
14 Ursula von der Leyen, Twitter, 31 March 2020,  
<https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1244960501085491202?s=20>.  
15 Ursula von der Leyen, Twitter, 31 March 2020, 
<https://twitter.com/vonderleyen/status/1244960502385688576?s=20>.  
16 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, ‘Law and Justice’. 
17 Tom Flynn, ‘Undermining Our European Way of Life: The von der Leyen Commission Takes the Low 
Road’, DCU Brexit Institute Blog, 19 September 2019, <http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2019/09/undermining-
our-european-way-of-life-the-von-der-leyen-commission-takes-the-low-road/>. 
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rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights arising from the adoption of certain 
emergency measures’.18 
 
A striking aspect of both these responses was their unwillingness—their seeming 
inability—to name Hungary, and to specifically state that Orbán’s power grab would be 
resisted and challenged. The consequences of this diplomatic squeamishness soon 
became clear: just a day later, on 2 April, in an act of the purest, most distilled chutzpah, 
the Hungarian government had the gall to join in adopting the statement issued by the 
‘deeply concerned’ 17 Member States.19 Whatever his other flaws, we can credit Viktor 
Orbán with being a master of comic timing.  
 
Subsequently, the decrees came in thick and fast.20 The plan to build a ‘museum quarter’ 
in Budapest’s City Park, held up by the unexpected victory of the opposition in last year’s 
mayoral elections, will go ahead. A person’s legal sex will now be fixed at birth, and cannot 
be legally altered. Municipal theatres—rare islands of intellectual independence and the 
possibility of artistic and political dissent—will be brought under central government 
control. Quite what these measures have to do with stopping the spread of the coronavirus 
and managing the crisis is not clear. What is clear is the Enabling Act is mere opportunism, 
seizing on a deadly threat to permit the government to go about its agenda with the very 
minimum of political, legal, and press scrutiny. 
 
The idea of ‘naming and shaming’ as an enforcement method only works if you actually 
name offenders, and if the offenders are actually capable of feeling shame. The refusal of 
the Commission and the Member States to name Hungary and to specifically condemn 
Orbán’s behaviour illustrates the extent to which senior figures in Europe are beholden to 
a kind of comity of idiots, where each is afraid of being undiplomatic to the other, just in 
case the other might one day be undiplomatic to them.  
 
This apparent reluctance of European heads of state and government to ‘interfere’ in one 
another’s ‘domestic’ affairs is a relic of a bygone age, a time when we really could draw 
such bright lines between the ‘national’ and the ‘European’.21 The Enabling Act adopted in 
response to the Covid-19 crisis does not just endanger Hungary and Hungarians, but 
Europe and Europeans: the rot can spread from the Member States to the Union, from the 
Union to the Member States, and from one Member State to another. Orbán’s pollution of 
the Hungarian body politic; PiS’s degradation of Poland; and the murders of Daphne 
 
18 Government of the Netherlands ‘Statement by Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden’, 1 April 2020, <https://www.government.nl/documents/diplomatic-
statements/2020/04/01/statement-by-belgium-denmark-finland-france-germany-greece-ireland-italy-
luxembourg-the-netherlands-portugal-spain-sweden>. 
19 Government of Hungary, ‘Statement by Hungary’, 2 April 2020), <https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-
justice/news/statement-of-hungary-02042020>. 
20 ‘Decrees That Have Nothing to Do with the Coronavirus Pandemic’, Hungarian Spectrum, 1 April 2020, 
<https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/04/01/decrees-that-have-nothing-to-do-with-the-coronavirus-
pandemic/>. 
21 Tom Flynn, ‘Triangular Constitutionalism: Some Consequences of Constitutional Pluralism for Domestic 
Constitutional Thought’ in Gareth Davies and Matej Avbelj (eds), Handbook on Legal Pluralism in the EU 
(Edward Elgar 2018). 
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Caruana Galizia in Malta22 and Ján Kuciak in Slovakia23 are not directly related, but taken 
together they are all indicative of a Union sliding ever further into the mire, where 
the appearance of unity is more important than any actual substantive commonality of 
democratic standards, or those beloved ‘values’ of which we hear so much. 
 
There has recently been at least some movement in terms of legal sanction for Orbán and 
those like him. In March, Advocate-General Kokott advised24 the CJEU to find Orbán’s ‘lex 
CEU’, by which the Central European University was hounded out of Budapest, in breach 
of EU and WTO law. In April, the CJEU held that Poland, Hungary, and Czechia had failed 
in their obligations under Union law to join in the EU’s relocation programme for the 
distribution of asylum-seekers across the Union.25 But these victories are partial, reactive, 
and belated, and have met with scorn from Fidesz.26 Union law in general, and the EU 
Treaties in particular, are simply not geared towards the rectification of the kind of 
authoritarian opportunism of which Orbán is the standard-bearer. 
 
In the present state of Union law, the solution must be, and can only be, political. The 
Hungarian Enabling Act exposes the idea that European conservatives can curb the 
excesses of their most obviously authoritarian bedfellows as the delusion it has always 
been. Nor are the EPP alone in sheltering undesirables: the Social Democrats and the 
Liberals are both happy to rely on the votes of members with questionable records and 
intentions.27 Remedying the authoritarian drift in the Union requires concerted political 
action, both within and between Member States. 
 
The Hungarian reaction to the Covid-19 crisis—and the European response—exposes the 
EU’s historical baggage about what it is, what it does, and what it is meant to be. From 
bailouts to borders to non-interference in ‘domestic’ politics, we must stop pretending that 
the EU can exist as a kind of rarefied space of apolitical technocracy. In this sense, we 
can learn a valuable lesson from Orbán: opportunities ought not be wasted. 
 
It is to another instance of Covid-19 revealing politicians hiding behind technocracy, rather 
than engaging in difficult negotiations and attempting to gain electoral approval for the 
results, that we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Jean Claude Cachia and André P DeBattista, ‘The Malaise of Malta: Social Divisions, Weak Institutions, 
and Political Partisanship’, Political Studies Association 68th Annual International Conference, Cardiff, 
March 2018, available at <www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2018/20180328%20-
%20Conference%20Paper.pdf>. 
23 Zora Bútorová and Martin Bútora, ‘The Pendulum Swing of Slovakia’s Democracy’ (2019) 86 Social 
Research 83. 
24 Case C–66/18 Commission v Hungary (AG’s Opinion) ECLI:EU:C:2020:172. 
25 Joined Cases C–715/17, C–718/17 and C–719/17 Commission v Poland and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:257. 
26 See the comment of Orbán’s Justice Minister, Judit Varga: ‘#EU compulsory relocation system of 
migrants is dead and today’s #CJEU judgement won’t change that. It must be lonesome in the saddle since 
the horse died,’ Twitter, 2 April 2020, 
<https://twitter.com/JuditVarga_EU/status/1245653581262286848?s=20>. 
27 Jean Morijn and Israel Butler, ‘EPP More Likely to Expel Fidesz if Rival Groups Also Ditch 
Troublemakers’, Euractiv, 12 March 2019, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/opinion/epp-more-
likely-to-expel-fidesz-if-rival-groups-also-ditch-troublemakers/>. 
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III. PEPP talk: the BVerfG’s judgment in Weiss 
 
In March 2015, the ECB launched the Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme (PSPP),28 
under which it would purchase government and other public bonds of Eurozone Member 
States under certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, in an attempt to get 
inflation rates—then very low—back to the ECB’s target of being below, but close to, 2%. 
Five years later, on 18 March 2020, the ECB announced a Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
Programme (PEPP), whereby €750bn would be spent on purchasing public sector 
securities to shore up European economies during the Covid-19 pandemic.29 The ECB 
was clear that the PEPP’s architecture is based on that of the PSPP, but with fewer 
restrictions and conditions in order to enhance its effectiveness. The ECB must have been 
confident that it had the legal power to launch the PEPP: after all, the CJEU had held in 
2018 that the PSPP complied with EU law, and was within the powers of the ECB.30 
However, just a few weeks after the launch of the PEPP, the BVerfG handed down its 
judgment in Weiss, responding to the CJEU’s greenlighting of the earlier PSPP. The 
German court’s judgment would have triggered a constitutional crisis—or something close 
to one—at the best of times. However, coming as it did while the pandemic raged across 
Europe, it raised serious questions not only about the ability of the EU to respond to the 
pandemic in monetary, financial, and economic terms, but about the very makeup and 
architecture of the Union in general and the Eurozone in particular: questions of long 
standing, surely, but ones thrown into new relief by the urgency and seriousness of the 
pandemic. 
 
The question of the legality of the PSPP arose in 2017, when the programme was subject 
to a constitutional challenge in Germany. The applicants argued that the PSPP 
contravenes the Treaties’ prohibition of lending to or otherwise financing the Member 
States,31 and the principle of conferral32 (under which the Union is not a body of unlimited 
competence, but has only the competences specifically bestowed upon it by the Member 
States in the Treaties). As such, the German state and its institutions would be prohibited 
from taking part in the PSPP, it being an illegal exercise of power by the Union. Under EU 
law, if any national court from which there is no appeal finds that the legality of an action 
of a Union institution is called into question in a case before it, the national court must refer 
the question the CJEU for decision. Only the CJEU is competent, under the Treaties, to 
determine whether a Union institution has acted illegally.33 This being such a case, the 
BVerfG referred the issue to the CJEU. 
 
 
28 Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public 
sector asset purchase programme (ECB/2015/10), as amended by Decision (EU) 2015/2101 of 5 
November 2015 (ECB/2015/33), Decision (EU) 2015/2464 of 16 December 2015 (ECB/2015/48), Decision 
(EU) 2016/702 of 18 April 2016 (ECB/2016/8), Decision (EU) 2016/1041 of 22 June 2016 on the eligibility 
of marketable debt instruments issued or fully guaranteed by the Hellenic Republic and repealing Decision 
(EU) 2015/300 (ECB/2016/18), and Decision (EU) 2017/ 100 of 11 January 2017 (ECB/2017/1). 
29 European Central Bank, ‘ECB announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme 
(PEPP),’ 18 March 2020, 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html>. 
30 Case C–493/17 Weiss and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:815 (hereinafter Weiss (CJEU)). 
31 Art 123 (1) TEU. 
32 Art 5 (1) TEU, read in conjunction with Arts 119 and 127–133 TFEU. 
33 Art 267 TFEU, known as the preliminary ruling procedure. 
 57 
 
In December 2018, the CJEU delivered its judgment,34 holding that the PSPP is within the 
competences of the Union. This was perhaps to be expected: the CJEU is famous for the 
expansive approach it takes to determining Union competence. The Court held that the 
PSPP does not involve the ECB straying from the realm of monetary policy (which is an 
exclusive Union competence for those Member States in the Eurozone35) to that of 
economic policy (which is an area primarily for the Member States, in which the ECB has 
only a supporting role36). The CJEU held that in dividing competences between the Union 
and the Member States in this way, ‘the authors of the Treaties did not intend to make an 
absolute separation between economic and monetary policies.’37 Here is the root of the 
problem: though the separation may not be absolute, it is clear: monetary policy is for the 
Union, economic policy is mainly for the Member States. However, such a division is plainly 
impossible, monetary and economic policy being so utterly intertwined and inextricable.38 
The presence of such an unworkable distinction at the very heart of the Eurozone’s legal 
constitution is the result of political cowardice by those who wanted a shared currency but 
not a shared budget and shared liabilities—the very definition of having one’s cake and 
eating it. 
 
Nevertheless, on the CJEU’s conception of the principle of the primacy of Union law, its 
judgment ought to have been the end of the matter: the BVerfG, as a court of a Member 
State and thus as a court of the Union, would have to accept this decision loyally, and 
dismiss the complaints in the domestic proceedings.  
 
However, the CJEU’s conception of the primacy of EU law is not shared by the 
Constitutional and Supreme courts of numerous Member States, including Germany. In a 
long line of case law, the BVerfG has held that as the Union is a body of limited 
competences, and as the CJEU is a Union institution, both the Union as a whole and the 
CJEU in particular lack Kompetenz-Kompetenz: the ability to determine the limits of their 
own powers.39 It cannot be left to the Union and its institutions to mark their own homework, 
and there remains a role, even if only a residual one, for the Member States and their 
courts to determine in a given case whether the Union has overstepped the bounds of the 
authority granted it in the Treaties.   
 
It was mere coincidence that the BVerfG’s reaction to the CJEU’s judgment in Weiss came 
as the pandemic was at its peak in Europe, but the coincidence is a revealing one, and 
illustrates the precarity of the constitutional and institutional architecture of the Eurozone. 
The single currency may well be able to plod along when times are good, but as soon as 
things go bad (as they have now done twice, and very suddenly, first with the onset of the 
Eurozone crisis and then with the pandemic), the inability of the Union to react to events 
with the necessary speed and firepower is revealed. 
 
For the BVerfG, the ECB had acted ultra vires by embarking on the PSPP without having 
conducted a proportionality review, in order to determine whether the programme was 
 
34 Weiss (CJEU) (n 30). 
35 Art 3 (1) (c) TEU. 
36 Art 127 (1) TFEU. 
37 Weiss (CJEU) (n 30) [60]. 
38 Benjamin Braun, Daniela Gabor, and Benjamin Lemoine, ‘Enlarging the ECB Mandate for the Common 
Good and the Planet’, Social Europe, 8 June 2020, <https://www.socialeurope.eu/enlarging-the-ecb-
mandate-for-the-common-good-and-the-planet>. 
39 See Tom Flynn, The Triangular Constitution: Constitutional Pluralism in Ireland, the EU, and the ECHR 
(Hart 2019) 2–4. 
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suitable, necessary, and appropriate for achieving aims that are within the ECB’s 
competence, and whether a different programme, with fewer effects on economic and 
fiscal policy, could achieve the same monetary aims.40 More than this, the failure (as the 
BVerfG sees it) of the CJEU properly to conduct such a proportionality review in the 
exercise of its judicial review functions rendered the CJEU’s purported review 
‘meaningless’,41 and its judgment ‘[in]comprehensible’.42 Accordingly, on the BVerfG’s 
conception of the relationship between EU law and German law (which, let us remember, 
does not mirror that of the CJEU), the CJEU’s judgment has no binding force in Germany. 
Therefore, the BVerfG, in the absence of effective judicial control of a Union institution by 
the CJEU, declared the PSPP ultra vires. The Bundesbank was ordered not to take part in 
the programme, though the BVerfG stayed this last order for three months, in order to give 
the ECB time to conduct the proportionality review it had failed to engage in. It is possible 
that, if it (or, more likely, the Bundesbank on its behalf) does so to the satisfaction of the 
BVerfG, the German court will revisit its verdict. 
 
This was a momentous decision. In term of its theoretical fundamentals, though not the 
specific methods employed, I agree with it entirely: the kind of unqualified ‘supremacy’ 
(rather than the more circumspect ‘primacy’)43 of EU law, and of the CJEU as its interpreter, 
for which some scholars advocate44 has no basis in the Treaties or in constitutional theory, 
and fails to respect both the specific nature of the Union as a sui generis non-state legal 
order and the constitutions of the Member States. The more contingent, relational 
conception of the school of thought known as constitutional pluralism, where the Member 
States and the Union inhabit a legal heterarchy rather than a hierarchy,45 is both more 
descriptively accurate and more normatively desirable. 
 
However, though grounded in the best interpretation of the relationship between EU law 
and that of the Member States, the judgment should still give us pause in other respects: 
the case was brought by an array of academics, industrialists, and politicians with close 
links to right-wing political parties: not merely Angela Merkel’s CDU and its Bavarian sister 
party, the CSU, but also the crypto-(and sometimes not very crypto-)fascist Alternative für 
Deutschland. Undergirding the applicants’ case is a deeply unsavoury logic whereby the 
Union in general, and the Euro in particular, are a kind of German charity project, whereby 
Germany (and other ‘frugal’, ‘thrifty’, ‘industrious’, generally ‘northern’ states) graciously 
lets less ‘responsible’ (‘lazy’, ‘dishonest’, ‘southern’) Member States come along for the 
ride. Widespread across the German right, this worldview bears no relation to economic 
or social reality, and fails to acknowledge that the current setup of the Eurozone and the 
internal market is one from which Germany profits nicely. 
 
Of course, politically distasteful applicants can still have a good legal case, as was the 
case here. The trouble is that in several passages, the BVerfG repeats ordoliberal 
 
40 Though note that here the BVerfG is engaging in the same pretence as the CJEU and the Eurozone’s 
architects: that such aims are in fact severable. 
41 Weiss (BVerfG) (n 5) [127]. 
42 Ibid [133]. 
43 ‘Supremacy’ implies and requires an erga omnes hierarchy between norms or institutions within a single, 
integrated system or order. ‘Primacy’ is concerned with the in casu preference given to one norm or 
institution over another in the context of interacting but distinct systems or orders: see Matej Avbelj, 
‘Supremacy or Primacy of EU Law—(Why) Does it Matter?’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 744. 
44 See R Daniel Kelemen, ‘The Dangers of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Gareth Davies & Matej Avbelj (eds), 
Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism and EU Law (Elgar 2018) 403. 
45 See generally Flynn (n 39) and references therein. 
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bromides about the risk of the PSPP reducing the incentive for ‘certain’ (ha!) Member 
States46 to pursue ‘sound’ budgetary policies,47 as if the question of budgetary ‘soundness’ 
were an objective standard capable of guiding legal action, rather than an entirely 
contingent concept, which varies according to the particular politics and economic 
approach of the person doing the sums. 
 
The BVerfG’s judgment concerns matters that long predate the pandemic, and would have 
ruffled feathers in any circumstances. However, its publication during the pandemic has 
had two consequences. 
 
First, it has consequences to the rule of law crisis discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter: it has been used by those who criticise constitutional pluralism—and argue for the 
untrammelled hierarchical superiority of EU law—as further evidence that whatever its 
theoretical rigour, and regardless of the good intentions behind those who developed it, 
constitutional pluralism is now a useful tool of autocrats, whereby they can justify their 
deviation from European norms of democracy, rights, and the rule of law.48 After all, if the 
BVerfG (or the Italian Corte Costituzionale49 or the Danish Højesteret50) can contradict the 
CJEU, then any national court can, and there is nothing to stop Hungary or Poland from 
simply declaring ultra vires any CJEU judgment with which they disagree. The problem 
with this objection is that it regards all national courts—and all questioning of CJEU 
orthodoxy—as being essentially the same. Neither is the case. The German, Italian, and 
Danish courts, whatever one may think of their decisions, are legitimate, independent 
judicial bodies operating in functioning Rechstaaten. The same is absolutely not true of, 
say, the Hungarian Kúria or the post-‘reform’ courts of Poland. The opportunistic misuse 
of legitimate jurisprudence by government hirelings acting as judges in courts ‘captured’ 
by the executive does not discredit that jurisprudence. Besides, one may agree or disagree 
with the reasoning of the German, Italian, or Danish courts, but the reasoning is at least 
defensible: this is in contrast to some of the CJEU verdicts which have triggered Member 
State rejection, and similarly in contrast to the abusive jurisprudence and threadbare 
reasoning of, for example, the Kúria.51 
 
Secondly, the BVerfG judgment raises significant questions about the viability of the PEPP, 
a key element of the EU’s economic and financial (not monetary: let us be honest) 
response to the pandemic. It is true that a programme such as the PEPP may satisfy the 
CJEU,52 but it is also true that it does not take much to satisfy the CJEU where the question 
of the Union acting within its competences is concerned. The PEPP being subject to even 
fewer and looser safeguards, conditions, and restrictions than the PSPP, it cannot satisfy 
 
46 Weiss (BVerfG) (n 5) [137]. 
47 Ibid [171]. 
48 See R Daniel Kelemen, Piet Eeckhout, Federico Fabbrini, Laurent Pech, Renáta Uitz, ‘National Courts 
Cannot Override CJEU Judgments’, Verfassungsblog, 26 May 2020, <verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-
cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/>. 
49 Judgment 115/2018 (‘Taricco II’) (available in English at 
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S_2018_115_EN.pdf). 
50 Case 15/2014 of 6 Dec 2016, Dansk Industri (Ajos), available in English at 
http://www.supremecourt.dk/supremecourt/nyheder/pressemeddelelser/Documents/Judgment%2015-
2014.pdf. 
51 Hungarian Constitutional Court Decision 22/2016, available in English at 
<https://hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_22_2016.pdf>. 
52 Sebastian Grund, ‘The Legality of the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme’, Delors 
Institute Policy Brief (draft), March 2020, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3558677>. 
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the BVerfG in the light of its decision regarding the PSPP. This does not mean that the 
PEPP, or something like it, is impossible, but it does mean that the ECB will need to take 
a rather different approach if it is to satisfy the BVerfG that it is acting within the terms of 
its mandate and not infringing on areas rightly or wrongly (I think wrongly) hived off from 
Union competence. One might say that as a Union institution, subject only to the CJEU, 
the ECB should simply not concern itself with what the BVerfG has to say, and on the 
CJEU’s reading of Union law and its relationship with national constitutional law, one would 
be right. However, the reality of European integration is more complex, and, one way or 
another, the contradiction will have to be resolved. 
 
IV. The Way Forward 
 
The Covid-19 crisis, aside from its own terrible toll, has exposed pre-existing tensions in 
the EU like never before.  
 
It has given the EU’s most authoritarian national government the perfect opportunity to 
pursue its agenda with the barest minimum of scrutiny, and the response from the Union 
and the other Member States is exactly the kind of dispiriting shrug to which we have 
become accustomed. 
 
It coincided with a German court judgment of Union-wide importance, which brings to the 
very fore political, legal, and economic tensions within the Union—a judgment which came 
at perhaps the most inopportune time possible, just as the ECB was embarking on another 
round of asset purchases in an attempt to assist the Member States, particularly those 
doubly affected both by the Eurozone crisis and by the pandemic. 
 
The solution, in both instances, should not—perhaps cannot—be legal (or, rather, judicial). 
It must be political.  
 
As regards the rule of law crisis, the non-authoritarian Member States must finally live up 
to their responsibilities, and stop pretending that the abuse of democracy and 
constitutionalism in Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere is a merely ‘national’ problem. This 
may include Art 7 TEU’s procedure in defence of the rule of law being deployed to its full 
extent, but cannot be limited to this alone: heavy political pressure must be brought to bear. 
 
As regards the ECB’s actions, those of us who are not beholden to 1950s ordoliberal 
fantasy visions of political economy must recognise two contradictory truths. It is true that 
the PEPP, like the PSPP before it, is an important and necessary step (but only a step) in 
correcting the foundational and fundamental flaw in the Eurozone: that is a monetary union, 
but not a fiscal one. It is also true that the PEPP is arguably illegal under the Treaties as 
they currently stand. On this question, the CJEU is simply wrong, and the BVerfG is right, 
no matter how much we may disagree with those who took the case, or with the German 
court’s underlying political-economic assumptions. The only way to deal with this 
contradiction and reconcile these two truths with legal integrity and intellectual honesty is 
by Treaty amendment. This does not have to mean full-scale economic or fiscal integration. 
But it does mean some undoing of the unworkably bright line drawn between monetary 
policy on the one hand and fiscal and economic policy on the other. The Franco-German 
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proposal for a €500bn ‘recovery fund’ as part of the current EU budget negotiations53—
announced not long after the BVerfG judgment, but not in response to it—is a very small 
step in the right direction, but further demonstrates the limits of what can be achieved 
within the framework of the Treaties as they currently stand. 
 
Both of these solutions require the Member States to stop cowering behind the CJEU (in 
the context of democratic values and the rule of law) and the ECB (in the monetary and 
fiscal context), and to live up to their responsibilities as ‘Masters of the Treaties’. With 27 
Member States, each with their own treaty ratification procedures and particular national 
sensitivities, no doubt this will be difficult. That is not an excuse not to try: Covid-19 has 
shown us that crises will not wait for us to get our act together. 
 
  
 
53 ‘Initiative franco-allemande pour le relance européenne face à la crise du coronavirus’, French 
Presidency, 18 May 2020, <https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/05/18/initiative-franco-
allemande-pour-la-relance-europeenne-face-a-la-crise-du-coronavirus>; ‘Deutsch-französische Initiative 
zur wirtschaftlichen Erholung Europas nach der Coronakrise’, German Federal Government, 18 May 2020, 
<https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/deutsch-franzoesische-initiative-zur-wirtschaftlichen-
erholung-europas-nach-der-coronakrise-1753760>. 
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Abstract 
States of emergency test the limits of constitutionalism and our commitment to the rule of 
law (Dyzenhaus 2012). They tell us something about the ultimate power in a society and 
the very nature of state powers. French constitutions have a long history of arising from 
crises, revolutions and overthrows. The current political regime was born in 1958 at the 
time of the Algerian war of independence. More recently, the French have lived under a 
sustained period of emergency regulations following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 
November 2015. Now that a state of health emergency has been declared and extended 
it is possible to reflect on how key principles relating to the rule of law, such as legality and 
judicial control, are being re-shaped. This helps us to reflect on how the state seeks to 
command compliance from its citizens and how a balance is struck between necessity and 
legality. Key stages can be identified: a first stage when (judicial) control is muted and a 
second stage when judges re-assert their role once the risks linked to the pandemic have 
been curbed. This differentiation both confirms the risk of normalising an executive state 
of emergency (at the time of the peak) and the possibility of a judicial state of emergency 
emerging (once the first wave is over) (Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020). This brings into 
question how the next steps in the health emergency can be made subject to robust 
scrutiny and accountability mechanisms as necessity evolves. 
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Slautsky, for commenting on a previous draft.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Is the health emergency state confirming the “banalisation”,1 “normalisation”2 or 
“experimentation”3 of the exceptional trend that academics denounced regarding the state 
of emergency during the period 2015-2017 (triggered by the Paris attacks at the Bataclan 
and the Stadium of France on 13 November 2015)? The UN special rapporteur of the 
Human Rights Council on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism highlighted this risk in times of emergency across the 
world.4 In shifting the attention from a community’s potential for long-term well-being to its 
physical survival in the short term, states of emergency do not leave time and space for 
rational collective argumentation based on careful weighting between quantitative 
evidence and qualitative factors in an iterative and/or incremental manner. This leads to 
 
1 Jean-Louis Halpérin, Stéphanie Hennette Vauchez and Eric Millard (eds), L’état d’urgence, de l’exception 
à la banalisation (Presses Universitaires de Nanterre 2017).  
2 Stéphanie Hennette Vauchez, ‘Introduction’, in Ce qui reste(ra) toujours de l’urgence, 2018, 6-7. 
3 Véronique Champeil-Desplats ‘Aspects théoriques: Ce que l’état d’urgence fait à l’état de droit’, in Ce qui 
reste(ra) toujours de l’urgence, 2018, 33. 
4 Report to the UN Secretary General, UN Doc. A/72/43280, 27 September 2017, paragraph 16.  
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probes into whether the executive is all-powerful or whether courts and similar 
mechanisms provide for a form of judicial accountability, as Ginsburg and Versteeg have 
asserted.5 In answering this question for the French health emergency this paper highlights 
that states of emergency need to be looked at as processes with differentiated stages and 
constellations of actors, not as monoliths.  
 
A long tradition in legal scholarship discusses emergencies in terms of law versus facts 
(politics or morality): do we need to find solutions to emergencies in the law or outside of 
it?6 Revolving around the boundary between legality and extra-legality, this question  is 
especially relevant when it comes to enforcement and mechanisms to ensure citizens’ 
compliance, maybe against their consent. The legitimacy of this enforcement is related to 
a conservative function of the state of emergency: the state of emergency is supposed to 
ensure that public bodies and social life are safeguarded against a great evil so that 
“normal” life can resume with the usual freedoms and liberties. States of emergency test 
the commitment of a legal order to the principle of legality and the rule of law.7 
 
Among all the states of emergency established across the world to respond to the Covid-
19 pandemic, analysing one case in depth, such as the French health emergency, helps 
with developing a more analytical approach. Three features of French administrative law 
– true any time, anyway – magnify the bluntness of the decision-making available to French 
public bodies during the Covid-19 pandemic. First is the centralisation of power in the 
national government, in tandem with an endemic reluctance to decentralise decision-
making. Second is the limited space for dissenting voices in decision-making. Third is a 
narrow understanding of “legality” and compliance, based on a binary dogmatism with little 
room for pragmatism and flexibility. Yet, the Covid-19 pandemic highlights how these 
features are in need of adaptation when it comes to addressing new challenges.  
 
After a brief contextualisation of the state of emergency in France the different phases in 
the health emergency will be analysed, namely its adoption, its enforcement, its extension 
and the resistance against it. The signs of wear and tear that ordinary French 
administrative law faces given the Covid-19 pandemic lead to a call for reimagining French 
administrative law – making it fit for the challenges of the 2020s. 
 
II. A History of Crises  
 
France has a long constitutional history of crises, with a regime dealing with state 
emergencies (then in the form of état de siège) going back to the 19th century.8 At the end 
of the First World War the French High Administrative Court developed the doctrine of  
“exceptional circumstances”, according to which legality could be set aside when 
circumstances made it impossible for the administration to comply with the law, provided 
some conditions were met.9 This led to the inclusion in the 1958 Constitution of an article 
granting extensive powers to the French president in cases of serious and immediate 
 
5 Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, ‘Binding the Unbound Executive: Checks and Balances in Times of 
Pandemic,’ 25 May 2020, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3608974. 
6 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Legal and Extralegal Emergencies’, in Gregory Caldeira, Daniel Kelemen and 
Keith Whittington (eds), Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (OUP 2008) 165-184. 
7 David Dyzenhaus, ’States of emergency’, in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajó (eds), Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 442-462. 
8 Sébastien Platon, ‘From One State of Emergency to Another – Emergency Powers in France’, 
Verfassungsblog, 9 April 2020. 
9 C.E., 28 June 1918, Heyriès and C.E., 28 February 1919, Dol et Laurent. 
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threats to the institutions of the Republic and of interruption to the proper functioning of the 
constitutional public authorities. This was meant as an answer both to the peculiar 
circumstances of the French surrender in 1940 and to the Algerian war of independence. 
This last event also caused a statute10 – still in force today – to be adopted in 1955 to 
regulate “states of emergency”. This statute was amended to provide the legislative 
framework for dealing with the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. Many of the specific 
powers introduced to address the threats of new attacks were then enshrined in the 
ordinary criminal procedure, in effect enacting permanent changes in the normal legal 
framework. 
 
III. The Health Emergency as Adopted in the Law: Procedures vs. Circumstances 
 
When Covid-19 struck France social distancing was first introduced on 14 March.11 As the 
population did not comply with these first instructions the prime minister took more 
restrictive measures on 16 March based on “the exceptional circumstances resulting from 
the Covid-19 pandemic”. On 23 March the statute on the health emergency was adopted 
to introduce new provisions in four areas: public health, economic life, elections,12 and 
parliamentary processes. In particular, the statute lists ten areas where individual 
freedoms can be curtailed, including a ban on free circulation except for essential travel, a 
ban on gatherings and restrictions on the freedom to trade. In cases of repeated breaches 
of the ban on circulation a criminal sanction of up to six months jail and 3,750 EUR fine 
was provided for. Three comments can be made about this system concerning the 
efficiency of governmental action, time malleability, and the limited parliamentary and 
judicial control over the state of emergency. 
 
First, this state of health emergency has led to centralising power around the prime minister 
and the Home Office (in charge of public security), with the support of the préfets (i.e., 
representatives of the state at the departmental level) in order to maintain public order and 
public health.13 In addition, as from 24 March, a scientific advisory body was set up to 
advise the French president in tandem with the “Comité analyse, recherche et expertise”.14 
On 24 March the French president declared, “We will overcome the virus thanks to science 
and medicine”.15 French scholarship has expressed doubts as to whether covid-19 
necessitated this totally new system as the previous 1955 emergency system was already 
available for cases of “events presenting, by their nature and seriousness, the character 
of a public calamity". Tweaks to the existing system may have been possible.16 Indeed, it 
 
10 Loi n°55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l'état d'urgence. 
11 Arrêté du 14 mars 2020 portant diverses mesures relatives à la lutte contre la propagation du virus 
covid-19. For a starting point into the many implementing measures and most important political speeches, 
see: https://www.vie-publique.fr/dossier/273938-dossier-coronavirus-mesures-pour-endiguer-lepidemie-
discours-publics. 
12 Olivier Béaud, ‘La surprenante invocation de l’article 16 dans le débat sur le report du second tour des 
élections municipales’, JP Blog, 23 March 2020.  
13 Senate, Deuxième rapport d’étape sur la mise en œuvre de l’état d’urgence sanitaire, 29 April 2020, 
Mission de suivi de la loi d’urgence pour faire face à l’épidémie de Covid-19 (hereafter Senate, Second 
report), 91-93. 
14 https://www.enseignementsup-recherche.gouv.fr/cid151204/le-comite-analyse-recherche-et-expertise-
care-covid-19.html. 
15 https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/03/24/medecins-chercheurs-et-scientifiques-mobilises-
contre-le-covid-19. 
16 Olivier Beaud, ‘L'état d'urgence sanitaire: était-il judicieux de créer un nouveau régime d'exception?’, 
(2020) Recueil Dalloz 891; Jean-Eric Gicquel, ‘Covid-19: crise sanitaire et crise des normes’, (2020) 
Recueil Dalloz 719; J. Petit, ‘L'état d'urgence sanitaire’, (2020) AJDA 833.  
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has been argued that most of the measures to fight Covid-19 had already been taken the 
day before the statute was adopted.  
 
Second, the health emergency has impacted the time taken over the law-making process. 
For instance, time was especially squeezed for the adoption of the statute on 23 March. 
Adopted in less than three days (from 20-22 March), the bill was discussed without any 
real opportunity for amendments:17 there were repeated calls during the discussions to 
shorten discussions and press ahead, and for comments to be limited to essential 
matters.18  
 
Third, the health emergency has been subject to little parliamentary or judicial control over 
executive decision-making.19 By way of parliamentary control, two missions, one of 
information (Lower Chamber) and one of monitoring (Upper Chamber),20 are provided for. 
The former is chaired by a person close to the president, Richard Ferrand. For the 2015 
emergency MPs could ask for investigations on the spot or hearings, an option that was 
not made available to MPs in the 23 March statute.  
 
Control by constitutional, administrative and ordinary judges is also limited. In addition to 
the 23 March statute, an “organic” statute had been adopted to suspend time limits in 
preliminary references to the Constitutional Council: preliminary references pertaining to 
the constitutionality of the health emergency could hence be delayed until at least 
September 2020, thus escaping scrutiny when it would be most needed. The adoption of 
this statute had to comply with time requirements in accordance with the French 
Constitution: normally such a bill needs to wait for fourteen days between being tabled and 
being discussed. Covid-19 did not allow for such a delay.21 However, in its ruling on this 
organic statute the Constitutional Council confirmed its constitutionality despite the obvious 
breach of the constitution, due to the “peculiar circumstances of the case”.22 
 
IV. The Health Emergency as Enforced:23 Legality, Prevention and Repression  
 
The health emergency caused many practical questions to arise regarding its 
implementation and enforcement. This provides food for thought regarding a better 
understanding of how “legality” is conceived under French administrative law. “Legality” is 
highly specific, heavily reliant on sanctions by police and directed towards the efficiency of 
governmental action (i.e. central vs. local level) with little leeway for differentiation. 
 
First, the legality principle in administrative action may refer to the fact that a statutory 
basis is needed to justify administrative decisions, especially when they limit individual 
 
17 Paul Cassia, ‘L’état d’urgence sanitaire: remède, placebo ou venin juridique?’, Mediapart, 23 March 2020.  
18 Pierre Januel, ‘Le Sénat en état d’urgence sanitaire’, Dalloz Actualité, 20 March 2020.   
19 Manon Altwegg-Boussac, ‘La fin des apparences’, Revue des droits de l’homme, Actualités Droits-
Libertés, (http://journals.openedition.org/revdh/9022). 
20 Senate, Commission des lois, 10 premiers jours d’état d’urgence sanitaire : premiers constats - Analyse 
des décrets et ordonnances (justice, intérieur, collectivités territoriales, fonction publique), 2 April  2020);  
Senate, Second report (n. 13).  
21 https://actu.dalloz-etudiant.fr/le-billet/article/un-nouveau-repli-du-conseil-constitutionnel-dans-son-role-
de-contrepoids/h/a1247a77d164c980639f8913ab0be8bf.html.  
22 CC, Décision n°2020-799 DC, 26 March 2020, Loi organique d'urgence pour faire face à l'épidémie de 
covid-19, §3 (available at https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2020/2020799DC.htm). 
23 For an overview of the enforcement measures (staff, technologies etc), see Senate, Second report, (n. 13) 
32 ff.  
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freedoms. In the case of Covid-19 the case law-based justification of “exceptional 
circumstances” was first relied upon, then dismissed in favour of a formal statutory-based 
exception, although it came back through the window in the constitutional case law in the 
form of “peculiar circumstances”. In addition, the French High Administrative Court has a 
particular understanding of the legality principle. As of 1 May the French High 
Administrative Court had decided eighty cases based on a specific procedure called 
“référé-liberté”, a procedure allowing a quick process when public bodies have harmed 
individual freedoms in a serious and obviously illegal way. In most cases the French High 
Administrative Court dismissed the challenges (often at the admissibility stage). In the very 
few cases where it did not, it asked the government to specify some aspects of its 
regulations, although with some oddities. One of the cases, decided the day before the 
health emergency was adopted, asked the government to clarify the exemptions to the 
lockdown for health grounds, to reassess the possibility of short trips near the home and 
to assess the risks caused by open-air markets.24 Another decision led to the curious result 
that the government had to adapt its soft law guidance on the use of bikes during the 
lockdown but not to amend its hard law regulation in any way.25 In both cases, the 
contribution of the French High Administrative Court to what counts as legality for 
protecting individual freedoms was minimal during the peak of the health emergency. 
 
Second, respect for the legality principle is paramount when it comes to implementing the 
law and exercising coercive powers. Normally, “administrative policing”, a well-developed 
concept relying on the key idea that “freedom is the principle and restrictions the 
exception”, is used to balance individual freedom with public order (and matters such as 
public health), with an emphasis on prevention using administrative tools instead of 
repression through (criminal) sanctions. However, the health emergency reshapes this 
classic understanding: it organises repression and criminal sanctions up to incarceration 
in cases of infringement of the measures limiting freedom of circulation.26 The government 
wanted to send a strong signal to the population with heavy criminal sanctions (up to six 
months in jail in cases of four violations). The enforcement by the police of these provisions 
has implications for individual freedoms and the risks of abuse have been real. For 
instance, problems of interpretation by the police force have been flagged up due to the 
sloppy formulation of the offences.27 Very little guidance was provided to the police 
regarding which travel was allowed. In other cases, the police resorted to extensive 
surveillance techniques in order to ensure compliance. In Paris it rolled out drones, which 
led to concerns over privacy.28 All in all, “legality” seems to be underpinned by the need to 
force citizens to comply with legal requirements at any cost. 
 
Third, the uneasy balance between (central) legality designed in Paris and its 
implementation to address local circumstances is also a key element of French 
administrative law. Centralisation reaches very far. Many mayors tried to take measures 
to address the Covid-19 pandemic in their local government, some introducing curfews, 
 
24 C.E., 22.03.2020 (ord), n°439.674, Syndicat Jeunes Médecins.  
25 C.E., 30.04.2020 (ord), n°440.179, Fédération française des usagers de la bicyclette; 
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Actualites/Communiques/Situation-relative-aux-autorisations-de-deplacement-
a-velo-dans-le-cadre-du-confinement. 
26 Jean-Claude Planque, ‘Le droit pénal bousculé par le covid-19’, The Conversation, 11 May 2020.  
27 Senate, Second report, (n. 13) 40. 
28 Jean-Michel Normand, ‘Confinement: la surveillance policière par drones dénoncée par deux 
associations’, Le Monde, 4 May 2020. After the complete lockdown ended, the Conseil d’Etat forbade this 
(C.E., 18 May 2020, n°440.442 and 440.445 (ord.), Association La Quadrature du Net and Ligue des droits 
de l’homme).    
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some forbidding access to open spaces or closing down hotels. In many cases they had 
to backtrack as the central government found these measures inappropriate.29  
 
One case sheds interesting light on this “central legality”, that of the Ville de Sceaux.30 The 
Ligue des droits de l’homme challenged the decision of this local government to require 
masks for people circulating on the streets. The Home Office joined the challenge: it 
considered that the local by-law was implying that citizens could move freely on the streets 
at a time when people were not supposed to do so according to the national statutory 
framework. The French High Administrative Court quashed the local by-law: local 
provisions based on general administrative policing (i.e., to protect security, salubrity and 
tranquillity) cannot derogate to a case of special policing (here: health protection) as a 
matter of principle. Only if two conditions were met could the mayor derogate from the 
national measures: firstly, when local specificities required the derogation; secondly, 
provided that the consistency and efficiency of the national provisions were not put in 
jeopardy. The principle and the first exception are in line with previous case law. However, 
the second condition is a striking innovation: the French High Administrative Court is not 
supposed to innovate but to follow case law closely when a decision is taken in speedy 
proceedings.31 As a consequence, mayors have seen curtailing of their ability to take 
measures differing from the national policy. This situation causes one to wonder: what 
matters most with legality in France? Uniformity across the country or efficient compliance 
despite differing needs in concrete local circumstances? In other words: legality for the 
sake of legality or legality for the sake of citizens’ well-being? 
 
V. The Health Emergency Extended: Exiting the Lockdown Incrementally  
 
Exiting the lockdown is challenging for most countries: governments face competing 
demands to relaunch the economy and re-establish individual freedoms on the one hand 
and to prevent the virus from reappearing on the other hand. On 11 May a statute extended 
the health emergency until 10 July. Once the emergency was extended critical voices 
became more insistent among the French population32 and legal scholarship.33 The 
political discussions behind the extension of the health emergency have revolved around 
two key matters: first, mandatory isolation; secondly, tracing people in contact with sick 
people.  
 
Regarding mandatory isolation, a loosening of the governmental approach can be noticed. 
In the first announcements mandatory isolation was widely conceived of to include 
vulnerable people and any person reported sick with Covid-19 on the French territory. 
However, the opposition to such a broad limitation to the freedom of circulation led the 
government to clarify that isolation would be voluntary in principle and that mandatory 
isolation would be limited to people travelling from abroad. Further exceptions were added 
for travellers coming from the EU, the Schengen space and the UK. Isolation for sick and 
vulnerable people would be purely voluntary. Asked to scrutinise the constitutionality of 
 
29 Senate, Second report, (n. 13) p. 28. 
30 C.E., 17.04.2020, n°440.057 (ord.): ‘Le maire presque privé de pouvoirs de police pour lutter contre le 
coronavirus’, (2020) AJDA 815. 
31 Paul Cassia, ‘Le Conseil d’Etat démasque Sceaux, et vice-versa’, Mediapart, 19 April 2020. 
32 Matthieu Goar, ‘Gestion du coronavirus: l’exécutif français jugé plus durement que ses homologues 
européens’, Le Monde, 2 May 2020. 
33 Paul Cassia, ‘Le confinement: 67 millions de privations arbitraires de la liberté de circuler’, Mediapart, 13 
May 2020. 
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this extension, the Constitutional Council accepted these measures as constitutional 
provided that they were so interpreted that any measures forbidding a person to leave 
his/her home for longer periods than twelve hours a day would be authorized by a judge.34 
 
Regarding tracing people who had been in contact with sick people, two different strategies 
have been devised. The first one relies on human intervention, namely the training of small 
teams visiting the homes of people at risks, taking samples and educating them on 
protective behaviour. 20,000 to 30,000 people are needed to “break” the transmission of 
the virus among the population in this way. This means a highly resource-intensive system 
for tracing the virus. The second strategy relies on new technologies, namely an app called 
StopCovid. Problems have surfaced, with a risk of habituation to being monitored by 
technologies among the population,35 complex technical implementation and a lack of 
guaranteed success. The app has been delayed. The Constitutional Council interpreted 
the statute extending the health emergency in such a way that the data for scientific 
research had to be anonymised; it also considered some provisions to be non-
constitutional. These included, first, the requirement for assent to the implementation 
decrees from the French data protection authority; secondly, the obligation for public 
bodies to transfer their decisions pertaining to tracing to the Senate and the National 
Assembly.36 This leaves a black hole when it comes to the monitoring of data processing 
in the coming weeks and months. The legality of this app is being shaped incrementally in 
an arm-wrestling match between public authorities and private technological firms37 as 
much as between the executive and the legislative.  
 
VI. The Health Emergency as Resisted: Discussion, Contestation, Monitoring 
  
Polls showed a broad consensus regarding the French health emergency at first. Protests 
emerged only marginally, a striking feat for a country where the situation was rather 
different only a few weeks before. The “yellow vests” had been challenging Macron’s 
reforms for months in 2018-19 and painful reforms to the retirement system triggered 
demonstrations until the start of Covid-19. However, as the lockdown began getting longer, 
increasing opposition arose. Seventy criminal complaints were logged against the prime 
minister and the ministers of health, justice and/or the Home Office for their management 
of the crisis, for instance. At least three different levels of resistance to the health 
emergency can be identified, which could shape the exit from the lockdown, administrative 
law and life beyond it.  
 
First, scientific, civic and scholarly discussions have flourished during Covid-19. If the 
French president has relied on science to address the pandemic, scientific controversies 
have quickly emerged, most famously in relation to hydroxychloroquine.38 Civil society and 
MPs have started an open consultation on how society could look after Covid-19.39 In 
scholarly circles Covid-19 has sparked discussions in traditional and modern media to an 
 
34 CC, Décision n°2020-800 DC, 11 May 2020, Loi prorogeant l'état d'urgence sanitaire et complétant ses 
dispositions, paragraph 43. 
35 Senate, Second report, (n. 13) 77-85. 
36 CC, Décision n°2020-800 DC, (n. 34), paragraphs 67, 70, 77-78, 82. 
37 Damien Leloup, ‘Application StopCovid: La France isolée dans son bras de fer avec Apple et Google’, Le 
Monde, 28 April 2020. 
38 Emmanuel Drouet, ‘Chloroquine et infections virales: Ce qu’il faut savoir’, The Conversation, 6 April  
2020.  
39 https://lejourdapres.parlement-ouvert.fr/. 
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extent never witnessed before. One academic has drafted a petition for the “return to 
ordinary legality”.40 
 
Second, civil society has been organising its activity in various ways, including a “réseau 
de vigilance sur l’état d’urgence sanitaire”,41 which monitors administrative action and its 
possible abuses. The Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme has set 
up a monitoring centre dedicated to the lockdown situation.42 Civil society is also actively 
involved in challenging administrative measures. The “référés-libertés” in front of the 
administrative judge mentioned above are most-often initiated by professional 
organisations and not-for-profits, representing sectorial, professional and social interests. 
Even though they did not succeed in clearly curbing the course of the health emergency 
in the first phase of the health emergency, their indirect impact cannot be understated. 
This willingness to call public bodies to account has led mayors to withdraw their by-laws 
once judicial challenges have been initiated. 
 
Third, a wave of criticism has arisen against the French High Administrative Court, 
perceived as the protector of the executive during this crisis.43 One specific issue pertains 
to its dual role of being both an advisor to the government and an administrative judge.44 
In the 2000s a discussion emerged around the application of article 6 Eur Conv H R to this 
institution, with Strasbourg eventually accepting this dual role and some of its associated 
features. At the time French academics strongly defended these specificities.45 Today, this 
willingness has faded away: academics and practitioners denounce the lack of 
independence of the administrative judge.46 They pinpoint that most challenges against 
administrative measures have been rejected, and the ones which have not been rejected 
are more symbolic than substantive.47 The head of the French High Administrative Court, 
Bruno Laserre, and the head of the litigation section, Jean-Denis Combrexelle,48 have tried 
to defend their institution – but to no avail.  
 
The awkward position held by the Conseil d’Etat, between the executive and citizens, 
between responsiveness to necessity and protection of individual freedoms, has come 
very much to light with Covid-19. From the moment easing out from the lockdown came 
 
40 Olivier Pluen, ‘Réflexion sur la diffusion de la doctrine pendant l’état d’urgence sanitaire, suivie d’une 
proposition de loi ou pétition visant à favoriser le retour à la «légalité ordinaire»’, RDLF 2020 chron. n°39.  
41 https://www.voxpublic.org/Verbalisations-abusives-le-Reseau-de-veille-sur-l-etat-d-urgence-
sanitaire.html?lang=fr.  
42 https://www.cncdh.fr/fr/travaux-en-cours/observatoire-de-letat-durgence-sanitaire-et-du-confinement.  
43 See above section IV. 
44 John Bell, ‘What is the function of the Conseil d'Etat in the preparation of legislation?’ (2000) 49(3) ICLQ 
661. 
45 John Bell, ‘From ‘Government Commissioner’ to ‘Public Reporter’: A Transformation in French 
Administrative Court Procedure?’ (2010) 16(4) European Public Law 533–538; Axel Barbelin, ‘Rapporteur 
public: chronique d’une controverse annoncée’, (2010) AJDA 1574. 
46 Mathieu Touzeil-Divina, ‘Quand le Conseil d’Etat n’avance plus masqué pour réaffirmer qu’il est, même 
en juridiction, le Conseil «d’Etat» et non «des collectivités» - Observations sur C.E., Ord., 17 April 2020,  
Commune de Sceaux (n°440.057) à propos de l’obligation du port du masque dans l’espace public 
(municipal)’, Journal de droit administratif 18 April 2020. William Bourdon and Vincent Brengarth, ‘Le 
Conseil d’Etat se dévitalise alors qu’il devrait être l’ultime bastion des libertés’, Le Monde, 12 April 2020. 
47 Some criticisms are strong (e.g. Paul Cassia, ‘Etat d’urgence sanitaire: Le Conseil d’Etat (ne) change 
(que) sa méthode’, Mediapart, 2 May 2020); some more nuanced (e.g. Claire Saunier, ‘La position délicate 
du juge des référés face à la crise sanitaire: entre interventionisme ambigu et déférence nécessaire’, JP 
Blog, 11 April 2020).  
48 Jean-Denis Combrexelle, ‘Les juges administratifs du Conseil d’Etat se situent loin des polémiques’, Le 
Monde, 12 April 2020.  
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closer it started taking a different stance towards the legality of the administrative 
decisions. While no administrative decisions pertaining to the health emergency were 
quashed from March 23 onwards, the French High Administrative Court ordered the 
administration to provide masks in prisons on 8 May.49 The approaching easing out of the 
lockdown as from 11 May features clearly in the judgment.50 This judgment was then 
followed by two decisions, one enjoining public authorities to stop using drones in public 
spaces in Paris51 and the other enjoining changes to the regulation of religious 
celebrations.52 It has been noted that these judicial decisions, although technically taken 
in the form of speedy proceedings and thus temporary, have become final: the very 
compliance by the executive with these decisions makes any further proceedings 
redundant.53 
 
VII. The Health Emergency and a “New Normal” Legality: Reimagining 
Administrative Law?   
 
The health emergency sheds light on the need to reimagine the conceptual, instrumental 
and functional components of French administrative law, to reconcile individual autonomy 
and collective concern for the common good. In more general terms, the very notion of 
“legality” may have to be re-visited to move beyond a positivist and black-letter approach 
to what it means beyond the legality/illegality dichotomy and why legality is a key feature 
of the rule of law. Factors such as time, quantitative and qualitative evidence for 
administrative decision-making, balancing individual privacy with collective health and 
spatial decentralisation and differentiation, impartial review of administrative action, 
exercising coercive powers in the light of social cohesion, and improved flows of better-
explained information (inside the administration, between administrations and public 
bodies, across society) would all need to be given some place in the next administrative 
covenant in France. A new articulation between legality and extra-legality is needed. 
French administrative law could help provide conceptual frames and a practical toolkit to 
articulate the social and the political spheres for living together. Such a renewal of French 
administrative law scholarship is much needed to address the social and economic 
consequences resulting from Covid-19 – in France and beyond. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
49 C.E., 7.05.2020 (ord.), n°440.151, Garde des Sceaux. 
50 Paragraphs 21, 25-26, 29, 33. 
51 C.E., 18 May 2020, n°440.442 and 440.445 (ord.), Association La Quadrature du Net and Ligue des 
droits de l’homme. Olivia Tambou, ‘Que faire face au développement des drones? Libres propos autour de 
l’ordonnance du Conseil d’État’, Dalloz Actualité, 25 May 2020. 
52 C.E., 18 May 2020, n°440.366, 440.380, 440.410, 440.531, 440.550, 440.562, 440.563 and 440.590 (ord.), 
W. 
53 John Bell, ‘The importance of urgent interim orders in contesting French government rules on covid-19’, 
British Association of Comparative Law Blog, 3 June 2020.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The lockdown restrictions brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic have also impacted the 
administration of justice around the world. Faced with the impossibility of human contact, 
judges and prosecutors have had to postpone investigations and suspend hearings and 
other justice-related activities during the pandemic. Taking note of these delays, 
international bodies have called on States to ensure that justice remains possible. Indeed, 
as stressed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 
today ‘a functioning judiciary is more essential than ever.’2   
 
Covid-19 has not only impacted justice systems in working democracies and peaceful 
States. It has also affected States undergoing conflict situations and engaged in 
transitional justice processes like Colombia. In such contexts, Covid-19 becomes one 
more factor to be considered when trying to fight impunity and stop human rights and 
humanitarian law violations. In such contexts, the question is not only about how to ensure 
justice but also, equally important: how to ensure that accountability mechanisms, like the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) in Colombia, are able to fulfil victims’ right to justice, 
while at the same time providing them with meaningful participation throughout the 
process. This question appears crucial given that victims’ participation is arguably not only 
a right but also, a key element of the healing and reparation process that both victims and 
society need, to come to terms with the legacy of mass atrocities. Victims not only need 
justice to be done, they also need to experience that justice is done. This can be achieved 
through their active participation in judicial proceedings.  
 
This paper explores some of the challenges faced by victims to ensure that their right to 
participate in transitional justice accountability mechanisms remains a reality in times of 
Covid-19. In particular, it considers victims’ participation through the use of Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs), particularly virtual hearings.3 The paper looks at 
these issues in the context of the work of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia, 
an accountability mechanism established by the Peace Agreement signed between the 
Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 
 
1 This article has been written as part of the AHRC funded project ‘Legitimacy, Accountability, Victims’ 
Participation and Reparation in Transitional Justice Settings – Lessons from and for Colombia’.  
2 Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, ‘Coronavirus Emergency: Challenges 
for the Justice System;, April 2020, available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25816&LangID=E. 
3 The use of ICTs in Colombia to facilitate the work of transitional justice mechanisms is not new. For 
example, ICTs have been used both as part of the implementation of the Justice and Peace Law, the 
transitional justice framework set up by Law 975/2005 in Colombia to deal primarily with the accountability 
of demobilised members of the paramilitary, and by civil society organisations.  
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Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) in 2016.4 It is divided into two sections. 
The first one considers the possibility to ensure victims’ participation in contexts of 
inequality, insecurity, and lack of access to ICTs in times of Covid-19. The second 
considers the use of virtual hearings, to identify the requirements such hearings must fulfil 
to ensure victims’ right to participate in such mechanisms. The article concludes with some 
final reflections on how to ensure victims’ participation at the SJP during the pandemic.  
 
II. Is it Possible to Ensure Victims’ Participation in Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
in Times of Covid-19? 
 
Impunity for mass atrocities is the rule in States undergoing transitional justice processes. 
It is possible because often those in power do not want the truth to be known or those 
guilty to be punished, as has been the case in Guatemala, Sri Lanka and El Salvador, but 
also because it is difficult to investigate and prosecute those responsible for serious 
crimes. Most States, undergoing processes of transition are still facing violence where 
many continue to be killed, disappeared, or displaced, and many others are under threat. 
Such conditions are serious impediments to justice. How can it be possible to recover and 
secure evidence in the middle of an armed conflict? How can it be possible to guarantee 
that a witness can appear in court to give her or his testimony without being killed? In 
addition, in countries that have been and continue to be devastated by war, the means to 
carry out investigations and prosecutions with due diligence are almost non-existent. For 
example, investigating the Rwandan genocide was a massive challenge, ‘it started with 
the basic realities of life in a society in which both lives and institutions were shattered by 
genocide.’5  
 
This means that in places devastated by conflict and with millions of victims, including 
Colombia, fulfilling victims’ right to justice remains a major challenge, and this challenge 
grows exponentially with Covid-19. Indeed, Covid-19 is affecting conflict zones, where 
many victims are located, and where armed groups and illegal economies are at work. In 
those areas, as stated by the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), ‘the institutions of the 
State are limited, infrastructure is reduced, access to goods and services is minimal, and 
people are exposed to the control of different criminal factions.’6 
 
It is in these types of contexts where transitional justice processes and mechanisms try to 
do their best to ensure accountability for those responsible for crimes. But today, in 
contrast to what happened during the Nuremberg trials,7 where victims did not participate 
whatsoever, victims are meant to play central stage in the fight for justice and 
accountability through the recognition of their right to participate in criminal proceedings 
both domestically and internationally. That they are allowed to participate, to exercise this 
right, is crucial in transitional societies as that gives recognition to victims,8 to their harms 
and the violations suffered by them. It also helps them to rebuild trust in society and the 
 
4 Peace Agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 2016, p. 9.  
5 Human Rights Watch, ‘Law and Reality: Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda’, 2008, section V.  
6 FIP, ‘Impactos y Riesgos del Covid-19 en la Pazs y las Dinámicas del Conflicto’, 2020, p. 4, available at: 
http://ideaspaz.org/media/website/FIP_COVID19_web_FINAL_V3.pdf. 
7 Susanne Karstedt, ‘For Absence to Presence, From Silence to Voice: Victims in International and 
Transitional Justice Since the Nuremberg Trials’, (2010) 17 Intl Rev Victimology 9. 
8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951).  
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State’s institutions and may trigger an important reparatory experience.9 Today, justice 
without victims is simply not justice. 
 
While this right of victims to participate in criminal proceedings has been upheld by courts 
and international bodies, the scope of this right remains contentious given that it clashes 
and is often in tension with various rights of an accused person, particularly their right to 
fair trial, and may also clash with the goals of the justice mechanism.10 However, we would 
argue that at the very least, the right of victims to participate in proceedings requires that 
victims are able to access justice mechanisms in a voluntary manner, based on adequate 
and timely information about how the justice proceedings work and what they offer.11 Also,  
their participation must be effective (and not merely symbolic) as they should be provided 
with a real opportunity to influence the outcomes of the justice process by, for example, 
being heard,12 and being able to present evidence or to object to evidence.13 For victims 
to participate, they also need enablers such as adequate legal representation,14 security 
measures15 and access to psychosocial support. For this participation to be truly reparatory 
and restorative, victims must be treated with dignity, with equality and non-discrimination, 
and new harm should be avoided.16 Victims’ participation in justice mechanisms should be 
the result of permanent and meaningful consultation with them. 
     
Based on these minimum principles that give meaning to a holistic right to participation, 
we can determine whether in countries emerging from conflict and undergoing a 
transitional justice process, like Colombia, it is possible to give effect to this right. In the 
case of Colombia, it should be noted that this right has been recognised in various legal 
instruments and judicial decisions, including in the normative documents that establish the 
mandate of transitional accountability mechanisms like the Justice and Peace Law as well 
as the ones establishing the SJP.17 Certainly, Covid-19 generates a new challenge for an 
already fragile accountability mechanism as is the SJP. According to the SJP prosecutor 
unit (UIA in Spanish), armed groups have been taking advantage of quarantine measures 
during Covid-19, to violate victims’ rights.18 Likewise social leaders have been murdered 
at a rate of one person every 64 hours.19 Equally, during Covid-19, the possibility to reach 
out to victims is even more limited given that social distancing becomes necessary and 
 
9 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’ in (2012) 51 Nomos 44. 
10 Salvatore Zappalà, ‘The Rights of Victims v. The Rights of the Accused’, (2010) 8(1) J Intl Crim J 137. 
11 Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-454/2006, magistrate Jaime Córdoba Triviño. 
12 Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-209/2007, magistrate Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa and C-
616/2014, magistrate Jorge Ignacio Pretelt Chaljub. 
13 Claire Garbett, ‘From Passive Objects to Active Agents: Changing Conceptions of Victim Identities at the 
ICTY and ICC’, (2016) 15(1) J Hum Rts 40. Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-516/2007, magistrate Jaime 
Córdoba Triviño.  
14 Luc Walleyn, ‘Victims’ Participation in ICC Proceedings: Challenges Ahead’  (2016) 16 Intl Crim L Rev 
995. 
15 Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-782/2012, magistrate Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva. 
16 Lorenn Walker and Katherine Wormer, Restorative Justice Today: Practical Applications (London, Sage, 
2013).  
17 Ley 975 de 2005, Article 37, Decreto 3391, 29 September 2006, Article 8, Decreto 315, 7 September 
2007, Article 2, JEP, Appeals Section, Interpretation Decision TP-SA-SENIT 1, 3 April 2019, par. 64-71. 
18 Unidad de investigación y Acusación de la JEP, Dinámicas de Violencia, Afectación a Civiles y Control 
Social Durante la Cuarentena en Colombia: Un Análisis de los Factores de Riesgo en los Territorios y las 
Poblaciones de Interés para la jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, 2020, p. 20, available at: 
https://www.jep.gov.co/JEP/SiteAssets/Paginas/uia/Sala-de-
prensa/Un%20an%C3%A1lisis%20de%20los%20factores%20de%20riesgo%20en%20los%20territorios%
20y%20las%20poblaciones%20de%20inter%C3%A9s%20para%20la%20UIA-JEP.pdf. 
19 Ibid, p. 17. 
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many victims lack adequate ICTs facilities. Yet, ‘technology provides new avenues for 
participation, enabling people to engage with the world and seek change in new ways’.20 
We argue in this article that ICTs offer important windows of opportunity for victims in 
Colombia to exercise their right to participation before the SJP even if challenges remain 
in place. We consider that these challenges can be surmounted through the use of specific 
measures that would permit the realisation of all principles that have been mentioned. 
 
We acknowledge that victims in Colombia have expressed their concerns about using ICTs 
to permit their participation in the SJP proceedings. For example, the president of the 
Asociación de Reclamantes de Tierra y Paz has indicated that ‘many persons in rural areas 
are victims, and we do not have the tools to communicate with others, we lack these 
resources and we would not have how to participate actively.’ Another victim has also 
indicated that ‘some could have the technology, but they do not know how to use it for a 
videoconference’.21 In Colombia, more than half of the population has access to the 
internet, and the expansion of internet networks has increased significantly in recent 
years.22 However, the digital divide remains big for the poor and those living in rural areas, 
many of which are victims of the conflict.23  
 
Despite the challenges, in Colombia there are various factors that could enable the use of 
ICTs to fulfil the right of victims to participate in judicial proceedings. First, the SJP has 
taken significant steps to deliver justice for victims,24 and it knows that failure to deliver will 
only affect its legitimacy. From early March 2020, the SJP took measures to prevent and 
avoid risks of contagion of staff and victims, such as suspending time limits in proceedings, 
changing work schedules and implementing telecommunication work, among others.25 The 
SJP shifted its work through virtual and electronic means, to respond to information 
requests, habeas corpus petitions, receiving reports from victims and victims’ 
organizations and adjudicating on issues related to the release from custody of the 
accused.26 But, transitional justice services must not postpone their activities indefinitely 
taking into account victims’ urgent claims and needs. Transitional justice work should 
continue even in the hardest of circumstances, as a tool and as a hope to victims. If 
necessary, justice should proceed outside the courtroom.27   
 
 
20 Helena Puig Larrauri, ‘The Use of New Technologies: Expanding Opportunities for Peacebuilding?’ 
(2013) Critical Reflection, Centre for Peacebuilding KOFF, swisspeace. 
21 Valentina Parada Lugo, ‘Las Preocupaciones de las Victimas durante la Pandemia’, El Espectador, 28 
April 2020. 
22 Robert Muggah and Gustavo Diniz, ‘Using Information and Communication Technologies for Violence 
Prevention in Latin America” in New Technology and Prevention of Violence and Conflict’  in Francesco 
Mancini (ed), New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict (New York: International Peace 
Institute, April 2013). 
23 OECD, ‘Colombia Must Boost Digital Transformation and Take Further Steps to Ensure Benefits are 
Shared by All’, 25 October 2019, available at: https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/colombia-must-boost-
digital-transformation-and-take-further-steps-to-ensure-benefits-are-shared-by-all.htm. 
24 Laura Dulce Romero, Cómo se debe preparar la JEP para las diligencias virtuales en medio de la 
pandemia?, El Espectador, 10 May 2020. 
25 All of the SJP and National government measures regarding Covid-19 are available at: 
https://www.jep.gov.co/Paginas/covid-19.aspx. 
26 See SJP, AOG 014 2020, available at: 
https://www.jep.gov.co/organosgobierno/Acuerdo%20AOG%20No%20014%20de%202020.pdf.  
27 As the President of the Caribbean Court of Justice, Justice Adrian Saunders, said: ‘A court is not a 
place; it is a service.’ Adrian Saunders, ‘The Court as a service not a place’, 2020, available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/dohadeclaration/en/news/2020/05/the-court-as-a-service-and-not-a-place.html. 
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Second, in Colombia there are important and solid networks in place, both State institution 
networks as well as civil society networks. Both of these could facilitate participation. 
Indeed, the SJP is part of a ‘system’ where various mechanisms are present to achieve 
the goals of transitional justice including the Truth Commission, the Commission for 
Missing Persons and the integral system for victims. All of them working together, and in 
conjunction with other State institutions, such as the Prosecutor’s Office, the 
Ombudsman’s Office, the Office of the Attorney General and others, could provide an 
important platform for victims to come forward and make their voices heard in judicial 
proceedings. These networks of State institutions are not alone. Indeed, Colombia has 
very strong civil society organisations that reach victims across the country, regardless of 
race, sex, gender, ethnicity or political ideology. And while access to ICTs might be missing 
in some parts of the country, good coordination among State and non-State authorities 
could help victims to gain timely, effective, safe and secure access to ICTs if some key 
conditions are met.28   
 
Third, not all the victims of the armed conflict are in the same situation and/or in the same 
locations, when considering access to ICTs, and responding to Covid-19 challenges.29 The 
SJP has so far prioritised seven macro-cases to fulfil its mission, each involving different 
perpetrators, violations, territories and victims. For example, case 001 considers the illegal 
retention of people by the FARC (kidnappings); case 003 deals with deaths illegitimately 
presented as casualties in hostilities by State agents (false positives); case 006 concerns 
the crimes committed against the Patriotic Union (a political party that claims to have been 
exterminated by State agents and paramilitary groups working under their acquiescence); 
and case 007 deals with recruitment and conscription of child soldiers by the FARC. Some 
of the victims associated with these cases find themselves in particularly vulnerable 
situations like those involved in case 006 (given their age) or indigenous groups or former 
child soldiers. Others have better access to ICTs and other resources such as the victims 
of kidnappings. Therefore, victims’ participation is also context and victim dependant, even 
in times of Covid-19. 
 
III. What is Needed to Ensure that Virtual Hearings Fulfil the Right to Participation of 
Victims in Times of Covid-19? 
 
We argue that in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, virtual proceedings offer an 
opportunity to bring justice outside the courtroom to deal with the legacy of mass atrocities 
that has taken place in Colombia. This is so, even if they are limited in their ability to ensure 
meaningful participation to victims.30 To put it simply, justice cannot wait any longer to help 
the society to come to terms with the crimes of the past and must continue along its course. 
The crimes that have been committed and over which the SJP has jurisdiction amount to 
serious international crimes. Virtual hearings at the SJP could offer an opportunity for 
justice if they take adequate account of the necessary conditions for justice, including those 
related to connectivity and security, in order to enable victims’ participation.  
 
 
28 See for example, Jean-Marie Chenou, Lina P. Chaparro-Martínez and Ana María Mora Rubio, 
‘Broadening Conceptualizations of Transitional Justice through Using Technology: ICTs in the Context of 
Justicia y Paz in Colombia’, (2019) 13(1) Intl J Transitional J 92.  
29 See some the public claims of civil society organizations in this regard available on the website of the 
Colombian Commission of Jurists, at: https://www.coljuristas.org/sala_de_prensa/articulo.php?id=296.  
30 International Commission of Jurists, ‘Judiciaries during COVID-19: South American experience’, 29 April 
2020, available at: https://www.icj.org/judiciaries-during-covid-19-south-american-experience/. 
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Certainly, the experience of attending a judicial proceeding, such as a hearing, and of 
physically interacting with magistrates, justice officials, lawyers, the accused and other 
actors, can hardly be replaced by a virtual hearing.31 Given the limitations virtual hearings 
present, the SJP will have to decide on a case-to-case basis32 whether it is possible and 
pertinent to conduct a virtual hearing. Virtual hearings should be considered only in relation 
to those cases where holding them is of utmost importance for the administration of justice 
and where there is no other way to secure such objectives, while at the same time fulfilling 
the right of victims to participate in such proceedings. The SJP decisions so far are in line 
with this principle.33 However, questions remain as to how best to fulfil the rights of victims 
to participate through virtual hearings.  
 
The SJP is currently working towards the adoption of guidelines to be applied in such 
situations. As part of our work under the AHRC funded grant ‘Legitimacy, accountability, 
victims’ participation and reparation in transitional justice settings – lessons from and for 
Colombia’ we have suggested to the Victims’ Participation Commission of the SJP, the 
inclusion of key measures to ensure the right of victims to participate in an effective manner 
in virtual hearings and other proceedings. Some of these key measures identify the 
conditions that are necessary to enable participation in such contexts such as access to 
ICTs as well as knowledge on how to work with them. Other measures aim to address how 
to compensate for what is lost when administering justice in times of the pandemic using 
ICTs such as providing additional opportunities for filings, or other means to present views 
before the SJP.  
 
To contextualise any consideration of conducting virtual hearings before the SJP, it is 
important to note that the SJP can conduct more than 17 different types of hearings. Simply 
put, one case includes various hearings. Some are private and others are public. However, 
among the hearings that the SJP can conduct, there are a few that are of particular 
importance to victims such as the hearing on recognition of responsibility of the accused. 
No such hearing has taking place so far at the SJP. This hearing is crucial in terms of 
legitimacy of the SJP but also for the fulfilment of various rights of victims, including their 
right to truth, justice and reparation. Given that what is at stake for victims depends on the 
nature of each hearing, we believe that the more important the hearing is for the fulfilment 
of victims’ rights, the more measures that would be required to ensure their rights and their 
participation. And, in relation to hearings like the one on recognition of responsibility, great 
creativity would also be necessary to ensure that the symbolisms and rituals victims would 
have had in a hearing, in person, would somehow be present, even if in a different manner 
and format.  
 
While Covid-19 is causing abrupt changes in the administration of justice, ICTs were 
already used by the SJP to facilitate victims’ participation in hearing given that not all 
victims of the cases under their jurisdiction have been in a position to attend them (given 
the amount of victims in each case, their location, their degree of vulnerability, etc), so 
blended options of participation have already been necessary and will continue to be 
required, even in times of Covid-19, where some victims will be able to attend in person or 
virtually, and others would be involved remotely or would gain access to it through other 
 
31 Michael Reed-Hurtado, ‘Covid-19 fevers: justice stalled, justice displaced, justice lost?’, justiceinfo.net, 
12 May 2020, available at: https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/justiceinfo-comment-and-debate/opinion/44252-
covid-19-fevers-justice-stalled-justice-displaced-justice-lost.html. 
32 ICJ (n. 30) p. 65. 
33 Jurisdicción Especial para La Paz, Comunicado 037. 
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means (Youtube videos, CDs, etc). Bearing this in mind, we suggest that the various 
hearings of the SJP could happen virtually if the following elements are present: 
 
Victims should consent to be part of virtual hearings 
 
Any decision to hold a virtual hearing by the SJP shall be taken by engaging in dialogue 
with victims giving due weight to their views on security, biosecurity and their goals to hear 
and be heard in the administration of justice. This guideline is a clear manifestation of the 
need to obtain consent of and consult victims.34 Also, it helps to understand what sort of 
additional measures in terms of security; bio-security and connectivity could be needed by 
victims in order to ensure meaningful participation. 
 
Addressing ICTs gaps and enabling victims to use ICTs 
 
Given the lack of access to ICTs and the digital divide that exists for victims in Colombia, 
it is crucial to ensure that victims have access to ICTs of the right quality to be able to 
consider virtual participation as an option.35 In considering the question of access to ICTs, 
the SJP should include an age, gender, ethnic, territorial and disabilities dimension to 
ensure equality and non-discrimination, which are key principles underpinning the right to 
participation.36 
  
If access to ICTs does not exist, and it is not an option to facilitate victims’ access to 
computers  and enough data, then blended options should be considered, for example to 
host virtual hearings in a State building or communal room in the community with the help 
of SJP personnel and with all necessary biosecurity measures. Mobile phones should not 
be used to connect to ICTs as it does not provide the best experience for victims and it 
was not designed to facilitate engagement that can last for several hours.37  
 
In those cases in which virtual hearings are a viable alternative, justice officials will still 
need to design a connectivity strategy to address the knowledge gap that victims may have 
about how to use ICTs. This is crucial for victims to have access to timely and adequate 
information about proceedings. The strategy would need to provide victims with access to 
adequate training in the use of communication technologies to maximise the quality of their 
online participation. Officials will also need to ensure that victims know how the hearing 
itself will be conducted and the modalities of their virtual participation. Educational 
materials can be developed to this end (both printed and online). Some of these could take 
the form of tutorials on the use of the software and hardware, online rehearsals and 
webinar sessions, and guidelines on the modalities of the virtual hearing itself.  
 
In addition to training, a connectivity strategy might also need to consider the hiring of IT 
personnel to ensure the smooth running of virtual hearings and their security. Some of their 
functions might include the testing of the software before the start of the hearing so that 
 
34 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation 
and guarantees of non-recurrence on the participation of victims in transitional justice measures’, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/34/62, 26 December 2011, para. 31. 
35 Richard Susskind,  ‘Digital exclusion; in Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford University 
Press, 2019). 
36 Impunity Watch. ‘“Restricted Access” Promises and Pitfalls of Victim Participation in Transitional Justice 
Mechanisms’, July 2017, p. 47.  
37 BBC News, ‘Remote Hearings for Family Court “Horribly Cruel”,’ 3 May 2020. 
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victims can see that the system is working, the creation of private and secure chat rooms 
for confidential communication between lawyers and victims, or to access psychosocial 
support, solving technical issues that might arise throughout the hearing itself, and the safe 
voice and video recording of the proceedings. Notably, IT personnel could play a key role 
in supporting victims during their online participation by enabling a communication channel 
through which they can ask technical questions.  
 
Security and bio-security measures are essential 
 
The SJP should also consider security measures for victims. As already noted, Covid-19 
has exacerbated the power that illegal groups have in certain parts of the country and this 
has generated increased risks for victims who might be unable to contribute to justice 
proceedings. In this regard, the SPJ should consider not only bio-security measures for 
the victims but also for any person and staff involved in the delivery of justice to prevent 
and avoid risks of contagion. Likewise, it is also crucial that systems used to hold virtual 
hearings are not capable of being hacked, and that the identity of victims and the 
information and evidence they provide can be trusted as well as the one provided by 
witnesses, and that what victims or witnesses say could remain confidential (if the hearing 
is confidential), so as to ensure that their security is not endangered by the proceedings 
before the SJP.38 Failure to do this might also jeopardise the legitimacy of the SJP. 
 
Psychosocial support 
 
Victims who participate through ICTs continue to require psychosocial support, even more 
so during the pandemic, given its mental health consequences, which can be exacerbated 
by insecurity in their places of residence.39 Special measures must be put in place for 
victims to have adequate access to psychosocial support before, during and after virtual 
hearings. Such access to psychosocial support should take into account all required 
biosecurity measures so that it does not endanger the health of the victim or of those 
providing the service.40 Appropriate means for psychosocial support could be provided 
through ICTs but the nature, and particular situation of the victim should be taken into 
account when deciding what is the best way to provide such services.  
 
Compensatory measures 
 
Virtual hearings permit an essential public service - the administration of justice, to 
continue its course. However, as already stated they are far than desirable in States 
undergoing transitional justice processes. Therefore, it becomes significantly important to 
consider the use and identification of adequate compensatory measures. Such measures 
should be considered in tandem with the planning of virtual hearings. The more that a 
virtual hearing could hamper the right of victims to participate, and the more that such 
hearing could affect their right to know the truth or to reparation, the more compensatory 
measures would be required. They should be identified bearing in mind the characteristics 
 
38  Corte Constitucional. “ACUERDO 01 DE 2020. Marzo 19.” p. 1. See also, Carolina Villadiego-Burbano, 
‘Judiciaries during COVID-19: South American experience’, ICJ, 29 April 2020. 
39 See World Health Organization, ‘Mental health and psychosocial considerations during COVID-19 
outbreak,’ 18 March 2020. 
40 UN News, ‘UN leads call to protect most vulnerable from mental health crisis during and after COVID-19: 
Huge needs in conflict-hit communities’, 14 May 2020, available at: 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1063882. 
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and situation of the victims (for example, age, disabilities, linguistic and cultural differences, 
gender, location, etc), the potential impact of the hearing in the justice process, and 
whether there are (or not) other similar opportunities for victims in the justice process to 
convey their views or object to evidence. For instance, justice officials could invite victims 
to submit virtual or written opinions or create a digital platform for victims to share video 
testimonies before the hearing. The receipt of virtual or written submissions could also take 
place after the virtual hearing through email or other means. Such compensatory measures 
depend on the type of hearing, whether it is adversarial or not, and must be adopted taking 
due account of the need to balance the rights of the victims and those of the accused.  
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
Covid-19 has impacted the administration of justice for institutions like the SJP in 
Colombia. Yet, the SJP is trying to respond and adapt quickly to the new context to ensure 
justice is done. A key opportunity is to provide victims with participation in the work of the 
SJP through virtual hearings and proceedings, but we argue that if virtual hearings are 
organised, they need to reflect certain minimum conditions and standards. If they do not, 
victims will not be able to be part of and experience the justice process.  
 
Some jurisdictions, particularly those in countries undergoing conflict and in which access 
to the internet is not universal, might be resistant towards the idea of virtual hearings. The 
Colombian case demonstrates that even in restrictive contexts, the use of virtual hearings 
might be possible, and even desirable, as they could provide an alternative to victims who 
cannot physically attend a courtroom due to their location and/or imminent security risks.  
 
The SJP cannot resolve the problem of access to ICTs affecting victims in Colombia but 
one of its assets, to conduct virtual hearings, are the State and non-State networks 
available across the country. Courts might take advantage of existing networks to ensure 
that victims, particularly those without internet access, can still participate in virtual 
hearings. However, we recommend that such experiences are properly assessed and 
monitored so that the way they are carried out improves over time. 
 
Finally, the conversation on virtual proceedings has gained new relevance in the context 
of the Covid-19 pandemic, the use of this type of technology will outlive the pandemic. 
Technological developments will continue to provide better virtual experiences of justice in 
the future. What is crucial in this process is to ensure that the right measures are taken, 
such as compensatory or enabling ones, to facilitate access to justice and to fulfil the rights 
of victims to truth, justice and reparation.  
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The Right to Health 
 
The Right to Health: A Discussion 
Judith Bueno de Mesquita, Lecturer and Sabina Michalowski, Professor, School of Law and Human Rights 
Centre [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_011] 
 
 
The two authors in this section took a few moments to discuss the broader themes related 
to their research.  
 
One recurring theme is the content of the right to health and its relationship to notions of 
public health. There can be synergies or tensions between the approaches taken in these 
different areas, depending on how public health is approached.  
 
Another issue is how to understand the relationship between policy makers and scientists, 
and the evidential basis for decision-making. It arises, for instance, in discussions about 
triage and prioritisation of access to treatment. It is important to consider who is involved 
in devising responses to the pandemic. It is interesting, for instance to consider who has 
been involved in developing the different triage guidelines and what their role is vis-à-vis 
the state; typically this has been professional associations or government bodies with 
public health professional participation. In most instances there has been little input from 
communities of interest such as disability groups; groups representing the elderly or 
minority groups with a higher susceptibility to the disease and mortality rate. Despite the 
importance of inclusivity and participation, so far, the global human rights community has 
not engaged with these issues very closely.  
 
Science was understood, at least in principle, as a more effective, rational and more 
neutral, and less political or contentious, basis for decision-making. However, given the 
limited scientific knowledge about Covid-19, particularly in the first weeks and month after 
its emergence,  the advice which is based on the ‘evidence’ has been evolving, whilst there 
has also been difference of opinion among scientists and social scientists about some 
aspects of the most appropriate responses. Policy or decision-making needs to continually 
respond to emerging research and take account of different findings and views.  The triage 
guidelines tend to focus on the ‘scientific’ basis for their decisions, but if the science is not 
yet conclusive or sufficiently probative, what are the guidelines actually based on? Also, 
scientific criteria can be used to hide ethically contentious decision-making. 
 
In terms of decisions about access to treatment or other interventions, there are difficult 
decisions that may arise where demand outstrips supply.  There are certain approaches 
which are clearly unjustifiable, because of their discriminatory nature. For instance, though 
the evidence points to the fact that certain minority groups, because of the social 
determinants of health, are more susceptible to contract the disease and less likely to 
survive it, “clearly” it would be wrong to deny those groups access to treatment because 
they have a lesser likelihood to survive it. Yet, one could easily make the opposite 
argument that those groups should benefit from even greater access to treatment, a form 
of “affirmative action” to positively address structural inequalities. On the other hand, for 
some, it has been less problematic to deny treatment to persons over a certain age or with 
certain health conditions or disabilities, even though these denials would constitute other 
forms of discrimination. These differences in what societies find “clearly” problematic or 
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not, perhaps underscores our own limitations and limited capacity to be guided simply by 
instinct; involving communities of interest tends to be important in its own sake but also to 
serve as a counterbalance to the unconscious biases of those usually tasked with making 
policy and taking decisions.   
 
From a human rights perspective, one can be uncomfortable with some of the triage criteria 
(e.g., age; health prospects) – partly because of the problem of the limited participation of 
affected groups in the development of the policy. Indeed, why should doctors and ethicists 
be allowed to take these fundamental decisions about who will live or die? Clearly, 
communities of interest should have a right to be involved in decisions on public resource 
allocation. By involving communities of interest, there is a lesser likelihood to arrive at 
blanket, and probably unintended positions or decisions; it reduces the danger of 
unreasonable or inflexible policies.  
 
In conflict zones, the human rights community has not challenged prioritisations based on 
likely health outcomes for soldiers in need of treatment, and seems to defer to the medical 
or scientific community to determine who should receive treatment. Most soldiers will have 
similar health backgrounds (relatively young and healthy), which means triage decisions 
tend to focus exclusively or mainly on the likelihood that soldiers would survive treatment 
for battlefield injuries. Though even in this example, the decision will not necessarily be 
neutral, if for example decisions are also taken on the basis of the rank of the soldier. 
 
Beyond the procedural rights associated with access to decision-making, are there 
additional substantive components of the right to health which may assist us with our 
approach to prioritization of access to treatment? There has been limited articulation by 
scholars and advocates of how precisely the right to health applies during pandemics; 
despite the knowledge about the significant risk of a global pandemic. The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ General Comment 14 on the right to health, provides 
a useful focus on positive health outcomes. Similarly, the right to health is relevant to 
articulations of what might be meant by “maximum available resources,” and the need for 
states to actively and positively invest in health systems. Beyond the right to health, these 
thorny questions raise other human rights issues such as the right to non-discrimination 
and the right to life.  
 
It was obvious to the discussants that there are limitations associated with looking at issues 
from a single perspective; there are so many angles and complexities involved with these 
issues, many of them interlinked. And, maybe one of the most important lessons from the 
current pandemic is that discussion of these issues needs to continue in quieter times that 
make it possible to consider the many difficult issues with time for wide consultations. 
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Covid-19: An Inconvenient Truth? Re-evaluating Progress and 
Confronting Challenges for the Right to Health 
Judith Bueno de Mesquita, Lecturer, University of Essex School of Law and Human Rights Centre, and Co-
Deputy Director, Human Rights Centre [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_012] 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As the global crisis of Covid-19 has unfurled, a grating dissonance can be observed 
between many States’ responses and their right to health obligations under international 
human rights law. This began with the initial cover-up of the Covid-19 outbreak in China, 
conflicting with the right to access health information and the principle of transparency. 
Following on, the “keep calm and carry on” approach of governments of the UK, USA and 
Brazil, influenced by perceived economic imperatives and a belief that the cure would be 
worse than the disease,1 failed to put in place timely protective measures for the right to 
health, contrary to advice and warnings from the World Health Organization (WHO). There 
have been particularly high rates of infection and deaths in these three countries.  There 
is anxiety about limited capacity of health systems in low and middle income (and indeed 
high income) countries to mount an effective response to Covid-19, on the back of long-
standing austerity and structural adjustment policies that have eaten away at the very core 
of structures required for an effective rights-based public health response,2 whilst many 
States have adopted protectionist measures in conflict with right to health obligations of 
international assistance and cooperation. This is not to mention the use by some countries 
of the public health emergency of Covid-19 as a smokescreen for erosions of human rights, 
including restrictions on reproductive freedoms and civil society space. Even as public 
health imperatives have become increasingly central to Governments’ actions worldwide, 
a shared global experience has been the disproportionate risks faced by vulnerable and 
marginalised populations, who are exposed to the double jeopardy of a significantly higher 
risk of catching and dying from Covid-19, and shouldering the burden of deprivations 
arising from social distancing measures which fail to protect their livelihoods and health 
and expose them to hunger and domestic violence, with significant implications in terms of 
equality and non-discrimination. A lack of accountability thus far for these shortcomings is 
also highly problematic.   
 
Infringing on almost all of its attributes, Covid-19, is a perfect storm for the right to health, 
a fundamental human right protected under international human rights law. The United 
Nations (UN), the WHO and UN human rights procedures have clearly articulated that the 
right to health should be at the frontline of responses.3 This makes the comparative 
absence of the right to health from States’ responses even more striking. States have 
largely embraced public health whilst eschewing the right to health. At the same time, 
predominantly, human rights scrutiny has honed in on derogations and legitimacy of 
 
1 Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, ‘COVID-19 Economy v Human Rights: a Misleading Dichotomy,’ Health and 
Human Rights Journal Blog, 29 April 2020. 
2 Lisa Forman, ‘The Evolution of the Right to Health in the Shadow of COVID-19,’ Health and Human 
Rights Journal Blog, 1 April  2020.  
3 UN, We are All in this Together: COVID-19 and Human Rights (United Nations: April 2020); WHO, 
‘Addressing Human Rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response’, 21 April 2020; Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘Statement on the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic and 
Economic, Social and Cultural rights’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2020/1, 9 April 2020.  
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limitations on civil liberties, rather than considering socio-economic rights impacts, 
including the right to health.  
 
Why has the right to health received so little attention beyond the UN system and what are 
the lessons to be learned by the human rights community? In this paper, I argue that this 
dearth of attention is firstly symptomatic of continued marginalisation of the right to health, 
particularly in the policy making context. Whilst the health and human rights community 
has celebrated progress of the right to health in recent years, particularly in terms of 
improving legal protections and the production of rights-based guidance for policy makers, 
there has been a conflicting and simultaneous erosion of a supportive policy environment. 
Health and other social support systems have been weakened by structural adjustment 
and austerity, which have also entrenched and exacerbated equalities in the social and 
economic determinants of health. Weak health systems and inequalities are exposed by 
the catastrophic impact of Covid-19, highlighting the need for the health and human rights 
community to rethink how to measure and bring about progress. Secondly, it is also 
reflective of the limited attention of human rights oversight bodies and the broader health 
and human rights community to unpacking the right to health in contexts of pandemics, 
which raise unique and often complex questions for human rights. These are questions 
which the human rights community has scrambled to grapple with but without always 
producing a clearly articulated positions and guidance. Human rights oversight bodies, and 
the health and human rights community more broadly, will need to clarify more specifically 
how the right to health, and other human rights, apply in the context of pandemics, if they 
are to have a meaningful impact on responses. Thirdly, whilst the pandemic has, at least 
in most quarters, refocused acceptance of the importance of science and evidence-based 
approaches, which have been challenged particularly by populist right-wing politicians in 
recent years, it has not only revealed their importance in many respects, but also their 
limits when it comes to securing the rights and well-being of all people everywhere. The 
human rights community can learn from the science and must take it on board; at the same 
time it can contribute important analysis and tools to support policy makers to promote and 
protect the well-being of all people. The health and human rights community must put 
efforts into ensuring its insights meaningfully shape government responses, including from 
the outset of crises.   
  
II. The Effects of Neoliberalism and Health Inequalities Call for a Re-evaluation of 
Progress in, and New Strategies for, Vindicating the Right to Health 
 
The right to health is centrally protected in international law by the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which obligates States parties to, 
amongst others, take steps for the ‘prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases’ and create conditions to assure ‘medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.’4 This requires health services and goods, such 
as medicines, to be available in adequate numbers; financially and physically accessible, 
and accessible on the basis of non-discrimination; acceptable including respectful of 
medical ethics; and good quality.5 Extending beyond health care, the right to health also 
embraces social determinants of health such as safe and healthy working conditions, food 
and nutrition, housing, and water, sanitation and hygiene.  With obligations to respect 
 
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) 
(1966), article 12.   
5 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’, UN Doc. 
No. E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000, para. 12.  
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(refrain from harm), protect (from third parties), and fulfill (promote) the right to health, 
States must adopt legislative, administrative, judicial, promotional and other measures and 
devote maximum available resources to progressively realise the right to health.  Further, 
the right to health must be realized on the basis of cross-cutting human rights principles, 
including non-discrimination and equality, participation and accountability.6  These 
obligations have a central relevance in Covid-19 responses, to minimise mortality and 
morbidity and prevent retrogression in the enjoyment of a swathe of other human rights.7 
 
Historically marginalised, there has been much progress in terms of increasingly extensive 
legal recognition of the right to health, and greater oversight provided by the international 
human rights system. With 170 State ratifications of the ICESCR, as well as even more 
widespread ratification of other international human rights treaties protecting the right to 
health, all States have assumed internationally binding legal obligations towards the right 
to health.  Constitutional protections of the right to health are now found in the majority of 
countries worldwide, some of which are generating a flourishing jurisprudence.8 Legal 
positivists, including within the human rights community, have celebrated these legal gains 
as significant milestones for the right to health, yet it is acknowledged that in practice the 
transformative potential of international law, constitutional protections and litigation has 
varied significantly between countries.9     
 
Whilst, on the one hand, States have been prepared to ratify international treaties and 
adopt constitutional protections recognising the right to health, on the other hand, many 
States have simultaneously adopted austerity and structural adjustment policies, resulting 
in the reduction or suppression of spending for healthcare and the erosion of social 
determinants of health, thus undermining the right to health in practice.10 With entrenched 
and widening inequalities in social determinants of health, the right to health situation has 
been particularly precarious for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including people 
living in poverty. Covid-19 has shone a torch on the underlying fragility of health systems 
in the face of sudden, widespread and acute need, with many systems experiencing 
shortages of equipment including ventilators, oxygen, protective clothing and testing 
capacity, denials of treatment by some private institutions, and interruptions to other 
essential healthcare, including cancer treatment, sexual and reproductive health care and 
immunisations.11 In the earliest weeks of the pandemic, there was strong messaging from 
governments, and the UN, that Covid-19 does not discriminate.12 Yet, with the passage of 
time, it has become clear that marginalised and vulnerable groups are at significantly 
higher risk of catching Covid-19, are more likely to die from it, and are more likely to suffer 
adverse consequences to their well-being and human rights from social distancing policies.  
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Dainius Pūras, Judith Bueno De Mesquita, Luisa Cabal, Allan Maleche, and Benjamin Mason Meier, ‘The 
Right to Health Must Guide Responses to COVID-19’, The Lancet, 29 May 2020. 
8 Alicia Ely Yamin and Siri Gloppen, Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts bring more Justice to Health? 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
9 Audrey Chapman, Global Health, Human Rights and the Challenge of Neoliberal Policies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016); Matthias Goldman, Contesting Austerity: Genealogies of Human 
Rights Discourse (Berlin: Max Planck Institute, 2020).  
10 Timon Forster, Alexander E. Kentikelenis, Thomas Stubbs, and Lawrence P. King, ‘Globalization and 
Health Equity: The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programs on Developing Countries’, (2019) 80(5) 
Social Science & Medicine 83-113.  
11 See, for example, UNICEF, ‘As COVID-19 Devastates Already Fragile Health Systems, over 6,000 
Additional Children Could Die a Day, Without Urgent Action’, 13 May 2020. 
12 See, for example, UN Network on Migration, ‘COVID-19 Does Not Discriminate; Nor Should Our 
Response’, 20 March 2020.  
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As well as older persons, racial and ethnic minorities and people with underlying health 
conditions, people living in poverty (a category which has disproportionate representation 
of groups marginalised on other grounds, e.g. racial and ethnic minorities and older 
persons) are at  particular risks of infection where they live in overcrowded conditions, lack 
access to sanitation and lack access to protective measures in the  workplace, whilst they 
are also particularly affected by social distancing policies which threaten their livelihood. 
Further, the World Bank has estimated that  Covid-19 will push 71 million more people into 
poverty worldwide.13   
  
Neoliberalism, which promotes a small role for the State, reliance on the market, and 
privatisation in health and other sectors, has provided the ideological underpinning of 
austerity and structural adjustment. The strain this approach has placed on the right to 
health is increasingly recognised.14 Yet, despite overwhelming evidence of harm, 
international human rights law, as currently interpreted, does not prescribe any particular 
type of economic system.15 Whilst some academics, NGOs and UN Special Procedures 
have taken an anti-neoliberal stance, other UN human rights bodies, such as the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which oversees the 
ICESCR, have refrained from adopting a principled position against neoliberalism, 
preferring to consider the provision of care and services on a case-by-case basis.16 
Further, the vast economic inequalities that are, at least in part, a product of neoliberalism 
(which has failed to redistribute economic gains),17 and which raise questions in terms of 
the obligation of States to devote maximum available resources to the right to health, have 
also not been robustly addressed by human rights bodies as questions of equality and 
non-discrimination. Interpretations of equality and non-discrimination under international 
human rights law have, to date, precluded the concept of economic inequalities, a position 
challenged by MacNaughton who describes income, wealth and social inequalities as the 
‘greatest human rights challenge of our time.’18 The impact of Covid-19 on low income 
groups suggests very clearly that these groups are experiencing inequality and 
discrimination. A further apposite criticism comes from Moyn, who has also lamented the 
failure of the human rights community to fully engage with economic inequalities, and who 
is particularly critical of the contentment of human rights bodies to elaborate and hold 
States accountable for minimum entitlements, often called “core obligations”, at the 
expense of the more challenging and redistributive goal, within and between countries, of 
economic equality.19 Covid-19 illustrates how economic inequality matters, not only 
intrinsically, but also for securing core obligations that are vital for dignity and well-being 
and which the human rights community purports to uphold.   
 
In recent years, the health and human rights community has increasingly engaged with the 
policy making context as well as with constitutionalism and litigation, particularly through 
elaborating human rights-based approaches to a range of different health issues and 
 
13 Daniel Gerszon Mahler, Christoph Lakner, R. Andres Castaneda Aguilar, and Haoyu Wu, ‘Updated 
Estimates on the Impact of COVID-19 on Global Poverty,’ World Bank Data Blog, 8 June 2020. 
14 Chapman (n. 9).  
15 Ibid. 
16 Paul O'Connell, ‘On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Human Rights,’ (2007) 
7(3) Human Rights Law Review 483–509. 
17 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty First Century (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
18 Gillian MacNaughton, ‘Vertical inequalities: are the SDGs and human rights up to the challenges?’, 
(2017) 21(8) International Journal of Human Rights 1-23. 
19 Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap, 2018). 
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issuing many sets of guidelines for policy makers.20 Whilst this clarification is important 
and welcome, Covid-19 raises questions about the scale of the mainstream impact of this 
enterprise. This sends an unequivocal message to the human rights community that, 
despite litigation and guidelines – both of which are playing an important role in Covid-19 
responses21 but have not have a widespread impact for all -  bolder approach are needed 
to secure the right to health for the most marginalised, including challenging the 
institutions, and economic models that underpin weak health systems and global 
inequalities.22 
 
III. The Human Rights Community Must Clarify Right to Health Obligations in the 
Context of Pandemics 
 
The devastating effects of pandemic diseases have been recorded across centuries. 
Plague was one of the first documented pandemics, with two major outbreaks during the 
middle ages, the Plague of St Justinian, which struck in 542 AD, and the Black Death which 
resulted in an estimated 100 million deaths between the 14th and 17th centuries in Eurasia, 
and which led to some of the earliest approaches at international health control, including 
quarantine and the cordon sanitaire.23 The 1918-19 influenza (Spanish Flu) epidemic led 
to an estimated 50-100 million deaths worldwide. More recent pandemic influenza 
outbreaks occurred in 1957, 1968 and 2009 (H1N1/Swine Flu), whilst outbreaks and 
spread of other novel infectious diseases, notably the HIV pandemic, and the SARS (2002-
3), MERS (2016) and Ebola epidemics (2014-16) have continued to remind us of a 
continuing global threat. 
 
Nascent international health collaborative engagements emerging in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries were, indeed, spawned by fears of the spread of infectious 
disease,  including cholera, yellow fever (in the Americas) and plague. Whilst the field of 
international, and more recently global, health has long since expanded to new areas, the 
remaining commitment to infectious disease control is reflected in the WHO’s Constitution, 
which sets out a long list of duties, amongst which is stimulating and advancing work to 
‘eradicate epidemic, endemic and other diseases’.24 In the context of this work, the WHO 
has not lost sight of this vitally important mandate. Whilst its response to infectious 
diseases has not been without fault,25 it has consistently warned of the threat posed by 
epidemics and pandemics, and spearheaded a number of relevant initiatives, most notably 
the legally binding International Health Regulations (IHR).26 As discussed in the chapter 
by Bueno de Mesquita and Meier in this publication, the International Health Regulations, 
which are grounded in human rights, require States to, amongst others: notify the WHO of 
 
20 Paul Hunt, Judith Bueno De Mesquita, Joo-Young Lee,and Sally-Anne Way, ‘Implementation of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, in Nigel Rodley, and Scott Sheeran (eds), Routledge Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law (London: Routledge, 2013). 
21 WHO, ‘Addressing Human Rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response’ (n. 3); Aoife Nolan, ‘Symposium: 
Constitutional Social Rights Litigation and Adjudication in a Time of COVID-19’, International Association of 
Constitutional Law Blog, 28 May 2020.  
22 Forman (n. 2). 
23 Anne-Emanuelle Birn, Yogan Pillay, and Timothy H. Holtz, Textbook of International Health: Global Health 
in a Dynamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 4. 
24 Constitution of the WHO, International Health Conference (1946). 
25 Sarah Boseley, ‘Experts Criticise WHO Delay in Sounding Alarm Over Ebola Outbreak’, The Guardian, 
22 November 2015. 
26 WHO, Fifty-eighth World Health Assembly Resolution WHA58.3: ‘Revisions of the International Health 
Regulations’, 23 May 2005.  
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events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern; and develop 
the capacity to respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public health 
emergencies of international concern. 
 
Whilst States have been criticised for failures to notify of, and prepare for pandemics, it is 
also the case that human rights bodies have been neglectful in attending to the delineation 
of right to health obligations in the context of pandemics, or addressing States compliance 
with the right to health, in terms of their preparedness for pandemics. The ICESCR clearly 
sets out that ‘[t]he prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases’ is a central right to health obligation.27 More recent international 
human rights standards do not include such specific language on epidemics, although this 
is not to say that their provisions cannot be interpreted as requiring State actions in this 
area.  General Comment 14 on the right to health of the CESCR sets out, in prescient 
albeit sketchy terms, that States must put in place a system of urgent medical care in the 
event of epidemics or, more generally, for infectious disease control; they should: make 
available relevant technologies; improve epidemiological surveillance and data collection 
on a disaggregated basis; and enhance and implement immunization programmes and 
other strategies.28 However, beyond this, little interpretive guidance had been promulgated 
by human rights procedures. 
 
Moreover, a search of the Universal Human Rights Index database revealed just 17 
recommendations made to States by treaty bodies or the Universal Periodic Review 
making explicit reference to pandemics and 22 to epidemics: these were reactive and 
almost all responding to the HIV pandemic, with a small number focused on Ebola (west 
Africa) and cholera (Haiti), rather than focused on pandemic preparedness.  
 
In the aftermath of the outbreak, almost all international human rights bodies and experts 
have rapidly elucidated concerns about the impact of the crisis on human rights, yet many 
recommendations remain quite broad and generic,29 phrased in terms of overarching 
principles, leaving some of the most challenging textural aspects of addressing Covid-19 
unclear. For example, what  positive obligations for the right to health apply in the context 
of pandemics?30 What is the specific relationship of restrictions of other human rights and 
the protection of the right to health in the context of a pandemic?31 In times of acute need 
and scare resources, for example for ventilators, personal protective equipment and 
vaccinations (when available), who should receive treatment as a priority?32 What is the 
relationship between restrictions of rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
with the core principles of this treaty, including non-discrimination, the right to survival and 
development and the right of children to express their views in all matters affecting them?33 
These are all conceptual questions that require clarification by the CESCR, the Committee 
 
27 ICESCR, article 12. 
28 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n. 5). 
29 CESCR, ‘Statement on the Coronavirus Disease’, (n. 3); Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council 
of Europe, ‘Learning from the Pandemic to Better Fulfil the Right to Health’, 23 April 2020; WHO, 
‘Addressing Human Rights as Key to the COVID-19 Response’ (n. 3). 
30 See, the paper by Koldo Casla in this publication. 
31 Nina Sun, ‘Applying Siracusa: A Call for a General Comment on Public Health Emergencies,’ Health and 
Human Rights Journal Blog, 23 April 2020.  
32 See, the paper by Sabine Michalowski in this publication. 
33 Aoife Nolan and Judith Bueno de Mesquita, ‘Of Limitations and Retrogression: Assessing COVID-19’s 
Impact on Children’s ESC Rights,’ Global Initiative for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Blog, 26 May 
2020.  
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on the Rights of the Child and other UN human rights bodies charged with overseeing and 
interpreting  core international human rights treaties, to support States to make decisions 
on complex issues which are compatible with their international human rights obligations. 
With this in mind, there have been calls for treaty bodies to update guidance, including 
through adopting new General Comments to flesh out some of these concerns.34  
 
IV. Science, Human Rights and Evidence  
 
Having worked on human rights in the field of public health for almost twenty years, one of 
the most frequent questions I have been asked by experts within that community, and 
which I have been rarely asked about by human rights lawyers, is what evidence is there 
that human rights can improve public health? This preoccupation is indicative of the 
overriding concern with evidence in public health (not to mention scepticism in some 
quarters about human rights).35 In recent years there has been an increasing focus on the 
evidence of impact of a human rights-based approach for health. Whilst methodological 
challenges of measurement persist, research does suggest positive correlations, including 
in terms of promoting a more equitable approach to the right to health that secures 
inclusion for vulnerable and marginalised groups.36 With impacts of Covid-19 
disproportionately borne by marginalised and vulnerable groups, and with policy makers 
engaging particularly with scientists in formulating responses, the emerging evidence of 
impact of human rights suggests that more should be done to persuade policy makers to 
adopt human rights-based approaches, including for effective pandemic responses. 
Conveying the evidence of impact of human rights through more research and awareness 
raising will be an important part of strategies of political engagement by the human rights 
community, and will complement efforts to implement human rights in Covid-19 responses 
through constitutional social rights litigation to remedy and review policies or other 
measures that have harmed human rights.37 
 
Turning to the field of international human rights law, interpretation of the law is principally 
guided by normative considerations, yet that evidence also has a role to play is also clearly 
acknowledged. For example, the adoption and implementation of a ‘national public health 
strategy and plan of action, on the basis of epidemiological evidence, addressing the health 
concerns of the whole population,’ is considered a core obligation of the right to health.38 
Thus, strategies must be guided by both norms and evidence of how to achieve them. 
 
The emergence and rapid global spread of Covid-19, a novel strain of coronavirus not 
previously identified in humans, has posed a series of urgent evidentiary questions 
surrounding transmission, severity of symptoms, the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
control measures in different settings, treatment and vaccines. Findings which suggest 
answers to some of these questions are emerging in an increasingly extensive, though not 
always coherent, patchwork of research. Whilst it is important that the public health 
community considers the evidence of impact of human rights, it is equally important that in 
interpreting international human rights law, the human rights community closely scrutinises 
 
34 See, for example, Sun (n. 31). 
35 Birn, Pillay and Holtz (n. 23). 
36 Paul Hunt, Alicia Ely Yamin, and Flavia Bustreo, ‘Making the Case: What is the Evidence of Impact of 
Applying Human Rights-based Approaches to Health?’ (2015) 17(2) Health and Human Rights Journal. 
37 Nolan (n. 21). 
38 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14,’ (n. 5), para. 43(f). 
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the public health evidence, taking into account the reliability of evidence, as well as what 
is still unknown. 
 
The Covid-19 outbreak provides a range of insights about questions of evidence. Firstly, it 
highlights the range of fields from which evidence can be drawn. As well as the already 
acknowledged importance of epidemiological evidence, Covid-19 has illustrated that 
research from a much broader raft of disciplines should also be drawn on. Like human 
rights, public health is an inter-disciplinary endeavour, and - in addition to epidemiology - 
economics, statistics, medicines, anthropology, political science, sociology, law and 
behavioural science are key disciplines generating research that contributes valuable 
evidence to shape pandemic, and other public health responses. Secondly, Covid-19 has 
highlighted the great importance of international scientific collaboration, which is reflected 
by the ICESCR which obligates States parties to recognise the benefits ‘derived from the 
encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural fields’.39 A lack of scientific collaboration of China with the WHO 
hindered the pandemic responses at the outset, whilst countries, including the UK, have 
been reluctant to learn from experiences, including the evidence of impact of good 
practices, from other countries such as  Taiwan or South Korea,40 such as their successful 
approaches to testing and contact tracing. Thirdly, transparency surrounding public health 
strategies and the evidence informing them is another critical consideration illustrated by 
Covid-19. Where a lack of transparency surrounds the scientific evidence shaping public 
health policies, this obstructs preparedness, and stymies participation and accountability.41 
 
In conclusion, the Covid-19 outbreak reveals that the development of an evidence-based 
public health policy demands critical engagement from human rights oversight bodies in 
terms of which fields of evidence are used to inform public health policy, political processes 
surrounding the development of policy, and whether policies engage with international as 
well as domestic public health guidance, whilst the evidence of impact of human rights 
must also guide responses to Covid-19. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
Covid-19 has created a situation of global and national disorder for the right to health. 
Touching on all of its attributes, and raising many seemingly intractable problems, the 
pandemic casts light on obstacles to realising? the right to health and provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the past work of, and think about new directions for, the health and 
human rights community. Now is the moment for the community to refine interpretations of 
the right to health and think strategically about how to effectively address challenges 
embedded in society and the global order to achieve health justice and well-being for 
populations worldwide. 
 
 
 
  
 
39 ICESCR, Article 15.4. 
40 Toby Helm, Emma Graham-Harrison, and Robin Mackie, ‘How Did Britain Get its Coronavirus Response 
So Wrong?’ The Guardian, 19 April 2020.   
41 Richard Coker, ‘Coronavirus can only be Beaten if Groups such as Sage are Transparent and 
Accountable,’ The Guardian, 27 April 2020. 
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I. Introduction 
 
There is nothing new about age being relevant for access to certain types of health 
interventions. For example, some routine health checks are only offered from a certain 
age, some fertility treatment might not be made available after a certain age. This is usually 
justified on the basis of clinical benefits or risks associated with a person’s age. Different 
questions arise where decisions on access to health care are being made with the 
objective of managing a shortage in available resources, that is in situations where more 
persons need a particular form of treatment than can be treated, for example with regard 
to organ transplants where demand tends to outweigh supply by far. In that scenario, it is 
controversial whether age should have a role to play when deciding how to allocate organs. 
 
The current coronavirus pandemic has brought this question to the forefront. In some 
countries, demand for critical care beds and access to ventilators has by far exceeded 
supply, which meant that difficult triage decisions on how to regulate access had to be 
made. In other countries, such as Germany, Switzerland and the UK, similar discussions 
have been taking place in order to prepare for the possibility of this scenario arising. While 
clinical guidelines in some countries, e.g., Spain and Italy, regard age to be an acceptable 
criterion to exclude patients from access to ventilators, other countries, such as Germany, 
reject such an approach vehemently. But even where age itself is rejected as an access 
criterion, it might indirectly become relevant, for example where age influences the 
prognosis of recovery, especially if the prognosis is linked to the likely length of survival. 
 
This contribution will address some of the ethical and human rights considerations that 
should inform the discussion of whether age can be regarded as a valid criterion to decide 
who receives life-saving treatment at a time of acute scarcity of medical resources, using 
the Covid-19 pandemic as a case study.1 
 
II. Different Countries’ Reactions to Covid-19 Triage2 
 
In some countries, such as Italy and Spain, at the peak of the pandemic not enough critical 
care beds were available to treat all patients who needed intubation. Difficult decisions on 
who to include or exclude from access to this particular form of life-saving treatment thus 
had to be made. Ethical guidelines were hastily drawn up, while hospitals were trying to 
cope as best as possible with an unmanageable situation.  
 
 
1 This contribution draws on Sabine Michalowski, Beatrice Han-Pile, Beatrice Carniato, Fabio Serôdio 
Mendes and Wayne, ‘Triage in the COVID-19 Pandemic:  Bioethical and Human Rights Considerations’; 
Joint Technical Report of the Essex Autonomy Project and the Ethics of Powerlessness Project. 6 April 
2020; http://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/covid-19. 
2 The guidelines referred to in this part of the paper might not be reflective of the official approach adopted 
in each of the countries, but rather serve as examples to tease out some of the issues around the 
relevance of age for access to Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds. 
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On 6 March 2020, the Italian Society for Anaesthesia, Analgesia, Resuscitation and 
Intensive Care issued recommendations,3 with the purpose of relieving individual 
physicians from the emotional burden of having to make such difficult decisions and 
contributing to the transparency of the decision-making process. With regard to age, the 
document indicated: 
 
It may be necessary to establish an age limit for admission to the ICU [Intensive Care Unit]. It is not 
a question of making choices merely according to worth, but to reserve resources that could become 
extremely scarce to those who, in the first instance, have a greater likelihood of surviving and who, 
secondarily, will have more years of life saved, with a view to maximizing the benefits for the greatest 
number of people. … 
 
While age was thus regarded as a legitimate exclusion criterion, no specific age limit was 
suggested. The justification behind using age as a triage criterion was clearly based on 
the understanding that health care should be guided by the utilitarian principle of 
maximising benefits for the greatest number of people and that this was interpreted to 
meant to maximise not just the number of lives saved, but instead the number of life years 
saved, based on a prognosis of how many years of life each patient has left. Another 
consideration referred to in the guidelines was the potential resource intensity when saving 
those who, because of their age or pre-existing health conditions, would need longer 
treatment and assistance than younger and healthier persons.  
 
The Spanish Society of Intensive and Critical Medicine and Coronary Units also issued 
ethical recommendations.4 Stressing the importance of the principles of maximising the 
greatest good and of distributive justice, the recommendations suggest that, faced with 
two patients in similar circumstances, the person with more life years ahead of them, 
adjusted by the quality of that life be prioritised. According to the guidelines, for older 
patients this requires taking into account the chances of survival free from disability, not 
simply survival as such. Nevertheless, the Spanish guidelines suggested a case-by-case 
approach for decisions about access to mechanical ventilation, even for patients above 80 
years of age with relevant co-morbidities, though non-invasive forms of ventilation were 
recommended as the default for those patients. The recommendations also excluded all 
patients with cognitive deterioration from access to mechanical ventilation because of 
dementia or other degenerative diseases. 
 
While both the Italian and Spanish recommendations were issued when a health care 
emergency was already underway, other countries considered ethical guidelines in 
preparation for similar crises, as was the case in Germany and Switzerland. Based on the 
predominance of the principle of human dignity, both the German and the Swiss 
constitutions attach equal value to each life, whatever its projected duration and its quality. 
Prioritising access to life-sustaining medical treatment based on age, life years and quality 
adjusted life years is therefore prohibited and ethical guidelines tend to reject age as a 
freestanding triage criterion, because of discrimination concerns. While prioritisation 
criteria that are regarded as permissible in these countries are seemingly based on clinical 
 
3 Clinical Ethics Recommendations for Admission to Intensive Care and for Withdrawing Treatment in 
Exceptional Conditions of Imbalance between Needs and Available Resources, available at: 
http://www.siaarti.it/SiteAssets/News/COVID19%20-%20documenti%20SIAARTI/SIAARTI%20-%20Covid-
19%20-%20Clinical%20Ethics%20Reccomendations.pdf  (accessed 27 March 2020). 
4 Recomendaciones éticas parala toma de decisiones en la situación excepcional de crisis por pandemia 
COVID-19 en las unidades de cuidados intensivos, available at: https://semicyuc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/%C3%89tica_SEMICYUC-COVID-19.pdf  (accessed 2 April 2020).  
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criteria and therefore supposedly age and disability neutral, age often comes into the 
equation as part of clinical assessments.  
 
The guidelines issued by the Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences5 explain with regard to 
age: 
 
Age in itself is not to be applied as a criterion, as this would be to accord less value to older than to 
younger people, thus infringing the constitutional prohibition on discrimination. Age is, however, 
indirectly taken into account under the main criterion «short-term prognosis», since older people 
more frequently suffer from comorbidity. In connection with COVID-19, age is a risk factor for 
mortality and must therefore be taken into account. 
 
This more general, introductory statement thus already suggests that it is not only 
acceptable, but instead inevitable, that age is an important factor that needs to be taken 
into account as part of the clinical prognosis. The guidelines go on to set out different 
criteria according to which to determine the main triage criterion, a person’s short-term 
prognosis. Surprisingly, short-term prognosis is defined differently depending on the level 
of capacity to provide treatment to all who are in need of it. In the situation where ICU beds 
are still available, but capacity is limited, patients are excluded from ICU treatment if their 
predicted survival span is less than 12 months, or where they suffer from a list of pre-
existing health conditions, including severe dementia. Where no ICU beds are available 
and capacity therefore needs to be managed either through decisions not to admit or 
through discontinuation of treatment to free up beds, the list of pre-existing illnesses that 
would automatically exclude the patient from treatment is broadened considerably. For 
example, patients are already excluded from treatment if they suffer from moderate 
dementia, or if their predicted life span post treatment is less than 24 months. In addition, 
patients older than 85 years are automatically excluded and those who are older than 75 
are excluded if they suffer from liver cirrhosis, stage III chronic kidney disease or a 
particular form of heart failure. It can thus be seen that clinical criteria are adapted to the 
availability of resources. Age itself, as well as age related co-morbidities take a more 
prominent role as scarcity of resources increases. 
 
In Germany, meanwhile, it is maintained more consistently that age is not an acceptable 
criterion for exclusion from treatment. The German Ethics Council issued a statement in 
which it insisted that it would be unconstitutional to make triage decisions that do not give 
equal value to all lives.6 Regarding the difficulties this could pose for medical professionals 
having to make frontline decisions in a situation of scarcity, the statement limits itself to 
suggesting that the responsibility to make such decisions in line with constitutional 
principles and based entirely on clinical considerations lies with professional bodies and 
individual health professionals. In making the decision entirely clinical, age nevertheless 
becomes an indirect factor. This can be seen when looking at the professional guidelines 
issued by the German Interdisciplinary Association of Intensive and Emergency Medicine,7 
 
5 ‘COVID-19 pandemic: triage for intensive-care treatment under resource scarcity’, 24 March 2020, 
available at: www.sams.ch/en/Ethics/Topics-A-to-Z/Intensive-care-medicine.html, (accessed 15 May 2020). 
6 Deutscher Ethikrat. 2020. Solidarität und Verantwortung in der Corona-Krise. Available at: 
https://www.ethikrat.org/fileadmin/Publikationen/Ad-hoc-Empfehlungen/deutsch/ad-hoc-empfehlung-
corona-krise.pdf  (accessed 2 April 2020). 
7 Entscheidungen über die Zuteilung von Ressourcen in der Notfall und der Intensivmedizin im Kontext der 
COVID-19-Pandemie, 25 March 2020, https://www.divi.de/aktuelle-meldungen-intensivmedizin/covid-19-
klinisch-ethische-empfehlungen-zur-entscheidung-ueber-die-zuteilung-von-ressourcen-veroeffentlicht, 
(accessed 15 May 2020). 
 96 
 
which list prioritisation criteria such as the clinical condition of the patient, co-morbidities, 
score on the clinical frailty scale (a scale that scores patients based on criteria such as 
general physical fitness, underlying diseases, dependency on others in their daily affairs) 
and the SOFA (Sequential Organ Failure Assessment) score. This overall evaluation will 
then be compared with that of other persons competing for the scarce resources, with 
priority being given to those with the best predicted clinical outcome.8 Age thus comes in 
as a criterion that indirectly influences a person’s chances to obtain access to a ventilator. 
 
The approaches to age as a triage criterion set out above differ substantially. In some, age 
is directly referred to as a criterion for triage ethics (Italy and Spain), suggesting age limits 
or a focus on life years saved which disadvantages older persons over younger persons. 
Others explicitly reject such an approach as discriminatory (Germany and Switzerland, 
with the Swiss guidelines making age an exclusion criterion in times of particularly limited 
resources, despite assurances to the contrary). Nevertheless, in all approaches age plays 
some role, to the extent that they rely on clinical assessments, given that co-morbidities, 
frailty etc. are more likely to be present in older than in younger persons. 
 
III. Reflections on Age as a Triage Criterion 
 
Triage decisions raise difficult ethical issues, because they require a decision on what is 
the best and fairest way to allocate scarce resources and, as a consequence, whose lives 
should or should not be saved. These are existential questions that touch upon deeply 
held ethical values that differ from country to country. Even within most countries, the 
criteria that should guide such decisions are controversial, as is how they should be 
reached and who should make them. The ethical debate on triage decisions seems to 
agree at least on one goal: the maximisation of lives saved.9 However, as the guidelines 
introduced in Part II demonstrate, fundamental disagreements exist as to whether this 
means that all lives need to be given equal value, no matter the person’s age, expected 
life span and quality of life.  
 
a) Age cut off point for treatment 
 
Only the Swiss guidelines fixed a clear age limit, above 85 years, as of which patients are 
automatically excluded from access to a ventilator in times of extreme scarcity, regardless 
of the individual health and other situation of the person. The Italian guidelines, without 
actually identifying a particular age limit, considered that ‘[i]t may be necessary to establish 
an age limit for admission to the ICU.’10 A slightly different approach is that of applying age 
not as a freestanding triage criterion, but to consider age limits for treatment where certain 
co-morbidities exist, as can be observed in the Swiss guidelines which, in addition to 
stipulating an absolute age limit of above 85 years, also exclude patients of above 75 years 
if they have particular health conditions. 
 
8 Guidelines in the UK adopt a comparable approach, see National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE). 2020. COVID-19 rapid guideline: critical care. Available at: 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng159/resources/covid19-rapidguideline-critical-care-in-adults-pdf-
66141848681413  (accessed 6 April 2020) and British Medical Association (BMA), ‘Covid-19 – ethical 
issues: A guidance note,’ available at: https://www.bma.org.uk/media/2226/bma-covid-19-ethics-
guidance.pdf  (accessed 1 April  2020). 
9 For a discussion see, for example, WHO, ‘Addressing ethical issues in pandemic influenza planning’, 
WHO/HSE/EPR/GIP/2008.2, WHO/IER/ETH/2008.1, p.8. 
10 See supra note 3. 
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The main advantage of a blanket cut off point for treatment eligibility in a triage context is 
clarity and making individual evaluations unnecessary at a moment when decisions need 
to be made quickly. However, a blanket rule is problematic for various reasons. Whatever 
age limit is set will necessarily be arbitrary, given how much the health condition of persons 
in the same age group can differ. There does not seem to be any particular age as of which 
mechanical ventilation is either futile or too burdensome, so that exclusion based on age 
can also not be justified in the interests of the patient him/herself. If this was the case, 
arguably these groups should be excluded from mechanical ventilation, whether or not 
there is a context of particular scarcity; however, this argument does not seem to have 
been made by anyone. Indeed, even those who promote a distributive justice argument 
according to which younger persons should receive priority over older persons when 
competing for ventilators,11 do not seem to advocate for a cut-off point based on age. Age 
thus only comes into the decision-making process where choices need to be made about 
which of two patients should be given access to a ventilator in priority over the other. The 
same seems to apply where triage guidelines use the criterion of age combined with 
particular pre-existing health conditions as an exclusion criterion, as the suggestion is not 
that the patient would not benefit from the treatment, but rather that other persons would 
benefit more because of they are younger. 
 
b) Maximising life years 
 
Another issue often discussed in the context of triage ethics is that of aiming to maximise 
not just the net number of lives, but the number of life-years. This approach could be seen 
in the Italian guidelines which justified excluding older patients partly because the limited 
life span they have left would result in fewer life years being saved if an older person were 
to be prioritised over a younger. While often linked to age, in the sense that where a choice 
between a younger and an older patient who compete for a ventilator needs to be made, 
the argument is that the younger person should be prioritised in order to achieve a 
maximisation of life years. This criterion can also potentially apply where a choice needs 
to be made between two patients of the same age, one of whom has a better prognosis to 
live longer than the other, but where both have a chance to benefit from the treatment. 
Even though this approach might sound attractive at first sight, it needs to be considered 
that such prognoses are uncertain. The approach also raises concerns about 
discrimination, not just based on age, but also based on pre-existing health conditions and 
disabilities that might shorten the life prognosis. Indeed, one could, on this basis, 
potentially discriminate against persons from minorities or deprived backgrounds, given 
the data according to which they have poorer health outcomes, including with regard to 
Covid-19, raising serious concerns about race and other forms of discrimination. 
 
Some suggest that age discrimination concerns could to some extent be alleviated by a 
particular distributive justice approach to triage ethics which focuses not just or even 
primarily on the life years to be saved, but on the years already lived. This approach which 
is sometimes also referred to as lifetime justice approach considers that those who have 
lived a shorter life have a greater entitlement to scarce resources than those who have 
already lived longer.12 Such an approach would, of course, run into problems where the 
 
11 E.g., Govind Persad, ‘Evaluating the Legality of Age-Based Criteria in Health Care: From 
Nondiscrimination and Discretion to Distributive Justice’, (2019) 60 B.C.L. Rev. 889, 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol60/iss3/4. 
12 Ibid. 
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younger person has much lower chances of surviving the treatment, or a shorter life span 
prognosis than the older person.  
 
In addition to these more pragmatic considerations, the New York State Task Force on Life 
and the Law made an interesting point in its ventilator guidelines13 that were developed to 
prepare for future pandemics, based on wide interdisciplinary and public consultations. 
The guidelines highlight that ‘age already factors indirectly into any criteria that assess the 
overall health of an individual (because the likelihood of having chronic medical conditions 
increases with age)’. There is therefore a risk that age becomes ‘double-weighted’ in triage 
decisions if age is considered as an additional factor to clinical considerations.  
 
Just like the approach that uses a specific age as a cut off point for exclusion from 
mechanical ventilation in times of pandemics, the life years approach, including in its 
lifetime justice manifestation, would violate the principle stressed by the German and Swiss 
guidelines, that all lives are of equal value and that a choice between different lives cannot 
be made based on any inherent characteristics of the person, be they related to age, 
health, social worth etc. According to this view, choices of who to treat can only be justified 
based on clinical criteria related to the treatment itself.  
 
c) The relevance of age in clinical triage criteria 
 
Most guidelines on triage in times of pandemics recommend using clinical considerations 
focusing on the treatment prognosis as the main criterion. Such an approach is seemingly 
neutral with regard to characteristics of the individual other than those that are directly 
related to the treatment itself, including those that influence risks, benefits, futility and 
overall prognosis. Nevertheless, age and also disability might play a role that needs to be 
considered in order to determine the acceptability of such approaches. In a recent interview 
in The Guardian, the chair of the BMA Ethics Committee pointed out that, even though age 
and disability will only be criteria where they have an impact on a patient’s ability to benefit 
from treatment’ ‘[a]n approach based solely on clinically relevant factors may, statistically, 
prioritise the younger and, where clinically relevant, it may discriminate against those with 
underlying health conditions. We need to be alert to this.’14 
 
A particularly concerning aspect of clinical decision-making in this context is the wide-
spread reliance on clinical frailty scores that are applied, in particular, to elderly dementia 
patients. The Clinical Frailty Scale (CFS) assesses the overall level of fitness or frailty, 
ranging from 1 (‘Very Fit’) to 9 (‘Terminally Ill’). Scores are predicated on an assessment 
of cognition and mood, mobility, function, social health, co-morbidities, medications and 
health attitude and differentiate on the basis of a person’s need for assistance with day to 
day activities.15  
 
In their Covid-19 Guidelines, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence in the UK, NICE 
differentiates between patients of a frailty score of below 5 and who are on that basis 
 
13 Ventilator allocation guidelines, 2015, available at: 
https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/reports_publications/docs/ventilator_guidelines.pdf. 
14 John Chisholm, ‘Doctors will have to choose who gets life-saving treatment. Here's how we'll do it’, The 
Guardian. 1 April 2020. 
15 Kenneth Rockwood, Xiaowei Song, Chris MacKnight, Howard Bergman, David B. Hogan, Ian McDowell, 
and Arnold Mitnitski. ‘A global clinical measure of fitness and frailty in elderly people’, (2005) 173(5) Cdn 
Medical Assoc J 489.  
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regarded as more likely to benefit from critical care and those who have a score of 5 
(moderate frailty) and above, where the benefit of critical care is more uncertain and where 
a discussion of a do not resuscitate order with the patient is recommended.16  Originally, 
the guidelines suggested the use of CFS scores irrespective of the person’s age. This 
provoked significant opposition from civil society organisations which regarded it as 
potentially discriminating against persons with learning disabilities. In the words of the chair 
of “Embracing Complexity”, a coalition of leading neurodevelopmental and mental health 
charities: ‘There is a risk that the scale does not distinguish clearly enough between those 
who need support with daily living as they near the end of their lives and those who need 
support because of neuro-developmental conditions but may otherwise be healthy.’17  
NICE reacted by changing the recommendation that clinicians use CFS scores ‘as part of 
a holistic assessment where appropriate,’ also acknowledging that ‘[t]he CFS should not 
be used in younger people, people with stable long-term disabilities (for example, cerebral 
palsy), learning disabilities or autism.’ While this addresses discrimination concerns of a 
particular group of disabled persons, it does not alleviate concerns that a group of persons 
are likely to be denied treatment based on their age combined with their need for 
assistance. 
  
To the extent that the CFS score has a bearing on the clinical indication for and success 
of mechanical ventilation in a patient, this might be an acceptable justification for it to be 
part of the triage decision-making process. However, where the score, such as that of 
moderately frail, primarily relates to a person’s need for assistance with their daily affairs, 
the relevance of this for clinical decision-making cannot automatically be assumed, and it 
is important to distinguish between those factors that influence the outcome and prognosis 
of treatment and those that mean that the person might need more resources during and 
after recovery. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
As this short paper has tried to show, differences exist as to whether age is an acceptable 
triage criterion, either in the form of a general age limit for treatment eligibility, in the form 
of setting age limits where certain co-morbidities are present, or hidden behind clinical 
considerations. With regard to the open use of age as a triage criterion, it needs to be 
borne in mind that this would amount to direct discrimination based on age resulting in the 
likely death of the older person. Such an approach would require an ethically and legally 
sound justification. Its acceptability seems to depend on whether one adheres to 
consequentialist views that define the greatest good and terms of direct consequences of 
decisions, in this case in the form of maximisation of life years, or whether one adheres to 
dignity based ethics that require protecting each life equally, no matter how short its 
projected duration.  
 
What seems almost more worrying than direct age based discrimination which is out in the 
open, is indirect discrimination under the guise of clinical criteria, where, as in the Swiss 
guidelines, lip service is paid to equal dignity and value of all lives, while including age 
 
16 National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), ‘COVID-19 rapid guideline: critical care’, 2020, 
available at: https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng159/resources/covid19-rapidguideline-critical-care-in-
adults-pdf-66141848681413  (accessed 11 June 2020). 
17 Jo Stephenson, ‘Avoid frailty score in Covid-19 guidance when assessing LD patients,’ Nursing Times, 
24 March 2020 https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/policies-and-guidance/avoid-frailty-score-in-covid-19-
guidance-when-assessing-ld-patients-24-03-2020 (accessed 6 April 2020). 
 100 
 
based exclusion criteria without acknowledging that this violates the basic values upon 
which the guidelines supposedly rest. Awareness is needed that clinical criteria will often 
not be as neutral as they might seem, particularly when they are not applied in order to 
determine, based on each person’s individual circumstances, whether or not he or she 
would benefit from being put on a ventilator, but rather for making choices between 
different patients in times of acute scarcity. It is all too easy to regard the elderly, if not as 
less deserving, nevertheless as less able to benefit from treatment.  
 
There are no clear and easy answer to the dilemmas posed by extreme shortages of vital 
medical treatment during pandemics, but it is important that a transparent and fair decision-
making process is in place and that the criteria are not random, discriminatory or based on 
intuitions and assumptions that are not openly admitted and thoroughly justified. At a 
minimum, this means that the criteria used are subjected to ethical discussion and scrutiny 
which ideally should take place outside of emergency situations, when there is time and 
space for such debate, and with wide consultation with all potentially affected groups.  
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The Effects of the Covid-19 Pandemic on the Regulation of the 
Economy: A Discussion 
Johanna Hoekstra, Jessica Lawrence, Niall O’Connor and Eugenio Vaccari [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_014] 
 
The sweeping nature of the Covid-19 pandemic is having devastating effects on all sectors 
of the economy. This new development has not just caused consumers to restrict their 
usual spending. It has caused governments all over the world to limit travel, free movement 
as well as social and economic activity. 
 
All of these governmental and social responses directly and indirectly affect companies 
and their operations. As a result, countries and international organisations are 
implementing a variety of fiscal and legislative measures to minimise the economic impact 
of this crisis. These measures ensure the performance of—or allow for reasonable 
changes to—ongoing contracts; protect the free movement of goods around the globe; 
safeguard employees’ rights; and establish financial relief packages and rescue policies to 
keep companies afloat. 
 
The papers in this section analyse the implications of the crisis and the measures 
announced or discussed by national governments and international organisations to 
minimise its effects from a variety of perspectives. These papers emphasise key issues 
that should feature prominently in short as well as long-term regulatory reforms. Overall, 
they advocate for more inclusive and just approaches to regulatory reforms than those 
implemented so far, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.  
 
Dr. Johanna Hoekstra investigates the judicial approach to the enforceability of obligations 
arising from international commercial contracts when one of the parties cannot perform 
their obligations due to the Covid-19 pandemic if the contract is regulated by transnational 
commercial law. In her paper, Johanna suggests that courts would use the existing legal 
instruments—the Convention for the International Sale of Good, the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contract, and the principles of the lex mercatoria—to promote 
a pragmatic interpretation of existing contracts. This pragmatic approach of the judiciary is 
likely to result in predictable rulings and, therefore, encourage parties to be cooperative 
and flexible in their dealings. 
 
The pragmatic approach of the judiciary is not restricted to the international level or cross-
border disputes. It is one of the main attributes of the judicial approach adopted by English 
courts in domestic insolvency cases. In his paper, Dr. Eugenio Vaccari focuses on some 
specific emergency measures enacted in the area of the insolvency law by the UK 
government. Particularly with reference to the suspension of wrongful trading, Eugenio 
warns of the risk that measures branded to save companies and, ultimately, jobs can have 
unwanted side-effects. These include delaying the inevitable (i.e. winding-up of 
unprofitable businesses) and unduly restricting legal rights (i.e. the creditors’ rights to hold 
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directors accountable for improper use of company’s assets), thus raising social and justice 
issues. 
 
This “justice perspective” is further explored and expanded in the remaining two papers of 
this section. Dr. Jessica Lawrence writes on trade policies, support measures and 
equivalent barriers to trade subject to World Trade Organisation (WTO) law. In her paper, 
Jessica challenges not simply the legality and permissibility, but also and more importantly 
the desirability of these measures in light of their potential crippling effect on some less 
developed economies. Jessica concludes that it is reductive and, ultimately, inadequate to 
articulate international rules solely designed to promote the neo-liberal purpose of 
facilitating global trade. 
 
Dr. Niall O’Connor follows a similar approach in presenting an overarching analysis of the 
virus’ intrusion into working conditions through the lens of the “right to work”. Niall highlights 
the components of the right to work and its fundamental, social nature. He observes that 
its key features (right to a decent work, to freely enter into a profession/job, to fair working 
conditions and to be shielded against dangerous working environments) may critically 
counteract the employers’ right to conduct a business, especially in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis. In his paper, Niall observes that reliance on the “right to work” can 
ensure a robust employee-protective response to the pandemic for a variety of employees. 
These include: (i) frontline workers who had to continue going to their workplaces for the 
whole period of the crisis; (ii) home workers; and (iii) furloughed workers. 
 
The economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic will be felt for years to come. The 
devastating effects on companies and trade may be prolonged by the approach of public 
health officials, who are attempting to minimise the impact of the Covid-19 virus on the 
population. More importantly, the Covid-19 pandemic will have extensive and long-lasting 
(perhaps, permanent) effects on the way we conduct our lives. Where 9/11 resulted in 
permanent changes for the aviation and travel industries, it is safe to assume that no sector 
of the economy will be unaffected by the exogenous shock caused by the current crisis.  
 
These societal and economic developments will impact the law regulating the economy, 
particularly in the long term. Speculating on how extensive the impact on regulations will 
be is premature and inappropriate at this stage, as no-one can reasonably predict the 
magnitude of changes caused by the Covid-19 pandemic on people’s lives. The papers 
included in this section suggest that, at least in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, states 
will resort to domestic, un-coordinated solutions. In line with patterns observed in other 
recent crisis—such as the Great Financial Crisis and the 2001 recession—co-ordinated 
approaches are likely to be developed after the emergency phase. The papers reported in 
this section are designed to inform the discussion on these co-ordinated approaches and 
provide arguments for a more inclusive and just approach to regulatory reforms.  
 
To conclude, the papers in this section do not aim at offering a comprehensive or 
exhaustive investigation of the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on economic regulations. 
However, they suggest that similar legal and non-legal issues arise in a variety of sectors 
of the economy, at a domestic and international level. They also suggest the need for a 
more inclusive regulatory debate, as the interests of less sophisticated and “vocal” 
players—such as emerging economies, employees, small businesses and suppliers—
have been frequently overlooked in the emergency measures adopted by governments in 
the aftermath of the crisis. As a result, these papers offer a tool to analyse the adequacy 
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of immediate responses and highlight issues that should be considered in any informed 
discussion on co-ordinated responses to the challenges raised by the Covid-19 pandemic.  
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Covid-19, Export Restrictions, and the WTO: Magnifying Global 
Divisions in a Time of Crisis 
Jessica Lawrence, Senior Lecturer, School of Law [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_015] 
 
 
Abstract 
Trade policy has been an important part of the global response to Covid-19. In order to 
boost production and increase the supply of critical goods, countries have lowered tariff 
barriers, put export restrictions in place, and smoothed the path to issue compulsory 
licenses for patented medicines and medical devices. All of these measures touch on trade 
policy, and fall under the ambit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This raises the 
question: do the flexibilities built into WTO law give countries the policy space they need 
to take emergency measures during this health crisis? This short paper explains the WTO 
rules and their application to national trade measures in response to Covid-19 using the 
example of export restrictions. It finds that from a legal perspective, WTO rules are flexible 
enough to permit countries to deviate from their normal obligations during this time of crisis. 
However, from a justice perspective, these flexibilities will be far more useful for wealthy 
developed states than for those with less purchasing power and production capacity. 
Indeed, the flexibility built into WTO law may prove ineffectual—and even detrimental—for 
poorer states, as it permits the wealthy the policy space to take measures in their own 
interest while leaving the less powerful without access to critical goods. The paper 
concludes that here, as elsewhere, the negative economic effects of Covid-19 will fall 
disproportionately on the poor and the vulnerable. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In response to the Covid-19 crisis, countries across the globe have implemented policies 
to spur production of critical goods, support the development of vaccines and anti-viral 
treatments, and safeguard domestic supplies of medicines, protective equipment, and 
diagnostic devices. Trade policy has played an important part in this global response, as 
countries lower entry barriers for medical products, put up export restrictions to keep 
scarce supplies at home, and look for ways to increase the production of medicines and 
medical devices and ensure affordable access for their populations.  
 
These measures fall within the scope of World Trade Organisation (WTO) law, under which 
countries have agreed to certain limits on their freedom to implement trade-related policies. 
These limits generally require countries to remove unnecessary barriers to trade, not to 
discriminate against products and services from other WTO members, to fairly administer 
their technical rules, to do away with certain types of subsidies, and to ensure a minimum 
level of protection for intellectual property, among other things.  
 
Some of the trade measures that countries have taken to combat Covid-19 are 
permissible—even desirable—under WTO rules. For example, many countries have 
lowered barriers to trade in critical goods, seeking to increase supplies and protect supply 
chains by making it cheaper and easier for products to cross international borders. To this 
end, governments have suspended or even eliminated tariffs on medicines and other 
critical supplies, suspended the application of anti-dumping duties on medical goods, and 
streamlined customs procedures, creating “green lanes” for the rapid inspection and 
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approval of products necessary for the fight against Covid-19.1 WTO members are 
certainly permitted to decrease trade barriers by lowering tariffs and simplifying entry 
procedures, so long as they do so in a non-discriminatory fashion, and observers have 
widely applauded these moves. Indeed, some have argued that they should be made a 
permanent part of WTO law after the crisis ends, as cheaper access to medical goods will 
be of long-term benefit to all.2 
 
Other responses, however, are less clearly compliant with WTO rules. Measures like 
export restrictions and limitations on patent protections are WTO-compatible only if they 
fall under the exceptions and flexibilities available under the current regime. This raises 
the important question of whether the flexibilities built into WTO law give countries the 
policy space they need to take emergency measures during this health crisis, and whether 
in doing so WTO law promotes positive global outcomes. 
 
This short paper addresses this question in two ways. First, it asks from a legal perspective 
whether or not WTO law permits the measures that countries have imposed thus far, and 
are considering imposing in the future. By way of illustration, it examines the rules that 
govern export restrictions on goods, explaining the requirements under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 and the carve-outs and exceptions that countries 
can make use of in order to justify actions that would normally fall afoul of the WTO 
rulebook. It concludes that the WTO Agreements do contain flexibilities for at least some 
types of emergency measures, and permit governments to act in ways that would normally 
contravene their obligations in order to respond to a public health crisis. 
 
Second, it asks from a justice perspective whether the legal flexibilities contained in the 
WTO rulebook are sufficient to protect the interests of all countries in ensuring access to 
critical medicines and supplies. Here, it discusses the ways in which WTO law’s flexibilities, 
while facially neutral, will be far more useful for wealthy developed states than for the 
developing world. Indeed, the flexibility built into WTO rules may prove ineffectual—and 
even detrimental—for poorer states, as it gives the wealthy the policy space to take 
measures in their own interest while leaving the less powerful without access to critical 
goods. As a result, WTO flexibilities may magnify, rather than diminish, the underlying 
divisions between countries in terms of purchasing power and production capacity.  
 
II. Are Export Restrictions on Goods Permissible under WTO Law? 
 
Among other measures put into place in the context of the Covid-19 crisis, a growing 
number of countries have enacted various types of export restrictions on goods, including 
medicines, medical devices, protective supplies, and food.4 These measures have come 
 
1 For example, Argentina has suspended anti-dumping duties on the import of syringes from China; Costa 
Rica granted a moratorium on import tariffs from April – June 2020; and the European Union implemented 
“green lanes” to facilitate the movement of essential goods and services. See, WTO, ‘COVID-19: Trade 
and Trade-Related Measures’, 29 May 2020, 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_goods_measure_e.htm> accessed 10 
June 2020. 
2 See, e.g., Jennifer A Hillman, ‘Six Proactive Steps in a Smart Trade Approach to Fighting COVID-19,’ 
Think Global Health, 20 March 2020, available at <https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/six-proactive-
steps-smart-trade-approach-fighting-covid-19> accessed 10 June 2020. 
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, LT/UR/A-1A/1, 14 April 1994(GATT) <http://docs.wto.org>. 
4 The WTO maintains a regularly updated list of such measures: ‘Trade and Trade-Related Measures’ (n 
1). 
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in the form of outright bans or restrictions on export as well as the introduction of new or 
strengthened export licensing and approval procedures. Such restrictions seek to 
safeguard national supplies of critical products, ensure food security, and prevent domestic 
shortages by keeping goods inside a country’s borders. 
 
The GATT generally prohibits quantitative restrictions (that is, measures such as bans and 
quotas) on exports of goods.5 The ban on quantitative restrictions is quite broad, covering 
both de jure and de facto measures imposed by WTO members. Any prohibition or 
limitation of exports in order to combat Covid-19 would clearly be caught by this rule, and 
is thus in principle incompatible with the GATT. 
 
The prohibition of quantitative restrictions is, however, subject to four important sets of 
exceptions that significantly soften the impact of this ban. 
 
First, the GATT includes a carve-out for ‘[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions temporarily 
applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to 
the exporting contracting party.’6 In the context of Covid-19 this means that a country can 
impose temporary export restrictions or prohibitions in order to prevent critical shortages 
of medical or other supplies. ‘Temporary’ means that the restrictions should last only so 
long as necessary,7 and ‘critical shortage’ means ‘those deficiencies in quantity that are 
crucial, that amount to a situation of decisive importance, or that reach a vitally important 
or decisive stage, or a turning point.’8 Thus, countries must be careful to restrict exports 
only of essential products, and only for a limited period (though this period may extend as 
long as necessary). Such restrictions should also be non-discriminatory, applying to all 
third countries equally and maintain insofar as possible a proportional distribution of trade.9 
Where a country’s measures do meet these criteria, they will not be considered violations 
of the GATT, and may thus be freely imposed. This carve-out is one of the two flexibilities 
cited most by the countries that have adopted export restrictions thus far, along with the 
general exception for health measures discussed below.10 
 
When it comes to restrictions on the export of agricultural products a few additional rules 
apply. Export restrictions on food are permitted where necessary to protect food security. 
Such restrictions were used extensively during the 2007–2008 global food crisis, for 
example. The WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture specifies that when a government puts in 
place restrictions on food exports, it should take into account the potential effects of the 
measure on the food security of other countries, notify the WTO’s Committee on 
Agriculture about the nature and extent of the rules, and, if requested, consult with other 
countries and provide them with information regarding the export restrictions.11 There is 
 
5 GATT, art XI(1). The Agreement on Agriculture provides further specific rules on export restrictions in the 
context of agricultural products (Agreement on Agriculture, LT/UR/A-1A/2, 15 April 1994, (AoA) art 12 
<http://docs.wto.org>). For an academic overview of the WTO’s rules on export restrictions, see Gabrielle 
Marceau, ‘WTO and Export Restrictions’, (2016) 50 Journal of World Trade 563.  
6 GATT, art XI(2)(a). 
7 China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Certain Raw Materials, WT/DS394/AB/R, 30 January 
2012, [323]–[331]. 
8 Ibid [324]. 
9 GATT, art XIII. 
10 WTO, ‘Export Prohibitions and Restrictions: Information Note’, 23 April 2020, 5 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/export_prohibitions_report_e.pdf> accessed 10 June 
2020. 
11 AoA, art 12. 
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some debate, however, as to whether this provision in fact imposes any hard substantive 
obligations, or whether it simply amounts to ‘soft law’ that is unlikely to constrain 
agricultural export restrictions.12  
 
Second, the prohibition of quantitative restrictions exempts ‘duties, taxes and other 
charges’ from its coverage, meaning that export tariffs or duties are generally permitted by 
WTO law so long as they continue to respect non-discrimination rules and continue to treat 
other countries equally.13 This means that countries could impose taxes on the export of 
medicines, devices, protective equipment, or other critical supplies in order to generate 
revenue or discourage exports.14  
 
Some countries have made special additional commitments to minimise, transform, or 
eliminate export taxes as part of their terms of accession to the WTO, and a few of these 
may be relevant in the context of measures taken to combat Covid-19.15 Montenegro, for 
example, agreed that it ‘would not apply or reintroduce any export duty,’16 which would 
include any new charge imposed on critical goods. Domestic policy space may in such 
cases face additional constraints.  
 
Third, even in the event that a country’s export restrictions cannot rely on the previous 
flexibilities, they may still fall under the general exceptions to WTO law. Three of these 
exceptions are potentially relevant here.  
 
First, countries may put in place measures otherwise incompatible with their GATT 
obligations if ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,’ provided they do 
so in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate among countries, and does 
not amount to a disguised restriction on trade.17 Such measures must be ‘necessary’ to 
addressing the Covid-19 situation, which may bar rules that are deemed to be more 
restrictive than is reasonable. Siddharth Aatreya has argued that this would exclude, for 
example, measures that hoard essential goods beyond the level that a country could 
reasonably need.18 But given that public health is such an important goal, the ‘necessity 
test’ is likely not to be read strictly.19 This general exception for health measures is the 
second flexibility commonly cited by the countries that have adopted export restrictions 
thus far, alongside the carve-out explained above.20 
 
12 For the argument that the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture should be read more strictly, see 
Robert Howse and Tim Josling, ‘Agricultural Export Restrictions and International Trade Law: A Way 
Forward’ (2012) International Food and Agriculture Trade Policy Council, 15–16. 
13 See further China—Raw Materials (n 7) [321]. 
14 But see Howse and Josling (n 12) 17–18 (arguing that the exemption of export taxes should be read in 
light of the object and purpose of GATT Article XI, and thus restricted to measures with a primarily fiscal, 
rather than trade-restrictive, objective). 
15 These countries include Bulgaria, Mongolia, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Croatia, China, Saudi Arabia, Viet 
Nam, Ukraine, Montenegro, Russia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Afghanistan (Marceau (n 5) 576–581). 
16 WTO, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Montenegro to the World Trade Organization’, 
WT/ACC/CGR/38, 5 December 2011 [132]. 
17 GATT, art XX(b). 
18 Siddharth S Aatreya, ‘Are COVID-19 Related Trade Restrictions WTO-Consistent?’, EJIL:Talk!, 25 April 
2020, <https://www.ejiltalk.org/are-covid-19-related-trade-restrictions-wto-consistent/> accessed 10 June 
2020. 
19 WTO, ‘European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products’, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001 [172]. 
20 WTO, ‘Export Prohibitions and Restrictions’ (n 10) 5. 
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Second, countries may make use of the general exception for ‘restrictions on exports of 
domestic materials necessary to ensure essential quantities of such materials to a 
domestic processing industry’ if they do so ‘during periods when the domestic price of such 
materials is held below the world price.’21 Here, too, such measures would need to be put 
in place in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate among countries, and 
does not amount to a disguised restriction on trade. This exception could cover, for 
example, situations in which a country placed price caps on materials necessary for the 
production of critical supplies, and coupled these price controls with export restrictions in 
order to keep the supplies from being sold on world markets at higher prices.  
 
Third, countries may also make use of the general exception for measures ‘essential to 
the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply,’ again provided 
they do so in a way that does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate among countries, 
and does not amount to a disguised restriction on trade.22 Such measures must be 
‘essential’ to acquiring or distributing the products in question, which would (as with the 
‘human health’ exception) bar measures that are more trade restrictive than is necessary 
to achieve this goal.23 The products in question must also be in ‘general or local short 
supply’, meaning that they are not available on the market – a simple lack of domestic 
production capacity will not be sufficient.24 This exception includes the further caveats that 
such measures must be ‘consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled 
to an equitable share of the international supply of such products’ and that they be 
‘discontinued as soon as the conditions giving rise to them have ceased to exist.’ In the 
context of Covid-19 export restrictions, this would seem to permit, for example, restrictions 
on trade in protective equipment, so long as that equipment is in short supply, the 
restrictions do not direct all exports to one country (violating the principle of equity), and 
are limited to the duration of the shortage. 
 
Finally, countries could also attempt to justify their export restrictions on the basis of 
national security concerns. The GATT contains a broad national security exception that 
permits a WTO Member to take ‘any action which it considers necessary for the protection 
of its essential security interests […] taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations.’25 The national security exception has so far been referenced 
primarily to justify boycotts and restrictions on trade and transit during times of conflict, and 
this seems to have been the understanding of the original drafters of the GATT.26 However, 
the outer limits of what qualifies as an ‘emergency in international relations’ are not entirely 
clear,27 and it is possible that Covid-19, which has been declared a global pandemic by 
 
21 GATT, art XX(i). 
22 GATT, art XX(j). 
23 The AB in India—Solar Cells found that the same weighing and balancing process would apply to 
assessing whether measures are ‘essential’ as is typically used to determine whether measures are 
‘necessary’ (‘India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules’, WT/DS/456/AB/R, 16 
September 2016 [5.63]).  
24 Ibid [5.75]–[5.77]. 
25 GATT, art XXI(b)(iii). 
26 ECOSOC ‘Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Employment’ E/PC/T/A/PV/33, 24 July 1947.  
27 A WTO Panel in 2019 provided a first interpretation of this provision in Russia—Traffic in Transit, in 
which it found that a series of Russian measures preventing the movement of goods from Ukraine during 
the 2014 conflict could be justified under the national security exception (Russia—Measures Concerning 
Traffic in Transit, WT/DS512/R, 5 April 2019. 
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the World Health Organization, could pass the test, permitting countries to take whatever 
measures they consider ‘necessary’ to protect their public health sectors. 
 
Provided that they apply their measures in a non-discriminatory way and respect the other 
limited requirements imposed by the various carve-outs and exceptions discussed in this 
section, it is likely that many national export restrictions on critical goods will be permissible 
under WTO rules.28 As was seen during the 2007–2008 food crisis, GATT flexibilities do 
seem broadly sufficient to permit countries to put in place extraordinary export measures 
in order to deal with a national crisis. However, the question of whether and to what extent 
this flexibility will actually serve to ensure that WTO Members are able to access the 
medicines, devices, protective equipment, food, and other supplies they need to combat 
the global pandemic is another matter. Indeed – these very flexibilities may prove 
detrimental to countries that need to import goods from abroad and the lack domestic 
production capacity or financial resources to make up for the loss of global supply. 
 
III. Are the WTO Flexibilities Sufficient to Ensure Medical and Food Security?  
 
While it is understandable that countries concerned with supply would wish to put export 
restrictions in place, such restrictions also pose significant dangers, particularly to smaller 
economies and those lacking in domestic production capacity.  
 
To begin with, export restrictions disrupt supply chains, causing delays in production and 
transport and impeding access to essential goods. Pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and 
other high-priority items are frequently the products of multiple jurisdictions, with 
manufacturers, intellectual property holders, and shipping lines stretching across national 
borders. In such cases, self-sufficiency is simply not a viable option. The interruption of 
global supply chains negatively impacts production, approval, and distribution processes, 
reducing supply and increasing prices for all.  
 
Second, export restrictions can be self-defeating, leading to a ‘multiplier effect’29 as 
countries put their own limitations in place in response to previously imposed rules. 
Research has found that during the global food crisis of 2008, export restrictions led to a 
13% increase in world food prices in general, and a 45% increase for rice, one of the 
hardest-hit products.30 In the case of medical devices, almost all economies are importers 
as well as exporters, making everyone vulnerable to price increases, but affecting those 
with less purchasing power the most. Countries with greater financial resources will be 
better placed to withstand price surges, while states with weaker fiscal positions and higher 
public debt will see the real value of their budgets fall, and will be far less able to borrow 
to support government policies.31 
 
Retaliation is also a matter of concern. For example, when US President Donald Trump 
decided to impose export restrictions on N95 protective masks, Canadian Prime Minister 
 
28 Countries are also responsible for notifying any new quantitative restrictions to the WTO ‘as soon as 
possible, but not later than six months from their entry into force’ (Decision on Notification Procedures for 
Quantitative Restrictions, G/L/59/Rev.1, 22 June 2012 <https://docs.wto.org> accessed 10 June 2020). 
29 Paolo E. Giordani, Nadia Rocha, and Michele Ruta, ‘Food Prices and the Multiplier Effects of Trade 
Policy’ (2016) 101 Journal of International Economics 102. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See, eg, Cesar Calderon et al, Africa's Pulse, No 21, Spring 2020: An Analysis of Issues Shaping 
Africa’s Economic Future, World Bank, 2020. 
 113 
 
Justin Trudeau swiftly threatened countermeasures, noting that ‘the United States also 
receives essential supplies and products’ from Canada.32 Retaliation is a concern with 
Covid-related food export restrictions as well, to the degree that the Directors-General of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization joined the WTO 
Director-General in issuing a joint statement cautioning that ‘[u]ncertainty about food 
availability can spark a wave of export restrictions, creating a shortage on the global 
market.’33 
 
Finally, export restrictions have a differential impact on countries with smaller or non-
existent domestic production capacity for critical goods.34 For example, World Bank 
economists Aaditya Mattoo and Michele Ruta have found that only seven countries 
account for 70% of world exports of ventilators.35 Export restrictions put in place by any of 
these states would endanger access to medical supplies throughout the world, and the 
hardest hit states would, again, be those without the resources to buy or build their own. 
In some areas, this has already come to pass. Despite calls for solidarity,36 the EU put in 
place restrictions on face shields, mouth-nose protection equipment, protective spectacles 
and visors, protective garments, and gloves beginning in March, and continued to restrict 
the export of masks, spectacles, and protective garments through the end of May.37 Chad 
Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics warned of the severe 
consequences of this move for countries that have historically imported these products 
from the EU, such as Cape Verde (89% of protective spectacles and visors), Niger (71%), 
and Angola (62%).38 
 
States and international organisations have recognised the damage that may be caused 
by export restrictions, and in response have proposed some guiding principles that 
countries should follow when enacting emergency trade measures. The G20, for example, 
has recommended that export restrictions should be ‘targeted, proportionate, transparent, 
temporary, [and] reflect our interest in protecting the most vulnerable.’39 And the WTO and 
World Customs Organisation (WCO) have stressed the importance of export measures 
 
32 Richard Hall, ‘Trudeau Threatens Retaliation after Trump Keeps Shipment of Masks Intended for 
Canadian Doctors’, Independent, 3 April 2020.  
33 WTO, ‘Agency Chiefs Issue Joint Call to Keep Food Trade Flowing in Response to COVID-19’ (WTO, 31 
March 2020) < https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_26mar20_e.htm> accessed 27 April 
2020. 
34 See, e.g., Alvaro Espitia, Nadia Rocha, and Michelle Ruta, ‘Trade and the COVID-19 Crisis in 
Developing Countries’, VoxEU, 9 April 2020 <https://voxeu.org/article/trade-and-covid-19-crisis-developing-
countries> accessed 15 April 2020. 
35 Aaditya Mattoo and Michele Ruta, ‘Viral Protectionism in the Time of Coronavirus’, World Bank Blogs, 27 
March 2020, <https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/viral-protectionism-time-coronavirus> accessed 27 April 
2020. 
36 Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, ‘WHO Director-General’s Opining Remarks at the Media Briefing on 
COVID-19’, 3 March 2020, <https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-
remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---3-march-2020> accessed 14 April 2020. 
37 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/568 of 23 April 2020 making the exportation of certain 
products subject to the production of an export authorisation [2020] OJ L 129/7. 
38 Chad P Bown, ‘COVID-19: Demand Spikes, Export Restrictions, and Quality Concerns Imperil Poor 
Country Access to Medical Supplies’ in Richard Baldwin & Simon J Evenett (eds), COVID-19 and Trade 
Policy: Why Turning Inward Won’t Work (Vox / CEPR Press 2020), 35. 
39 ‘G20 Trade and Investment Ministerial Meeting: Ministerial Statement’, 14 May 2020, Annex art 1.1.1 
<https://g20.org/en/media/Documents/G20SS_Statement_G20%20Second%20Trade%20&%20Investment
%20Ministerial%20Meeting_EN.pdf> accessed 10 June 2020. 
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being temporary and designed in a non-discriminatory way.40 These guidelines do not 
impose any hard limits on national behaviour, but seek to prompt countries to think more 
carefully about the design of their export restrictions while preserving their freedom to act 
as they believe necessary.  
 
Fearing that these moves do not go far enough to prevent or remedy the negative impacts 
of export restrictions, some scholars have called on the international community to take 
bolder and more legally binding action. Wendy Cutler, for example, has argued that the G7 
and G20 should call for a standstill on tariff hikes, export bans, and export limitations, and 
that the WTO should call an emergency session to act on the surge in export restrictions.41 
Mona Pinchis-Paulsen has argued for a revision of the WTO rules to add an ‘inverse-
exception’ whereby countries would be asked to drop their trade barriers, rather than being 
permitted to raise them, during times of global emergency.42 The likelihood of any legal 
development of this type is, however, vanishingly small—particularly given the WTO’s pre-
existing struggles over the collapse of the Doha round trade negotiations, the turn to 
bilateralism and regionalism as the primary forums for economic liberalisation, and the 
breakdown of the dispute settlement process that has resulted from the US’s refusal to 
appoint new members to the Appellate Body.43  
 
Covid-19-related export restrictions—even those that are WTO-compliant—are likely to 
increase prices, decrease supply, and disrupt supply chains, especially when put in place 
by important industrial centres. And in the absence of more extensive international 
cooperation and commitment to ensure that the interests of developing countries are 
protected, it can only be the case that the poorest and most vulnerable will 
disproportionately suffer the negative impacts of any trade measures enacted in response 
to the crisis. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Times of crisis prompt us to reconsider law and policy by exposing stress points and 
weaknesses in the existing system. In the world of WTO law, the Covid-19 crisis, like the 
food crisis of 2007–2008, has brought attention to, among other issues, the tricky question 
of export restrictions.  
 
As explained in Section II, the GATT provides numerous flexibilities that allow countries to 
enact emergency measures that would otherwise be incompatible with their WTO 
obligations. So long as export restrictions are non-discriminatory, temporary, and do not 
go beyond what is needed to protect domestic supply, they are likely permissible under 
 
40 ‘WCO-WTO Joint Statement on COVID-19 Related Trade Measures’, 6 April 2020, 
<https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/igo_06apr20_e.htm>. 
41 Wendy Cutler, ‘Coronavirus: The Need to Adjust and Reshape Our Trade Agenda’, Asia Society Policy 
Institute, 17 March 2020, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/coronavirus-need-adjust-and-reshape-our-
trade-agenda> accessed 10 June 2020. 
42 Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, ‘COVID-19 Symposium: Thinking Creatively and Learning from COVID-19—How 
the WTO can Maintain Open Trade on Critical Supplies’, Opinio Juris, 2 April 2020, 
<https://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/02/covid-19-symposium-thinking-creatively-and-learning-from-covid-19-
how-the-wto-can-maintain-open-trade-on-critical-supplies/> accessed 28 April 2020. 
43 See, e.g., Imogen Saunders, ‘Populism, Backlash and the Ongoing Use of the World Trade Organization 
Dispute Settlement System: State Responses to the Appellate Body Crisis’ (2020) 35 Maryland Journal of 
International Law (forthcoming) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3611539> 
accessed 10 June 2020. 
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WTO rules. This means that the many nations that have put such rules in place—from 
Colombia to India to the UK—will not face multilateral restrictions on their freedom to act. 
 
But is this flexibility really a good thing? As discussed in Section III, export restrictions 
come with many negative side effects, including increases in prices and disruptions in 
production and distribution networks. These effects are problematic for everyone, but 
especially for those countries without the money or industrial capacity to buy or make their 
own substitutes. As with other aspects of the Covid-19 crisis, the impact of export 
restrictions will disproportionately fall on the poor and vulnerable.  
 
While the WTO’s flexibilities are sufficient in terms of providing policy space to member 
states who wish to enact export restrictions, they do not help to ensure equitable global 
access to critical supplies. Indeed, they exacerbate inequality in distribution by failing to 
control the use of export restrictions by countries that seek to protect their own citizens at 
the expense of their neighbours. We may well wish for a global trade regime that pays 
more attention to issues of justice and equity, but that it is not the one we have. 
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Regulating International Contracts in a Pandemic: Application of the 
Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Commercial Law 
Johanna Hoekstra, Lecturer, School of Law [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_016] 
 
Abstract 
The Covid-19 pandemic is a significant disruption for the performance of contractual 
obligations. Contracts often contain a force majeure clause that lays out the circumstances 
under which a contract can be terminated or suspended. However, not all contracts contain 
such a clause, or the clause might not cover the current situation. In the absence of a force 
majeure or similar type clause the applicable law fills that gap.  
 
This paper concentrates on international commercial law contracts and transnational 
commercial law; it specifically focuses on the Convention for the International Sale of 
Goods,1 the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,2 and the 
principles of the lex mercatoria. This paper analyses how these instruments could be 
applied if the contractual parties do not meet their obligations because of the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
 
 
 
I. Transnational Commercial Contracts in Times of Corona 
 
a) Introduction 
 
The Covid-19 pandemic significantly disrupts the performance of a large number of 
contracts. This can be because the performance of the contract is now impossible, illegal, 
no longer necessary, onerous, or simply inconvenient for the contracting parties. The key 
question is how the law deals with non-performance caused by the pandemic. In most 
cases hopefully the parties will come to an amicable agreement about the termination or 
modification of the contract. In other cases, however, that might not be possible; one of 
the parties may not wish to terminate/modify or the parties cannot reach agreement on 
how consequences of any changes should be attributed. 
 
This paper analyses contractual disruption due to Covid-19 focussing on international 
commercial law contracts and transnational commercial regulations. This entails contracts 
where both parties operate in a commercial capacity and concerns sales, services, hire-
purchase, and agency agreements among others. International commercial law contracts 
regularly include non-state rules such as transnational commercial law instruments or the 
lex mercatoria in the choice of law clause, either as the applicable law or by reference as 
contractual rules. Even in the absence of any reference in the contract, arbitrators and 
courts apply non-state rules with some regularity.  
 
The Convention for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) are two of the most prominent examples 
of transnational commercial instruments. This paper analyses how these instruments could 
be applied if the contractual parties do not meet their obligations because of the pandemic. 
 
1 United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods (adopted 11 April 1980, entered into force 
1 January 1988). 
2 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2016 edition). 
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It furthermore examines how a court or tribunal would decide on issues related to the 
pandemic if the lex mercatoria is applied. The next section discusses the relationship 
between the force majeure clause and the applicable law. The following part introduces 
the CISG and the UPICC and discusses how these instruments approach force majeure. 
The final part examines how, when applying the lex mercatoria, the court/tribunal could 
deal with breach of contract resulting from Covid-19 and concludes with some reflections 
on the likely effect of Covid-19 in relation to contractual modification or termination under 
transnational commercial law. 
 
b) Force Majeure and the Applicable Law 
 
The court/tribunal firstly looks at the contractual provisions, given that the contract is said 
to be the first source of contract law.3 Contracts often contain a force majeure and/or 
hardship clause (or similar) that will lay out the circumstances under which a contract can 
be cancelled, modified, or suspended. Such a clause typically includes a description of the 
type of situations that are covered by it, for instance war, strikes, acts of God, and 
eventually pandemics. However, not all contracts contain such a clause and even when 
they do, the clause might not cover pandemics (or it may be formulated in such a way that 
it is unclear whether it does). In the absence of a force majeure or similar type clause, the 
applicable law fills in the contractual gaps to resolve the dispute.   
 
For instance, if English law is the applicable law, then the doctrine of frustration is 
applicable. The threshold for frustration is high; the contract needs to be either impossible 
to perform,4 illegal,5 or the main purpose of the contract must have been thwarted.6 This 
could cover difficulties caused by a pandemic but would not cover all contracts that are 
disrupted because of the pandemic. For instance, it would not cover the situation where 
the contract can still be performed, although performance might now be significantly more 
onerous for one of the parties. Therefore, if the contract does not contain an adequate 
force majeure clause it could very well be that the contract cannot be terminated without 
one of the parties being in breach and thus liable to pay damages. Other jurisdictions have 
similar doctrines, such as force majeure in France and Unmöglichkeit der Leistung in 
Germany, although these each operate somewhat differently and will have a different 
threshold as to when a contract can be terminated without incurring liability.  
 
The parties to an international commercial contract can insert a choice of law clause in 
their contract for the application of non-state rules.  With non-state rules is meant the body 
of transnational commercial law that is either developed by international organisations and 
trade associations  (such as restatements of laws and standard terms and conditions) or 
emerges spontaneously from usage by merchants (trade usages) and is refined through 
application by courts/tribunals (creating general principles of transnational commercial 
law). Non-state rules are thus created by other entities than the state and aim to facilitate 
international commerce through legal unification. Whilst a choice for non-state rules is not 
permitted in most jurisdictions in litigation, it is usually permitted for arbitration.7 This choice 
could be formulated in a precise manner by referring to a transnational commercial law 
 
3 Jacques Ghestin, ‘La notion de contrat’ (1990) 12 Periodicals Archive Online 7, 10. 
4 Taylor v Caldwell [1863] EWHC QB J1. 
5 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1942] UKHL 4. 
6 Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740. 
7 See for instance, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985) Art. 28. 
Legislation based on this model law has been adopted by 83 states. 
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instrument by name (such as the UNIDROIT Principles) or could employ a formula such 
as general principles of commercial law, accepted transnational commercial practices, or 
the lex mercatoria. It is then up to the tribunal to find and decide the general principles and 
concrete rules of the lex mercatoria. There is no agreement on what the substance of the 
lex mercatoria is, as the intense debate on the subject shows.8 Tribunals often refer to 
transnational commercial law instruments as an expression or reflection of the lex 
mercatoria;9 that is to say as a source of the lex mercatoria or as the written evidence of 
the lex mercatoria. The instrument that is used most often for this purpose is the UNIDROIT 
Principles (others include the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) and the 
Principles of Latin America Contract Law (PLACL) as well as the Incoterms10). 
 
II. Transnational Commercial Law Instruments 
 
a) The Convention for the International Sale of Goods 
 
The CISG is also regularly used by courts/tribunals as a reflection of the lex mercatoria. It 
is debatable whether conventional law should be included in the lex mercatoria (or indeed 
whether codified non-state rules should be included at all) but regardless of whether it is 
desirable it is often applied in this way. Aside from being used as lex mercatoria, the CISG 
is a leading convention that is ratified by 93 states as of 2020.   
 
The underlying principles of the CISG are characterised by internationality, good faith, 
uniformity in interpretation, pragmatism, and freedom of contract. The CISG has a strong 
favor contractus approach: preserving the contractual relationship is key. It offers limited 
possibilities to rely on force majeure. There is no rebus sic stantibus type provision which 
allows the contract to be modified or terminated if there is a significant change in 
circumstances.  
 
Art. 79 discusses non-liability for performance: 
 
A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due 
to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken 
the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or 
overcome it, or its consequences.11 
 
Non-liability is only valid for the duration of the event.12 Whilst the party in breach will not 
be liable for any damages, the other party can still avoid the contract if the breach is 
considered fundamental: ‘Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any 
right other than to claim damages under this Convention.’13 The contract is only terminated 
when it is avoided and not retroactively upon occurrence of the impeding event.14 
 
8 See for instance, Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (Kluwer Law 
International 1999); Gilles Cuniberti,  ‘Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria’ (2013) 52 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Commercial Law. 
9 See the UNILEX database for examples: http://www.unilex.info/instrument/principles. 
10 The International Commercial Terms created by the International Chamber of Commerce to facilitate the 
international sale of goods, available at: https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-business/incoterms-
rules/incoterms-2020/. 
11 CISG Art. 79 (1). 
12 CISG Art. 79 (3). 
13 CISG Art .79 (5). 
14 Jacob Ziegler, ‘Report to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada on Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods’, July 1981, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/ziegel79.html.  
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Understanding how impediments should be interpreted is key to understanding the scope 
of the article. The definition of impediment is not immediately clear from the article, which 
has been criticised for its generality and lack of detail.15 
 
The CISG Advisory Council is a private initiative from a group of scholars and publishes 
opinions on the interpretation of the CISG. Whilst these opinions are not canon, they have 
persuasive value as they are based on caselaw and the legislative history of the CISG. 
Opinion 7 discusses the interpretation of Article 79 and includes an analysis of existing 
caselaw. It explains that overall, courts and tribunals take a strict interpretation of Article 
79. Courts do not rely excessively on domestic law interpretations of hardship and force 
majeure which might have a broader approach, and they maintain high standards for 
exemption of liability.16  
 
Clearly Covid-19 can lead to economic hardship. Would such a situation fall within the 
scope of Article 79? The legislative history clarifies that impediment should not only cover 
situations where it is physically impossible to perform the contract but also, under limited 
circumstances, those situations in which it is economically problematic to do so.17 Overall, 
however, the courts have taken a reticent approach to accepting economic hardship as an 
excuse for non-performance.18 It could be that Covid-19 represents such a sufficiently 
exceptional situation that courts would take a more flexible approach, however it could also 
be said that certainty in deciding contractual disputes is needed now more than ever and 
therefore the standards for exemption are likely to remain high.  
 
If Article 79 is rather general, how should the courts, then interpret any request for relief? 
According to Article 7, any matters covered by the CISG but not explicitly discussed should 
be settled by relying upon the principles underlying the CISG, If such principles are not 
found, the courts should turn to the applicable law to settle the issue (and not the lex fori 
as some courts have the tendency to do).19 Turning to the applicable law creates 
uncertainty for the parties and should therefore be the last resort. It is not recommended 
that the applicable law should be used to further define what an impediment is or whether 
hardship should be covered, given the diverse approaches taken by different jurisdictions. 
This would lead to unpredictable results for the parties because they cannot anticipate the 
outcome of the dispute that well. Rather, courts should rely upon the extensive CISG 
caselaw to interpret the Convention and extend the scope of impediment to include 
exceptional economic hardship. It would be especially appropriate to grant such relief if 
the equilibrium of the contract is destroyed and where one of the parties stands to profit 
whilst the other party suffers extensive losses because of the unforeseen event.20  
 
 
15 Ibid. See also, Harry Flechtner, ‘Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for 
Delivering Non-Conforming Goods’ (2007) 19 Pace International Law Review 29. 
16 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 7: ‘Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the CISG,’ 
2007, http://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no7/.  
17 Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods’, 1986, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-79.html.  
18 CISG Advisory Council, Opinion No. 7: ‘Exemption of Liability for Damages Under Article 79 of the 
CISG,’ 2007, http://www.cisgac.com/cisgac-opinion-no7/. 
19 Franco Ferrari, ‘Homeward Trend and Lex Forism in International Sales Law’ (2009) International 
Business Law Journal 333. 
20 Joseph M. Perillo, ‘Force Majeure and Hardship under the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts,’ (1997) 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 5-28, 14. 
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The approach of the CISG favours certainty in contractual relationships rather than 
allowing for flexibility should the situation change. At the same time the pragmatism that is 
reflected in the CISG through, for instance, the requirement to mitigate damages (Article 
77) and allow for a period of grace/nachfrist (Article 49), suggests that the parties should 
maintain if possible, a certain flexibility towards each other if situations change. The CISG 
does not include an explicit duty to renegotiate in cases of hardship but there is caselaw 
suggesting that such a duty is implied in the principles underlying the CISG.21 This 
suggests that exempting a party from liability in exceptional circumstances such as Covid-
19 for reasons of economic hardship is permitted under the CISG. 
 
b) The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
 
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (first published in 1994) 
are a restatement of international commercial law. They are the result of a comparative 
study between the commercial laws of different states and the common practices between 
international merchants and they seek to provide the best possible legal solutions for 
facilitating international trade.22 They can be applied if the parties choose them as the 
governing law, if the parties have chosen the lex mercatoria as the governing law, and to 
interpret the contract, the law, and international conventions (such as the CISG).23  
 
Article 6.2 covers questions of hardship. Article 6.2.1 provides ‘Where the performance of 
a contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound 
to perform its obligations subject to the following provisions on hardship.’ The official 
commentary reinforces that even if the contract is now significantly more costly or no longer 
beneficial for one of the parties, they still need to perform, unless there are exceptional 
circumstances.24 Whilst economic risks can undoubtedly cause a significant imbalance in 
the contract and provide difficulties, hardship should only be applied if the economic 
difficulties go significantly beyond normal market developments.25 The consequences of 
Covid-19 would qualify as such a development, given that the scale of disruptiveness 
clearly goes beyond any expected economic disruption.   
 
Article 6.2.2 provides that the principle is not ‘absolute’ and that it applies ‘when 
supervening circumstances are such that they lead to a fundamental alteration of the 
equilibrium of the contract.’ The event must be outside of the control of the disadvantaged 
party and the party must not have assumed the risk for such an event. This means that if 
the contract contains a clause where the party has assumed the risk for a pandemic 
occurring, they could not rely on the provisions of hardship. This could either be explicitly 
(if the contract refers to a pandemic/epidemy) or implicitly (if the party assumes all risks no 
matter outside events occurring for instance).  To qualify, the event must have become 
known or occurred after the conclusion of the contract. Therefore, it is unlikely contracts 
concluded after March 2020 could rely upon this article to be exempted from liability. 
 
 
21 Julie Dewez et al, ‘The Duty to Renegotiate an International Sales Contract under CISG in Case of 
Hardship and the Use of the Unidroit Principles’ (2011) 19(1) European Review of Private Law 101. 
22 Michael Joachim Bonell, ‘Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Why What How,’ 
(1994-95) 69(5) Tulane Law Review 1121-1148, 1129. 
23 Preamble (Purpose of the Principles). 
24 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 217. 
25 Dietrich Maskow, ‘Hardship and Force Majeure’, (1992) 40 The American Journal of Comparative Law 
657-669, 662. 
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The effects of hardship (Article 6.2.3) are that the disadvantaged party is first entitled to 
request renegotiations, but such a request does not of itself entitle the party to withhold 
performance. If these negotiations are unsuccessful, they can turn to the court who, if it 
finds hardship may terminate the agreement or adapt the contract to reach an equilibrium 
between the parties which could according to the official comments on the article entail a 
price recalibration. Equilibrium should not be interpreted as contractual fairness but should 
be based on ‘the intended effect of the contract on risk and reward,’ and thus concerns the 
effect on the purpose of the contract.26 For instance, if an electronics company cannot 
source specific goods because of a lockdown caused by Covid-19 they will have no need 
of transportation. The carriage contract that they have with a truck company can still be 
performed given the trucks can still ride between A and B. However, there is no purpose 
to the contract anymore for the electronics company if they have no goods that need to be 
transported.   
 
Article 7.1.7 discusses force majeure. Force majeure is a container concept that means 
different things depending on the jurisdiction. The official comments on the Article discuss 
that the term was chosen because it is well-known in international trade and covers the 
same ground as the common law concept of frustration and the civil law concept of force 
majeure but it should not be seen as identical to these domestic law concepts.27 The official 
comments on Article 7.1.7 state that a party’s non-performance is excused if this was ‘due 
to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not reasonably be expected to have 
taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have 
avoided or overcome it or its consequences.’28  
 
Article 7.17 furthermore states that if the impediment is only temporary than it has effect 
for that period and that ‘nothing in this Article prevents a party from exercising a right to 
terminate the contract or to withhold performance or request interest on money due.’ 
Therefore, like the CISG, it excuses liability for damages, but it does not waive other rights.  
Whilst under the CISG, impediment is interpreted to include economic hardship, this is not 
the case for the UPICC. As the UPICC has a separate article on hardship, impediment 
should be interpreted in a strict manner and refers to an event that makes the contract 
impossible to perform.29 Whilst Covid-19 does make some contracts impossible to perform 
and this provision can therefore be relied upon by the disadvantaged party, for other 
contracts there will thus be a need to rely on the hardship provisions to escape liability 
rather than on the force majeure provisions.  
 
The UPICC offer a more comprehensive approach to hardship and non-performance than 
the CISG. It even confers (controversially) the power on courts/tribunals to adapt the 
contract to restore the equilibrium (which the CISG does not do). At the same time the 
UPICC also emphasise the exceptionality of the event, again safeguarding the contractual 
obligations. The official comments stress that these articles would mainly be applied to 
long term contracts, therefore for shorter and single transactions the approach would be 
more stringent.30  
 
26 Donald Robertson, ‘Symposium Paper: Long-Term Relational Contracts and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts,’ (2008) Australian International Law Journal 185, 188. 
27 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 240. 
28 Ibid, 241. 
29 Joseph M. Perillo, ‘Force Majeure and Hardship under the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts,’ (1997) 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 5-28, 15. 
30 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 242. 
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Good contractual relationships are at the centre of the UPICC. Parties should first 
negotiate if there is hardship.  The UPICC emphasise the general principles of good faith 
and fair dealing (Article 1.7) and incorporate a specific duty of cooperation (Article 5.1.3). 
Parties should be flexible and cooperative towards one another, and whether they 
demonstrate this cooperation can play a part in the deliberations of the court/tribunal. 
 
Both the CISG and the UPICC refer to the temporality of the event, which means 
performance could be merely suspended. Whilst one hopes that Covid-19 is a temporary 
event, the duration of it is likely to be long-term, certainly months and perhaps years. The 
courts should take into account that it is unforeseeable how long the pandemic will continue 
and therefore this might favour termination over suspension.  
 
III. Principles of the Lex Mercatoria  
 
a) Applying the Lex Mercatoria 
 
If a tribunal/court is applying the lex mercatoria they might choose to use transnational 
instruments such as the UPICC or the CISG (or both). The court might also come to a 
reasoned conclusion of what the general principles of transnational commercial law and 
trade usages are that should be applied.  
 
Trade usages are considered implied terms of the contract under Article 9 of the CISG and 
Articles 1.8 and 4.3 of the UPICC. They form the cornerstone of the lex mercatoria. Usages 
clarify how force majeure and hardship should be interpreted in different trades (which 
could mean a broader or stricter interpretation depending on the trade) and need to be 
applied by the court/tribunal, immediately after the express contractual provisions. 
 
A key principle of the lex mercatoria is a strong favor contracus; that is to say the need to 
interpret the legal provisions in a way that as far as possible upholds the contract. 
Termination is a last option. This combined with the principle of pacta sunt servanda means 
that under the lex mercatoria, terminating a contract should only be done as the last resort. 
Legal uncertainty is one of the key detriments for trading abroad and therefore predictability 
and security are important for the contracting parties.31 The barrier to non-liability for non-
performance is thus high. This means that in principle even in times of Covid-19 the court 
should uphold the contract and the obligations of the parties as far as possible. Clearly this 
situation affects a myriad of contracts and certainty is thus even more important.  
 
Good faith is a key principle of the lex mercatoria and the UPICC. Good faith is also one 
of the principles underlying the CISG although from the wording it seems that it is the 
Convention rather than the contract that needs to be interpreted in good faith. The wording 
of the good faith principle is vague because the CISG is trying to bridge common law and 
civil law.32 English common law does not recognise an overall good faith obligation, 
differently from civil law. Good faith is recognised as a principle of the lex mercatoria, 
probably partly because the origins of the lex mercatoria are in Roman law and much of 
its development took place in Italy and France. Furthermore, the revival of the lex 
 
31 Clive M Schmitthoff, ‘American and European Commercial Law’ (1979) 6 Journal of Legislation 44, 44. 
32 For an analysis see for instance, Ulrich Magnus, ‘The Vienna Sales Convention (CISG) between Civil 
And Common Law - Best of All Worlds,’ (2010) 3(1) Journal of Civil Law Studies 67-98. 
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mercatoria started with the work of French scholars.33 Good faith would imply that the 
parties deal with each other in a transparent and honest manner. The lex mercatoria 
emphasises equity and fairness.34 This should especially be taken into account if 
unexpected outside events such as Covid-19 cause significant hardship for one of the 
parties. 
 
The principle of Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus allows the parties to modify or terminate an 
agreement because of serious disruptions and is considered part of the lex mercatoria. In 
combination with the good faith requirement it means that parties should be willing to 
renegotiate. If an event happens that would not have been in the contemplation of the 
parties (like Covid-19) then the fundamental changes to their obligations would not have 
been intended by the parties and this vitiates their consent.35 Therefore, there is a strong 
case for saying that despite the key principle of contractual certainty, extreme economic 
hardship caused by Covid-19 is a cause for renegotiation.  
 
b) Conclusion 
 
The WHO declared Covid-19 a pandemic on 11 March 2020. The effects of the pandemic 
were already felt before that and certainly will continue to be felt for the foreseeable future. 
Both the CISG and the UPICC emphasise that for the terms of the contract to be vitiated, 
the event should not be foreseeable. The question of foreseeability is complicated, 
however. Can it be foreseen that a pandemic might occur at some point? Yes, of course, 
it has happened in the past and will happen again. Can it be foreseen in what manner it 
will occur or when? No, of course not. Caselaw shows that courts struggle with the notion 
of foreseeability, especially in long-term contracts, that might have decades of running 
time. Within that time all sorts of events including wars and natural disasters can be 
expected to happen, even if we do not know the precise shape they will take. A pandemic 
can be expected to occur at some point given that in human history we see a pattern of 
disease outbreaks, but how likely it is to happen, and would the parties have contemplated 
this at the time of contracting? There is a grey area with a margin of appreciation. The next 
years will undoubtedly bring contradictory caselaw on the foreseeability of Covid-19.  
 
For any contract concluded after 11 March 2020 it would be difficult to rely upon the 
pandemic as an excuse for non-performance. It could even be argued that before 11 
March, the outbreak was already so prominent that it was foreseeable that this would 
create hardship.36 It is also clear that the exact consequences of the pandemic could not 
be foreseen on 11 March and there are still more questions than answers with regards to 
the immediate future. But clearly the pandemic itself is now a reality and relying on it as an 
excuse for non-performance will be more difficult. This is not to say that it can never be 
relied upon but the party in breach will face a higher threshold to prove that the effects 
were unforeseen. This makes the inclusion of a force majeure/hardship clause even more 
 
33 See for instance, Harold J Berman, ‘The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex 
Mercatoria),’ (1987) 2 Emory Journal of International Dispute Resolution 235. For the renewal of the lex 
mercatoria see, Klaus Peter Berger, ‘Berthold Goldman and the Dijon School: The rebirth of the Lex 
Mercatoria’ (undated), http://www.trans-lex.org/000001. 
34 William Mitchell, An Essay on the Early History of the Law Merchant (Cambridge University Press 1904) 
13. 
35 Joseph M. Perillo, ‘Force Majeure and Hardship under the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts,’ (1997) 5 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 5-28, 13. 
36 On 30 January 2020, the WHO already declared Covid-19 a public health emergency of international 
concern. 
 125 
 
important. This force majeure clause should cover pandemics explicitly to maximise the 
security of the parties. 37  
 
In conclusion it can be said that under the rules discussed, the approach is to favour 
certainty first. Therefore, the threshold to excuse non-performance is high. Whilst Covid-
19 is an exceptional situation and clearly could not have been expected by either party the 
importance of certainty for international commercial contracts is paramount and 
courts/tribunals will likely continue with a strict interpretation of these rules.  At the same 
time, the principles of good faith and fair dealing combined with the pragmatism of 
international trade also call for the parties to be cooperative and flexible towards one 
another in order to come as far as possible to an amicable settlement.  
 
  
 
37 See for example, ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses, available at 
https://iccwbo.org/publication/icc-force-majeure-and-hardship-clauses/.  
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Abstract 
The economic impact of the Covid-19 outbreak has triggered calls for emergency fiscal 
and legislative measures to address liquidity and legal problems in several areas of law. 
Some of these measures address specifically companies in financial distress and 
insolvency statutes. Among the proposed changes to the insolvency framework, the UK 
Government announced a suspension of wrongful trading provision as outlined in section 
214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (‘the Act’). This announcement was later implemented (with 
significant amendments) in section 10 of the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 
(‘the Bill’). This measure applies retrospectively from 1 March 2020 for a 3-month period 
or one month after the coming into force of the Bill, whichever is later.  
 
To assess the need for such a measure, this paper investigates the requirements to 
establish a successful claim for wrongful trading and the interpretation of those 
requirements, stemming from the case law. It also discusses the announced suspension 
as implemented by the Government in the Bill. This analysis strongly suggests that the 
suspension of (liability for) wrongful trading does nothing to achieve the purpose for which 
it was introduced, i.e. to facilitate business rescue and/or to help viable companies to 
survive the crisis created by the Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
To the contrary, the suspension of personal liability actions against the directors is likely to 
curb the rule of law in the UK. Laws are deferred and the exercise of civil liability remedies 
restricted without any apparent justification and with no proof that this measure is relevant 
to address the crisis created by the Covid-19 pandemic. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The economic measures announced and implemented by the Government in the past few 
weeks to deal with the immediate and long-term consequences of the Covid-19 outbreak 
are broad-ranging.1 Some aim at keeping companies afloat by furloughing employees 
under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme,2 granting emergency loans, deferring VAT 
 
* This article covers statutes, literature and case law published before 1 June 2020. The usual disclaimer 
applies. The author is greatly indebted to Yseult Marique for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper, as well as to Panagiota Kotzamani and Lee Hansen for their constructive criticism of the manuscript. 
1 For an updated outline, see the report prepared by Sonya Van de Graaff (Morrison & Foerster (U.K.) LLP) 
for the World Bank and INSOL International, available here: <http://insol-
techlibrary.s3.amazonaws.com/c17d98a5-bb2a-4713-80d9-
54f43ebcecd1.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJA2C2IGD2CIW7KIA&Expires=1587279308&Signature=8%2B
EvPI5l5NrY3gYlM1mTdXZmWdg%3D> accessed 25 April 2020. 
2 Under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, companies can put their employees on furlough because 
of the restrictions on trade arising from the Covid-19 pandemic. In that case, the Government will pay 80 
per cent of the employee’s wages plus any employer National Insurance and pension contribution up to 
£2,500/month: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/claim-for-wages-through-the-coronavirus-job-retention-
scheme> accessed 25 April 2020. Unfortunately, despite the detrimental effect that this may cause for the 
possibility of rescuing the company in administration, the courts have held that if the employees remained 
 128 
 
payments and stopping the requirement to pay taxes on property leases.3 Others avoid 
that insolvency procedures are brought against companies that are only temporarily cash-
flow insolvent due to the Covid-19 outbreak.4  
 
On Saturday 28 March 2020, the Business Secretary, Alok Sharma, announced new 
insolvency measures to provide businesses with the flexibility and breathing space they 
need to continue trading during the Covid-19 crisis.5 This announcement later resulted in 
the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill (‘Bill’),6 which is expected to be converted 
into law by the end of June 2020. The most prominent of the proposed changes to the 
insolvency framework are: 
 
1. A temporary suspension of liability for wrongful trading; 
2. A short automatic stay for companies giving them a breathing space from creditor 
action, whilst they seek rescue or restructure; 
3. Allowing companies continued access to their supplies; and 
4. A new restructuring plan which would be binding on all creditors and include a 
“cross-class cram down”.7 
 
This paper focuses on the announced suspension of wrongful trading provision as later 
implemented in the Bill. To assess the need for such a measure, this paper investigates 
the requirements to establish a successful claim for wrongful trading, taking into account 
the interpretation of those requirements established from the case law. This analysis 
suggests that suspension of (liability for) wrongful trading does nothing to allow directors 
to protect viable businesses struggling from the Covid-19 pandemic from vulture creditors.  
 
To the contrary, the suspension of personal liability actions against the directors has the 
effect of promoting abusive exercise of powers by directors, thus reducing the rule of law 
in the UK and restricting the exercise of civil law remedies by the company’s creditors. 
 
furloughed and the administrators took no further action in relation to them, this would amount to adopting 
the employment contracts of these employees: Re Debenhams Retail ltd (in administration) [2020] EWCA 
Civ 600, [2020] Bus. L.R. 788, confirming [2020] EWHC 921 (Ch), [2020] 4 WLUK 158 (Powdrill v Watson 
[1995] 2 A.C. 394 followed). As a result, the employees are accorded a priority of entitlement to payment of 
any sums payable as wages or salary under their contract of employment, and these liabilities take 
precedence ahead of the administrator’s own entitlement to payment: para. 99, Sch. B1 of the Act. 
3 See, for instance, the provisions made in the Coronavirus Act 2020 (which received Royal Assent on 25 
March 2020), preventing landlords from exercising a right of forfeiture of a relevant business tenancy 
(under Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954) for non-payment of rent between 25 March and 30 
June 2020 (a date which may be extended). 
4 See, for instance, the provisions in the Temporary Insolvency Practice Direction effective from 6 April 
2020, which adjourned all non-urgent insolvency applications and petitions listed for hearing prior to 21 
April 2020. Available here: <https://www.trinitychambers.co.uk/media/2654/temporary-ipd-april-2020_.pdf> 
para. 4, accessed 25 April 2020. 
5 The press release is available here: <https://www.gov.uk/Government/news/regulations-temporarily-
suspended-to-fast-track-supplies-of-ppe-to-nhs-staff-and-protect-companies-hit-by-covid-19> accessed 25 
April 2020. 
6 Corporate Insolvency and Governance HC Bill (2019-21). 
7 “Cross-class cram down” is a prominent feature of the US Chapter process. Usually, a restructuring plan 
can only be approved if the required majority of creditors vote in favour of it.  
If creditors are divided in classes, all classes need to reach the required majority but dissenting creditors 
within that class are out-voted by the other creditors within the same class.  
If cross-class cram down is allowed, dissenting classes of creditors can be out-voted provided that the 
other classes vote in favour of the restructuring plan. The cross-class cram down needs to be sanctioned 
by a court so long as it does not unfairly prejudice the dissenting class of creditors. 
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II. Wrongful Trading under English Law – A Look at the Statutes 
 
The wrongful trading section of the Act applies whenever the company directors did not 
take appropriate actions and caused damage to the creditors by continuing to operate a 
company when they knew or ought to have known that the company had no reasonable 
prospects of avoiding insolvent liquidation or administration.8  
 
The introduction of a similar provision was strongly recommended by the Cork Report,9 as 
there was the perception that the burden of proof required to establish fraudulent trading 
(criminal liability) was too high to prevent the inappropriate behaviour of the directors.  
 
This section is without prejudice to sections 213 and 246ZA of the Act, which deal with 
fraudulent trading.10  
 
The petition can be submitted not only by the liquidators, but also by the administrators.11 
The consequences for the alleged perpetrator are not only to make a contribution to the 
assets of the company but also to be subject to disqualification proceedings.12  
 
To establish civil liability, the petitioner (administrator or liquidator) needs to demonstrate 
that: 
 
1. There was a specific moment in time before the director filed for liquidation or 
administration when the directors realised that a formal insolvency proceeding was 
inevitable (“point in time”); 
2. The director, de facto director and shadow director13 knew or ought to have known 
that there was no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding going into insolvent 
liquidation or administration (“director’s knowledge”); and 
3. The wrongful trading caused an increase in the company’s net deficiency 
(“damage”).  
 
To assess the director’s knowledge, section 214(4) of the Act introduces a test which is 
both objective and subjective (“moment of truth” test). Accordingly, what is being assessed 
is whether a director knew or ought to have known that there was no prospect of avoiding 
insolvent liquidation or administration if such outcome would be reached by: 
 
(a) Any director with general knowledge, skill and experience; and 
(b) The specific director, with his or her specific knowledge, skill and experience. 
 
If it is proven that the director continued trading after they knew or ought to have known 
that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent administration or liquidation, 
there is a case of wrongful trading.  
 
 
8 s.214(1) IA 1986. 
9 RJ Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP 2005); I Fletcher, The Law of 
Insolvency (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) 835 at [27-034]. 
10 s.214(8) IA 1986. For more on this matter, see section III(a) of this paper. 
11 s.246ZB IA 1986. 
12 s.215(2) and (4) IA 1986. 
13 s.214(7) IA 1986.  
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Directors can only escape liability for wrongful trading if they demonstrate – on the balance 
of probabilities – that they took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to 
the company’s creditors.14  
 
This preliminary analysis of the statutory requirements to establish a successful claim for 
wrongful trading suggests that directors would have a hard time in shielding themselves 
from such claims. The office holder needs only to establish that the debtor was 
approaching insolvency and the director continued trading, thus causing a financial loss to 
the creditors.  
 
It appears, therefore, that the Government’s decision to suspend this provision facilitates 
business rescue and helps viable companies to survive the crisis created by the Covid-19 
pandemic. However, one should exercise caution when making such assumption, 
especially because – as mentioned before in this section – the directors remain liable for 
a multitude of other offences under the Act.   
 
The next part of the paper considers whether the Government’s decision to suspend this 
provision stands up to scrutiny, when considered in light of how courts have interpreted 
this section of the Act and the statutory language in the Bill. 
 
III. Wrongful Trading under English Law – A Look at the Cases and at the Bill 
 
Law in books differs from law in practice. It is, therefore, appropriate to investigate how 
courts have implemented the statutory provision outlined in the earlier part of this paper 
and how the suspension of wrongful trading was translated into the Bill.  
 
a) Case Law 
 
In order to establish if a director is liable for breaching the wrongful trading provision, the 
courts consider the specific circumstances of the case. Particularly, they consider the 
companies run in the past by the director, the type of business and the profile (executive 
or non-executive) of the director.15  
 
Courts do not approach the question of whether a director ought to have concluded that a 
company had no reasonable prospect of avoiding liquidation with the benefit of hindsight, 
i.e. on the basis of ex post knowledge.16 
 
One of the most contentious points of the wrongful trading provision has always been the 
defence provided by section 214(3) of the Act. Directors can invoke this defence if they 
took every step to minimise the potential loss to the company’s creditors. 
 
Proof that they have met the requisite conditions set out in section 214(3) can be reached 
if the director demonstrates that the continuation of trading was intended to reduce the net 
deficiency of the company and minimise the risk of loss to individual creditors.17  
 
14 S.214(3) IA 1986. 
15 Re Produce Marketing Consortium ltd (1989) 5 B.C.C. 569; Re Sherborne Associates ltd [1995] B.C.C. 
40; Re Bian D Pierson (Contractors) ltd [1999] B.C.C. 26. 
16 Re Ralls Builders ltd [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch), [2016] B.C.C. 293; Johnson v Beighton [2019] EWHC 895 
(Ch), [2019] 3 W.L.U.K. 380. 
17 Re Ralls Builders ltd [2016] EWHC 243 (Ch), [2016] B.C.C. 293. 
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In Continental Assurance, the directors escaped liability because they reduced trading to 
minimal and cautious levels and filed for liquidation when they were advised that the 
company was insolvent.18 And, vice versa, the directors did not escape liability in Idessa, 
as they did not take appropriate measures to reduce the company’s cash flow and 
minimise the losses for the creditors.19  
 
While this defence in section 214(3) has been successfully invoked in the past, it is also 
undeniable that it had been construed strictly,20 in order to avoid making it too easy  for 
directors to escape liability. Additionally, courts have usually adopted a tough stance on 
directors.21  
 
Overall, this may give even more credence to the suggestion that the Government’s 
decision to introduce a suspension to this provision is appropriate to ensure that viable 
companies continue trading over the Covid-19 crisis. A law tough on directors has been 
applied strictly by the courts. Law in books and law in practice seem not to differ, at least 
at first glance. 
 
Nevertheless, it is to be noted that, even if the section 214(3) defence fails, courts have 
complete discretion as to whether to make an order and if so, on its content. For instance, 
in Nicholson the court declined to make a declaration that the company’s directors were 
liable for the losses caused by wrongful trading despite the fact that the applicant 
succeeded in proving the misconduct and the defendant failed in their defence. This is 
because the debtor was operating in challenging market conditions (the period following 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08), in a sector of the economy significantly affected by 
the said challenging conditions. Additionally, the directors constantly monitored and 
discussed the situation with key creditors.22 
 
The court’s discretion may suggest that there is no real need to introduce a suspension of 
this provision due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, there are other factors militating 
against the need to introduce such a suspension into the law.  
 
First, in any wrongful trading application, the applicants need to prove that the company 
had "no reasonable prospect" of avoiding insolvency. This represents a challenging and 
daunting task in the current economic and financial climate. At the time of writing, the 
Government announced that the lockdown should have remained in place for 3 weeks.23 
Subsequently the Government extended this period for another 3 weeks24 and it only on 
23 April acceded to a request to outline an exit strategy from “phase 1” of the Covid-19 
 
18 Re Continental Assurance Company of London plc [2001] B.P.I.R. 733. 
19 Re Idessa (UK) ltd [2011] EWHC 804 (Ch), [2011] B.P.I.R. 957. 
20 A Keay and P Walton, Insolvency Law. Corporate and Personal (4th edn, LexisNexis 2017) 662. 
21 See, among others, Palmer v Tsai [2017] EWHC 2710 (Ch), [2017] 9 W.L.U.K. 369, where the court 
refused to grant additional time to directors to file their defences as they had already failed to comply with 
previous court orders. 
22 Nicholson v Fielding [2017] 9 W.L.U.K. 260. 
23 On 23 March 2020, the Government announced measures to stem the coronavirus pandemic. These 
included a 'lockdown': citizens should now stay at home apart from essential travel or risk fines and all non-
essential shops were to close: H Stewart and others, ‘Boris Johnson orders UK lockdown to be enforced by 
police’ The Guardian, 23 March 2020. 
24 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: UK lockdown extended for ‘at least’ three weeks’, 16 April 2020. 
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crisis.25 If directors do not know when their companies will be allowed to operate again in 
the market and under which conditions, they cannot assess if their companies have no 
reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation or administration. Hence, office 
holders cannot successfully promote a claim for wrongful trading against them. It follows 
that there is no apparent reason for the Government to suspend the enforceability of this 
section in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis. 
  
Other reasons militate against the introduction of a suspension of wrongful trading.  
 
Second, this suspension is not a panacea. Directors continue to be liable for the breach of 
the duties26 they have towards the creditors;27 fraudulent trading28 and transactions 
defrauding creditors;29 antecedent transactions which put assets beyond the reach of 
creditors;30 and misfeasance.31  
 
As the wrongful trading section is not the only means by which directors may incur personal 
liability for their actions, suspending this provision alone will not remove the risk of personal 
liability for directors. This in itself suggests that the announced protection against personal 
liability granted to directors by means of the suspension of wrongful trading is partial at 
best. 
 
Third, courts also retain discretion not only with reference to the wrongful trading order but 
also in determining if the company is cash-flow insolvent. The existence of a condition of 
insolvency or inability to pay its debts is a key issue for triggering a wrongful trading claim.  
 
On this latter point, in the seminal case of Cheyne Finance,32 the court held that they will 
not adopt a “blinkered” review based on a slavish focus on the debts due at the relevant 
date. In other words, English courts will not declare a company “insolvent” if the inability to 
pay its debts is due to a temporary lack of liquidity soon to be remedied.33 This position 
was approved by the UK Supreme Court in Eurosail.34 
 
The Eurosail approach is being generally applied by the courts.35 As a result, it is nowadays 
possible to claim that the words “as they fall due” in section 123(1)(e) of the Act transform 
the cash-flow test into a flexible and fact sensitive requirement to which balance-sheet 
insolvency is not irrelevant. The analysis of cash-flow insolvency shall not be carried out 
mechanistically but in a manner that has regard to commercial reality.36  
 
 
25 R Merrick, ‘Coronavirus: Government finally reveals lockdown ‘exit strategy’ with plan to recruit 18,000 to 
trace infected people’ The Independent,  23 April 2020. 
26 ss. 171-177 Companies Act 2006. 
27 It is still uncertain the exact moment in time in which creditors’ interests have to be considered by the 
company’s directors.  
28 s.213 IA 1986. 
29 s.423 IA 1986. 
30 ss. 238-239 and 244-245 IA 1986. 
31 s.212 IA 1986. 
32 Re Cheyne Finance plc (No 2) [2007] EWHC 2402 (Ch), [2008] Bus. L.R. 1562. 
33 Ibid [51]. 
34 BNY Corporate Trustee Services v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL Plc [2013] UKSC 28, [2013] 1 WLR 1408. 
35 Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd [2013] EWHC 2876 (Ch), [2014] BCC 337 [81]; Evans v Jones 
[2016] EWCA Civ 660, [2017] Ch. 1. 
36 Re Rococo Developments Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 660, [2017] Ch. 1, [24]. 
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Fourth and finally, courts have consistently held that “to put a company into administration 
is a serious matter”37 and should be restricted to cases where rescue is possible38 and the 
debtor is more likely than not to be insolvent.39 
 
The third and fourth points reassert that – especially during the Covid-19 crisis – office 
holders will have a hard time to prove that the company had no reasonable prospects of 
avoiding insolvent liquidation or administration. This suggests, once again, the lack of 
justification to suspend wrongful trading. 
 
b) The Bill 
 
Despite the sensible approach adopted by courts in interpreting section 214 of the Act and 
the existence of other instances of personal liability in the Act, the Government thought it 
appropriate to introduce changes to the wrongful trading regime to avoid unnecessary 
insolvencies and allow distressed yet viable companies to continue trading during the 
crisis. Section III(a) demonstrated that this decision does not withstand academic scrutiny. 
It is yet to be assessed, however, whether the suspension provision affords directors the 
protection from wrongful trading actions which the Government intended to give. This 
section carries out this assessment with reference to the wording of the Bill. 
 
A close look at the provision in the Bill suggests that the announced measure presents 
several issues, particularly with reference to its scope which at times appears too narrow 
and other times too broad. 
 
The scope is arguably too narrow. Sections 10(3) and (4) of the Bill clarify that the 
suspension of liability for wrongful trading does not apply to a variety of companies. These 
include (among others) insurance companies, banks (including investment banks and 
firms), building societies, friendly societies, credit unions, public-private partnership project 
companies and overseas companies with corresponding functions. In other words, a lot of 
medium and large enterprises are excluded from the scope of this provision without any 
apparent justification. 
 
Additionally, the Government decided to waive the liability for wrongful trading, while 
section 214 of the Act continues to apply. Furthermore, the liability for wrongful trading for 
petitions but only for debt (“worsening of the financial condition”) incurred in the relevant 
period.  
 
This means that a company can be admitted into insolvency proceedings as a result of the 
Covid-19 pandemic40 and directors can still be sued for breach of section 214 of the Act. 
As a result, petitioners can still hold directors liable for debt incurred before 1 March 2020 
if the criteria summarised above are met. 
 
37 Re Colt Telecom Plc (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2815 (Ch), [2003] BPIR 324 [24]. See also: Re Gigi Brooks ltd 
[2015] EWHC 961 (Ch), [2015] 2 W.L.U.K. 736, where the court declined to make an administration order 
because it could not be satisfied that the company was insolvent, either on a balance sheet or cash flow 
basis, or that the statutory purposes would be achieved. 
38 Re Arrows ltd No. 3 [1992] BCLC 555, dismissing a petition for administration because the majority of 
the creditors appeared to be against such an order, thus making it unlikely their approval of the 
administrator’s plan. 
39 Re Colt Telecom Plc (No 2) [2002] EWHC 2815 (Ch), [2003] BPIR 324 [25]. 
40 Exceptions and exclusions apply. 
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Furthermore, the poor drafting quality of the Bill has the effect of further narrowing down 
the scope of the suspension. As a result, it is argued that directors may be held 
accountable for breach of wrongful trading provision even for debt incurred after 1 March 
2020 for the reasons outlined below. 
 
The Explanatory Notes seem to grant adequate protection to directors. They state that 
courts will not take into account losses incurred during the period in which businesses were 
suffering from the impact of the pandemic.41 This is not, however, reflected in the language 
used in the Bill. 
 
Section 10(1) of the Bill provides that the court is to assume that the person is not 
responsible for any worsening of the financial position of the company or its creditors that 
occurs during the relevant period.  From a director’s perspective, there would appear to be 
the risk of an insolvency practitioner being able to rebut that assumption in the course of 
an action for wrongful trading. 
 
This raises a number of issues. For instance, does the presumption in section 10(1) of the 
Bill leave it open to an office holder to seek a contribution where they can, through 
evidence, demonstrate that the person was responsible for the worsening position? On the 
basis of the current draft of the Bill, the answer is likely going to be in the affirmative. 
 
The narrow scope of the suspension means that it does not apply with reference to some 
companies and – even with reference to the companies for which it applies – directors can 
still be held liable for losses incurred before and after 1 March 2020 as a result of wrongful 
trading. 
 
At the same time, the scope is too broad. First, the provision makes no reference to the 
pandemic.  Other temporary provisions in the Bill refer specifically to coronavirus for the 
purposes of determining their applicability. For instance, creditors are restricted from 
serving winding up petitions unless they demonstrated that Covid-19 has not had a 
financial effect on the debtor.42 This might be the case, for instant, of an insolvent grocery 
shop. 
 
However, there is no such qualification to the application of the suspension of liability for 
wrongful trading provision.  Both the Explanatory Notes and the Bill state that there is no 
requirement to show that the company’s worsening financial position was due to the Covid-
19 pandemic. The Bill adopts a blanket approach: liability for losses incurred in the relevant 
period is waived, irrespective of whether the losses are incurred because of the Covid-19 
pandemic. 
 
This blanket approach raises issues of potential abuse of the law if the office holders 
cannot hold the directors accountable for losses that are not caused by the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
 
For instance, the creditor of the above-mentioned insolvent grocery shop may be able to 
file an insolvency petition against their debtor. This petition is likely to be granted if the 
 
41 Explanatory Notes to the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 2019-21, para. 28. 
42 Section 2(2), Part 2, Schedule 10 of the Bill. 
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debtor is insolvent for the reason mentioned above. Yet, the office holders may not be able 
to recover any losses caused by wrongful trading incurred in the relevant period because 
of the blanket approach of the Bill. This is even if the losses were not caused by the Covid-
19 pandemic, thus showing that the scope of the suspension is too broad here. 
 
Second, as stated in section III(a) of this paper, suspending liability for wrongful trading 
alone will not remove the risk of personal liability for directors. However, the other sections 
of the Act introduce personal liabilities only for “extreme” cases, such as fraudulent or 
gratuitous transactions to the detriment of creditors. De facto, section 10 of the Bill 
introduces a general, too broad shield to personal liability for directors. 
 
Third, this extension is likely to last far longer than the three months originally envisaged 
by the Government. The Explanatory Notes state that, in the event that the impact of the 
pandemic on businesses continues beyond the end of that period, the measure may be 
extended for up to six months using secondary legislation. This process may be repeated, 
extending the suspension period further.43 
 
As a result of all these considerations, a measure in theory designed to remove the threat 
of the Covid-19 pandemic on businesses is likely to lift significant restrictions on the 
arbitrary exercise of powers by rogue directors, thus significantly affecting creditors’ rights 
(and the rule of law). 
 
c) Concluding Remarks 
 
Wrongful trading already has a relatively high barrier of proof, with very few cases ever 
taken forward. It already has safeguards which probably would, for most sensible directors, 
not leave them exposed to risk of personal liability in any given circumstance.  
 
In practice, English courts manage to successfully balance the need to adopt a tough 
stance on errant directors without unduly compressing their freedom and ability to make 
rescue attempts on the eve of insolvency. This is especially true whenever directors act 
under the expert advice of turnaround professionals and accountants.44 As a result, there 
is no need to introduce a suspension of wrongful trading. 
 
Section 10 of the Bill has altered this equilibrium, unless it is significantly amended as the 
Bill progresses through Parliament. On the one hand, in some instances this section does 
not offer protection to directors responsible for worsening of the debtor’s financial position, 
even if this happened after 1 March 2020 and because of the crisis. On the other, it has 
the potential of being abused by rogue directors because liability is suspended irrespective 
of whether the losses are caused by the pandemic. It is sufficient that these losses are 
incurred during the pandemic (or for a long period of time after 1 March 2020).  
 
As a result, section 10 of the Bill becomes a sort of “Get Out Jail Free” card45 for rogue 
directors who incurred excessive liabilities at the time of Covid-19. When applicable, it 
shields them from liability for losses caused by wrongful trading and not due to the Covid-
19 pandemic. 
 
43 Explanatory Notes to the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 2019-21, para 29. 
44 Re Continental Assurance Company of London plc [2001] B.P.I.R. 733. 
45 Wrongful trading is a civil rather than criminal offence. Readers should not be too alarmed by this choice 
of phrase. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
A person who is not expert in insolvency matters may be excused for thinking that the 
wrongful trading provision represents an unreasonable burden for directors at times of 
crisis. The same person might be equally excused for thinking that the Government’s 
decision to suspend the liability rather than enforceability of this provision is “the right one” 
to save companies and, ultimately, jobs.  
 
But the devil is in the detail. This paper evidences that the Government’s decision does 
not withstand academic scrutiny. This is because the suspension of liability for wrongful 
trading is poorly drafted and does not properly consider the law and the way in which courts 
have consistently interpreted section 214 of the Act.  
 
All these elements strongly suggest that the measure fails to achieve the Government’s 
goal to remove a deterrence to continue trading where there is a threat of insolvency. It 
produces, however, undesired side effects. As a result, the announced suspension of 
liability for wrongful trading may generate a plethora of abusive practices and raise rule-
of-law concerns for restricting creditors’ rights without any apparent justification. 
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I. Introduction  
 
With many of us now working from home and some commentators even predicting the 
‘end of the office’, we cannot but fail to notice the impact of the Coronavirus outbreak on 
our terms and conditions of employment.1 For those essential workers on the frontline, the 
situation is altogether more serious.2 The effects of the Coronavirus on the world of work 
are beginning to be explored, with the current academic analysis largely focused on 
discrete areas of employment law, for example the health and safety of workers,3 
protection from unfair dismissal, the right to paid annual leave,4 and the interaction 
between the UK Government’s furlough scheme and the background rules of domestic 
employment legislation.5  
 
This paper will seek to present an overarching analysis of the virus’ intrusion into working 
conditions through the lens of the ‘right to work’. The right to work is a social right identified 
in a number of international rights instruments, notably the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Covenant), the European Social Charter (the 
Social Charter) and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (the EU Charter).6 
This paper will explore the components of the right to work that are particularly relevant in 
the context of the Coronavirus pandemic, notably the State’s obligation to prevent 
unemployment, the right to decent conditions of work and crucially, the right not to work.  
 
The right to work is also linked intimately to the freedom of employers to pursue their 
business. The consequences of this connection for workers’ rights is a potential cause for 
concern. Of course, all of these issues clearly transcend the current pandemic, but the 
Coronavirus provides an important impetus to explore a concept that despite extensive 
academic analysis, has so far failed to gain much traction as a standalone fundamental 
social right.   
 
II. What is the Right to Work?  
 
The first hurdle in any consideration of the right to work is that the content and scope of 
the concept is difficult to define, with various meanings being ascribed to it depending on 
 
1 Daniel Thomas, Stephen Morris and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, ‘The End of the Office? Coronavirus 
may Change Work Forever’, The Financial Times, 1 May 2020.  
2 James Robottom, ‘The Legal Rights of Healthcare Workers to Personal Protective Equipment during the 
COVID-19 Pandemic’, UK Labour Law Blog, 13 April 2020.  
3 Stuart Brittenden, ‘The Coronavirus: Rights to Leave the Workplace and Strikes’, UK Labour Law Blog, 
27 March 2020.  
4 Alan Bogg and Michael Ford, ‘Furloughing and Fundamental Rights: The Case of Paid Annual Leave’, UK 
Labour Law Blog, 6 April 2020.  
5 Alan Bogg and Michael Ford, ‘Legislating in Times of Crisis: The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme’, UK 
Labour Law Blog, 23 March 2020; Alan Bogg and Michael Ford, ‘Not Legislating in a Crisis? The 
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, Part 2’, UK Labour Law Blog, 31 March 2020.  
6 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, UN Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3; Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised), 3 May 1996, 
ETS 163; EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, [2012] OJ C26/02.  
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the context. It could, first of all, be conceived as a legally enforceable right, with a 
corresponding obligation on the State to provide employment, although this is unlikely to 
stretch to a right to a particular job.7 Second, the right to work might be viewed as 
encompassing a right to decent work, being tied with the concept of fair and just working 
conditions, explored below. Going further still, it can be thought of as a right destined to 
provide for human self-realisation.8 More controversially, the right to work has been linked 
with the correlative duty to work. 9 As argued in this paper, the right to work may also be 
construed as a right not to work, or at least the right not to work in dangerous conditions.  
 
The scope and content of the right to work is complicated by the fact that it is a right that 
can potentially be raised against a variety of actors, namely the State, the employer or 
trade unions. As against the State, the right to work can be viewed as a duty to maintain 
conditions of full employment, to protect the right of every worker to earn a living freely 
chosen and to provide employment services and vocational training for all workers.10 The 
second actor against whom the right to work could conceivably be raised is the employer. 
Every worker has the right to be engaged on a non-discriminatory basis, a right to be given 
work while employed, a right to remain in continuous employment and to be reinstated in 
cases of unfair dismissal.11 However, the right is probably not broad enough to encompass 
a guarantee of satisfying or rewarding work from the employer. Finally, the right to work 
can be invoked against trade unions in closed-shop situations, providing a right for workers 
who are not members of a union to seek and maintain employment.12 The latter has led to 
the right to work being treated with a great deal of suspicion within employment law circles, 
and overlooks the role that trade unions can play alongside the State and private 
employers in ensuring the realisation at national level of a meaningful right to work.13  
 
III. The Right to Work as a Fundamental Social Right    
 
The right to work is scattered across a number of international rights instruments. To begin 
with, Article 23(1) of the Universal  Declaration of Human Rights provides that ‘[e]veryone 
has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of 
work and to protection against unemployment’.14 The content of the right to work is further 
specified in other UN rights instruments, most notably the Covenant. Article 6 of the 
Covenant attests to the recognition by the States Parties of the right to work ‘which includes 
the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses 
or accepts’. Steps to be taken to safeguard this right include technical and vocational 
guidance and training programmes, policies, and techniques to achieve economic, social, 
and cultural development and productive employment under conditions that safeguard the 
 
7 Bob Hepple, ‘The Right to Work’ (1981) 10 ILJ 65, 73; Council of Europe, European Social Charter: A 
Short Guide, 2000, 119.  
8 Hugh Collins, ‘Is There a Human Right to Work?’ in Virginia Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work (Hart 
2015) 17, 29.  
9 Guy Mundlak, ‘The Right to Work, the Value of Work’ in Daphne Barak-Erez and Aeyal Gross (eds), 
Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Hart 2007) 341, 343.  
10 Hepple (n. 7) 69.  
11 ibid 73.  
12 ibid 79.  
13 Alan Bogg, ‘Only Fools and Horses: Some Sceptical Reflections on the Right to Work’ in Virginia 
Mantouvalou (ed), The Right to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Hart 2015) 149; Colm 
O’Cinneide, ‘The Right to Work in International Human Rights Law’ in Virginia Mantouvalou (ed), The Right 
to Work: Legal and Philosophical Perspectives (Hart 2015) 99, 109.  
14 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III).  
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fundamental freedoms of the individual. The provisions of Article 6 enjoy particular 
prominence as the first substantive right set out in the Covenant.15 The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has sought to flesh out the concept of the right to 
work, highlighting that ‘[w]ork as specified in article 6 of the Covenant must be decent work. 
This is work that respects the fundamental rights of the human person as well as the rights 
of workers in terms of conditions of work safety and remuneration’.16  
 
At the European level, the right to work can be found in both the Social Charter, which is 
the social rights equivalent of the European Convention on Human Rights and also in the 
EU Charter.  Article 1 of the Social Charter calls on the Parties to undertake:  
 
(1) to accept as one of their primary aims and responsibilities the achievement and maintenance of 
as high and stable a level of employment as possible, with a view to the attainment of full 
employment; (2) to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely 
entered upon; (3) to establish or maintain free employment services for all workers; (4) to provide or 
promote appropriate vocational guidance, training and rehabilitation.  
 
The focus of this provision is on the State’s obligation to achieve full employment, although 
it also roots the right to work in the right of every worker to earn their living in an occupation 
or profession freely entered upon. Essentially, this means that every worker has the right 
to enter the workforce without constraint or coercion, ie it is the ‘liberty’ component of the 
right to work.17  
 
The EU Charter similarly conceives of the right to work as the freedom to choose an 
occupation, thereby overlooking the other components of Article 1 of the Social Charter, 
which as we just saw, also ground the right to work in wider issues of access and availability 
of work.18 Article 15 provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to engage in work and to pursue 
a freely chosen or accepted occupation’. This provision has a very wide personal scope 
when compared to other EU Charter rights, applying to “everyone”, but the corresponding 
duty to ensure the right’s protection is framed by the EU Charter’s horizontal provisions, 
which specify that it is addressed to the EU’s institutions and the Member States when 
they are implementing EU law. The Explanations attached to the EU Charter note that 
Article 15 is derived from the Court of Justice of the European Union’s pre-existing case 
law on the freedom to pursue a trade or occupation as a general principle of EU law.19 The 
Explanations thereby link Article 15 to the freedom to enter a freely chosen occupation 
found in Article 1(2) of the Social Charter. Again, this implies a right to access employment 
(or not to be deprived of employment) in a non-discriminatory manner. The difficulty here 
is that the terminology used has been inconsistent. For example, the Explanations 
attached to Article 15 refer to the ‘freedom to pursue an economic activity’, while the case 
referred to does not use that formula at all, instead referring to the ‘freedom to choose and 
practice their trade or profession’. As explained further below in the context of the freedom 
to conduct a business, there are perhaps different connotations to being able to freely enter 
an occupation and the freedom to choose an economic activity.    
 
15 O’Cinneide (n. 13) 104.  
16 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: General Comment No 18, The Right to Work, 
UN Doc. C/C/12/GC/18, 6 February 2006 para. 7. 
17 Guy Mundlak, ‘The Right to Work: Linking Human Rights and Employment Policy’ (2007) 146 Int'l Lab 
Rev 189, 193.  
18 Diamond Ashiagbor, ‘Article 15’ in Steve Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(1st edn, Hart 2014) 423, 428.  
19 Case C-4/73 Nold ECLI:EU:C:1974:51.  
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The nebulous nature of the right to work’s focus on the ‘availability’ and ‘accessibility’ of 
work is somewhat tempered by its close connection to other more ‘substantive’ rights which 
seek to guarantee work that is ‘acceptable’.20 As O’Cinneide remarks in relation to the 
Covenant and the Social Charter, ‘the placing of work at the beginning of the list of 
substantive rights is no accident, but rather reflects its fundamental importance in the 
overall scheme of social rights’.21 Most obviously, we rely on work as a source of income 
to fulfil our basic human needs such as food, housing, and health. More widely, work can 
be seen as an act of human self-expression and socialisation.22 The freedom to pursue a 
freely chosen trade or profession also has clear links to the concept of self-determination 
and human dignity. The idea is, that although not all of us want to work, or at least not all 
of the time, work gives us a sense of purpose, community, and self-respect.23 The right to 
work is also linked to protections against unfair dismissal  and discrimination in access to 
employment. Finally, the right to work has a clear relationship with other fundamental 
employment rights such as the right to fair and just working conditions.24 
 
Having set out the content and scope of the right to work, we are now in a position to 
assess the implications of the Coronavirus pandemic for that right.  
 
IV. The Implications of Coronavirus for the Right to Work  
 
The Coronavirus poses obvious challenges for the right to work, but at the same time, the 
right to work can potentially be relied on to ensure a robust employee-protective response 
to the pandemic. Three situations will be distinguished, with the Coronavirus pandemic 
creating different right to work implications in each category. namely: (a) the right to work 
implications for those of us now working from home; (b) the consequences for those who 
are no longer working either due to having been furloughed or made redundant and finally 
and (c) the right to work implications of going to work while the pandemic continues.  
 
a) Those who are working from home 
 
At least since the beginning of the UK’s initial general lockdown on 23 March, a large 
proportion of the population have been working from home, with the Coronavirus 
Regulations permitting travel for the purposes of work only where it is not ‘reasonably 
possible’ to do this.25 In certain respects, those of us who are able to work from home are 
in a privileged category from a right to work perspective, with our continued employment 
likely to be facilitated for the duration of the pandemic.26 Having said that, the wider right 
to (decent) work implications of working from home are potentially numerous.  
 
The most obvious consequence of working from home is the further blurring of the home 
and work distinction, already under strain from the ever-presence of email. The deployment 
of new workplace technologies to facilitate staff meetings, such as Zoom add to the sense 
that we never really leave the workplace and that work never really leaves us. The added 
 
20 Collins (n. 8) 120.  
21 O’Cinneide (n. 13) 112.  
22 Mundlak, ‘The Right to Work, the Value of Work’ (n. 9) 342. 
23 Ashiagbor (n. 18) 425.  
24 For example, Article 31(2) of the EU Charter.  
25 The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020.  
26 COVID Inequality Project, <https://sites.google.com/view/covidinequality/home> .  
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pressure to be ‘always on’ also places strain on employment rights found in domestic 
legislation, notably the Working Time Regulations 1998, which implement the EU’s 
Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC. The Directive entitles workers to a minimum number 
of rest periods during the day, a limited working week and a right to paid annual leave. In 
a long line of case law, the EU Court of Justice has ensured that any such break period 
must be for the purpose of rest and relaxation from work and any time spent not working, 
but on-call, at the employer’s disposal or even on sick leave, cannot count as time off.27 
But, how does one ensure that adequate rests breaks are taken when the office is also the 
home and when, at least in the early stages of the lockdown, frequently going outside was 
not an option?  
 
Anyone whose travel plans have recently been disrupted will also know that there are 
definite consequences of the pandemic for the exercise of the right to annual leave. Is it 
really possible to switch off and relax when confined to the home which has also been 
serving as your workplace? Recently adopted legislation recognises these difficulties, 
providing that where, due to the Coronavirus, it is not reasonably practical for the worker 
to take leave during a particular leave period, the entitlement to annual leave can transfer 
to the next period.28 As Bogg and Ford argue, these Regulations should be interpreted as 
preventing the employer from insisting on workers taking annual leave while the pandemic 
persists, including for those employees on furlough.29 Such a reading is reinforced by the 
right to fair and just working conditions found in Article 31(2) of the EU Charter, perhaps in 
conjunction with the right to work in Article 15. The Court of Justice has already held that, 
as a fundamental social right, the obligation is on the employer to ensure that the employee 
is able to exercise the right to annual leave.30 However, the Government’s current advice 
seems to be that the employer can indeed specify when the employee should take leave, 
an interpretation that does not sit well with the purpose of the underlying right.31 
 
In the grand scheme of a global pandemic, these issues might seem insignificant, but there 
is always the risk that hard-won employment rights will be eroded. Working time 
protections are already vulnerable to Brexit, with the UK Government having long- 
demonised the protections granted in the Working Time Directive.32 Indeed, the Charter 
itself will strictly speaking no longer apply in the UK once the transition period has ended, 
although its interpretative pull may live on. When the floor of rights currently guaranteed 
by EU legislation and the EU Charter is removed, it may be a whole lot easier to justify the 
suspension of working time rights found in domestic legislation. It is here where reliance 
on wider international standards such as the right to work guaranteed in the Social Charter 
and the Covenant may prove useful.  
 
A more immediate issue is the particular effect that working from home has for those with 
childcare responsibilities. Balancing work with childcare has obvious consequences for the 
accessibility limb of the right to work. There are also clear gender dimensions to this issue, 
with the burden of childcare and housework continuing to fall disproportionately on female 
 
27 Case C-151/02 Jaeger ECLI:EU:C:2003:437; Joined Cases C-350/06 and C-520/06 Stringer 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:18.  
28 The Working Time (Coronavirus) (Amendment) Regulations 2020.  
29 Bogg and Ford (n. 4).  
30 C-214/16 King ECLI:EU:C:2017:914.  
31 UK Government, ‘Holiday entitlement and pay during coronavirus (COVID-19)’, 13 May 2020.  
32 Case C-84/94 UK v Council ECLI:EU:C:1996:431.  
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workers.33 There have long been calls for greater recognition of the value of work done in 
the home. If the right to work is to have any real meaning, we need to decide what is meant 
by ‘work’. As a fundamental social right, the concept of work should be defined broadly. If 
nothing else, the Coronavirus pandemic has shown us that it is those in the most 
precarious and often low-paid industries who we now depend on the most.  
 
Finally, the increased reliance on home-based technology raises further issues as to 
access to such technology, for example computer equipment and high speed internet and 
the consequent rise in energy bills, which are unlikely to be met by increased wages.34 All 
of these issues clearly engage the non-discriminatory access to employment aspect of the 
right work, but it is not at all obvious who bears the responsibility for responding to these 
challenges. The existing legal framework in the employment context, which was not 
designed to meet the current circumstances, and is already creaking under the weight of 
new technology and increasingly flexible forms of work, is unlikely to be of much 
assistance. The contractual model underpinning the employment relationship is very 
adaptable to permitting non-traditional (and less protective) forms of work, while at the 
same time, alterations to terms and conditions of employment are not so easily facilitated 
without falling foul of contractual principles.  
 
b) Those who are no longer working  
 
As already mentioned, those who can work from home are in a relatively secure position. 
For those who have been made redundant, or who have been furloughed, the situation is 
more precarious. Particular difficulties have been caused for those employed by shops and 
restaurants, most of which were forced to close temporarily, meaning that many of these 
already low-paid workers are likely to have been furloughed.35 Furloughing is provided for 
in the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme , which allows employers to apply for an 80% 
reimbursement of wages (up to £2,500) for employees who have been placed on furlough, 
for an initial period of three months (now extended until October 2020), the purpose being 
to prevent redundancies in situations where it is no longer possible for the employee to 
continue working due to the restrictions on businesses opening.  
 
The Scheme has been criticised from the outset, notably for its initial differentiated 
approach to the various categories of employment status.36 This is partly because it cannot 
be divorced from the background of the existing inadequacies in domestic UK employment 
law, which, as mentioned, do not allow for much flexibility in the variation of terms and 
conditions of employment. By contrast, the law is much more permissive of dismissals at 
both common law and under statute, albeit that the latter engages further procedural and 
substantive protections, thereby incentivising employers to dismiss their workforce and 
reengage them later on under new terms and conditions.37 The only real protection derives 
from the Equality Act 2010, which would prevent discriminatory selection for furlough and 
potentially other contractual mechanisms such as the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence.38 If the Scheme, combined with the existing legislative backdrop, were 
 
33 Donna Ferguson, ‘“I feel like a 1950s housewife”: how lockdown has exposed the gender divide’, The 
Observer, 3 May 2020; COVID Inequality Project (n. 26).  
34 Joanna Partridge, ‘UK household energy bills to soar by £32 per month’, The Guardian, 4 May 2020.  
35 Andy Verity, ‘Coronavirus: More than 9 million expected to be furloughed’, BBC News, 8 April 2020.  
36 Bogg and Ford (n. 5).  
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
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(inadvertently) to lead to widespread redundancies, this would clearly be at odds with the 
State’s obligation under the Covenant and the Social Charter to devise labour market 
policies that support employment. The same is true of the State’s handling of the wider 
economic impact of the pandemic.  
 
c) Those who are still going to work  
 
As already mentioned, the Regulations stipulate that workers can leave their home to go 
to work where it is not ‘reasonably possible’ to work at home. As the lockdown begins to 
ease, more of us will also return to work. This raises significant health and safety issues 
for those who are required to go to work, particularly those in essential frontline services 
such as the NHS, transport, and food supply. The lack of access to Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) has gained much attention in recent weeks. There is a raft of legislation 
guaranteeing the health and safety at workers at work.39 For example, the EU’s Framework 
Directive 89/391/EEC stipulates that workers should not suffer any detriment for having 
exercised their right to protect their safety. The UK implementing legislation stipulates that 
any dismissal resulting from an exercise of these rights will be automatically unfair and 
incapable of justification by the employer. The right not to suffer a detriment or dismissal 
covers a situation where an employee refuses to work,  leaves the workplace or refuses to 
enter certain parts of the workplace due to a reasonable belief that there are circumstances 
of ‘serious and imminent danger’.40 These provisions have been interpreted widely to cover 
not only the individual employee themselves, but also other workers and potentially family 
members.41 Brittenden suggests that given the seriousness of the pandemic and the 
Government’s own use of the terms ‘serious and imminent’, it is highly likely that an 
employee refusing to work out of fear of infecting themselves or others, will be protected. 
It is suggested that such a reading can be bolstered by reliance on the right to work.  
 
Of course, many of us expect to return to work at some point in the near future. The 
Government has issued draft guidelines for getting employees to return to work while the 
pandemic is on-going.42 These non-binding guidelines have been criticised by the Trade 
Union Congress as putting workers’ health at risk.43  The guidelines leave it to employers 
to decide whether it is safe for their business to reopen but provides little detail beyond 
stating that social distancing and handwashing “should” happen. Given the risks while at 
work or travelling to work, the question arises as to whether the right to work can also 
encompass a right not to work.  
 
Most of us, regardless of need,  derive a strong sense of identity and value from our chosen 
trade or profession and value the social connections that work can bring. It would be a 
stretch, to say the least, to argue that the right to work as a fundamental human right, 
encompasses the right not to work at all. However, it may be interpreted as including a 
right to refuse to work under certain circumstances or to perform certain tasks. Such a 
 
39 Framework Directive 89/391/EEC;  ss 44 and 100 Employment Rights Act 1996; Directive 89/656; The 
Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992; Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) 
Regulations 1992; Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999; Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974.  
40 Brittenden (n. 3).  
41 Masiak v City Restaurants [1999] IRLR 780.  
42 UK Government, ‘Working safely during coronavirus (COVID-19)’, 11 May 2020.  
43 Rowena Mason, ‘Coronavirus plan for returning to work puts employees at risk, says TUC’, The 
Guardian, 4 May 2020.  
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refusal to work will usually constitute a breach of contract. We have already seen that this 
rule is to an extent tempered by the fact that the employee has a right not to suffer a 
detriment for refusing to work in the face of serious and imminent danger. The employer is 
also required to comply with health and safety legislation. But is this really enough for an 
employee who genuinely fears the health repercussions of continuing to work during the 
pandemic? The right to work might help in one respect, namely the idea that work must be 
“freely” chosen or entered upon. Making the choice between potentially be dismissed for 
falling on the wrong side of the concept of “serious and imminent danger” and continuing 
to take the risk of going to work is really no choice at all.  
 
Of course, the right to work, like most rights, is not absolute, but may be limited, provided 
that any such limitations are necessary, justified, and proportionate. It should be 
recognised that employers and the Government are reacting to a fast-developing situation, 
but this is no excuse to overlook fundamental social rights. There is also the danger that 
some of the rapid changes to working conditions that have taken place in the immediate 
wake of the crisis will solidify, leading to a semi-detached body of regulation that sits 
uneasily with existing employment law. If nothing else, the current situation has highlighted 
flaws within the current regulatory regime, notably the continued exclusion of some of the 
most vulnerable workers from legislative protections, income inequality and the continued 
gendering of household work.   
 
Another issue, is that, as mentioned, the employer has competing rights that may 
undermine any invocation of the right to work. The freedom to conduct a business found 
in Article 16 of the EU Charter is a clear example. Quite clearly, businesses that have been 
closed due to the Coronavirus, will want to reopen as soon as possible and it can 
conceivably be argued the decision to require many businesses to shut their doors 
infringes their freedom to conduct a business. The invocation of business freedoms to 
challenge the lockdown has potential implications for the health, safety and working 
conditions of employees.  
 
Both Articles 15 and 16 of the EU Charter derive from the EU Court’s earliest case law on 
the freedom to pursue economic activity as a general principle of EU law.44  Although both 
rights are, in theory, also subject to the same limitations, the reality is that the CJEU has 
granted a wide interpretation of the concept of freedom of contract within Article 16, to the 
detriment of employee-protective legislative rights.45 The CJEU has confirmed that both 
Articles 15 and 16 are closely related, with both protecting individual autonomy, linked to 
the performance of economic activity. Where the two provisions differ is that the right to 
work is connected to the concept of free choice and personal autonomy of the individual, 
while the freedom to conduct a business protects entrepreneurial values, such as freedom 
of contract.46 The right to work is also infused with (and indeed infuses) other fundamental 
employment rights, such as the right to fair and just working conditions. This symbiosis can 
lead to a more worker-friendly reading of employment legislation even in the face of the 
strains posed by the current pandemic.  
 
 
 
 
 
44 Case C-4/73 Nold ECLI:EU:C:1974:51.  
45 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron ECLI:EU:C:2013:521.  
46 Advocate General opinion in Case C-190/16 Werner Fries ECLI:EU:C:2017:225. 
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V. Conclusion  
 
The Coronavirus pandemic has clear implications for the world of work, from both the 
perspective of the wider shape of the economy and on the basis of our individual terms 
and conditions of employment. The right to work, while often indeterminate and difficult to 
enforce, can serve to highlight the fundamental nature of the social rights underlying our 
everyday experiences at work. It also acts as a unifying force, bringing together what can 
at times appear a rather disparate medley of individual employment rights, found both in 
international social rights instruments and domestic law. The right to work, being closely 
linked with autonomy concepts, can act as a strong counterpoint to the freedom to conduct 
a business of employers, many of whom are now keen to return to business as usual in 
the wake of the pandemic.  
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The Impact on Vulnerable Populations 
 
Vulnerability: A Discussion 
Caroline Bald, Laura Carter, Carla Ferstman, Andrew Fagan, Geoff Gilbert and Aaron Wyllie  
[DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_019] 
 
The majority of authors in this section came together to discuss synergies between their 
chapters and common themes arising in their research.  
 
It was agreed that “vulnerability” is not a neutral world. It arises from intersecting structural 
inequalities and is a cross-cutting issue. The use of this particular term, the context in 
which it is used and by whom, as well as how it is framed, feeds into its politicisation and, 
indeed, its weaponisation. Covid-19 has turned populist narrative about who is vulnerable, 
on its head. It requires us to rethink who is vulnerable, in all sorts of ways. This is further 
underscored by the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis on 25 May. This entire area is 
rapidly evolving.    
 
The discussants also noted that vulnerability is not accidental; it is constructed. It can be 
about choices, all of which requires structural, political analysis: how are long-standing 
issues of marginalisation redressed by governments and communities; who obtains 
access to healthcare; who is released from prison; how are asylum seekers dealt with? 
Covid-19 has simply amplified every aspect of pre-existing discrimination and 
disempowerment.  
 
There is power in the designation of “vulnerable”; there is also a power for who is taking or 
avoiding responsibility for that vulnerability. Older people in care homes have been 
significantly affected; this must be considered in terms of the extent to which governments 
had made provision for care, but also how hospitals have navigated and cast to the side 
vulnerability by pushing persons back into care homes and exposing those locals to further 
infection risks. The power dynamic is about who is responsible for the vulnerable, and who 
is responsible for the fatal outcomes.  
 
Another theme which arose during the discussion was the role of knowledge and knowing. 
There is an urgent need to educate the public about race in response to the recent protests 
against racism, but what is missing perhaps is a deeper understanding of how inequalities 
are created, maintained and accentuated, and to consider the tools to dismantle the 
structures in place which lead to such edifices. What are our responsibilities as educators, 
social workers, activists or lawyers? 
 
Carter’s paper discusses the importance of “centering” as a conceptual process of bringing 
vulnerable people back in from the margins in policy discourses, a concept articulated by 
the theorist and activist bell hooks. This was understood as a crucial framing for 
understanding power dynamics and to recognise that by incorporating their lived 
experience and expertise from their situation of vulnerability, it is possible for theory and 
policy responses to become more complete and appropriate, in order to better reflect the 
needs of people caught up in vulnerability. The discussants canvassed the ways in which 
this principle of “centering” could also encompass or take into account the goals of 
empowerment – access to decision-making from the context of vulnerability, having their 
own unfiltered voices heard. In many ways, the pandemic has reduced those voices even 
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further than before. One needs to take care to consider whether the “we” who wish to bring 
people in situations of vulnerability in from the margins, includes those people themselves: 
they can still be marginalised in “the middle”. 
 
The notion of positive obligations is another useful lens through which to assess necessary 
actions to take better account of structural vulnerabilities and seek to address them. There 
is a question whether Covid-19 requires the state to go beyond what they would normally 
be doing to address the extra layers of vulnerability and added risks facing affected 
persons. This may depend on the nature of the particular issues at stake. It may be that 
the laws work fine, but it is the resources to underpin them which have been lacking.   
 
It is important to understand the role of social movements and other “soft” approaches to 
advance rights, particularly when the law is being undermined or unenforced. There are 
important political opportunities that can be used to ensure that the fleeting examples of 
solidarity are solidified. Just beneath the veneer of “we’re all in it together” is a veneer or 
populism and racism, that must be addressed systematically. There is a moment of 
potential transformation on which we must be ready to capitalize, but the transformation 
must occur through structural changes and activism, as opposed to simply wishful thinking. 
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The Politics of Identity in the UK: Before, During and After Covid-19 
Dr Andrew Fagan (Director, Human Rights Centre) [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_020] 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Covid-19 is the most harmful and devastating pandemic the world has faced for over a 
century, and one hopes that biomedical science will provide the most effective clinical 
remedy to the virus in due course. When countries began to seriously pay attention to the 
rapid spread of the virus, it was commonly asserted that Covid-19 was an indiscriminate 
disease, which everyone was similarly vulnerable to, a claim which appears to be 
exemplified by the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, contracting the virus in late March 
2020.  
 
After several months of the spread of Covid-19 throughout the developed world, we now 
know that the fate of Boris Johnson revealed little about peoples’ vulnerability to the virus. 
In stark contrast to the claim that the virus did not discriminate,  it became quickly apparent 
that the likelihood of becoming infected is far higher amongst some socio-economic, racial 
and ethnic groups than others.1 Identity is an aetiological factor in the spread of the virus. 
This is not because of the differing physiological or DNA composition of those who have 
disproportionately been infected by the virus. Biology is not destiny. Rather, those most 
likely to become infected and thus to die from the virus are also many of the poorest and 
most socially marginalised within our societies. In addition to its biomedical properties, 
Covid-19 must also be understood as a profoundly social and political pathogen, that sheds 
an unrelenting light on the social and political pathologies of affluent, notionally democratic 
societies such as the United Kingdom.   
 
This paper focuses upon two pandemics and examines the relationship between them. 
The first is, of course, Covid-19. The second, that I suggest here, consists of a form of 
identity-fuelled politics which has quickly risen to the status of liberal democracy’s most 
formidable adversary in many affluent societies, including that which I shall focus upon 
here: the United Kingdom. In a chapter I wrote in December 2019, I referred to this as the 
“pandemic of discontent”.2 In this brief chapter, I will analyse three stages of the pandemic 
of discontent: before, during, and “after” the Covid-19 pandemic. In so doing, I aim to 
analyse the pathological character of a particular form of identity politics in the UK, whilst 
also, albeit somewhat speculatively, seeking to show how Covid-19 might provide the basis 
for the human rights community and the defenders of social justice to begin politically 
disrupting key identity-based elements of the pandemic of discontent. My hope is that we 
might be able to derive some longer-term benefits from the terrible devastation which 
Covid-19 has already caused by reasserting the extent to which respect for fundamental 
rights is essential for the sustainable well-being of any and all diverse societies.       
 
 
 
 
 
1 See the paper by Caroline Bald and Sharon Walker in this volume. 
2 Andrew Fagan, ‘Confronting Uncomfortable Truths: Liberal Democracy, Minority Rights, Identity Politics 
and Populism,’ in Anna Maria Biro, Andrew Fagan and Dwight Newman (eds) Minority Rights and Unstable 
Orders (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2021). 
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II. Before 
 
Can you still clearly recall the UK as it was before Covid-19? Lest your frustrations with life 
in the age of Covid-19 have induced a state of nostalgia for what came before, let me 
remind you: significant parts of the UK had become infected by a wider political 
phenomenon, which, I have labelled the “pandemic of discontent”. Though not entirely 
consisting of a politics of identity, a particular form of identity politics was and is integral to 
this pandemic. 
 
There is a large and growing body of academic literature devoted to the study of identity 
as a central feature of the political, socio-cultural and economic distribution of rights, 
resources and opportunities within established liberal democratic societies, such as the 
USA, the UK, France, and the Netherlands.3 Despite liberalism’s avowed commitment to 
equality and non-discrimination, which underpin a comprehensive body of equality and 
anti-discrimination law, many theorists, commentators and activists have repeatedly 
pointed to the multitude of ways in which formally rights-respecting, liberal democratic 
societies have failed to recognise and support the interests of groups of people whose 
avowed identity results in systematically restricting their enjoyment of equal opportunities.4 
These critiques appear in areas such as, education, employment, housing, health-care, 
the protection afforded by the law, the criminal justice system, the enjoyment of one’s 
gender orientation, and the ability to practice key cultural and religious traditions and 
beliefs. Identity politics belies liberal democracy’s complacent assumption regarding the 
basically just and fair character of liberal institutions and liberal societies.  
 
While advocates of identity politics are typically associated with positions on the left of the 
political spectrum, the identity-politicking components of the pandemic of discontent 
extends to include many groups towards the opposite end of that spectrum. Specifically, 
those groups that typically espouse nationalist and exclusionary causes and interests. 
While the underlying causes of right-wing populism are complex, a key element of right-
wing populist identity politicking consists of the support it enjoys amongst communities of 
people who have come to view themselves as the victims of the liberal democratic order 
and the “elites” who are seen as administering liberal democracy.5 Ironically, for many of 
its supporters,  much of the ostensive appeal of right-wing populist identity draws upon an 
experience of the ontological insecurity and vulnerability which has mobilised various 
minority communities to fight for their collective rights to exist and thrive since the 
emergence of the identity politicking age in the 1960s until the present day.6 The re-
emergence, and several eye-catching political successes, of right-wing populism freshly 
highlights the extent to which identity politics now includes groups  of people who claim 
that their own identities are increasingly vulnerable to the presumed legal, political, socio-
 
3 Bhiku Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2nd edition) 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
4 Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). Michael Kenny, The Politics of Identity: Liberal Political Theory and the 
Dilemmas of Difference, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
5 Eric Kaufman, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 2019). 
6 Ipsos Mori, ‘Populist and Nativist Sentiment in 2019: A 27 Country Survey,’ 2019, 
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-08/populism-and-nativism-2019_0.pdf; 
Steven Hahn, ‘The Rage of White Folk: How the silent majority became a loud and angry minority’, The 
Nation, 27 September 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/the-rage-of-white-folks/. 
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cultural and economic rights gained by particular minority communities within societies 
such as the UK. Illiberal right-wing populism is, to a large extent, the principal political 
manifestation, or symptom, of the pandemic of discontent, which itself is seen by many as 
posing the greatest existential threat to liberal democracy.7  
 
In addition to unbridled prejudice, right-wing populism is fuelled by a wide range of 
concerns and anxieties which have emerged within the UK over the course of many years. 
The services and “goods” which the vast majority of us depend upon: education, 
employment, health-care, safe and affordable housing, access to a healthy environment, 
pensions which support a dignified old age for all, adequate social security, affordable 
public transport and adequately funded local authorities, have become increasingly 
precarious and vulnerable to under-funding and reduced accountability over several 
decades.8 Many people are entirely justified in feeling that the prevailing political system 
has routinely and systematically failed them. Under more democratic circumstances, these 
conditions might have led to wholesale popular support for a progressive political platform 
committed to addressing what some identify as the principal cause of this pandemic: an 
inequitable neoliberal economic order, which has led to the relative impoverishment and 
destitution of many different groups of people who inhabit the UK. There are demonstrable 
grounds for forging an electorally powerful, multicultural constituency comprising all of 
those who the prevailing order has failed, which would include many amongst the white 
British and BAME communities who share a common exposure to an inequitable economy 
and society. Against this possibility, right-wing populist identity politicking represents, 
arguably, the most powerful obstacle to forging a transformative politics committed to 
securing equal rights and effective opportunities for all communities and individuals within 
the UK. By weaponizing racism and xenophobia, right-wing populism divides groups of 
people who, despite their differing identities, are similarly exposed to many of the same 
social, political and economic ills.   
           
As is the case with the Covid-19 pandemic, the pandemic of discontent has also 
disproportionately impacted many of the more vulnerable and marginalised communities 
within the UK.9 Racist, xenophobic and intolerant beliefs and attitudes persist within many 
liberal democracies, despite the existence of a comprehensive array of legal commitments 
and constitutional provisions designed to protect minorities from such harms. For many 
legal theorists and political philosophers, the very survival of liberal democracy rests upon 
robust state support for the rights of minorities, combined with concerted efforts to combat 
prevailing forms of racism, xenophobia and intolerance which some utterly illiberal sections 
of the population may cling to.10 One of the most disturbing features of right-wing populist 
 
7 William Galston, Anti-Pluralism: the Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2018). Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to 
Save It (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018). Yascha Mounk and Jordan Kyle, ‘What 
Populists Do to Democracies’, The Atlantic, 26 December 2018; Jan-Werner Muller, What is Populism? 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2017). 
8 Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London: Bloomsbury, 2011). 
9 The Runnymede Trust, ‘State of the Nation: New comprehensive analysis on race in Britain,’ London, 
April, 2020, https://www.runnymedetrust.org/blog/state-of-the-nation-new-comprehensive-analysis-on-race-
in-britain; Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Healing a Divided Britain: the need for a 
comprehensive race strategy,’ London, 2016, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/race-report-healing-
divided-britain. 
10 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1977). Alan 
Patten, Equal Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2014).  
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identity politicking is the extent to which persistent tensions and prejudices surrounding 
race, ethnicity and religion amongst populations, have been mainstreamed into the political 
discourse and even the policy commitments of some governments within some liberal 
democracies. The UK provides one such example of this utterly illiberal development. 
 
Thus, evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey, published in 2019 found that 
between 1983 and 2018, the proportion of the population who describe themselves as 
‘very’ or a ‘little racially prejudiced’ persistently remained between one quarter and one 
third of the UK population.11 The figure has never fallen below 25%, and has actually 
increased since 1996. In respect of racially motivated hate crimes, UK Home Office figures 
demonstrate that racially motivated hate crime has risen every year since 2013.12  In 2018, 
71,251 such crimes were reported in England and Wales: the number of hate crimes has 
more than doubled since 2013. An extensive range of other governmental and civil society 
surveys reinforce the perception that racism and xenophobia are part of the lived realities 
of many minorities in the UK.13  
    
Of course, one might counter that, within a liberal democracy, the government cannot be 
held primarily responsible for the persistence of illiberal attitudes amongst some parts of 
the population. Indeed, the very fact that criminal sanctions exist against those who seek 
to turn their hateful attitudes into actions testifies to the government’s continuing 
commitment to minority rights protection. However earnestly this objection is made, it 
belies the extent to which prominent UK politicians and government officials have 
repeatedly sought to gain political capital by playing the race and ethnicity “card”.  
 
The most prominent and far-reaching example of this is, of course, Brexit. While it is 
entirely reasonable to assume that many people who voted “leave” in the UK’s EU 
referendum were not motivated by racist and xenophobic prejudices, there is reliable 
evidence pointing to the numerically decisive role which racially and ethnically motivated 
voters played in ensuring the outcome.14 This is unsurprising given the fact that many 
politicians, public figures and several national media outlets repeatedly sought to persuade 
some voters that supporting the reassertion of a particularly restrictive notion of national 
identity was precisely what the EU referendum was concerned with. They, at least, should 
not have been surprised to see significant increases in racially and religiously motivated 
hate crime immediately prior to and following the referendum, including the terrorist murder 
of the MP, Jo Cox.   
 
Other examples of state level right-wing populist identity politicking are easy to find. Take, 
for example, the then Home Secretary Theresa May’s 2012 statement that the UK 
government was committed to creating a “hostile environment” for irregular immigrants in 
the UK.15 The hostile environment policy was then quickly underpinned by two highly 
controversial pieces of legislation in the form of the Immigration Acts 2014 and 2016, which 
were heavily criticised by impartial bodies such as the UN Committee on the Elimination 
 
11 John Curtice, Elizabeth Clery, Jane Perry, Miranda Phillips and Nilufer Rahim (eds), British Social 
Attitudes: The 36th Report (London: The National Centre for Social Research, 2019).  
12 UK Home Office, Hate Crime: England and Wales, 2017-2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2017-to-2018. 
13 See Runnymede Trust, ‘State of the Nation’ (n. 9).  
14 Maria Sobolewska and Robert Ford, ‘British Culture Wars? Brexit and the Future Politics of Immigration 
and Ethnic Diversity’, (April 2019) 90(52) The Political Quarterly, 142-154. 
15 See the Runnymede Trust, ‘The State of the Nation’ (n. 9). 
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of Racial Discrimination and, most recently, by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance in 
her 2019 report on the situation in the UK.16 Theresa May’s successor as Home Secretary, 
Amber Rudd, then had to resign in 2018 as a direct result of the shameful Windrush 
Scandal, which amounted to little more than an instance of state racism, highlighting how 
a campaign against irregular immigrants could embroil many non-white British citizens. 
The effective mainstreaming of racist and xenophobic prejudices was also highlighted in 
the previously mentioned UN Special Rapporteur’s damning country report on the UK. 
Resorting to rather stark language, Tendayi Achiume stated that ‘the harsh reality is that 
race, ethnicity, religion, gender, disability status and related categories all continue to 
determine the life chances and well-being of people in Britain in ways that are 
unacceptable and, in many cases, unlawful.’ (2019: p. 7) She concluded that ‘in the United 
Kingdom explicit expressions of racial, ethnic and religious intolerance have become more 
acceptable, in ways that mark a notable shift.’ (op cit. p.17)  
 
Immediately prior to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, it was clear that UK politics 
and society were significantly infected by profoundly harmful pathogens, which had the 
most damaging effects upon many of the country’s racial, ethnic and religious minority 
communities.  
 
III. During 
 
To repeat the claim I made towards the beginning of this paper, Covid-19 is not 
biochemically predisposed to infect certain identity-based groups of people. We are all of 
us exposed to the same disease. However, there are manifest inequalities in the rates of 
infection within the UK, which largely overlap existing socio-economic and identity-based 
inequalities within the wider population. Class and identity are integral aetiological 
elements of Covid-19.17  
 
Socio-economic deprivation and marginalisation appears to be the most general category 
in which the discriminatory effects of Covid-19 are most apparent. Thus, in April 2020, the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) revealed that those living in the poorest parts of 
England and Wales were dying at twice the rate of those living in the richest areas. The 
most deprived areas of England and Wales recorded 55.1 deaths per 100,000 people, 
compared with 25.3 in affluent areas.18 Of course, poverty is, to a certain extent, an 
intersectional injustice, which impacts many different racial and ethnic groups in the UK. 
Many poor and deprived white British people have also died from Covid-19. However, the 
racism and xenophobia which I set out above, serves to disproportionately consign many 
racial, ethnic and religious minorities to socio-economic vulnerability and marginalisation. 
This is apparent in the figures which show the disproportionate impact of Covid-19 upon 
many black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities in the UK. The same data 
showed that more than 16 percent of all people who had tested positive for coronavirus 
when they died were from BAME communities, despite the fact that the 2011 UK census 
 
16 OHCHR, ‘Visit to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance,’ UN Doc. A/HRC/41/54/Add. 2, 27 May 2019. 
17 Helen Pidd, Caelainn Barr and Aamna Mohdin, ‘Calls for health funding to be prioritised as poor bear 
brunt of Covid-19,’ The Guardian, 1 May 2020. 
18 Chris Giles and William Wallis, ‘Deprived areas hit hardest by the pandemic in the UK,’ The Financial 
Times, 1 May 2020. 
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showed that 7.5 per cent of the population were Asian and 3.3 per cent black. More 
anecdotally, it was also very noteworthy that the first ten doctors and two-thirds of the first 
100 health and social care workers who died of Covid-19 were from ethnic minorities.19 
Public Health England has produced a report examining the causes of these disparities.20  
   
There is, no doubt, be a very complex set of factors and conditions which combine to 
expose many minority communities to significantly greater risk of becoming infected and 
dying from Covid-19. Some have pointed to cultural factors, such as the relatively larger 
size of family households amongst some South Asian-descended communities, which 
make socially isolating all the more difficult. However, it is clear that one of the principal 
factors is the greater exposure of particular occupational groups to the virus. Many of us, 
including many university staff, have been able to continue working from home throughout 
the period of social lockdown. The opportunity to work from home is, one might say, a 
particular privilege which Covid-19 has underlined. Many others, of course, do not enjoy 
this privilege. So-called key or essential workers have had to continue exposing 
themselves to a far higher risk of infection as they have continued to go to work. The most 
obvious such groups are health care and social care professionals, but the category of key 
workers extends far beyond these occupational categories. Identity is significant here for 
the simple reason that racial and ethnic minority communities are disproportionately 
employed in key-worker positions. For example, more than two in ten black African women 
of working age are employed in health and social care roles. Indian men are 150% more 
likely to work in health or social care roles than their white British counterparts. While the 
Indian ethnic group makes up 3% of the working-age population of England and Wales, 
they account for 14% of doctors.21 Similar figures are also found amongst other key 
occupational groups, such as public transport and public utilities.  
 
The higher rates of infection and death from the coronavirus pandemic connect directly to 
the other pandemic I have been analysing in this chapter. Identity politicking based upon 
racism, xenophobia and intolerance are a manifestation of the social, political and 
economic marginalisation and vulnerability which many minority communities have been 
exposed to for a very considerable time and which has intensified in recent years as such 
prejudices have been mainstreamed into many areas of UK politics and society. The 
coronavirus pandemic has served to highlight the disturbingly pathological character and 
effects of the pandemic of discontent. The two pandemics converge to deadly effect. 
 
IV. “After” 
 
These words are being written in early June 2020 and I must acknowledge the speculative 
nature of contemplating any post-Covid age and the unavoidably tentative nature of any 
 
19 Haroon Siddique, ‘UK government urged to investigate coronavirus deaths of BAME doctors,’ 10 April 
2020. 
20 Public Health England, ‘Disparities in the risk and outcomes of Covid-19,’ June 2020, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/890258/
disparities_review.pdf, although it’s important to note that the findings of the report have been quickly 
criticised by members of the BAME community. See, Haroon Siddique and Denis Campbell, ‘Censorship 
row over report on UK BAME Covid-19 deaths,’ The Guardian, 4 June 2020. 
21 Omar Khan, ‘Coronavirus exposes how riddled Britain is with racial inequality,’ The Guardian, 20 April 
2020; Lucinda Platt and Ross Warwick, ‘Are some ethnic groups more vulnerable to Covid-19 than others?’ 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, April 2020, https://www.ifs.org.uk/inequality/chapter/are-some-ethnic-groups-
more-vulnerable-to-covid-19-than-others/. 
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predictions regarding what changes the post-Covid world will undergo. It does, however, 
seem reasonable to assume that significant changes will occur. The question is, will the 
overwhelming evidence of the indispensable contribution BAME communities make in 
sustaining the UK during (before and after) the Covid-19 pandemic, provide a means for 
undercutting the toxic identity politicking of the pandemic of discontent within the UK? A 
change is gonna come. The question is, can those of us who care about the equal rights 
of all steer this change in the right direction? 
 
Right-wing populist identity politicking seeks to exploit long-standing socio-cultural 
differences to its own ends. Advocates of a politics which resorts to racism, xenophobia 
and intolerance seek to convert difference into hostile otherness. Further, the architects of 
right-wing populism have persistently sought to argue that the always vaguely defined 
essential interests of those sections of the electorate represented as the “genuine people” 
are necessarily at odds with liberal commitments to respecting the rights of many minority 
communities.22 It is possible that this interests-based appeal will be strengthened as 
societies like the UK face the huge economic challenges which Covid-19 will entail. History 
is rife with examples of severe crises being accompanied by populations turning against 
and scapegoating marginalised communities in their midst. 
 
However, such developments are not inevitable. Periods of profound crisis also afford 
opportunities for developing radically different forms of political imagination and action. It 
is also possible to develop a very different narrative from our collective experience of 
Covid-19. While identity is a salient aspect of peoples’ vulnerability to the virus, identity 
has also been an essential feature of the UK’s social and economic survival over the past 
few months. The very same racial, ethnic and religious communities who were often 
targeted as posing an existential threat to the UK’s wider collective identity, have emerged 
as disproportionately populating the key and essential workers the media have come to 
depict as national heroes, worthy of being applauded once a week in a national rite of 
appreciation. This is particularly the case with many “front-line” health care professionals, 
amongst whom there is a massively disproportionate number of people from BAME 
communities. Thus, as of March 2019, 20% of the more than 1.2 million staff employed by 
the health service were BAME, compared with 14% of the general population of England 
and Wales. This proportion increases to 44% when it comes to medical staff. The latest 
figures show that 43% of senior NHS doctors and 47% of junior doctors were BAME as of 
March last year.23 Indeed, other evidence has unequivocally demonstrated the 
indispensable role migrants from many of the UK’s former colonial territories played in 
staffing the then newly established NHS in the late 1940s and early 1950s.24 Broadly 
similar claims can be made for many of the sectors included within the other key and 
essential worker occupations, upon whom much of the entire country has depended, not 
just over the past few months, but, of course, for many decades prior to the Covid-19 
pandemic.25 Racial, ethnic and religious minorities have shown themselves to be 
 
22 See Muller (n. 7). 
23 Haroon Siddique, ‘UK doctors’ coronavirus deaths highlight crucial role of BAME medics,’ The Guardian, 
3 April 2020. 
24 Mend, ‘Overlooking the Incredible Contributions of BAME Staff in the NHS’, Muslim Engagement and 
Development, April 2020, https://www.mend.org.uk/overlooking-the-incredible-contributions-of-bame-staff-
in-the-nhs/. 
25 Who the UK Government identifies as key workers during the coronavirus is provided here: UK 
Government, ‘Guidance: Critical workers who can access schools or educational settings,’ updated 16 
June 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-maintaining-educational-
provision/guidance-for-schools-colleges-and-local-authorities-on-maintaining-educational-provision. 
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absolutely essential for the development and survival of British society, despite the racism 
and xenophobia which they have often had to confront.  
 
Right-wing populism draws support from across the socio-economic demographic sectors 
of the UK electorate and it is false to assume that its supporters are entirely relatively 
poorly educated and low-paid white British voters.26 There is no denying, however, that 
right-wing populist political parties, such as UKIP, the Brexit Party and Boris Johnson’s 
Conservative Party have capitalised on the support of such voters.27 Right-wing populism 
has successfully depicted socio-cultural differences between white British communities 
and their BAME neighbours as, in some ill-defined sense, detrimental to the interests of 
the nation and its people. The experience of Covid-19 provides an opportunity to 
fundamentally defy and contradict this strategy, by manifestly demonstrating that the most 
vital interests of us all, staying alive and retaining some degree of socio-economic 
functioning, have been secured by countless numbers of people whom right-wing populists 
have sought to characterise as being, in effect, the enemies within. The NHS would 
collapse without BAME staff. Many of the essential services we all depend upon would 
grind to a halt without the very many BAME workers continuing to expose themselves and 
their families to greater risk of infection. BAME communities will play an absolutely 
essential role in rebuilding the UK’s economy and society after a vaccine has been 
delivered.  These irrefutable truths provide the basis for a political project of “building back 
better” as the world and the UK confronts an altered world social and economic 
environment.28 
 
The, admittedly rather optimistic, position I am asserting here has, perhaps, been further 
strengthened by the ongoing response by many people to the death of George Floyd in 
the US. The death of yet another African American at the hands of US police officers has 
sparked an astonishing reaction by a wide cross-section of people who are united in their 
outrage at continuing racism in societies such as ours. Initial attempts by right-wing 
populists to gain political capital from the killing of George Floyd have been largely 
overwhelmed by a different form of popular protest, one which stands up for the human 
rights of all and is demanding radical and transformative change. This political and social 
phenomenon points to the possibility of mobilising large numbers of people in support of a 
genuinely rights-based alternative to the hateful politics of the pandemic of discontent.  A 
key aspect of politics consists of how we name the collective problems we are confronted 
by. Right wing populism has, for several years, sought to name the profoundly serious 
challenges we all face in ways which conspire to reinforce the pathologies which right-wing 
populism ultimately depends upon and which cause us so much harm and discontent. We 
now have an opportunity of renaming and thus effectively confronting the problems we 
face in ways which support the ongoing struggle to secure genuine justice for all.     
 
 
 
 
26 Catarina Kinnvall, ‘The Postcolonial has moved into Europe: bordering, security and ethnocultural 
belonging’, (2016) 54(1) Journal of Common Market Studies, 152-168. 
27 Nicolas Morieson, ‘The Revenge of Farage: Right-Wing Populism at the 2019 UK Elections’, Australian 
Institute for International Affairs, 19 December 2019, 
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-revenge-of-farage-right-wing-populism-at-the-
2019-uk-elections/. 
28 See the UN Secretary-General’s statement on “building back better” after Covid-19 – ‘We are all in this 
Together: Human Rights and COVID-19 Response and Recovery,’ 23 April 2020, https://www.un.org/en/un-
coronavirus-communications-team/we-are-all-together-human-rights-and-covid-19-response-and. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
The two pandemics I have briefly analysed in this chapter converge around socio-
economic and socio-cultural inequalities and marginalisation. Significant aspects of the 
pandemic of discontent should be understood as symptoms of a deep and underlying set 
of structural conditions that have adversely impacted broad cross-sections of British 
society. The very genuine concerns which have fuelled some aspects of right-wing populist 
identity politicking were, of course, never going to be remedied by the hateful “medicine” 
prescribed by the architects of right-wing populism. In contrast, the inequalities which 
Covid-19 have cast such an uncompromising light upon offer a glimmer of hope of 
developing a new political narrative, which recognises that we really all ought to be in the 
struggle to rebuild better together, because our relationships with each other are (or can 
be) mutually interdependent and supportive. In the final analysis, we all depend upon each 
other. I fear that the collective memory of our interdependence will not last too long without 
a sustained and rights-based political project to support it. Call me a naïve optimist, but 
the lessons we might learn from the Covid-19 pandemic provide the means for fighting 
back against and perhaps even neutering the right-wing populism pathogen at the heart of 
the pandemic of discontent.  
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Abstract 
Shortly before the UK was struck by the Covid-19 pandemic, research was published which 
showed that since 2010 ‘inequalities in life expectancy have widened and life expectancy 
fell in the most deprived communities’.1 Such inequalities in health are mainly caused by 
wider social inequalities. Evidence of the demographics of those who died as a result of 
the virus, served to highlight how these inequalities disproportionately led to the elderly 
and BME communities contracting Covid-19 and succumbing to it. This article will discuss 
how the health and wellbeing of socially disadvantaged people were negatively 
impacted.  It argues that these inequalities are a breach of Article 2 of the Human Rights 
Act 1988 - the right to life, in that this right cannot be equally accessed by all. Finally, the 
article explores the current and future practice implications for social workers, who work 
daily with some of the most vulnerable people in society. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The advice from the government to stay home was announced in March 2020. In effect, 
the country went into “lockdown” with only essential workers able to continue in their role 
in the workplace. Cabinet Office minister Michael Gove claimed that, ‘…the fact that both 
the prime minister and the health secretary have contracted the virus is a reminder that 
the virus does not discriminate’.2  This implied that the virus was a “great leveller” that 
indiscriminately struck, independently of other factors – except age - not least people’s 
socio-economic circumstances. However, data began to emerge which demonstrated the 
Covid-19 pandemic has done exactly the opposite and established that being socially 
advantaged has been a protective factor in the UK and globally.  
 
It is a fallacy that the National Health Service (NHS) is available to all UK citizens that need 
to access free health care. Professor Donna Kinnair argues that from the point of going to 
the GP to accessing treatment, BME patients have worse experiences and outcomes 
compared to those of their white counterparts.3 Saini noted that black women were five 
times more likely to die in pregnancy than white women.4 She argues being poor is a crucial 
factor in health and wellbeing.  The life expectancy for people living in deprived areas in 
England is seven years lower for women and nine year lower for men.   It is a long-
established fact that the lower down the social scale you are, the worse your health is likely 
 
1 ‘Taking urgent action on health inequities’, Editorial, (2020) 395 Lancet 659. 
2 Angelo Boccato, ‘COVID-19: Race, Class and the “Great Equalizer” Myth,’ Media Diversity Institute, 17 
April 2020, https://www.media-diversity.org/covid-19-race-class-and-the-great-equalizer-myth/.  
3 Sirin Kale, ‘Prof Donna Kinnair on racism in the NHS: “In every community, BAME patients suffer the 
most”,’ The Guardian, 10 June 2020.  
4 Angela Saini, ‘The data was there - so why did it take coronavirus to wake us up to racial health 
inequalities?,’ The Guardian, 11 June 2020. 
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to be.5 People who are socially disadvantaged whether by poverty, “race”, gender, 
disability or sexual orientation will, on average, have more illness and shorter lives than 
people who are less disadvantaged, or indeed privileged.  Moreover, as Marmot, et al say: 
 
… health inequalities are not confined to poor health for the poor and good health for everyone else: 
instead, health follows a social gradient. Everyone below the top has greater risk of worse health 
than those at the top.6 
 
One implication of this social gradient is that most people are affected by health 
inequalities, albeit to varying extents. 
 
In February 2020, a month before the Covid-19 lockdown in the UK, a major review of 
health inequalities in England since 20107 found that the increase in average life 
expectancy which had continued for over a century had now stalled. It also found that, ‘… 
inequalities in health have widened. Among women, particularly, life expectancy declined 
in the more deprived areas of the country’.8 
 
II. Health Inequalities in the UK  
 
Health inequalities are measured across two dimensions of life: illness and death.  With 
death rates, there is a widening gap between rich and poor as measured by life expectancy 
at birth. In 2016-18 men in the richest tenth of the population could expect to live 9.5 years 
and women 7.7 years longer than people in the poorest tenth.9 A related trend in illness is 
that on average people experience longer periods in poor health. These contradictory 
trends present a paradox: people live longer but their old age is blighted by ill health.  
Marmot, et al, show that, for women, ‘healthy life expectancy has declined since 2009–11 
and for both men and women years spent in poor health have increased’.10 In short, 
disadvantaged people will, on average, live significantly shorter lives than wealthier people 
and in their shorter lives will suffer more years of illness.   
 
This raises two questions: what causes these inequalities and why are they getting worse? 
There are two main concepts that attempt to provide these answers: cultural/behavioural 
theories and socio-economic ideologies. Behavioural explanations dominate in public 
discourse about health where the belief is that the cause of inequalities lies with the people 
who are victims of it. With behaviour for example, poor people are more likely to smoke 
and less likely to exercise regularly and to eat a healthy diet.11 Hence it seems to follow 
that if disadvantaged people made better choices, their health would improve and health 
inequalities would be reduced.  Cultural explanations are often used in relation to Black, 
Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) groups who tend to have worse health than the white 
 
5 See e.g. Peter Townsend and Nick Davidson (eds) Inequalities in Health: The Black Report, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982).   
6 Michael Marmot, Jessica Allen, Tammy Boyce, Peter Goldblatt and Joana Morrison, ‘Health equity in 
England: The Marmot Review 10 years on,’ Institute of Health Equity, 2020, 7. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid, 7. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid, 21. 
11 Public Health England, ‘Health profile for England: 2017,’ 2017.  
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British majority; as Chouhan and Nazroo say these inequalities, ‘are easily understood to 
be a consequence of supposed biological and cultural differences…’.12  
       
The alternative to cultural and behavioural explanations is what is called the social 
determinants of health. This perspective seeks to understand health inequalities in their 
socio-economic context. The social determinants of health are, ‘the conditions in which 
people are born, grow, live, work and age and inequities in power, money and resources’.13 
Unhealthy eating is a good example of how a social determinants approach gives more 
insight into the problems than cultural or behavioural explanations. 
 
In 2018 it was found that nearly one in four adults were likely to have had a “heart age” 
older than their actual age.14 Having a heart which is “older” than your chronological age 
greatly increases ‘the risk of an early grave or ending up very disabled in later life’.15 Media 
discussion of how these risks could be averted mostly took the same approach; the 
answer, we were told, lay in changing our behaviour, making healthier lifestyle choices.  
This included things like, ‘quitting smoking, exercising regularly and cutting back on 
alcohol’.16  To help with this the government published an Eatwell Guide which showed the 
types of food, and what amounts, people should eat to have a healthy diet.17 
 
At much the same time the Food Foundation published research showing that many people 
could not afford this recommended diet.18 To follow the government’s guidelines the 
poorest fifth of UK households would have to spend two fifths of their disposable income 
on food, when they are already spending more than half their income on other essentials.  
Worse, households in the poorest tenth of the population would have to spend almost three 
quarters of their disposable income to buy the Eatwell diet.  
 
Human behaviour is complex but it is plainly not helpful to tell people to take more 
responsibility for their health by eating a healthy diet if they cannot afford to do so.  In 
2018/19 Trussell Trust foodbanks distributed 1.6 million emergency food parcels, a 76% 
increase over the five years from 2013/14. As Emma Revie, Trussell’s Chief Executive, 
observed, ‘What we are seeing year-upon-year is more and more people struggling to eat 
because they simply cannot afford food’.19 Unhealthy eating, like other health related 
behaviour, is rooted in the social determinants of health. Poor people do not make 
unhealthy lifestyle choices because they are ignorant or stupid. Rather, in general, they try 
to make the best of their situation so far as the conditions in which they, ‘are born, grow, 
live, work and age’20 allow.  
 
 
12 Karen Chouhan and James Nazroo, ‘Health Inequalities’, in Bridget Byrne, Claire Alexander, Omar Khan, 
James Nazroo and William Shankley (eds.) Ethnicity, Race and Inequality in the UK: State of the Nation, 
(Bristol: Policy Press, 2020) 78. 
13 Marmot and others, (n. 6) 5. 
14 Public Health England, ‘Heart Age Test gives early warning of heart attack and stroke,’ 4 September 
2018.  
15 Professor Jamie Waterall quoted in Denis Campbell, ‘UK health crisis: why are so many of us heading 
for an early grave?,’ The Guardian, 4 September 2018.   
16 Public Health England, ‘Heart Age Test gives early warning of heart attack and stroke,’ 2018. 
17 Public Health England, ‘From Plate to Guide: What, why and how for the eatwell model,’ 2016. 
18 Courtney Scott, Jennifer Sutherland, and Anna Taylor, Affordability of the UK’s Eatwell Guide, (London: 
Food Foundation, 2018). 
19 quoted in Patrick Butler, ‘Food bank network hands out record 1.6m food parcels in a year,’ The 
Guardian, 25 April 2019.  
20 Marmot and others, (n. 6) 5. 
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As health inequalities are socially determined, they are not inevitable but can be reduced 
by changing social conditions. One way to address food poverty, for example, would be to 
increase poor people’s incomes. Similarly, as Chouhan and Nazroo argue, health 
inequalities suffered by BAME groups reflect inequalities in areas such as, ‘economic 
activity, employment levels, educational outcomes, housing, geographical location, area 
deprivation, racism and discrimination, citizenship and claims to citizenship’.21  These are 
complex issues but they are not immutable: they can be changed if there is the political 
will to do so. 
 
III. The Impact of Austerity 
 
Austerity refers to the programme of public spending cuts made by governments in the 
decade since 2010.  Two areas of cuts most directly impact on the social determinants of 
health: social security benefits and local government services. With social security women 
and disadvantaged women in particular are most affected, for example:  
 
• The poorest families have lost the most; with an average drop in living standards of 
around 17% by 2020; 
• Lone mothers will experience a drop in living standards of 18%.22  
 
These and related changes have led to increasing child poverty, with over four million 
children in England now growing up in poverty.23 
 
Cuts to local government services have also hit the worst off hardest, with children and 
young people’s services suffering a 29 percent funding reduction since 2010. As Marmot 
et al say, ‘The growing mismatch between need and funding risks widening inequalities in 
outcomes for families and children’.24 
     
Austerity has been accompanied by other social and economic changes summarised by 
Marmot et al thus:     
 
From… the closure of children’s centres, to declines in education funding, an increase in precarious 
work and zero hours contracts, to a housing affordability crisis and a rise in homelessness… to 
ignored communities with poor conditions and little reason for hope. And these outcomes… are even 
worse for minority ethnic population groups and people with disabilities.25 
 
Overall, the 2020 Marmot review concludes that, ‘austerity has adversely affected the 
social determinants that impact on health… [and this] will cast a long shadow over the lives 
of the children born and growing up under its effects’.26 
 
 
 
 
 
21 Chouhan and Nazroo (n. 12), 78. 
22 Sarah Hall, Kimberly McIntosh, Eva Neitzert, Laura Pottinger, Kalwinder Sandhu, Mary-Ann Stephenson, 
Howard Reed, and Leonie Taylor, Intersecting Inequalities: The Impact of Austerity on Black and Minority 
Ethnic Women in the UK (London: Women’s Budget Group, 2017) 5. 
23 Marmot and others (n. 6). 
24 Ibid, 46. 
25 Ibid, 5. 
26 Ibid, 5. 
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IV. Covid-19 in Context 
 
Seen in isolation Covid-19 might appear indiscriminate, as Michael Gove claimed. Yet, like 
any other disease or health condition, how it affects people, and which people it affects 
most is greatly influenced by the social determinants of health. Rather than a level playing 
field, when it reached the UK Covid-19 hit an increasingly unequal society. As Ryan points 
out doing one big shop per week during the lockdown is a lot easier if you have money in 
the bank to pay for it.27 Similarly, self-isolation is a different proposition if you can, as the 
Prime Minister did, retire to a country retreat, rather than living in overcrowded housing 
with shared facilities and no garden.  
 
The socio-economic factors that were likely to contribute to the increased incidence of 
BME men being four times more likely to contract Covid-19 than their white counterparts 
(ONS analysis, April 2020) include living in overcrowded conditions, being on a low 
income, using public transport. However, BAME NHS staff including nurses and doctors 
who died, their deaths were disproportionately higher than white staff. Yet, many of these 
NHS staff worked in densely populated London which was substantially affected.  Omar 
Khan argues race should be seen as a social determinant of health.28 Far from being 
random, the disproportionately high Covid-19 deaths experienced by BAME groups29 track 
inequalities in the social determinants of health which BAME groups experience.30   
 
Public Health England’s report on “disparities” in Covid outcomes echoes earlier concerns 
showing people from the BAME community being most likely to be diagnosed and most 
likely to die as a result of Covid – while deprivation was also seen as an indicator, with 
twice higher risk of diagnosis, the report stopped short of connecting the two as result of 
structural racism.31 The report has been further criticised by Dr Chaand Nagpaul, the 
British Medical Association chair, that nearly seventy pages which addressed 
recommendations were removed from the report.32 Therefore, no recommendations have 
been offered as a way of resolving the disparities. 
 
Similarly, health inequalities have been marked for the elderly during the Covid-19 
pandemic. The Public Health England Report, (2020) found that between 20 March and 7 
May 2020 the number of Covid-19 deaths for the elderly in care homes was equivalent to 
20,457 (46.4%) and 16,016 in hospitals of the excess number of deaths expected for that 
period of time. This means that 75% of excess deaths were of people aged 75 and over. 
With a lack of resources such as ventilators, a report in the Telegraph noted that Imperial 
College Healthcare NHS Trust stated that very “poorly” people might need to be on 
 
27 Frances Ryan, ‘Britain has a hidden coronavirus crisis – and it's shaped by inequality,’ The Guardian, 15 
April 2020. 
28 Omar Khan, ‘Coronavirus exposes how riddled Britain is with racial inequality,’ The Guardian. 20 April 
2020. 
29 Up to 10 April 2020, 34% of critically ill coronavirus patients in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland 
were from BAME backgrounds, although in the 2011 census they made up only 14% of the UK population 
(ICNARC report on Covid-19 in critical care, 17 April 2020, available at: https://www.icnarc.org/Our-
Audit/Audits/Cmp/Reports). 
30 For a fuller discussion of this, see Andrew Fagan’s paper in this publication. 
31 Public Health England, ‘Disparities in the risk and outcomes of COVID-19,’ June 2020. 
32 Aamna Mondon, ‘BMA demands answers over missing BAME pages of COVID-19 report,’ The 
Guardian, 13 June 2020.  
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ventilators for two weeks, which might not be in their interest.33 Feinstein et al highlighted 
that some patients would be excluded from receiving scarce resources, including 
mechanical ventilation; they could instead be considered for palliative extubation. They 
noted that ventilator allocation might be prioritised for younger patients, with a higher 
likelihood of recovery and maximisation of life-years saved.34 Hoskin and Finch argue the 
use of “do not resuscitate” letters, whereby elderly patients were encouraged to consent 
to not be resuscitated and the resulting ethics of triage,  has served to widen health 
outcomes for a generation.35 Combined with being most likely to receive private care has 
created a the current situation whereby the elderly have been let down significantly and 
social care has been marginalised to such a degree it can do little to challenge government 
policy and health practice. This is evidenced in language with the Minister for Health and 
Social Care often only referred to as Minister for Health to performative with no social care 
leaders presenting at UK Government Daily Briefings. 
 
To put into context, marketisation of social care is such that 80% of government funding of 
social services is now spent on private and voluntary sector provision.36 Three quarters of 
children’s and 84% of elderly care homes in England are owned by private companies.37 
The Association of Directors of Adult Social Services (ADASS), publishing their annual 
budget summary as a Coronavirus Survey, noted that four-fifths of local authorities had to 
call private funders to step in to support their work. They underlined that austerity did not 
work, put business gain before public health and ultimately there needed to be a return to 
state intervention when exposed by the pandemic.38  
 
The network of contracting, some 18,500 domiciliary care providers alone, hampered relief 
and built unnecessary risk in care release plans from hospital to community.39   
 
Before the imposition of austerity in 2010 population health was improving.40 Had this trend 
continued, Hochlaf, et al estimate that, between 2012 and 2017, 130,000 deaths could 
have been averted.41 They argue that in withdrawing services at that this, public health 
policy missed opportunities to engage with activity designed to reduced preventable 
disease, such as reducing schools’ capacity to deliver physical education or underfunding 
health visiting.42 It follows that those 130,000 deaths were both preventable and a breach 
 
33 Henry Bodkin, ‘Intensive care for coronavirus patients now limited to those “reasonably certain” to 
survive, NHS Trust admits,’ The Telegraph, 29 March 2020. 
34 Max Feinstein, Joshua Niforatos, Insoo Hyundai, Thomas Cunningham, Alexandra Reynolds, Daniel 
Brodie and Adam Levine, ‘Consideration for ventilator triage during the COVID-19 pandemic,’ (2020) 8(6) 
Lancet 1.  
35 Janet Hoskin and Jo Finch, ‘COVID-19, disability, and the new eugenics: implications for social work 
policy and practice,’ Social Work 2020 under Covid-19 Magazine , 2 June 2020. See also, John Chisholm, 
‘Doctors will have to choose who gets life-saving treatment. Here’s how we do it,’ The Guardian, 1 April 
2020. 
36 John Lister, ‘The History of Privatisation,’ The Lowdown, 16 March 2020. 
37 Ray Jones, ‘Outsourcing children’s services isn’t just wrong – it’s a waste of money,’ The Guardian, 7 
August 2019. See also, Denis Campbell, ‘84% of care home beds in England owned by private firms,’ The 
Guardian, 18 September 2019. 
38 Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, ‘ASASS Coronavirus Survey’, online, June 2020.  
39 Ibid. 39. 
40 Marmot and others (n. 6). 
41 Dean Hochlaf, Harry Quilter-Pinner and Tom Kibasi, Ending the blame game: The case for a new approach 
to public health and prevention, (London: IPPR, 2019).  
42 Toby Helm, ‘Austerity to blame for 130,0000 “preventable” UK deaths – report,’ The Guardian, 1 June 
2019.  
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of the victims’ right to life. According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Article 
2 of the HRA applies where: ‘policy decisions … may undermine or threaten someone’s 
life or put their life at risk’.43 This is exactly what austerity has been shown to have done. 
This is also evidenced in the ethical decisions to prioritise treatment by ventilation to 
younger people and providing older people with palliative extubation, effectively ending 
their life.44 
 
In the ten years since 2010 social fault lines have widened to the point where ‘inequities in 
power, money and resources’45 have rendered poor and disadvantaged people particularly 
vulnerable to Covid-19. Social workers, with other health and social care professionals, 
cannot undo the effects of ten years of austerity by themselves but they can use the human 
right to life as a lever to help protect service users from the twin depredations of austerity 
and Covid-19. 
 
V. Social Work: Time for Change? – The Case for Critical Social Work Pedagogy  
 
Many will have begun to ask whether Covid has raised public awareness of inequalities. It 
has certainly served to highlight the impact health inequalities have on the right to life  by 
setting out a call for social work to more clearly situate itself as a human rights profession; 
from a critical social work pedagogy in education. Such a restructuring of social work 
education centres human rights and social justice over procedure and preparedness for 
current methods of practice. Critical social work pedagogy seeks to centre reflexive 
learning and conceptual knowing. It sets a focus on voice to acknowledge and counteract 
against power and stigma power positioning social work education as critique and 
instructional.46 We posit that to do so would require curriculum and regulatory authority 
review. It could be argued there is a need cross-helping professions where focus is on 
health and lifelong wellbeing.  
 
Critical pedagogy is a philosophical approach, drawn ostensibly from the work of Paulo 
Freire47 examining the role of power in the production of knowledge. Situating in social 
work education speaks to valuing emancipation of oppressed groups.48 It has been 
recognised for some time that the inherent tension in social work as advocate and 
administrator of social justice lies in its relationship to, in and with the state. Lavelette and 
Ioakimidis highlight the potential for social work innovation at grassroots level to meet 
extreme situations.49 We advocate Covid-19 is unprecedented and requires a return to 
radical community-based practice, which Gutierrez and Gant describe as working with the 
 
43 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Human Rights: Human Lives, a Guide to the Human Rights Act 
for Public Authorities, (London: Equality and Human Rights Commission 2014), 11. 
44 Feinstein et al (n. 34).   
45 Marmot and others, (n. 6), 5. 
46 Gemma Corradi Fiumara, The other side of language: a philosophy of listening, (London: Routledge, 
1999). See also, Henry Giroux, Pedagogy and the politics of hope: theory, future, and schooling, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997); Amy Rossiter, ‘Innocence lost and suspicion found: do we educate for or against 
social work?, (2001) 2(1) Critical Social Work.  
47 Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, reprint, (London: Penguin Random House, 1993). 
48 Dennis Scanlon and Edward Saleebey, ‘Is a critical pedagogy for the profession of social work 
possible?,’ (2005) 25 Journal of Teaching in Social Work.  
49 Michael Lavalette and Vasilios Ioakimidis (eds) (2011) Social work in extremis: lessons for social work 
(London: Policy Press, 2011).  
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community to empower and create change through collective action would allow for social 
work to re-centre its activist roots.50  
 
There is no doubt, as Bywater argues, that health inequalities are ‘a vital social work 
issue,’51 both because they are unjust and because ‘almost all social work service users 
are either already living with poor health or their health is threatened by the conditions in 
which they live’.52 Social work ought to be well placed to help meet fresh demands for 
parity. However, as shown, austerity has been a pervasive ideology with an 
uncompromising focus on government withdrawal in favour of free markets. Social care 
and by extension social work has in many ways had its hands tied by decentralising 
marketisation policies and regulatory authority undermined by repeated change. This has 
been evident by social care absence at the Covid daily briefings also, by fast-tracked 
changes made under various Covid-19 legislation. The Covid-19 Bill made changes to the 
Care Act 2014, making it permissible to not meet all service user needs and allowing some 
assessments to be delayed. Similarly, the Coronavirus guidance for Children’s Social Care 
Service (2020) made amendments to the Care Planning, Placement and Case Review 
(England) Regulations where statutory visits can be conducted as soon as “reasonably 
practicable” rather than in the time-frames that have been in set to regularly monitor the 
wellbeing of children. These changes potentially increase the incidents of safeguarding 
issues whilst furthering inequalities for those dependent upon statutory services and 
interventions. In response to this, we argue, to follow on from Peter McLaren’s call53 for 
rethinking critical pedagogy, that there is a striking need to re-establish and embed 
criticality and activism in social work education and practice and formally establish a new 
critical social work pedagogy. This would require a root and branch reclamation of social 
work values, language, education and space.  
 
While the challenges to come for social care, and social work specifically, are very different 
to those leading up to Covid-19 with the awareness of these inequalities, navigating the 
ramifications of remote working and overnight changes in legislation,  it must surely be 
impossible for social work practice and social work education to return to business as 
usual. The social work rhetoric of social justice and equality would become platitudes 
unless we concede that a clear voice has at least the potential for activism in reasserting 
Article 2 of the Human Rights Act as the right to a full life.54  
 
  
 
50 Lorraine Gutierrez and Larry Gant, ‘Community practice in social work: reflection on its first century and 
directs for the future,’ (2018) 92(4) Social Service Review 617.  
51 Paul Bywaters, ‘Tackling inequalities in health: a global challenge for social work,’ (2009) 39(2) British 
Journal of Social Work 353, 355. 
52 Ibid, 355. 
53 Peter McLaren, ‘The Future of Critical Pedagogy,’ (2020) 1(1) Rethinking Critical Pedagogy. 
54 The Care Badge, online, ‘thecarebadge.org’.  
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Abstract 
Covid-19 has limited “access” by refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). First, 
access to protection at the frontiers of states and access to services in a state. Covid-19 
was defined in terms of a disease from abroad, so refugees who were always seen as 
“other” are seen as tainted in yet a new way. Nevertheless, states have a right to control 
their own borders and in a time of a global pandemic, entry can be restricted. This paper 
will argue, however, that those controls cannot be arbitrary and must respect international 
refugee law and international human rights law, as well as the international rule of law. 
Those seeking asylum from persecution cannot be sent back to the frontiers of a territory 
where their life or freedom would be threatened, even if they are Covid-19 infectious. 
 
Secondly, those admitted to the state must have the same access to life saving health care 
as anyone else within the territory of the state; to deny access to health care is not to make 
the problem go away, but to drive those fearing expulsion underground, placing even more 
people at risk during a pandemic. Beyond health care, refugees and IDPs must have 
access to all other rights during any lockdown and there can be no discrimination based 
on forced displacement status. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The protection sector’s response to this rolling apex needs to be measured by the number of lives 
saved, not the number of webinars, seminars, guidance and strategies. What will save lives is putting 
well-resourced local staff capable of communicating with broader communities as close to the 
problem as possible.1 
 
Part of that resourcing is putting forward legal analysis to ensure the greatest protection 
for those forcibly displaced during this pandemic. Part of any crisis is the natural willingness 
of governments to retreat from anything other than legally binding obligations. 
 
Much has been published lately, but it is not the first time, even in recent years, that forcibly 
displaced persons have been caught up in health crises.2 What is different this time is its 
global character and the threat to international human rights law (IHRL), international 
refugee law and the rule of law. These threats may not pass even after the pandemic has 
subsided. As at 10 June 2020, there had been no serious outbreaks of Covid-19 in any 
 
1 Paul White, ‘Humanitarians in the Frontline: The protection sector in the COVID-19 humanitarian 
response’, Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, 23 April 2020, 7, 
https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/humanitarians-frontline-protection-sector-covid-19-
humanitarian-response. 
2 See, for the West African Ebola Crisis, 2013-16: UNHCR, ‘Gender-based violence prevention, risk 
mitigation and response during COVID-19’, 20 March 2020, 1, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e84bb2b4.html. Equally, see IOM, ‘Mobilisation Against COVID-19 Draws 
on Ebola Response Experience’, 8 May 2020, https://www.iom.int/news/mobilisation-against-covid-19-
draws-ebola-response-experience?utm_source=IOM+External+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=a98996c8d1-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_05_08_05_54&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9968056566-a98996c8d1-
43575781.  
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refugee or IDP camp or settlement,3 although that might be because only limited testing is 
possible. Nevertheless, states have limited refugees’ access to protection and have 
curtailed the rights of displaced persons within their territories, as well as limiting access 
by humanitarian agencies to persons of concern in some cases.4 Access in all those 
senses is not straightforward for forcibly displaced persons and humanitarian actors in 
normal times, but Covid-19 has raised this problem to new heights. This paper addresses 
this attack on protection under international law. 
 
II. Accessing Protection 
 
a) Access to states 
 
States have the right to control their borders, particularly to protect their own populations.5 
However, that obligation cannot justify ignoring other obligations with respect to IHRL, 
international refugee law and rule of law, such as respecting the right of individuals to seek 
and enjoy asylum from persecution and upholding the principle of non-refoulement.6 
Equally under Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states 
cannot close their borders preventing people, including IDPs, from leaving to seek 
protection elsewhere.7 Nevertheless, during the pandemic, states have closed borders and 
denied access:8 as at 22 May 2020, 161 countries had closed their borders, 99 even to 
those seeking refugee status.9 Closing borders resulting in persons seeking protection 
 
3 There were 25 confirmed cases in Kutupalong camp, Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, that houses 860,000 
refugees. See statistics at www.unhcr.org.  
4 UNHCR, ‘COVID-19 Preparedness and Response’, 24 April 2020, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e84bb2b4.html. 
5 Even human rights treaty bodies recognise this power in states: see UN Human Rights Committee in 
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and nineteen other Mauritian women v Mauritius, Communication No. 35/1978, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978, 9 April 1981, para. 9.2b(2)(ii)3; The Committee Against Torture in Agiza v 
Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, UN Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 24 May 2005, para. 13.1. See 
also, UNHCR, ‘Key Legal Considerations on access to territory for persons in need of international 
protection in the context of the COVID-19 response’, 16 March 2020, paras. 1-3, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e7132834.html. 
6 See, Art. 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, UNGA Res 217(III), 10 December 1948, 
(hereafter, UDHR); Arts. 1A(2) and 33(1) 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 
137. The European Union Commission stated on 16 April that ‘[registration] and processing of applications 
should continue’, Press Release, ‘Coronavirus: Commission presents guidance on implementing EU rules 
on asylum and return procedures and on resettlement’, 16 April 2020,  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_666. See also, Columbia, Cornell, Zolberg 
Institute, ‘Human mobility and human rights in the COVID-19 pandemic: Principles of protection for 
migrants, refugees, and other displaced persons’, Principle 6, (hereafter CCZI Principles), 
https://zolberginstitute.org/covid-19/. 
7 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). See also, Principle 15, ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998, on the right of IDPs to be able to seek asylum outside the state. 
And see, Kate Ogg, ‘COVID-19 Travel Bans: The Right to Seek Asylum When You Cannot Leave Your 
Homeland’, Kaldor Centre, 16 April 2020, 1, https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/covid-19-
travel-bans-right-seek-asylum-when-you-cannot-leave-your-homeland. 
8 See, on Malaysia blocking Rohingya refugees attempting to arrive by sea, BBC News, ‘Rohingya crisis: 
Hundreds of refugees stranded in boats at sea’, 26 April 2020,  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-asia-
52431222/rohingya-crisis-hundreds-of-refugees-stranded-in-boats-at-sea. 
9 See UN Secretary-General, ‘Policy Brief: COVID-19 and People on the Move’,19, 
https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_policy_brief_on_people_on_the_move.pdf. See also, UNHCR, 
‘The COVID-19 Crisis: Key Protection Messages’, 31 March 2020, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e84b9f64.html. See also, Gillian Triggs, ‘We can secure both public health 
and the rights of refugees to protection’, Kaldor Centre, 8 April 2020, 2, 
https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/we-can-secure-both-public-health-and-rights-refugees-
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being forced back to persecution or conflict zones is a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement.10 While states can derogate in time of public emergency that threatens the 
life of the nation or in exceptional circumstances under Article 4 ICCPR or Article 9 1951 
Convention, respectively, the 1951 Convention limits provisional measures to the case of 
a particular person and derogations under the ICCPR have to be non-discriminatory, 
proportionate, strictly required and established by law. Blanket bans on all persons arriving 
from outside the territory, therefore, are prohibited.11  
 
The European Union Qualification Directive, contrary to EU states’ commitments in the 
1951 Convention, might appear to offer broader scope to prevent entry.12 Under Article 
33(2) of the 1951 Convention, states can refoule a refugee where there are reasonable 
grounds to regard them as a danger to security of the country; however, they must be a 
recognised refugee for Article 33(2) to apply. Under Article 14 of the EU Qualification 
Directive, states can decide not to grant refugee status, that is, effectively reject at the 
border, where ‘there are reasonable grounds to regard her or him as a danger to security 
of the Member State’. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where an EU member state 
decides to rely on Article 14(4) and 14(5) to deny protection on the ground that the 
applicants for refugee status might have Covid-19. However, not only does the EU 
Commission Coronavirus Press Release suggest that steps can be taken to process where 
the person is suspected of having Covid-19,13 but in Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 
and C-719/17, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that member states 
could not apply particular EU laws: 
 
for the sole purposes of general prevention and without establishing any direct relationship with a 
particular case, in order to justify suspending the implementation of or even a ceasing to implement 
its obligations ….14 
 
Thus, not only ought regional mechanisms be interpreted in conformity with the 1951 
Convention, even where individual applicants for refugee status were thought to be Covid-
 
protection; Lucas Guttentag, ‘Coronavirus Border Expulsions: CDC's Assault on Asylum Seekers and 
Unaccompanied Minors’, Just Security, 13 April 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/69640/coronavirus-
border-expulsions-cdcs-assault-on-asylum-seekers-and-unaccompanied-minors/. 
10 Uganda has apparently closed its borders. See also, Rebecca Blumenthal and Catriona Murdoch, 
‘COVID-19 and Humanitarian Access for Refugees and IDPs: Part 2 – Syria and Bangladesh’, Just 
Security, 9 April 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/69570/covid-19-and-humanitarian-access-for-refugees-
and-idps-part-2-syria-and-bangladesh/. See also, UNHCR, ‘COVID-19 Preparedness and Response’ (n. 4), 
4, 7. In the light of the reasoning in Paposhvili v Belgium (GC), Application no. 41738/10, 13 December 
2016, transposable to other international and regional human rights mechanisms, even if an asylum 
seeker’s claim to refugee status were to be rejected, they should not be removed to any country where the 
treatment they could expect to receive would place them at risk of inhuman treatment because of the care 
they could expect in the country of nationality (paras. 186-91). In Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy (GC), 
Application No. 27765/09, , 23 February 2012, Italy was found to have collectively expelled 12 Somali and 
13 Eritrean asylum seekers who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian navy before reaching Italian 
waters and returned to Libya contrary to Article 4, Protocol 4 ECHR, so closing borders in such a way as to 
force return may be treated similarly, there being no way to challenge the closure (cf. ND and NT v Spain 
(GC), Application Nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, 13 February 2020). 
11 Guttentag (n. 9). 
12 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards 
for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international 
protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast), OJ L 337/9. 
13 EU Commission (n. 6). 
14 Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17, EU Commission v Hungary, Poland and Czech 
Republic (CJEU Third Chamber, 2 April 2020) para. 160. 
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19 infectious, there is no justification for blanket bans because states can implement 
measures to protect their own population without forcing people back contrary to the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
 
b) Accessing services and protection in states 
 
For applicants for refugee status within a state and for IDPs generally, again there are 
access issues. Those issues are also tied up with access by humanitarian actors to 
persons of concern. 
 
 i) Humanitarian Access15 
 
UNHCR has the unique mandate to provide international protection to refugees and its 
extended mandate includes conflict driven IDPs and other persons of concern.16 To fulfil 
that role, the organization needs access to these populations. States also have a duty to 
co-operate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions.17 Nevertheless, during this 
pandemic access by humanitarian actors has been restricted, particularly in conflict zones 
that still face the same Covid-19 threat. To resolve this, regard needs to be had not just to 
IHRL, but also to the international law of armed conflict and rule of law that complement 
IHRL, but that have been strangely missing from much of the current analysis.18 Under the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, the ICRC and ‘any other impartial humanitarian organization’ 
may undertake care for the sick, while parties to the conflict should permit ‘relief actions 
which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse 
distinction’.19 In 2012, the General Assembly agreed that rule of law was applicable to 
states and to international organizations:20  
 
 
15 For an in-depth discussion, see International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance 
and Protection, ‘Access and Humanitarian Protection: Lessons from restricted operational contexts and 
their application to the COVID-19 operational environment’, Webinar, 22 April 2020,  
https://phap.org/PHAP/Events/OEV2020/OEV200422.aspx. 
16 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNGA Res 428(V), 14 
December 1950 (hereinafter, 1950 Statute); the Cluster Approach was established in 2005 under the UN’s 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and UNHCR has the lead for protection of conflict driven IDPs 
(https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/about-us/who-we-are/). See also, Volker Türk and Elizabeth 
Eyster, ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, (2010) 22 International Journal of Refugee Law 159 . 
17 Article 35, 1951 Convention (n. 6). 
18 E.g., CCZI Principles (n. 6). 
19 See Common Article 3, Articles 9 Geneva Conventions I-III, 10 GC IV, 70 and 71 Additional Protocol 1, 
and Article 18 Additional Protocol 2. See also, Principle 25, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (n. 
7), as well as Geoff Gilbert and Anna Magdalena Rüsch, ‘Creating Safe Zones and Safe Corridors in 
Conflict Situations: Providing protection at home or preventing the search for asylum?’, Kaldor Centre for 
International Refugee Law Policy Brief No.5, 2017, 
http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/Policy_brief_Creating_safe_zones_and_safe_corrid
ors.pdf?mc_cid=6e9bb775e9&mc_eid=fb55c2c7c4&cn=bWVudGlvbg%3D%3D. Notably, the ICRC has not 
failed to promote the international law of armed conflict – ICRC Blog, ‘COVID-19 response in conflict zones 
hinges on respect for international humanitarian law’, 16 April 2020, https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2020/04/16/covid-19-
respons…n_47_fQ70xw3RYCqH1h79PsBMvHjOG1l_qjxKHw90X_laJZxg&_hsmi=86397599. See also, the 
humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality [UNGA res 46/182, 19 
December 1991]. 
20 UN General Assembly, ‘Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of 
Law at the National and International Levels’, UNGA Res 67/1, 30 November 2012; Geoff Gilbert and Anna 
Magdalena Rüsch, ‘Rule of Law and UN Interoperability’, (2018) 30 International Journal of Refugee Law 
31. 
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2. We recognize that the rule of law applies to all States equally, and to international organizations, 
including the United Nations and its principal organs, and that respect for and promotion of the rule 
of law and justice should guide all of their activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their 
actions. 
 
Thick rule of law demands that all actors operationalize interoperability to uphold the full 
gamut of IHRL.21 Given that 85 percent of persons of concern to UNHCR are in low- or 
middle-income countries (LMICs), their capacity to respond to the Covid-19 crisis will not 
be as great as that of states in the global north, so a concerted and co-ordinated response 
that includes humanitarian actors who are given full access is essential.22 The joint work 
of the IASC’s GPC and Health Cluster,23 as White explains, placing humanitarian actors 
on the ground to work with local medics and other relief agencies, will be essential to 
saving lives.24 
 
Finally with respect to humanitarian access, the General Assembly in 2018 adopted the 
Global Compact on Refugees. 
 
5. The global compact emanates from fundamental principles of humanity and international 
solidarity, and seeks to operationalize the principles of burden- and responsibility-sharing to better 
protect and assist refugees and support host countries and communities.25 
 
It applies to the international community as a whole, including states and international 
organizations and, if fully operationalised, benefits refugees, host communities and 
relieves the burden on host states.26 While it does not expressly cover IDPs, host 
communities will often be mixed populations. During the global pandemic, categorising 
who benefits from protection should be irrelevant;27 a comprehensive and inclusive 
approach that operationalizes interoperability can address several aspects of the 
consequences of Covid-19, upholding at the same time IHRL and the rule of law. 
 
In Niger, UNHCR, in partnership with WFP and UNDP, is providing training on the production of 
soap, bleach and masks to over 5,000 refugees and hosts, among whom over 90% are women. 
Apart from improving health conditions and hygiene in the camp, this activity promotes women as 
economic agents, generates an income for refugee households and stimulates the local economy, 
mitigating the negative socio-economic impact of COVID.28 
 
 
21 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation, 
and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence to the General Assembly’, UN Doc A/67/368, 13 September 2012, 
para. 12. See also, Gilbert and Rüsch, ibid, 45-46, 59-68. 
22 See UNHCR, ‘COVID-19 Preparedness and Response’ (n. 4), 3, 6 and 7, particularly as regards the 
situation in East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes. 
23 See, on the Cluster Approach under the IASC (n. 16). 
24 White (n. 1) 2. 
25 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), UNGA Res 73/151, 18 December 2018, para. 5. 
26 See donations made to UNHCR by states to respond to COVID-19 Crisis, UNHCR ‘COVID-19 
Preparedness and Response’ (n. 4) 3, 10; Triggs (n. 9) 4. See also, UN Sustainable Development Group, 
‘Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the Socio-Economic Impacts of COVID-19’, March 
2020, https://unsdg.un.org/resources/shared-responsibility-global-solidarity-responding-socio-economic-
impacts-covid-19. 
27 White (n. 1) 2-3. See also, WHO, ‘Preparedness, prevention and control of coronavirus disease (COVID-
19) for refugees and migrants in non-camp settings: Interim guidance’, 17 April 2020, Guiding Principles 5 
and 6, https://www.who.int/publications-detail/preparedness-prevention-and-control-of-coronavirus-
disease-(covid-19)-for-refugees-and-migrants-in-non-camp-settings. 
28 UNHCR, ‘COVID-19 Preparedness and Response’ (n. 4), 11. 
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An awareness of all the available frameworks for protection is essential if refugees, local 
communities, countries of asylum and the international community as a whole are to meet 
all their commitments. 
 
 ii) Accessing in-state services 
 
Displaced persons need to be able to obtain a variety of services in the hosting state 
whether they are refugees or IDPs.29 During the pandemic, the most obvious is access to 
health care. However, this is an area of law where status matters. IDPs, by definition are 
within their country of nationality or habitual residence and should have access to all such 
services as normal, taking into account the cause and effects of the displacement – their 
displacement might have been part of some event that disrupts services for everyone. As 
for refugees, if they have been recognised as such by the country of asylum, then the 1951 
Convention complements normal IHRL, but if they are asylum-seekers then their rights are 
not so broadly based.30 Regardless, there should be no discrimination based on seeking 
refugee status for the purposes of IHRL.31 
 
Thus, accessing refugee status determination is important during the pandemic. As 
discussed above, gaining access to the state will be the first hurdle, but that does not mean 
that refugee status determination will proceed smoothly thereafter. The EU Commission 
contemplates delays in the process and that accommodations will be needed for social 
distancing, but clearly provides that status determination will take place.32 Furthermore, 
the applicant needs to be able to access legal advice as regards the application – if 
quarantined, as may well happen, there will be additional difficulties.33 
 
Refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs must also be able to access health care. Fear that 
seeking medical advice might lead to detention and removal will only drive those seeking 
protection to conceal their presence, risking spreading the virus much further if they are 
infectious. At this time, it makes sense for the state and the host community that displaced 
persons have as much access as possible to health care. Equally, they need access to 
information, which includes access to the internet, something equally important for those 
seeking refugee status, discussed above.34 Access to the internet for information has been 
recognised as a right by the Human Rights Council,35 but states and international 
 
29 On IDPs, see OHCHR, ‘COVID-19: Do not forget internally displaced persons, UN expert urges 
Governments worldwide’, 1 April 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25763&LangID=E. 
30 Articles 3-30, 1951 Convention (n. 6), apply either to all those seeking refugee status, refugees ‘lawfully 
in the territory’ or ‘lawfully staying in the territory’. 
31 See, CCZI Principle 1 (n. 6). 
32 EU Commission (n. 6). 
33 See Kerry Murphy, ‘COVID-19: Some issues for asylum seekers and refugees in Australia - Kaldor 
Centre’, 17 April 2020, 1, https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/covid-19-some-issues-asylum-
seekers-and-refugees-australia. 
34 See UNHCR, ‘Key Protection Messages’ (n. 9). 
35 UN Human Rights Council, ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet’, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/13, 18 July 2016. See also, Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 34, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, para. 15. 
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organizations must ensure there is no digital divide.36 CCZI Principle 9 on the right to 
information provides:37 
 
Migrants, refugees, and other displaced persons have a right to information about COVID-19, 
including information related to symptoms, prevention, control of spread, treatment, and social relief. 
The internet is an indispensable source of information, and blocking or interfering with access during 
a pandemic is not justifiable.38 
 
As UNHCR’s guidance has made clear, information must be understandable by refugees, 
asylum-seekers and IDPs, possibly requiring the state and UNHCR to combine their 
resources.39 
 
Article 12, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
provides that everyone has the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health.40 CCZI Principle 2 expands on the right to health, including preventive medicine. 
WHO Guiding Principle 1 is in similar terms.41 This right applies just as much to forcibly 
displaced persons as anyone else. Moreover, more vulnerable displaced persons need to 
be ensured even greater access to health care.42 When it is also remembered that many 
displaced persons are caught up in conflict zones, where too often the parties do not 
respect the international law of armed conflict and health services are diminished or 
destroyed,43 then the risks are even higher and the need for international rule of law is 
greater than ever. 
 
Likewise, Article 11 ICESCR sets out a right to an adequate standard of living, including 
housing.44 Adequate in the time of a global pandemic that requires social distancing is 
clearly different from what would be acceptable at other times. It should also be noted that 
over 60 percent of refugees live in urban settings, not camps, so the ability of international 
organizations to regulate accommodation in such circumstances is limited. A range of 
related matters arise in relation to standard of living during this particular pandemic. There 
is no explicit right to water in the ICESCR,45 but, in terms of sanitation, the right to the 
 
36 See, statistics from the International Telecommunication Union, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx. See also, Matthew Downer, ‘Bridging the mobile gender gap for 
refugees’, GSMA, March 2019, https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/africa/sizing-the-mobile-
gender-gap-in-refugee-contexts/; UNHCR, ‘Displaced and Disconnected’, February 2019, 
https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/resources/displaced-and-disconnected/.  
37 CCZI (n. 6) – emphasis added. 
38 Bangladesh has restricted access to the internet in Cox’s Bazar – Blumenthal and Murdoch (n. 10), 10-
11, 15-16. 
39 UNHCR, ‘Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) – COVID-19’, 21 March 2020, 1 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/75289. On promoting protection and assistance for 
refugees and host communities see the GCR and rule of law principles (n. 25, 20 respectively). Moreover, 
if contact tracing is part of controlling the spread of infection, then displaced persons need to able to 
access the internet, although with even greater protection of their privacy. See, UNHCR, Policy on the 
Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR, May 2015 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/55643c1d4.html; White (n. 1), 4, 5-6. 
40 999 UNTS 3 (hereafter, ICESCR). 
41 WHO Guiding Principles (n. 27). 
42 UNHCR, ‘Age, Gender and Diversity Considerations – COVID-19’, 21 March 2020, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5e84a9dd4.html. 
43 Article 12 AP1 and Article 11 AP2 (n. 19), as well as Article 56 GC IV. See also, Ngala Killian Chimtom, 
‘Cameroon's deadly mix of war and coronavirus’, BBC News, 10 May 2020. 
44 See also, Article 21, 1951 Convention (n. 6). 
45 Cf. CESCR, ‘General Comment 15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant)’, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January 2003.. 
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highest attainable standard of health during this pandemic demands access to water.46 In 
terms of upholding the right to adequate housing, Article 12 ICCPR establishes the right to 
choose one’s residence.47 Principles 5 – 9 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement  
provide that all authorities shall prevent displacement from one’s home or habitual 
residence.48 Furthermore, parties to a conflict cannot, according to Article 51(7) Additional 
Protocol 1, constrain the movements of non-fighters ‘in order to attempt to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield military operations’; similarly, Article 17(1) Additional 
Protocol 2 that applies in non-international armed conflicts provides ‘[the] displacement of 
the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the 
security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand’ (emphasis 
added).49 
 
Accessing employment opportunities is always difficult for displaced persons, but when so 
many places of work are closed, the informal economy is even more restricted.50 The 
consequence is that refugees’, asylum-seekers’ and IDPs’ standards of living are even 
more threatened. At the same time, cash-based interventions are more difficult to 
implement due to the requirements of social distancing.51 One very predictable 
consequence of lockdowns in inadequate housing with limited resources for families has 
been an increased risk of sex and gender-based violence in refugee and IDP 
settlements.52 More than ever, states need to uphold rule of law so that victims can seek 
protection.53 
 
 iii) Detention 
 
The flipside of in-state services is detention by the state. Quarantining those who may have 
the virus is undoubtedly permitted, but it must be provided for by law, proportionate and 
no longer than is necessary. Article 26 1951 Convention54 and Article 12 ICCPR grant 
freedom of movement and choice of one’s place of residence.55 Under IHRL, forcibly 
displaced persons cannot suffer discriminatory treatment because of the situation in which 
they find themselves. Furthermore, states must ensure that detention would not place 
displaced persons at greater risk of infection from Covid-19 – social distancing and proper 
sanitation must be part of any detention regime where that is the proportionate response. 
The UN Network on Migration has called on states to:56 
 
 
46 Blumenthal and Murdoch (n. 10), 14-15. 
47 ICCPR (n. 7). 
48 Guiding Principles (n. 7). 
49 AP 2 (n. 19), and Gilbert and Rüsch (n. 20). 
50 Cf. CCZI Principle 13 (n. 6). 
51 UNHCR, ‘COVID-19 Preparedness and Response’ (n. 4), 5. 
52 UNHCR, ‘Gender-based violence’ (n. 2), 1; Blumenthal and Murdoch (n. 10), 3-4. 
53 Gilbert and Rüsch (n. 20), 50, 58, fn128. 
54 1951 Convention (n. 6). Article 31 allows for detention of those who enter the country of asylum 
unlawfully, but it must be proportionate and only until their situation is regularised. 
55 See also CCZI Principle 7 (n. 6). 
56 UN Network on Migration, ‘COVID-19 & Immigration Detention: What Can Governments and Other 
Stakeholders Do?, 29 April 2020, 
https://migrationnetwork.un.org/sites/default/files/docs/un_network_on_migration_wg_atd_policy_brief_covi
d-19_and_immigration_detention_0.pdf. While the Network speaks on migration issues, UNHCR has 
stated that the recommendations are relevant to refugees and asylum seekers in immigration detention. 
See, p 13. 
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1. Stop new detentions of migrants for migration- or health-related reasons and 
introduce a moratorium on the use of immigration detention. 
2. Scale up and urgently implement non-custodial, community-based 
alternatives to immigration detention in accordance with international law. 
3. Release all migrants detained into non-custodial, community-based 
alternatives, following proper safeguards. 
4. Improve conditions in places of immigration detention while alternatives are 
being scaled up and implemented. 
 
Ultimately, quarantine is a temporary measure to protect the health of the host community 
while the individual is treated: immigration detention is something very different and is 
wholly inappropriate for those seeking protection from persecution.57 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The lives of forcibly displaced persons are already complicated and challenging and Covid-
19 has added a further layer of complexity, if not outright threat. The interaction of various 
sub-disciplines of international law make it difficult to navigate their situations, without 
having regard in addition to the domestic laws where they find themselves seeking 
protection. If, as is often the case, the situation is one of acute crisis resulting from armed 
conflict or generalized violence, then yet further problems confront the refugee or IDP 
seeking protection and the humanitarian actors trying to provide it. This paper has sought 
to address the most pressing issues caused by the pandemic for all the various actors 
within the already complicated context of forced displacement. Refugees and IDPs have 
to be resilient to survive displacement, but they are in situations of vulnerability and, when 
states are threatened, the “outsider” is frequently left unprotected.58 
 
  
 
57 See also, Joined Cases C‐924/19 PPU and C‐925/19 PPU FMS, FNZ (C‐924/19 PPU) SA, SA junior 
(C‐925/19 PPU) v Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság, 
Országos Idegenrendészeti Főigazgatóság, CJEU Grand Chamber. 
58 Jane McAdam, ‘’The impacts of COVID-19 on the world's displaced people: A watching brief’, Kaldor 
Centre, 6 April 2020, 2, https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/impacts-covid-19-world’s-
displaced-people-watching-brief. 
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Abstract 
This essay considers the circumstances of persons deprived of their liberty in the context 
of Covid-19. Detention is always intended to be exceptional and the essay explores the 
extent to which the pandemic impacts upon this exceptional character. First, by increasing 
the unacceptability of detention, have the rules regarding what may constitute “arbitrary 
detention” changed? Secondly, for persons serving out prison sentences, to what extent 
should Covid-19 serve as a justification for early release or commutation of punishment? 
In this respect, should the goals of retribution and specific and general deterrence be 
weighed against the rights to health and safety of prisoners and prison staff, and if so, 
how? Do detaining authorities have absolute discretion to determine which detainees to 
release or must they ensure that policies of release also, are not arbitrary? To what extent 
does the arbitrary resort to detention as well as the arbitrary decision to maintain someone 
in detention during the pandemic, which may heighten certain individuals’ exposure to the 
disease and thereby produce extreme anxiety, give rise to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, if not torture?  
 
The paper considers how governments, specialist agencies and courts are beginning to 
grapple with these legal, ethical and public health issues. On the one hand, recognition of 
the heightened health risks for detainees associated with the pandemic is proving to be an 
important opportunity to reduce reliance on detention – and thereby to make good on the 
intention for detention to be recognised as an exceptional measure. Yet on the other hand, 
as will be shown, the selectivity of approaches and lack of transparency and oversight of 
decision-making has put some detainees at even greater risk of harm.   
 
 
I. Introduction: A Brief Roadmap 
 
This essay starts by considering the various contexts of detention. It then reviews the 
concept of “arbitrariness” as applied to detention. It continues by considering the different 
ways in which the understanding of “arbitrariness” are impacted by Covid-19. It does so by 
considering a range of pandemic-related circumstances that can heighten the arbitrariness 
of detention. It also considers how Covid-19-inspired releases from detention, whether 
they are temporary releases or permanent commutations of sentences, may also 
contribute to arbitrariness.    
 
The pandemic also contributes to other rights issues associated with detention. Indeed, 
the use of quarantines and protective detention have featured regularly in Covid-19 
responses. Also, persons who ignore emergency regulations may be prosecuted, and in 
that context may be detained. The potential over-reach of emergency provisions, 
discriminatory impacts and/or the ways in which the restrictions put in place have been 
balanced with other rights, particularly for the most vulnerable in our societies, are all topics 
worthy of detailed consideration.1 Notwithstanding their importance, these aspects are not 
the focus of this essay. The essay focuses on how responses to Covid-19 are impacting 
 
1 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), ‘Deliberation No. 11 on prevention of arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty in the context of public health emergencies’, 8 May 2020. 
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persons who are already detained or at risk of detention for reasons unconnected to the 
pandemic. 
 
II. Places of Confinement: Positive Obligations in a State of Hyper-Engagement 
 
Places of confinement are particularly dangerous for the spread of infectious diseases. 
This is regardless of whether they are prisons, police stations, hospitals, drug rehabilitation 
centres, ships, residential care homes, transit zones, refugee and migrant detention or 
removal centres or closed refugee or displaced persons camps. It is also irrespective of 
whether the goals of the places of confinement are to care for or protect the inhabitants, to 
respond to emergencies or to serve as some form of rehabilitation or punishment. The 
dangers associated with places of confinement stem from the large number of persons 
forced to live in close proximity to one another and the inability to practice effective social 
distancing measures and hygiene best practise. Also, the heightened risks stem from the 
vulnerability of many individuals within some detainee populations on account of their 
underlying health statuses and/or their experience of different forms of marginalisation, 
taken together with often poor ventilation, challenging sanitation conditions, limited space 
and insufficient access to doctors and medical supplies. Consequently, detainees as well 
as those working in detention settings face a disproportionately high risk of infection as 
well as a higher mortality rate.  
 
Given the lack of autonomy within detention settings, detainees are reliant on those 
responsible for their detention to address both proactively and reactively, their health, 
safety and related needs. This reliance exists at all times but is accentuated in the time of 
a pandemic given the special health risks. The reliance heightens detainees’ vulnerability, 
which in turn means that any acts or omissions of the authorities are likely to have a greater 
impact on detainees’ psychological well-being on account of the feelings of powerlessness 
they engender. Arguably, it also means that detaining authorities have a heightened or 
special duty of care to those they detain,2 which because of the greater risks of infection 
and higher mortality rates associated with the pandemic in detention, goes beyond the 
general duty of care recognised in the Mandela Rules to provide to detainees (irrespective 
of citizenship, nationality or migration status) the same level of care inside detention as is 
available outside in the community.3 The special duty of care will be breached if detention 
conditions and the policies relating to detention do not take adequate account of the 
specific contexts of detention and the special risks posed by Covid-19, and tailor services 
and measures to adequately protect against the disease.  
 
This heightened duty of care, or in human rights terms states’ obligation to exercise due 
diligence, is one of means rather than result, however it is context-specific; it is focused on 
the reasonable steps detaining authorities must take in light of the specific and heightened 
risks posed by the pandemic in places of confinement, in terms of protective gear for staff; 
testing for detainees at the time of admission; ventilation and general air quality; hand 
sanitisers; and measures to improve physical distancing. Because of the nature and 
 
2 UN Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, 
paras. 6, 25. See also, Rowson v Department of Justice and Community Safety [2020] VSC 236, 1 May 2020, 
discussed in Human Rights Law Centre, ‘Supreme Court rules Victorian Government prima facie breached 
duty of care to person in prison in their response to COVID-19 pandemic’ 2 May 2020 (at 
https://www.hrlc.org.au/). 
3 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules), GA Res’n 70/175, Principle 
24(1). 
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seriousness of the risks and the vulnerability of detainees, states’ positive obligations to 
protect detainees and staff operating in places of confinement extends beyond the right to 
liberty and security of the person, to the rights to life, freedom from torture and other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, health, to be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and an array of other rights. 
These rights are not simply engaged – the pandemic puts them in a state of “hyper-
engagement” given the significant, special risks posed.  
 
III. The Exceptional Nature of Detention 
 
The right to liberty and security of the person is a fundamental principle of human rights 
law recognised by numerous international and regional treaties, case law and national 
constitutions.4 While there will be circumstances when detention is appropriate, it is always 
supposed to be exceptional; it cannot be “arbitrary”.  
 
No detention that is arbitrary can ever be regarded as lawful;5 though the parameters of 
what might constitute “arbitrary” detention are not always clear. Detention tends to be 
arbitrary if it is ordered outside of any law, or if it involves an unfair or improper procedure,6 
a degree of inappropriateness, injustice or unpredictability.7 Examples of arbitrary 
detention include: indefinite or unduly prolonged administrative detention; automatic 
pretrial or administrative detention without review; if there is no possibility to review the 
legality of the detention within a reasonable time from the detention and at regular periodic 
intervals thereafter; if it results from discrimination against a protected group or from an 
individual or group seeking to exercise freedom of expression or association.8  
 
In order for a detention to be lawful, the detention must be on grounds and in accordance 
with a procedure prescribed by law.9 Potential examples, which would depend on the facts 
in any given case, include: if a person has been found guilty of a crime and sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment; to prevent the commission of a crime; when someone presents a 
risk of absconding from future legal proceedings or administrative processes or presents 
a danger to their own or public security. Other reasons may relate to the mental health of 
the person which may make it necessary to detain them for their own protection or 
protection of others.10  
 
Beyond this, any decision to detain must be made on the basis of and in accordance with 
such procedures as are established by law, and the law itself must be appropriate, 
accessible, sufficiently precise, consistently applied and predictable.11 Equally, the 
detention must be for a legitimate purpose and must be necessary and proportionate - 
there must be no lesser means available to achieve the objective justifying 
 
4 Art 9 UDHR; Art 9 ICCPR; Art 5 ECHR; Art 6 Banjul Charter; Art 7 ACHR. 
5 Winterwerp v. The Netherlands Appl No. 6301/73, 24 October 1979, para. 39. 
6 Ibid, para. 45. See also, Kemmache v. France (No. 3), Appl No. 17621/91, 24 November 1994, para. 37. 
7 Mukong v. Cameroon, Case No. 458/1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, 21 July 1994, para. 9.8. 
See also, Gangaram Panday v. Suriname (Merits, reparations, and costs), Series C No. 16, 21 January 
1994, para. 47. 
8 WGAD, ‘Deliberation No. 9 concerning the definition and scope of arbitrary deprivation of liberty under 
customary international law’, UN Doc. A/HRC/22/44, 24 December 2012. 
99 Art 9(1) ICCPR. 
10 Art 5(1) ECHR. 
11 Mukong v. Cameroon (n. 7), para. 9.8; Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 
16483/12, 15 December 2016, para. 92. See also, WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 10. 
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detention.12 Furthermore, detention must be of a limited duration and must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. 
 
Inadequate conditions of detention may make detention arbitrary. This is because the 
conditions can impede detainees from exercising crucial rights. The UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) has explained that pre-trial detainees who endure detention 
conditions that affect health, safety or well-being, or who have none or insufficient access 
to counsel or others, will participate in criminal proceedings in less favourable conditions 
than the prosecution, impairing the prospect for a fair trial. Sometimes, conditions will be 
so poor so as ‘to create an incentive for self-incrimination, or - even worse - to make pre-
trial detention a form of advance punishment in violation of the presumption of 
innocence.’13 
 
IV. Does Covid-19 Impact on Exceptionality in Detention? 
 
a) Covid-19 and conditions of detention 
 
It has been recognised that detainees must be held in conditions that are compatible with 
respect for their human dignity, that they are not subjected to distress or hardship that goes 
beyond the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical 
demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured.14 At times, 
conditions of detention will be so deficient that they will cause severe pain or suffering that 
may rise to the level of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, if not torture. 
Severe overcrowding can amount to prohibited ill-treatment15 on account of the distress or 
hardship it engenders, for example by being ‘obliged to live, sleep and use the toilet in the 
same cell with so little personal space’.16 It is not difficult to extend this logic to detainees 
who fear the spread of Covid-19 because of inadequate sanitation, poor ventilation, lack 
of protective gear for staff entering and exiting facilities and inadequate testing and medical 
care.   
 
Detention authorities have taken measures to reduce the risk of Covid-19 spreading. Some 
measures have to do with releases, discussed in the next section (b). Other measures 
have to do with improving sanitation, increasing social distancing within detention facilities 
(through solitary cell confinement; reducing exercise and other mingling between 
detainees) and prohibiting or severely restricting access to outside visits. There is a 
question whether these measures are sufficient or appropriate in the circumstances in light 
of authorities’ heightened due diligence obligations. There is also a question whether the 
measures taken may increase the risk of arbitrariness. This is because of the arbitrary way 
in which decisions tend to be taken. For example, the lack of transparency with respect to 
who may be temporarily released as a social distancing measure and who may be 
subjected to new/additional restrictions on movement within places of confinement; as well 
as the failure for detaining authorities to consider adequately the impact on particularly 
vulnerable detainees of the removal of privileges (which tend to increase isolation within 
detention settings as well as vulnerability). 
 
12 Saadi v. the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 13229/03, 29 January 2008, paras. 68-74. 
13 WGAD, ‘Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/6 1 December 
2004, paras. 69, 70. 
14 Ramirez Sanchez v. France (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 59450/00, 4 July 2006, para. 119. 
15 Kalashnikov v. Russia, Appl. No. 47095/99, 15 July 2002, paras. 96-97.  
16 Khudoyorov v. Russia, Appl. No. 6847/02, 8 November 2005, para 107. 
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Detainees must receive appropriate medical treatment, and where needed, psychological 
counselling. Detaining authorities have a positive obligation to prevent the spread of 
contagious disease, and must introduce appropriate measures, such as screening 
detainees upon admission and prompt and effective treatment programmes.17 The 
European Court of Human Rights has recognised that the failure to diagnose and provide 
adequate medical care to detainees can amount to ill-treatment;18 lack of treatment 
resulting in death also violates the right to life.19 In Gladkiy v. Russia, it determined that, 
‘for lack of adequate medical treatment, the applicant was exposed to prolonged mental 
and physical suffering diminishing his human dignity.’20  
 
In an effort to increase social distancing, many institutions have severely restricted or even 
eliminated outside visits, including from families and lawyers. Similarly, independent 
detention monitoring and oversight bodies which are crucial to help stop abuse and 
inadequate prison conditions, have been placed on hold, increasing detainee vulnerability, 
isolation, fears and anxieties. Reportedly, one woman at HMP Downview prison in Surrey, 
United Kingdom, has alerted the United Nations to a breach of her human rights, because 
she has been locked in her cell for 23 hours a day -  measure taken by the facility to reduce 
the likelihood of spread of the disease.21 It is important as some policy bodies have 
recognised, that any limitations ‘must be necessary, time-bound and proportionate. 
However, the most critical is the combined effect of a series of limitations which together 
create a dangerous vacuum, disproportionately impacting the legal protection of detainees 
at a time of heightened anxiety and tension.’22 The WGAD has recognised that the 
‘introduction of blanket measures restricting access to courts and legal counsel cannot be 
justified and could render the deprivation of liberty arbitrary.’23 It determined that ‘States 
must ensure the availability of other ways for legal counsel to communicate with their 
clients, including secured online communication or communication over the telephone, free 
of charge and in circumstances in which privileged and confidential discussions can take 
place.’24  
 
b) Covid-19 and Justifications for Early Release 
 
The rules to determine whether a particular detention is arbitrary have not changed 
because of the pandemic. It is still necessary to consider whether the detention was subject 
to law, whether the law itself was just and appropriate, and whether the detention was 
necessary and proportionate to fulfil a legitimate purpose.  However, the factors to take 
into account when determining whether detention was necessary and proportionate have 
certainly changed and the pandemic may change the outcome of such considerations. 
 
17 Poghosyan v. Georgia, Appl. No. 9870/07, 24 February 2009, para. 69, 70. 
18 Khudobin v. Russia, Applic. No. 59696/00, 26 October 2006, paras 94 – 96. See also, Asyukov v. 
Russia, Applic. No. 2974/05, 5 April 2011, para. 76. 
19 Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, Applic. No. 28005/08, 14 March 2013.    
20  Gladkiy v. Russia, Applic. No. 3242/03, 21 December 2010, para. 96. 
21 See, Lara Keay, ‘Coronavirus: Woman in Surrey Jail Petitions UN over “Horrific” Lockdown Treatment’, 
Sky News, 11 June 2020. 
22 OMCT, ‘Building Our Response on COVID-19 and Detention: OMCT Guidance brief to the SOS-Torture 
Network and partner organizations’, April 2020. 
23 WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 21. 
24 Ibid. See also, Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of OHCHR and WHO, ‘Interim Guidance 
COVID-19: Focus on Persons Deprived of Their Liberty’, March 2020;  Fair Trials, ‘The Public Health Need 
to Keep People out of Detention Practical Guidance’, March 2020. 
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Certain detentions which would otherwise satisfy necessity and proportionality 
requirements may no longer do so, given the disproportionately high risk of infection in 
detention and higher mortality rate. Consequently, it is necessary to assess whether, in 
light of the change in circumstances occasioned by the pandemic, continued detention is 
still justified in each detained case or class of cases.25 The failure to do so increases the 
arbitrariness of detention by failing to allow individuals’ changed circumstances to be 
considered as part of a review of the legality of their detention. 
 
Proportionality and necessity requirements may have changed as a result of Covid-19. 
First, proportionality requires some comparison between the detention and the purpose it 
is intended to achieve. Purposes will differ depending on the type of detention. The 
purpose of pre-trial detention is to ensure defendants appear at trial and the safety of 
accused and/or the public whereas the purpose of sentencing is to ensure the various 
crime control punishment rationales (e.g., specific and general deterrence; retribution; 
rehabilitation). In other settings, purposes include to ensure physical or psychological care 
and protection in hospital and care settings; to ensure attendance at future legal 
proceedings or administrative processes for migrant and refugee processing or removal 
centres. These various purposes may change over time,26 and sometimes, Covid-19 may 
render the purposes no longer justifiable. For instance, it may not be justifiable to detain a 
failed asylum seeker to await deportation,  when deportation to the country of origin is not 
an option because that country is not expecting to accept entrants within a reasonable 
time, because of Covid-19.27 But also, the costs associated with detention are augmented 
by Covid-19, arguably shifting the balance. As an example, pre-trial detention may be 
harder to justify if trials in a particular country have been put on hold because of the 
pandemic. As explained by the Howard League for Penal Reform, in the UK, ‘remand and 
sentenced prisoners alike are being held in conditions amounting to solitary confinement, 
for extended periods as they await trials that have invariably been delayed. Nothing has 
been done to address this, for adults or children in the system.’28    
 
Secondly, necessity is focussed on whether there are realistic alternatives to detention. 
Here, the negatives associated with detention during Covid-19 are augmented, but the 
alternatives to detention will also have been affected; due to lockdowns, there may be 
fewer available half-way houses or less temporary accommodation; community 
programmes to help integrate released detainees may not be operational and parole 
systems may be dysfunctional.29 As OMCT highlights, ‘release into confinement with 
families can also create difficulties and tensions with little time to prepare for release and 
appropriate post-release monitoring or support. There may also be detainees without clear 
places to go to, including foreigners, migrants, children or women defenders whose family 
ties are broken, or street children.’30  
 
Releases, whether permanent or temporary, help underscore that detention should be 
exceptional, and particularly so in the context of a pandemic. Releases encourage 
detaining authorities and policymakers to consider alternatives to detention. These could 
 
25 ‘Challenging immigration detention in the COVID-19 pandemic’, Landmark Chambers, 15 April 2020. 
26 Murray v. the Netherlands (Grand Chamber), Appl. No. 10511/10, 26 April 2016, para. 100. 
27 Ibid. See also, R v Governor of Durham Prison ex parte Hardial Singh[1984] 1 WLR 704. 
28 Howard League for Penal Reform, ‘Justice and fairness under Covid-19 restrictions’, May 2020. 
29 Ibid. 
30 OMCT (n. 22). 
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be applied to short-term pandemic needs, but might in the longer term be incorporated as 
standard alternatives to detention.  
 
Nevertheless, release is another area where an absence of clear rules transparently 
implemented may result in arbitrariness, particularly if there is no clear procedure for 
detainees to petition to have their cases considered. The jurisprudence on the reducibility 
of life sentences is relevant, where the European Court of Human Rights has found a 
violation of Article 3 when legislation on clemency did not require the President ‘to assess 
whether continued imprisonment is justified on legitimate penological grounds.’ Nor did it 
‘set a time-frame in which the President must decide on the clemency application or 
to oblige him or the Minister of Justice … to give reasons for the decision….’.31 Covid-19 
releases which are undertaken without transparency or without a clear framework can also 
result in those who remain in detention feeling as if they are being doubly punished.  
 
Many oversight bodies have recommended who should be prioritised for release.32 The 
recommendations tend to focus on factors connected, first, to the rationale for the detention 
(e.g., persons unlawfully or arbitrarily detained should be released, as should the bulk of 
pre-trial detainees; persons held for non-penal reasons such as immigration detainees).33 
Regarding migrants, the WGAD noted that ‘detention is only permissible as an exceptional 
measure of last resort, which is a particularly high threshold to be satisfied in the context 
of a pandemic or other public health emergency.’34 However, some of the major refugee 
receiving countries have been slow to implement releases, with dangerous consequences. 
Arguably migrants are the equivalent in terms of the derision they receive to the human 
rights defenders and protest movements operating in the most repressive regimes. At the 
time of writing, the USA’s ICE programme had refused to proceed with releases of 
vulnerable migrants detained in its wide network of immigration detention centres.35  
 
Other factors taken into account include whether persons pose a danger to society 
(prisoners serving short prison sentences for non-violent crimes; prisoners who are almost 
at the end of their prison term).36 States have begun to take on board some of these 
recommendations, leading to an important number of temporary and permanent releases 
in many countries. However, there are some important gaps. Many countries that routinely 
resort to arbitrary detention, particularly against protest movements, opposition groups, 
human rights defenders and journalists, have failed to proceed with their releases. At 
times, this is because the individuals concerned have been charged and at times convicted 
of security-related offences, which have been classified as some of the most serious 
offences not subject to full or conditional release.37 At other times, it is because the state 
has introduced arbitrariness into the release process, picking and choosing who should 
benefit from this solution. For instance, it has been reported that in the context of the 
pandemic, Turkey introduced legislation to secure the release of up to 100,000 prisoners, 
 
31 T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary, Apps. 37871/14, 73986/14, 4 October 2016, para. 49. See also, Matiošaitis 
and others v. Lithuania, Apps. No. 22662/13, 51059/13, 58823/13, 23 May 2017, 157-181. 
32 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings, ‘COVID-19 and Protection of right 
to life in places of detention’, COVID-19 Human Rights Dispatch No. 2, 5 May 2020.  
33 IASC (n. 24); see also, WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1). 
34 WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 23. 
35 Sam Levin, ‘He lived in the US for 40 years. Then he became the first to die from Covid-19 in 
immigration jail’, The Guardian, 12 May 2020. 
36 See, e.g., the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CPT) in its COVID-19 Statement of Principles; IASC (n. 24).  
37 OMCT (n. 22). 
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but detained journalists and human rights activists are not included.38 Similarly, Israel has 
announced the release of thousands of Israeli prisoners, including serious offenders. 
However, reportedly, it has failed to release Palestinian prisoners, even the minors, 
women, the elderly and infirm.39 In Egypt, thousands of prisoners have been pardoned but 
reportedly, none of those pardoned are “political” prisoners.40 For those forced to remain 
in detention it is a double punishment; arbitrarily detained and now condemned to 
anxiously await infection.  
  
Also, there is an emphasis on different forms of vulnerability, which focuses on categories 
such as persons over a certain age, pregnant women and women who are breastfeeding, 
persons with underlying health conditions, and persons with disabilities, as well as children 
and women with children.41 Who is considered vulnerable, and relative levels of 
vulnerability, particularly if connected to disease susceptibility, is highly contested as the 
disease is not yet fully understood. Also, assessments of vulnerability can ignore or 
undervalue complex, intersecting vulnerabilities. Invariably, considerations of who should 
be released on account of their vulnerability will involve both ethics and science, and also 
some consideration of human rights. It is important that decisions to release are taken on 
clear and transparent grounds that are non-discriminatory.  
 
In respect of persons serving out sentences of imprisonment for crimes committed, to what 
extent should Covid-19 serve as a justification for early release or commutation of 
sentence? In this respect, should the goals of retribution and specific and general 
deterrence be weighed against the right to health and safety of prisoners and prison staff, 
and, if so, how? A number of elderly and potentially frail convicted war criminals have been 
temporarily released from detention, on vulnerability considerations. Penological 
considerations such as retribution or rehabilitation have not been major considerations for 
the release, particularly as they are intended to be temporary releases. These include 
Hissène Habré, who was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Extraordinary African 
Chambers seated in Senegal, for the torture and crimes against humanity he directly 
perpetrated and oversaw in Chad, has been given a two month leave from prison (to house 
arrest) as a consequence of the Covid-19 risks.42 Victims of Habré’s crimes have 
expressed deep concern, given the failure to progress their reparations awards; all the 
concern over Habré’s health leaves them cold.43 Many convicted war criminals have been 
seeking release around the world.44 The human rights community has struggled with its 
 
38 Emma Sinclair-Webb, ‘Turkey Should Protect All Prisoners from Pandemic’, HRW, 23 March 2020. 
Beyond Turkey, Human Rights Watch has reported that key human rights defenders remain in detention 
despite national release programmes making progress with other detainee groups in Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Cambodia, Cameroon, Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen and China. See, HRW, 
‘COVID-19: A Human Rights Checklist’, 23 April 2020.   
39 Raji Sourani, ‘COVID-19 and Human Rights – 2013 Laureate Raji Sourani: “Governments must put 
human rights and dignity at the centre”’, The Right Livelihood Foundation, 8 May 2020.  
40 ‘No political prisoners freed as Egypt pardons thousands on Eid: President el-Sisi grants clemency to 
3,157 people, including ex-policeman jailed for murder of singer Suzanne Tamim’, Al Jazeera, 24 May 
2020. 
41 E.g., WGAD, Deliberation No. 11 (n. 1), para. 15, 16; See also IASC (n. 24). 
42 ‘Chad: Ex-president temporarily released from jail due to COVID-19’, Aljazeera, 7 April 2020. 
43 Ephrem Rugiririza, ‘COVID-19: Should we Release Vulnerable Convicts?’, Justiceinfo.Net, 
16 April 2020. 
44 See, e.g., Jo-Marie Burt, ‘In Guatemala, COVID-19 Puts Justice on Hold, Emboldening Convicted War 
Criminals to Seek Their Freedom’, International Justice Monitor, 17 April 2020. See also, ‘ADC-ICT Urges 
President of the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals to Urgently Grant Early or 
Provisional Release to Detainees in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic’, 27 March 2020. 
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response to such releases. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence has issued guidance on this issue, noting 
that ‘the legitimate and necessary measures to protect against Covid-19 and overcrowding 
should not lead, de jure or de facto, to impunity for persons convicted in various parts of 
the world for serious violations of human rights, crimes against humanity, genocide, or war 
crimes.’ He has underscored that temporary house arrest should only be afforded if it is 
impossible to relocate such prisoner to a prison facility with safe and healthy conditions.45 
OMCT has taken a more direct line, recommending to the organizations in its network that 
‘we should avoid advocating for the potential release of war criminals, those convicted of 
crimes against humanity, genocide or the crime of torture, whose prosecutions many of us 
have supported.’46 But this presents an arbitrary exception to the application of vulnerability 
criteria, which cannot be right.  
 
IV. Conclusions: An Increase or Reduction in Arbitrariness? 
 
We know that there is a prohibition of arbitrary detention. However, as has been described, 
Covid-19 can accentuate the arbitrariness of detention in several important ways. First, 
detention may no longer satisfy the tests of proportionality and necessity. Second, 
inadequate prison conditions, including poor health and sanitation as well as distancing 
measures which isolate detainees for their own health and safety, but fail to provide 
reasonable accommodation, can also make the detention arbitrary given the impact such 
conditions have on the ability of detainees to exercise their rights. Detention in the context 
of Covid-19 can also heighten the arbitrariness associated with a number of other human 
rights violations.47 
 
Also, arbitrariness can enter into decisions to release detainees as part of distancing 
measures. Lack of clarity, fairness and transparency in decisions to release contributes to 
arbitrariness and increases the stress and anxiety of detainees and their families, which 
constitutes a double punishment which they do not deserve, this time cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.   
 
 
  
 
45 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings (n. 32). 
46 OMCT (n. 22), p. 5. 
47 UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings (n. 32).  
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Abstract 
As the Covid-19 pandemic has unfolded, epidemiologists have been working to build and 
refine models of how the disease is spread through populations: at the same time, policy-
makers around the world have been taking measures to try to stem the transmission of 
disease, which are based on models of how they think the world works. These models may 
be implicit, or made explicit including through the use of statistics and data science: 
frequently, though, they are based on stereotypes and assumptions about how individuals 
and systems operate.  
 
This paper argues that it is crucial to understand to whom models are useful, and who they 
ignore. This paper looks at the gendered assumptions – and resulting gaps - in policy 
responses, which betray an understanding of the world that neglects the experiences of 
women and of trans and non-binary people. It examines how gendered assumptions, 
gender binaries and stereotypes weaken responses to the pandemic, and how they 
reinforce imperfect models of the world that have detrimental impacts on the people who 
are not included. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Covid-19 is a new disease, caused by a newly discovered virus.1 We don’t know how it will 
behave or what to expect: but as societies, we have to respond to a disease that has killed 
more than a third of a million people worldwide in a few months.2 In this paper, I articulate 
how the way that we – individuals, authorities, scientists, or governments – respond to 
Covid-19 is based on how we model the world, and the assumptions that we make as we 
do this. I outline how these assumptions may be based on stereotypes, and how the 
 
1 The virus is called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2): the disease it causes 
is called coronavirus disease (Covid-19). For more information, see World Health Organization, ‘Naming 
the Coronavirus Disease (Covid-19) and the Virus That Causes It’, accessed 7 May 2020, 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-
coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it. 
2 As of 10 June 2020, the WHO had reported 408,025 deaths. World Health Organization, 
‘Coronavirusdisease (Covid-19) Situation Report–142’, 31 May 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200511-covid-19-sitrep-112.pdf?sfvrsn=813f2669_2. 
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inaccuracies caused by inaccurate models can lead to discrimination. Finally, I articulate 
two recommendations that could help alleviate the problems caused by these imperfect 
models: making the assumptions that underly them explicit; and centering the people who 
are already marginalised by building policy responses that foreground their experiences 
and expertise. 
 
II. The Importance of Models 
 
The experts in new diseases are epidemiologists. As with SARS, H1N1, and Ebola, they 
follow the spread of Covid-19. They look at data on positive tests, on infection rates, on 
hospitalisation and deaths. This data enables them to build models of the disease: 
expressed as diagrams or in computer programs, these models allow us to better 
determine what is happening now, and to predict what will happen next. 
 
a) Models in epidemiology 
 
Models can help us understand what was previously unknown: and to communicate ideas 
that might not have been previously accepted. In the UK in the 1850s, the prevailing model 
of cholera, as understood by doctors, was that it was spread by a “miasma”: bad air.3 Dr 
John Snow disagreed. He recorded the deaths from a cholera outbreak in Soho, London 
in 1854, marking the residences of those who died on a map: and because he thought that 
the disease might be spread by water, he also marked the location of neighbourhood 
pumps.  
 
3 William F Bynum, ‘On the Mode of Communication of Cholera’, Nature, 14 March 2013, 169. 
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Figure 1: John Snow’s map showing cholera cases in Soho in 1854.4 
Snow’s map – now often cited as an early example of data visualisation5 – is shown in 
Figure 1. The largest cluster of deaths was around the pump on Broad Street. Snow 
demanded that the handle of the pump be removed, and the outbreak stopped.6 More than 
150 years later, modern-day epidemiologists are engaged in similar projects: understand 
how a disease spreads, and what actions need to be taken to save lives.  
 
b) Models in the world 
 
Of course, models are not solely the tool of epidemiologists. Models of how the world 
operates are familiar in all academic disciplines: from microeconomic graphs that plot price 
against demand, to legal theories that posit humans as rational actors, to sociological 
theories about the ways that we constitute ideas of ‘disability’.  
 
These models may be developed as theories, that are then tested empirically, or they may 
be developed through a ‘grounded’ observation of a situation, on top of which a model is 
 
4 John Snow, Map from ‘On the Mode of Communication of Cholera’, 1854, 1854, Originally published in 
1854 by C.F. Cheffins, Lith, Southhampton Buildings, London, England, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Snow-cholera-map-1.jpg. 
5 See for example Edward R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (Graphics Press, 1983), 
24. 
6 Broad Street is now called Broadwick Street: it now hosts a commemorative replica of the original pump, 
just outside the (more traditionally British commemoration) John Snow pub.   
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built; they may make use of qualitative or quantitative research; they may be constructed 
as single static forms, or constantly updated. Written in academic papers and presented 
in the form of graphs, computer code or flowcharts, we are familiar with models of the 
world: and we understand that some models are better than others. We no longer accept 
the “miasma” theory of cholera transmission as a useful explanation, just as we no longer 
find geocentric models of the universe useful.7  
 
Models are crucial for policy responses as well. In order to have some idea of how a policy 
will work, we need to have some understanding of how a complex system will respond to 
changes. This is a model, whether it’s computational, theoretical, or ideological.  
 
III. The Imperfections of Models 
 
Statistician George Box wrote, ‘all models are wrong, but some are useful.’ 8 All models 
are wrong in the sense that they are inherently reductive. They reduce the complexities of 
the world down to a finite set of parts.  
 
This reduction may be because not enough is known about all the components: Snow was 
able to advance the understanding of cholera through his work, but he died before the 
development of germ theory,9 which argued that some diseases are caused by micro-
organisms. His model of cholera, therefore, held that it was spread by sewage-
contaminated water, but was not specific enough to identify the contamination: the 
bacterium Vibrio cholerae, which can be spread in human faeces.10 
 
It may also be because assumptions are made that are not spelled out: Newton did not 
explicitly state that his laws were only valid up to a certain speed. While during his lifetime, 
he accepted the idea that light travelled at a very fast but finite speed,11 he did not consider 
that the laws he developed to measure the world around him might not be universally 
applicable. Newtonian classical mechanics is accurate enough to send humans to the 
moon, but it fails for objects that are very small, or going very fast.12 
 
This is just as true in the humanities as in the sciences. Liberal theories of society explicitly 
model society as being composed of individuals who are rational, autonomous, and equal 
before the law,13 while international law institutions have rightly been criticised for their 
 
7 In a geocentric model of the universe, everything – the Sun, the Moon, planets, and stars – orbits around 
the Earth. Geocentric models were known to be flawed from the 2nd century BC, and were superseded by 
heliocentric (orbiting around the Sun) models in the 16th century. 
8 An oft-quoted aphorism, it appears in print in for example George E P Box and Norman R Draper, 
Empirical Model-Building and Response Surface (USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1986), 424. 
9 Bynum, ‘Cholera’ (n. 3). 
10 World Health Organization, ‘Cholera’, 17 January 2019, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/cholera. 
11 Isaac Newton, Opticks, 1704, 77, https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k3362k. 
12 How small, or how fast, exactly? Smaller than atoms, or faster than around 10% the speed of light. In 
practice, the differences between Newton’s predictions, and Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity, were 
far smaller than the rounding errors in the computer systems used by NASA in the Apollo program. (Much) 
more information about the computer system is available from Ron Burkey, ‘The Apollo Guidance 
Computer: A Kinder, Gentler Introduction’, Virtual AGC — AGS — LVDC — Gemini, accessed 7 May 2020, 
http://www.ibiblio.org/apollo/ForDummies.html. 
13 Sandra Fredman, Women and the Law, Oxford Monographs on Labour Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 12–17. 
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‘outmoded but nevertheless deeply entrenched attitudes concerning the roles and status 
of men and women in society.’14  
 
Some models are useful: but only to some people. Newton’s model of gravity was useful 
to NASA scientists, but not to quantum theorists. Snow’s model of cholera was useful to 
future Londoners, but not to the residents of Soho who had already died – or fled – the 
outbreak of 1854.  
 
Models of – and about – people may be useful for describing some lives, but less so for 
others. These include both theoretical models and grounded models, both qualitative and 
quantitative. Feminist legal scholars have argued, for example, that the assumptions of 
liberalism are masculine: they do not fit the realities of people’s lives, particularly the lives 
of women, in their neglect of human bodies, social contexts and relationships.15  
 
At the international level, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, and the CEDAW Committee which oversees its implementation has 
begun not only to identify that gender stereotyping is a problem,16 but to name specific 
stereotypes and show how their application is harmful in judicial decisions.17 Imperfect 
models of the world can lead to unexpected outcomes for people who don’t fit – and 
sometimes discrimination. 
 
IV. Imperfect Models and Covid-19 
 
In crisis situations, things move fast. The people – whether they are epidemiologists or 
policy makers – are unlikely to have all the information they need to build accurate models 
at the best of time. In crises, this is exacerbated, and the model-makers also may not have 
time to interrogate all their assumptions. 
 
Take, for example, collecting disaggregated data on Covid-19 cases and deaths. This is 
crucial in order to track potential disparities and inequities in health: it enables health care 
researchers to see how the virus is impacting different groups of people.18 The USA has 
the highest number of Covid-19 cases in the world, but the disease is not hitting everyone 
equally. In order to understand which communities are being hit hardest, US states have 
started to collect data that is disaggregated by race. But at the time of writing, this data 
was available for only 35% of deaths.19  
 
 
14 Elizabeth Evatt, ‘Foreword’, in The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis, by Hilary 
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, Melland Schill Studies in International Law (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), ix. 
15 Rosemary Hunter, ‘Contesting the Dominant Paradigm: Feminist Critiques of Liberal Legalism’, in The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory, ed. Margaret Davies and Vanessa Munro, 
Ashgate Research Companion (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 21. 
16 As in for example AT v Hungary, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003, 26 January 2005. 
17 Simone Cusack, ‘Building Momentum Towards Change: How the UN’s Response to Stereotyping Is 
Evolving’, in Stereotypes and Human Rights Law, ed. Eva Brems and Alexandra Timmer (Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Intersentia, 2016), 28. 
18 PolicyLink, ‘Counting a Diverse Nation: Disaggregating Data on Race and Ethnicity to Advance a Culture 
of Health’, 2018, 5, https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/Counting_a_Diverse_Nation_08_15_18.pdf. 
19 Johns Hopkins University of Medicine, ‘State Testing Data by Race’, Johns Hopkins Coronavirus 
Resource Center, accessed 7 May 2020, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/racial-data-transparency. 
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a) Who is ‘other’? 
 
Not all data on infection rates and deaths is disaggregated. In four of the ten states with 
the highest population of Native Americans, data about the case and fatality numbers for 
this population is not disaggregated, and is instead counted under ‘other.’ Without accurate 
data about Native populations – who are disproportionately likely to be living in poverty, 
and unable to access healthcare – it will not be possible to design policy responses that 
take into the account how they have been hit by the virus.  
 
And it is likely that they have been hit hard. Where data has been collected, Native 
Americans are more likely to have been infected – as in New Mexico, where they are less 
than 10% of the population but more than a third of the cases – and to die – as in Arizona, 
where 6% of the population, but 16% of the deaths, are amongst Native populations.20 In 
per capita cases, the Navajo Nation is third highest in the USA, behind only New York and 
New Jersey.21 
 
b) Exactly two genders? 
 
Policy responses, too, can rely on imperfect models of the world. In Panama, in order to 
minimise the number of people in public at one time, the government implemented a 
gendered curfew: women can leave their houses on Monday, Wednesday and Friday, 
while men can go out on Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday:22 Violations are enforced by the 
police and quarantine officers. This presents a challenge for trans and non-conforming 
Panamanians, in a country where changing the gender marker on official documents 
requires undergoing costly gender confirmation surgery, and where transphobic 
discrimination is widespread.  
 
For trans people whose gender doesn’t match their legal documents, they risk arrest, 
humiliation and criminalisation: one woman was detained for three hours, despite being 
outside on a Wednesday, and as a health volunteer, exempt from the quarantine 
restrictions.23 It took more than five weeks for the government of Panama to recognise that 
the enforcement of the quarantine was discriminatory against trans and gender non-
conforming people, and to issue a communication to the security forces.24 
 
 
 
 
20 Rebecca Nagle, ‘Native Americans Being Left out of US Coronavirus Data and Labelled as “Other”’, The 
Guardian, 24 April 2020. 
21 Delilah Friedler, ‘Navajo Nation Is behind Only New York and New Jersey in Rates of COVID-19 
Infection. What Happened?’, Mother Jones (blog), 5 May 2020, 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/05/navajo-nation-covid-outbreak-deaths/. 
22 This was combined with specified hours for leaving the house, based on the last digit of a person’s ID 
card or passport. República de Panamá Gobierno Nacional, ‘Nuevas Medidas Para La Cuarantena 
Absoluta’, 30 March 2020. 
23 Cristian González Cabrera, ‘Panama’s Gender-Based Quarantine Ensnares Trans Woman’, Human 
Rights Watch (blog), 2 April 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/02/panamas-gender-based-
quarantine-ensnares-trans-woman. 
24 Human Rights Watch, ‘Panama: Government Takes Step to End Quarantine Gender Discrimination’, 
Human Rights Watch, 18 May 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/18/panama-government-takes-
step-end-quarantine-gender-discrimination. 
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c) Hitting the most marginalised hardest 
 
Both of these outcomes result from a failure to model aspects of the world. In Panama, it 
is a failure to recognise that legal gender and gender expression are not the same for many 
people, and that policing the latter to enforce the former leaves an already marginalized 
group at risk of further oppression. In the USA, it is a failure to recognise in models that 
there is a population – Native Americans – who experienced consistently poor health 
outcomes (including lower life expectancy, and higher rates of death from preventable 
diseases) in general,25 and who would therefore benefit from disaggregated data in order 
to understand the specific impact of Covid-19. 
 
In both of these countries, this failure to model accurately, disproportionately impacts 
groups that are already marginalized. This might be the result of models – explicit or implicit 
models – suffering from what D’Ignazio and Klein call the ‘privilege hazard’: they are built 
by people who lack the tools to recognize the oppression that other people experience.26 
It might be the result of deliberate discrimination. Or it might be the result of hurried 
decision-making. Regardless of the motivation, the outcome is the same: inequalities are 
exacerbated, and marginalised people are pushed further into the margins. 
 
Assumptions are not neutral. They may be made deliberately, in service of faster, more 
streamlined models. They may be made implicitly, because everyone in the room is 
working under the same set of assumptions and so no-one thinks to question if a different 
approach could be taken. But when modelling the world, the assumptions made are 
choices: about what to spell out in detail, and what to abstract. The choices are political: 
they determine what is counted, and what is ignored. 
 
V. Building Better Models 
 
Models must be reductive in some way: but  the choices that are made in order to reduce 
the world to a model are political. They hit some people harder than others. In this final 
section, I offer two methods to mitigate against this disproportionate impact.  
 
a) Make assumptions explicit 
 
When developing a model – whether it is computational, diagrammatic, or theoretical – 
everyone involved could articulate the assumptions that they are making. The specific 
actors will be different for every model, but Wieringa’s taxonomy of actors involved in 
computer algorithm development is a helpful illustration: she distinguishes between 
decision-makers, developers and users.27 In complex systems, it is not always easy – or 
possible – to know the individual or individuals who fill each of these roles  
 
 
25 Donald Warne, ‘The State of Indigenous America Series: Ten Indian Health Policy Challenges for the 
New Administration in 2009’, Wicazo Sa Review 24, no. 1 (10 May 2009): 7–23, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/wic.0.0023. 
26 Catherine D’Ignazio and Lauren F. Klein, Data Feminism, <Strong> Ideas Series (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2020), 29. 
27 Maranke Wieringa, ‘What to Account for When Accounting for Algorithms: A Systematic Literature 
Review on Algorithmic Accountability’, in Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, 
and Transparency (FAT* ’20: Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, Barcelona, 
Spain: ACM, 2020), 3–4, https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372833. 
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‘Decision-makers’ are those who specify parameters for a model. In the example cited 
above, this could be the state- and federal-level public health bodies in the USA who 
decided that collecting data about Covid-19 cases and deaths was important, or the 
individuals or teams within the Government of Panama, who decided that they needed to 
impose a curfew. 
 
‘Developers’ are those who make decisions about how to implement the model. These 
could be the civil servants tasked with dividing Panama’s population into discrete groups, 
for the purposes of limiting the number of people in public. It could also be the 
representatives of Arizona Department of Health Services which included Native American 
as a category in their demographic data,28 or those at the Texas Department of State 
Health Services, which did not.29 
 
Finally, ‘users’ are the operators of a model: the health and social care workers tasked with 
recording demographic information about COVID-19 patients, or the police and security 
forces in Panama tasked with enforcing the curfew.  
 
In Covid-19 data collected in Texas, for example, an unspoken assumption is that certain 
racial groups are worthy of special consideration, and others are not. Collecting data so 
that disproportionate impact on White people could be identified is deemed worthwhile by 
the Texas public health authorities: similarly, Black people. But Native Americans – despite 
a history of health inequities – were not necessarily considered a group worth of scrutiny. 
Implicitly, it was assumed that the impact on Native American populations was likely to be 
either small enough to be not worth scrutinising: or (possibly in addition), the virus was 
expected to hit those populations in the same way as other groups that are not counted 
separately in data, such as Arab-Americans.30  
 
In the case of the Panama gendered quarantine, the policy makers assumed that gender 
could be determined by third parties: police and quarantine officers: they also assumed 
that gender expression and legal gender were the same for everyone. Neither of these 
assumptions hold, as trans activists and gender scholars have been arguing for many 
years.31  
 
Articulating assumptions is not an easy task: it takes practice! It is easier to do when the 
people in the room are from diverse backgrounds – when everyone has the same 
assumptions, they often go unnoticed: and it is easier to do when there is a strong incentive 
to devote resources to this process Spelling out assumptions in the Panamanian and USA-
ian examples above might have helped identify why – and for whom – they failed: which 
leads neatly into my second method.  
 
 
28 Arizona Department of Health Services, ‘COVID-19 Data Dashboard’, Arizona Department of Health 
Services, accessed 27 May 2020, http://www.azdhs.gov/preparedness/epidemiology-disease-
control/infectious-disease-epidemiology/covid-19/dashboards/index.php. 
29 Texas Department of State Health Services, ‘Texas Case Counts: COVID-19’, accessed 27 May 2020, 
https://txdshs.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/ed483ecd702b4298ab01e8b9cafc8b83. 
30 For more information about advocacy for including ‘Arab American’ as a separate category in census 
and other data, see: PolicyLink, ‘Counting a Diverse Nation’. 
31 See for example TGEU, ‘Legal Gender Recognition’, accessed 27 May 2020, 
https://tgeu.org/issues/legal-gender-recognition/; Amnesty International, ‘The State Decides Who I Am: 
Lack of Legal Gender Recognition for Transgender People in Europe’, 2014, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=EUR01%2f001%2f2014&language=en. 
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b) Centre the impact on the people on the margins 
 
Scholars like Donna Haraway have been arguing for ‘strong objectivity’ as a lens of 
analysis, which centres the perspectives of groups who are excluded from knowledge-
making processes:32 while standpoint theory, a common tool of feminist analysis, 
recognises that all knowledge is situated, partial and historically specific.33 Black feminist 
scholar and activist bell hooks argued that it is not only important to recognise that the 
people on the margins have a specific perspective: it is crucial to building successful 
movements that the experiences of marginalised people are “understood, addressed and 
incorporated.”34 
 
Yet while scholars have been arguing for local knowledge, properly used, for decades: 
those in power remain, in many situations, prone to discount the impact of their decisions 
on marginalised people. Marginalised people are less likely to be in the room when 
decisions are made: and if they are in the room, they are less likely to have their voices 
heard, let alone have the power to influence the decisions that are made.  
 
In the medium-to-long term, one way to resolve this is to have decision-makers with diverse 
identities, backgrounds and experiences. But this will take time. In the short-term – and 
particularly in crisis situations – it is crucial for those who hold power to think about the 
impact of their decisions – and the assumptions that underly them – on people who are 
marginalised. Centring marginalised people means, in hooks’ analysis, bringing in their 
experiences, but also creating – and in some cases, ceding – space for them to participate 
as both ‘makers of theory and of leaders of action.’35 
 
In the USA, this would have meant including the experiences, perspectives and expertise 
of communities who are already known to have poorer health outcomes - including Native 
Americans – in the development of policy responses. It would have meant ensuring that 
the policy included responses centred on these communities, instead of keeping them at 
the margins. And to be effective, these policy responses needed data for evaluation. While 
there are legitimate concerns about collecting data on marginalized groups, ignoring them 
or subsuming them into ‘other’ was not effective here. 
 
In Panama, this would have meant including trans people, and gender-non-conforming 
people – and their lived experiences - in the development of the quarantine measures. It 
would have meant considering how the measures would impact them, including how 
quarantine violations were to be policed. Trans people are already more likely to be 
targeted by police: quarantine measures that exacerbated this should not have been put 
into place.  
 
Both of these responses require a broader view of the world: they require thought and 
reflection on the part of the designers and implementers, about the models of the world 
that they are using and the assumptions that underly them. Crisis situations are inherently 
fast-moving and individuals tasked with decision-making may feel they don’t have time to 
think about these concerns: this is precisely why these are important. Not just in our current 
 
32 D’Ignazio and Klein, Data Feminism, (n. 26) 83. 
33 Joey Sprague, Feminist Methodologies for Critical Researchers: Bridging Differences, The Gender Lens 
Series (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2005), 41. 
34 bell hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center (South End Press, 1984), 161. 
35 Ibid. 
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pandemic situation, but in every future crisis – and day-to-day – policy response. These 
two methods: making assumptions explicit, and centering the people who are already 
marginalized – should be paramount in all the models that we build of the world. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Beyond Covid-19 
 
As I have described, imperfect models of the world have the potential to have a detrimental 
impact on responses to Covid-19. But the harm of imperfect models does not stop there. 
The Covid-19 crisis will continue for months and years, but decision-making based on 
imperfect models did not begin with the virus, and it will not end with it.  
 
Models of the world are in use in almost every sphere of life, but the proliferation of big 
data analytics and algorithmic decision-making has concretised these models into 
computer code. Without proper oversight, the decision-makers, developers and user of 
models risk using models with reductive views of the world based on assumptions and 
stereotypes. The two methods I have outlined here: spelling out assumptions, and centring 
the people at the margins, will be necessary – although perhaps a starting point, rather 
than a complete solution – to ensuring that these models are useful without being harmful.  
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Abstract 
To date, the vast majority of Covid-19 deaths have been those over the age of 65. The 
vulnerability of older people to the impacts of Covid-19 were recognised early and have 
featured prominently in policy discussions and decision-making of governments around 
the world. While the risks posed by Covid-19 to the health and wellbeing of older people 
are significant, the impact of policies introduced in response to the public health crisis raise 
several critical human rights issues.   
 
This article addresses two broad areas of concern regarding the rights of older people 
which have emerged in the United Kingdom as a consequence of Covid-19. Firstly, this 
article discusses the risks posed by the suspension of several Local Authority duties under 
the Care Act, and proposes amendments aimed at ensuring the rights of people in need 
of care and support are maintained during this period. Secondly, the social wellbeing of 
older people is discussed with reference to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which establishes the right to respect for private and family life. For older adults 
living the in the community, it is argued that Article 8 imposes a positive obligation on Local 
Authorities to identify and support those older adults experiencing significant isolation or 
loneliness as a consequence of measures introduced in response Covid-19. In care home 
environments, Article 8 is considered with reference to the suspension of care home 
visitation rights, which is argued to be a disproportional and overly restrictive measure 
which imperils the rights and social wellbeing of older people.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Older people are at the highest risk of Covid-19, owing to age-related physiological 
changes which increase infection susceptibility, and a higher incidence of underlying 
conditions. As a result, older people are more likely to contract Covid-19, and at greater 
risk of complications and morbidity when they do.1 Those over the age of 65 have 
accounted for 93% of all Covid-19 deaths in England and Wales, with a death rate of 286 
per 100,000, compared with 8.4 among those aged under 65.2 Globally, fatality rates from 
Covid-19 among those over the age of 80 are five times greater than the population 
average, with this rate expected to increase further as the virus spreads among older 
 
1 World Health Organization, Office for Europe, ‘Statement: Older people are at highest risk from COVID-
19, but all must act to prevent community spread’, by Hans Henri P. Kluge, 2 April 2020, 
http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/statements/statement-
older-people-are-at-highest-risk-from-covid-19,-but-all-must-act-to-prevent-community-spread [accessed 8 
May 2020].  
2 Office of National Statistics (ONS), ‘Coronavirus related deaths by occupation, England and Wales: 
Deaths registered up to and including 20 April 2020’, 11 May 2020, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/causesofdeath/bulletins/coron
aviruscovid19relateddeathsbyoccupationenglandandwales/deathsregistereduptoandincluding20april2020 
[accessed 10 May 2020]. 
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people living in developing countries.3 While the significant direct health risks posed by 
Covid-19 for older people demand clear and targeted responses, policies enacted must be 
proportional, measured and aimed towards the preservation of older person’s dignity and 
fundamental human rights. This article focuses on two areas of concern with regard to the 
effect of Covid-19 on the rights and dignity of older people in the United Kingdom (UK): 
social wellbeing, and access to care and support.  
 
II. Access to Care and Support 
 
In recognition of the significant impact of COVID-19 on the social care workforce capacity, 
the Coronavirus Act 20204 has modified or temporally suspended a range of local authority 
duties under the Care Act 2014 (CA). With an expected increase in social care referrals 
coinciding with a significantly reduced workforce, these changes were justified on the basis 
of enabling local authorities to ‘continue to be able to deliver the best possible care services 
during the peak and to protect the lives of the most vulnerable members of society’.5 
Among the most significant changes has been the suspension6 of the duty for local 
authorities to undertake a needs and financial assessment ‘where it appears to a local 
authority that an adult may have needs for care and support,’ irrespective of their view of 
the extent of the adult’s needs, or their financial resources.7 The duty to provide support to 
meet eligible unmet needs has also been suspended, with the only requirement being that 
support be provided where it is necessary to prevent a breach of a person’s rights under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as incorporated by the Human Rights 
Act.8 While this duty applies to potential breaches of any of the ECHR rights, those most 
relevant to the aforementioned  CA duties are Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (freedom 
from inhumane and degrading treatment), and Article 8 (the right to private and family life).  
 
Regulations giving effect to the suspension of these duties have not yet been published, 
with the government advising that local authorities should only exercise these easements 
‘where this this is essential in order to maintain the highest possible level of resources’.9 
Nonetheless, serious concerns remain as to the impact of these measures during a time 
when older people’s needs for care and support are likely to increase, and informal support 
and care in the community is likely to be harder to access. First, while the intention of these 
easements is to enable a more efficient and effective use of resources, the scale of the 
revised provisions is likely to require local authorities to introduce new procedures and 
administrative systems that will delay the provision of critical care.10  Second, the lowering 
 
3 World Health Organization,’ COVID-19 Strategy update’, 14 April 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-
source/coronaviruse/covid-strategy-update-14april2020.pdf?sfvrsn=29da3ba0_19&download=true 
[accessed 7 May 2020].   
4 Coronavirus Act, 2020, Schedule 11, Chapter 7. 
5 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Guidance: What the Coronavirus Bill will do, Easing the burden 
on frontline staff both within the NHS and beyond,’ 26 March 2020, paragraph 5 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-bill-what-it-will-do/what-the-coronavirus-bill-will-do 
[accessed 6 May 2020]. 
6 Coronavirus Act, 2020, Chapter 7, Part 1 (Main Provisions). 
7 Care Act, 2014, Section 9 (1-7). 
8 Human Rights Act, 1998, Section 1.  
9 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities,’ Section 4, 1 
April 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-changes-to-the-care-act-
2014/care-act-easements-guidance-for-local-authorities [accessed 2 May 2020]. 
10 British Association of Social Work, ‘Briefing paper on Coronavirus Bill,’ 25 March 2020, 
https://www.basw.co.uk/media/news/2020/mar/basw-england-briefing-paper-coronavirus-bill [accessed 4 
May 2020]. 
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of the duty threshold to circumstances of anticipated ECHR breaches assumes a high level 
of knowledge and expertise on the part of the assessor and gives an unprecedented level 
of discretion to local authority decision makers. With the vast majority of CA assessments 
undertaken by social workers, the British Association of Social Worker’s (BASW) response 
to the CA easements cautions against the assumption of the requisite ECHR knowledge 
and competency:11 
 
…social workers are not experienced in applying human rights law in the specific way that is 
envisaged and this would involve a steep learning curve. The Care Act 2014 operationalises the 
principles of human rights into the concept of wellbeing and provides a well understood means of 
social workers applying professional judgment to assessing and meeting needs. 
  
While recognising the unique circumstances posed by Covid-19, and the speed at which 
the Coronavirus Act needed to be developed, changes are needed to ensure that older 
people’s needs continue to be met over this period. Reflecting the limitations discussed 
above, the following amendments proffered by public law experts, and the BASW, are 
worthy of serious consideration:12 
 
• Amending the application of local authority duties under the CA to require that they be 
implemented “as far as reasonably practicable”, rather than the wholesale suspension 
of duties to undertake needs and financial assessments. The “reasonably practicable” 
provision would not apply in circumstances of anticipated ECHR breaches, such as 
where a failure to undertake an assessment could conceivably lead to the loss of life 
(ECHR Article 2), or subject a person to neglect, abuse or indignity (ECHR Article 3).  
In such circumstances, undertaking a needs or financial assessment would remain a 
duty.  
 
• The introduction of a provision which would require the local authority to be satisfied 
that compliance with pre-amendment CA duties is incompatible with other statutory 
duties, or the efficient use of resources, prior to treating the relevant duties as 
disapplied. In effect, such a provision would require local authorities to justify the 
suspension of duties by demonstrating a significance change to needs, or available 
resources. For example, suspending the duty to undertake routine needs re-
assessments could be justified on the basis of a demonstrated increase in the number 
of new assessments needing to be undertaken.  
 
• Amending the Act to include an express requirement that local authorities carry out an 
assessment in order to verify the risk of an ECHR breach. While local authorities are 
currently required to be satisfied that there would not be an ECHR breach, the 
corresponding suspension of the duty to undertake a needs assessment would make 
such a determination difficult, if not impossible.   
  
 
11 Ibid.  
12 Jenni Richards, Jonathan Auburn and Steve Broach, ‘The Coronavirus Bill – Schedule 11’, 20 March 
2020, https://www.11kbw.com/knowledge-events/article/the-coronavirus-bill-schedule-11/ [accessed 4 May 
2020]; BASW (n. 10). 
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III. Social Wellbeing 
 
f) a) Older people living in the community 
 
The social and economic wellbeing of older people has been significantly and 
disproportionately disrupted as countries around the world instruct those vulnerable to 
Covid-19 to self-isolate within their own homes and arrange for the delivery of groceries, 
medicines and other essential items. At the time of writing, all people over the age of 70 in 
the UK have been advised to self-isolate within their own homes for two months, with no 
clear indication as to when this guidance will be amended.13  Changes associated with 
later life, such as retirement, declines in health or mobility, and the death of spouses and 
friends, leave many older people vulnerable to social isolation and loneliness.14  In the UK, 
approximately 2 million people over the age of 75 live alone,15 and 17% of people over 65 
report less than weekly contact with family, friends and neighbours.16 With older people 
more likely to live alone and to rely on social networks within their immediate 
neighbourhood environment for social interaction,17 the physical distancing and self-
isolation measures introduced in response to COVID-19 have been particular onerous.  
 
It is important to recognise that many older people with the means and capacity to adapt, 
have been proactive in using digital social networking technology to communicate and 
maintain relationships with family and friends. However, it remains the case that older 
adults are significantly less likely than younger people to have access to an internet 
enabled device, with 79% of all digital exclusion in the UK among those aged over 65.18 
Considering that the rate of digital exclusion is highest among older people living alone 
and experiencing financial disadvantage,19 physical distancing and home isolation are 
exacerbating existing inequalities experienced by some older people. While the guidance 
provided to older people is intended to protect their health and wellbeing during this period, 
it is critical that local authorities are proactive in recognising and responding to the 
consequences of these measures for older people. As noted by the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission with respect to the obligations of local authorities under Article 8 of the 
ECHR: 
 
 
13 Public Health England, ‘Guidance on social distancing for everyone in the UK,’ 30 March 2020, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-guidance-on-social-distancing-and-for-vulnerable-
people/guidance-on-social-distancing-for-everyone-in-the-uk-and-protecting-older-people-and-vulnerable-
adults; Cabinet Office, ‘Guidance: Staying alert and safe (social distancing),’ 11 May 2020, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/staying-alert-and-safe-social-distancing/staying-alert-and-
safe-social-distancing [accessed 4 May 2020]. 
14 Susan Davidson and Phil Rossall, ‘Evidence review: Loneliness in later life’, Report commissioned by 
Age UK, July 2015, https://www.ageuk.org.uk/globalassets/age-uk/documents/reports-and-
publications/reports-and-briefings/health--wellbeing/rb_june15_lonelines_in_later_life_evidence_review.pdf 
[accessed 8 May 2020]. 
15 Jennifer Thomas, ‘Insights into loneliness, older people and wellbeing’, Office of National Statistics, 
October 2015, https://backup.ons.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/10/Insights-into-Loneliness-
Older-People-and-Well-being-2015.pdf [accessed 8 May 2020]. 
16 Christina Victor et al., ‘The prevalence of, and risk factors for, loneliness in later life: a survey of older 
people in Great Britain,’ (2005) 25(6) Ageing & Society 357. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Digital exclusion is defined here as ‘not having used the internet in the past 3 months.’ [Susan Davidson, 
‘Digital inclusion evidence review 2018’, Report commissioned by Age UK (November 2018), 
https://www.ageuk.org.uk/globalassets/age-uk/documents/reports-and-
publications/age_uk_digital_inclusion_evidence_review_2018.pdf]. 
19 Ibid.  
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In some limited circumstances, this could mean that local authorities have a positive obligation to 
remedy extreme isolation experienced by individuals who depend on care services to maintain 
relationships with others by getting out of their homes.20 
 
During this period, such positive obligations should apply to those older adults 
experiencing the most significant forms of isolation and disadvantage as a consequence 
of physical distancing and self-isolation measures.  
 
b) Older people in supported accommodation environments 
 
There are 11,300 care homes for older people in the UK,21 responsible for the care and 
support of approximately 418,000 residents.22 As has been demonstrated since the advent 
of Covid-19, residential environments for older people are particularly susceptible to 
outbreaks of infectious disease, with management and containment hampered by close 
living quarters and the vulnerable health status of many residents.23 In addition, isolating 
residents and limiting their interaction with staff is difficult to implement in an environment 
with high-level physical, mental and cognitive care needs.24 The toll of Covid-19 on care 
homes in the UK and around the world has been undeniably devastating, having claimed 
the lives of almost 10,000 care home residents in the UK at time of writing.25  In response 
to shifting government guidance, non-essential visits to care homes by family and friends 
have been restricted or completely suspended in many care homes across the UK. While 
alterations to normal practice and procedure are clearly warranted by the unique 
vulnerabilities of care home environments, these must be carefully balanced against the 
physical and mental health risks of loneliness and isolation from social support networks. 
As public authorities, National Health Service (NHS) Funded care homes have a legal 
obligation under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act to act compatibly with human rights. 
Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to private and family life, home and 
correspondence.26 This includes the right to live with one’s family, or, where this is not 
possible, to right to maintain relationships through regular contact and the facilitation of 
visits from family and friends.27 The protection against interference with the right to respect 
 
20 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Close to home: An inquiry into older people and human rights 
in home care’, 2011, https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/close_to_home.pdf [accessed 
8 May 2020],  39. 
21 Competition and Markets Authority, ‘Care homes market study: summary of final report,’ 30 November 
2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/care-homes-market-study-summary-of-final-report/care-
homes-market-study-summary-of-final-report#fn:4 [accessed 10 May 2020]. 
22 Laing Buisson, ‘Care of older people: UK market report’ (28th ed), May 2017, 12-13. 
23 Evonne Curran, ‘Infection outbreaks in care homes: Prevention and management’, (2017) 113 (9) 
Nursing Times  18-21. See also, for similar issues affecting prisons and other places of detention, the 
paper by Carla Ferstman on detention and pandemic exceptionality, in this publication.  
24 An estimated 69% of UK care home residents live with dementia. See,  Martin Prince et al., ‘Dementia 
UK: Update Second Edition’, Report produced for the Alzheimer’s Society, 2014, 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/59437/1/Dementia_UK_Second_edition_-_Overview.pdf 
[accessed 8 May 2020]. 
25 Office of National Statistics, ‘Deaths involving COVID-19 in the care sector, England and Wales: deaths 
occurring up to 1 May 2020 and registered up to 9 May 2020’, 15 May 2020, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/articles/deathsin
volvingcovid19inthecaresectorenglandandwales/deathsoccurringupto1may2020andregisteredupto9may20
20provisional [accessed 16 May 2020]. 
26 Health and Social Care Act, 2008, section 145. 
27 Eilidh Turnbull, ‘Family visits and care home complaints: Getting it right’, British Institute of Human 
Rights, 30 April 2019, https://www.bihr.org.uk/blog/family-visits-and-care-home-complaints [accessed 6 
May 2020]. 
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the home under ECHR Article 8 has also been found to extend to contracts for 
accommodation in care home environments,28 and is reflected in the Care Quality 
Commission’s position that ‘we must never forget that care homes are people’s homes’.29  
Beyond protection against interference, Article 8 imposes positive obligations on 
government and those working on its behalf to ensure that private and family life, home 
and correspondence are respected.30 As such, care homes are required to take 
reasonable steps to enable regular contact between residents and their family and friends, 
such as providing dedicated spaces for private visits, and facilitating contact through 
telephone, post or other means.31 These duties are reflected in guidance issued by the 
independent regulator of health and social care providers in England, the Care Quality 
Commission, who impose the following obligations on social care providers:32 
 
Regulation 10(2)(a): People’s relationships with their visitors, carer, friends, family or relevant other 
persons should be respected and privacy maintained as far as reasonably practicable during visits. 
 
Regulation 10(2)(b): People must be supported to maintain relationships that are important to them 
while they are receiving care and treatment. 
 
The rights under Article 8 of the ECHR are qualified rather than absolute, meaning that 
they can be restricted where it is in pursuit of a legitimate aim set out in the Human Rights 
Act, and is both necessary and proportionate to the circumstances.33 In satisfying the test 
for necessity and proportionality with respect to obligations under Article 8 of the ECHR,  it 
has been argued that the ‘care home must show it has considered all other options 
available and picked the least restrictive option’.34 The risks posed by Covid-19 provide a 
clear justification under the ECHR Article 8(2) for temporary changes to care home 
visitation procedures to protect the health and safety of staff and residents. However, it is 
questionable whether the current balance struck by some care providers between staff and 
resident safety and residents’ need for social connection meets the test of proportionality 
and the principle of the least-restrictive alternative. Guidance provided by the Department 
of Health and Social Care initially ‘recommended that care homes limit unnecessary visits’, 
while maintaining that ‘visits at the end of life are important both for the individual and their 
loved ones’.35 However, considering the average length of stay in a care home prior to 
 
28 See, Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v. Donoghue [2001] EWCA Civ 595.  
29 Care Home Professional, ‘More care homes banning relatives who complain, charity warns’, 23 April 
2019, paragraph 4, https://www.carehomeprofessional.com/more-care-homes-banning-relatives-who-
complain-charity-warns/ [accessed 9 May 2020]. 
30 Marckx v. Belgium, Appl. no. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, held that Article 8 ‘does not merely compel the 
State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective ‘respect’ for family life’, [para. 31]. 
31 Care Quality Commission, ‘Information on visiting rights in care homes,’ October 2019 
https://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20191017_visiting_rights_information_2019_update.pdf 
[accessed 8 May 2020]. 
32 Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations, regulation 10. 
33 ECHR Article 8(2) holds that interference is justified only where it is in accordance with the law; in pursuit 
of a legitimate aim (national security, public safety, economic wellbeing, the prevention of disorder or 
crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others); and, 
necessary in a democratic society.  
34 Claire Burrows, ‘To what extent can a care home restrict visitors’ access?’, (Dec. 2019) 22(1) Nursing 
and Residential Care, paragraph 11.  
35 Department of Health and Social Care, ‘COVID-19: Our action plan for adult social care,’ Section 3.11, 
16 April 2020, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/879639/
covid-19-adult-social-care-action-plan.pdf [accessed 2 May 2020]. 
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death is approximately 26 months,36 the absence of clear guidance as to what constitutes 
a ‘necessary’ visit, and who is responsible for determining this, continues to cause 
understandable concern among some residents and their loved ones.37 In addition the 
social wellbeing of care home residents, the question of the ‘necessity’ should also be 
considered within the context of the accountability and oversight provided by external 
visitors to care home environments.38 With visits suspended, there may be an increased 
risk, or at least decreased visibility, of inhuman or degrading treatment of older people, 
potentially in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.  
 
Differences in interpretation and implementation of the Department of Health and Social 
Care guidelines have also resulted in a myriad of different policies, ranging from enhanced 
visitor management, such as supervising handwashing and scheduling visits, through to 
the suspension of all social visits outside of a palliative context.39 With guidelines for the 
management of Covid-19 in care homes under review at the time of writing, clear and 
unambiguous guidance on visitation procedures is needed to ensure that the rights and 
wellbeing of older people are uniformly protected. With respect to care homes’ obligations 
under Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, the least restrictive approach is surely one which 
allows for older people to receive visitors, while maintaining the health and safety of care 
home residents and staff. While the temporary imposition of no-visitor policies is perhaps 
appropriate during periods of an acute outbreak, it should not be the case that visitation is 
suspended as a defensive strategy across all care homes in the UK. Instead, reflecting 
their positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR, local authorities should be 
proactive in providing care homes with the resources required to adapt their visiting policies 
and procedures during this period.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The lives of older people have been significantly and disproportionately impacted by Covid-
19. While all older people in the UK are likely to have been impacted in some way with the 
introduction of physical distancing and isolation measures, this paper has drawn particular 
attention to the unique vulnerabilities facing socially isolated older people living in the 
community, those in need of care and support, and those residing in care homes. In each 
of these settings, the rapid changes seen since Covid-19, whether as a consequence of 
the illness itself, or policies developed in response, have exacerbated underlying 
vulnerabilities and raised several human rights concerns. As this public health crisis 
continues to develop, the rights and wellbeing of older people must remain a visible and 
critical consideration.  
 
 
36 Julien Forder and Jose-Luis Fernandez, ‘Length of stay in care homes’, Report commissioned by Bupa 
Care Services, PSSRU discussion paper 2769 (January 2011), https://www.pssru.ac.uk/pub/3211.pdf 
[accessed 3 May 2020]. 
37 See Relatives and Residents Association, ‘Coronavirus: Voices from the ground,’ 
https://www.relres.org/voices-from-ground/ [accessed 10 May 2020]. 
38 Alison Rahn, ‘Banning visitors to aged care during coronavirus raises several ethical questions – with no 
simple answers,’ 15 April 2020, https://theconversation.com/banning-visitors-to-aged-care-during-
coronavirus-raises-several-ethical-questions-with-no-simple-answers-134663 [accessed 10 June 2020]. 
39 Care Home Professional, ‘Coronavirus: Care home visitor restrictions called into question,’ 16 March  
2020, https://www.carehomeprofessional.com/coronavirus-care-home-visitor-restrictions-called-into-
question/ [accessed May 9 2020]. 
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Access to Justice: A Discussion 
Elizabeth Fisher Frank, Lee Hansen, Joanna Harwood, Jaime Lindsey and Timea Tallodi  
[DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_026] 
 
Some of the authors in this section got together to discuss some of the common themes 
and challenges arising from the issues they canvassed in their papers.  
 
A very obvious difficulty occurred when all services quickly went online; the 7% of the 
population who is unable to access the internet was doubly disadvantaged as the agencies 
normally available to help them access online services (libraries; community centres; 
advice groups) went fully virtual so the 7% were left without support and further 
marginalised. With respect to legal advice, telephone advice has been made available in 
some cases, as has online chat and text services, however it can be quite expensive for 
individuals to obtain telephone advice unless there are clear call-back arrangements in 
place. One can query, perhaps, whether legal advice and service providers were overly 
cautious in their approach to lockdowns. At the height of the lockdowns, one needed a 
reasonable excuse to go out and meet someone. Perhaps as a sector we need to consider 
whether we should have been more flexible in accommodating vulnerable individuals who 
could not access the internet with in-person meetings.  
 
With domestic abuse cases, accessing advice remotely when both victim and perpetrator 
are in the same household has been very difficult; however, there is very limited data 
available about what alternatives were put in place and whether they worked effectively. 
Furthermore, these access to justice gaps must be understood in a wider context in which 
law firms have been progressively limiting their legal aid agency work in the light of the 
impact of legal aid reform. 
 
Another area which requires further attention is “litigants in person”. For normal courtroom 
hearings there is a system of support in place which works relatively effectively in some 
locations. The Essex Law Clinic had already been planning to develop a student-led 
support project for “litigants in person”. It appears that these litigants have not been 
receiving support in virtual hearings.  
 
It is important that virtual hearings reflect the principles of open justice, as well. It is crucial 
to be able to scrutinise what is happening in the virtual court room, but observations have 
become more difficult. It is less straight-forward for researchers and members of the public 
to obtain permission to access; more questions are being asked by officials about why an 
applicant wants to dial-in to a hearing. It is also unclear whether virtual observations are 
perceived as more or less intrusive by litigants. Further research is needed on this point.  
 
The structural challenges to access legal aid in England and Wales stem from the strong 
reliance on the private sector, as well as the progressive cuts to legal aid provision under 
austerity policies. This differs, for example, from the approach taken in Australia (described 
in Hansen’s paper), where large public bodies deliver services directly to the public. The 
access to justice crisis in the UK invites us to look more fundamentally at the way we 
organize ourselves to deliver legal services, though there is not a natural organization to 
take the central role, given the fragmentation within legal aid service delivery. 
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It was recognised that the pandemic constitutes an important learning experience, in which 
all pre-existing problems with access to justice have been magnified. In the field of 
mediation, for example, it is not simply access to justice but comfort with the justice 
environment which contributes to successful justice outcomes. As mediation requires an 
open exchange addressing human needs and a dialogue in which parties gradually enter 
a deeper layer of their experience, concerns and wishes, videoconferencing is not the 
optimal channel for all mediations and for all individuals. A number of factors may 
negatively impact on parties’ experience of video mediation, reducing the likelihood for a 
successful resolution or achieving the best possible outcome. On the other hand, for those 
individuals who experience extreme stress from the courtroom experience or in-person 
face-to-face mediation, they may have a better online experience. Importantly, whilst at 
present practitioners are working on establishing trust with phone calls or web-based 
conflict resolution, after the pandemic, it will be essential that they carefully consider all 
factors in each individual case when advising on the best communication channel for 
mediation and conflict resolution. 
 
Overall, in all areas of legal advice including ADR, it is important to ensure that advice 
providers are able to treat the needs of their clients holistically. It is not only the narrow 
legal problem that deserves attention but the wider impact it is having on the person, and 
similarly how issues extraneous to law impact on legal problems. Whilst this idea was 
present in the past, for example as a precursor of the mediation movement, the realisation 
of the need for a holistic approach has been fortified in the pandemic across various areas 
of the law, legal casework and conflict resolution.  In this regard, advice providers should 
be prepared to engage with issues related to clients’ trauma associated with the pandemic, 
which may have a delayed impact. Such an approach should be incorporated into our 
learning and advice methodologies to best serve clients’ needs.   
 
Similarly, there is a sense that legal education, unlike medical education for example, has 
traditionally been less focused on ensuring that future lawyers are trained to respond to 
legal emergencies where the need for advice may be massive in both size and scope and 
urgent, such as pandemics. It would be important to integrate this into clinical training and 
the legal curriculum.   
 
There was a strong sense that detailed evaluation was needed of the virtual and other 
measures which were instituted to enable access to justice during the lockdown, and their 
effectiveness. There are advantages and disadvantages to the virtual systems and it would 
be important to identify what worked well and integrate it into the post-Covid justice 
systems. There is a need to look deeply at service delivery and to identify how blended 
approaches could be employed to increase both access to justice and the quality of the 
justice experience.  
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Covid-19 and Criminal Justice: Temporary Fixes or Long Term 
Reform? 
Donald Nicolson, Director of the Essex Law Clinic and Professor at the School of Law and Human Rights 
Centre, and Jago Russell, Chief Executive of Fair Trials* [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_027] 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Countries across the globe have been struggling with the question of how to keep the 
wheels of justice turning during the Covid-19 pandemic. Accordingly, both the UK and 
Scottish governments have taken a number of measures to ensure the justice system does 
not grind to a halt despite rules requiring social isolation and social distancing.  Most notably, 
they have moved court hearings (and even trials) online and the Scottish government has 
extended the exceptions to the hearsay rule to cover witnesses who cannot be in court 
because of Covid-19.  
 
Undoubtedly, these moves were motivated1 at least in part by the idea that “justice delayed 
is justice denied” which is guaranteed by article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) which provides a right to a trial within a “reasonable time” as one of its rights 
to a fair trial. Delays in trials may extend pre-trial custody and exacerbate all the anxieties 
and other material consequences of having important decisions hanging over one’s head. 
And it is not, of course, only the defendants who are affected by delays, but also witnesses, 
alleged victims, and all those with an interest in seeing justice done.  
 
However, the right to speedy justice is by no means the only aspect of the right to a fair trial 
raised by the coronavirus crisis. In fact, it clashes with various other of the protections 
accorded to criminal accused as part of the “due process” model of criminal justice2 which 
Herbert Packer defined as prioritising the protection of criminal suspects and accused 
through a variety of measures, such as the asymmetrical burden of proof, and the rights to 
silence, legal representation and to challenge prosecution evidence. Thus, recognising the 
power imbalances between the state and citizen which run throughout all aspects of the 
criminal justice system and the fact that wrongful decisions have more extreme 
consequences for convicted accused than acquittals have for the community, it has long 
been recognised that in Blackstone’s celebrated aphorism ‘it is better to let ten guilty men 
go free than to convict one innocent.’3 In addition, the law has increasingly come to grant 
suspects certain civil liberties associated with the right to fair trial and fair treatment which 
are not simply party of the “overprotection” of suspects and accused but can also be seen 
as a recognition of the inherent value of human dignity and autonomy and/or the legitimacy 
and d integrity of criminal proceedings. 
 
However,  speedy justice is not just a civil liberty. It is also a core element of the competing 
“crime control” model  of criminal justice which favours the quick and efficient processing 
 
* We would like to thank Eamon Keane for his useful comments on this article. 
1 Cf Scottish Government, ‘Covid-19 And Solemn Criminal Trials Scottish Government Discussion 
Document’, April 2020, 7-8, https://www.gov.scot/publications/coronavirus-covid-19-options-for-
progressing-the-most-serious-criminal-ca.   
2 Herbert Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford Univ. Press, 1968). 
3 Blackstone, Commentaries (1765-1769) 4.27.  
 208 
 
of suspected criminal activity, especially in the lower courts;4 an orientation which has seen 
a re-emergence in recent years not least because of the rise of what has been called ‘penal 
populism’5 and ‘managerialism’.6 At the same time, however, changes to the operation of 
the criminal justice systems in both England and Wales, and Scotland have not just come 
from government. Lawyers have also had to adapt the way they represent clients including, 
as we discuss, those who are in police custody.  
 
In this chapter we assess the impact of these changes on the procedural features and 
principles that have been developed over centuries in the two  criminal justice systems, 
considering in particular whether they are merely a temporary necessary evil in the face of 
a dangerous pandemic or whether they might become – or even should become – more 
permanent features of the criminal justice landscape in England and Wales and in 
Scotland. 
 
II. Early Access to Legal Representation  
 
The right to a lawyer is an essential safeguard in criminal proceedings and is now protected 
by Article 6 of the ECHR. It ensures vulnerable citizens some semblance of equality of arms 
with powerful investigating and prosecuting authorities. Given that what happens in police 
stations can cast a long shadow over subsequent proceedings, potentially representing the 
difference between conviction and acquittal, the right to representation applies here as well 
as in court, operating as a safeguard against coercion and ill-treatment, and helping suspects 
understand their other rights, including the right to remain silent.7 At least in principle, 
suspects in England and Wales had long enjoyed this right – a position which was put beyond 
doubt by the unambiguous decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)in  
Salduz v. Turkey.8 However, the same situation only came about in Scotland after the UK 
Supreme Court in Cadder v HMA9 found that the Scottish system of police custody permitting 
suspects to be questioned for six hours without access to a lawyer breached their human 
rights. In response, the Scottish Government legislated to recognise suspects’ right to 
privately consult with legal representatives before and at any other time during police 
questioning, but did not specifically provide a right to have them present during police 
questioning.10  
 
After lockdown was imposed in mid-March, the question arose as to whether lawyers should 
continue to attend police stations to advise arrested clients. In England and Wales, some 
custody sergeants initially continued to insist that suspects who requested lawyers should be 
given face-to-face legal advice. However, this created understandable fears about obvious 
health dangers, particularly in the absence of appropriate PPE and facilities to allow for social 
 
4 Cf Doreen McBarnet’s analysis of the “ideology of triviality” in terms of which cases in the lower courts are 
not regarded as serious enough to merit the full panoply of civil liberties protection: Conviction (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1981), ch. 7. 
5 Peter Duff, ‘Scottish Criminal Law Adrift?’ in Peter Duff and Pamela Ferguson (eds) Current 
Developments in Scottish Criminal Evidence Law (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2017), 227-34. 
6 Jenny McEwan, ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ (2011) 31 Legal 
Studies 519.   
7 Cf Beuze v Belgium, App no. 71409/10 (Judgment of 9 November 2018), § 125-13. 
8 App. no. 36391/02 (27 November 2008).  
9 [2010] UKSC 43, following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Salduz v. Turkey [GC], 
App. no. 36391/02, 27 November 2008. 
10 Section 15A(3) Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as inserted by Section 1(4) Criminal Procedure 
(Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010). 
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distancing.11 Consequently, in early April a number of stakeholders met to agree guidance 
on police interviews. This provides that, in the vast majority of cases, if a police interview is 
required, it should be conducted with lawyers and other specialist support services (such as 
interpreters) attending remotely, with the disclosure and custody record provided 
electronically to lawyers in advance.12 As a result, many lawyers are now conducting pre-
interview consultations with their clients remotely (by phone or videolink) and attending the 
interview itself via videolink.  
 
This arrangement might represent ‘a situation which is as good as we could possibly have 
hoped to achieve’,13 but it may lead in future trials to questions about the fairness of 
convictions that rely in any substantial way on evidence obtained during police interview (or 
drawing adverse inferences from silence) when suspects were refused face-to-face legal 
support in the police station. Whether such evidence (or silence) can be relied on is likely to 
depend on a number of factors such as whether: (a) the accused is particularly vulnerable, 
for example by reason of age or mental capacity; (b) the evidence formed an integral or 
significant part of the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based; and (c) 
whether other rights were complied with at the time of arrest and in custody.14 One would 
expect courts to be sympathetic to the exceptional circumstances of the pandemic and to 
admit evidence or inferences, where effective remote access to a lawyer was provided. 
Nevertheless, the police would be advised to take steps to pre-empt exclusion such as by: 
delaying arrest and interviews wherever possible and proportionate until health can be better 
protected; assessing the vulnerability of the suspect; ensuring that the technology is working 
properly; and ensuring social-distancing and PPE for face-to-face consultation and lawyer 
attendance at interview where the accused requests this or is vulnerable. Also relevant to 
potential exclusion are allegations by accused that they did not voluntarily waive the right to 
a lawyer (for example, where police wrongly state that lawyers are not available because of 
the pandemic). 
 
In Scotland, guidance from the Legal Aid Board published in May merely states: ‘Local Police 
Station Duty Solicitors will still be called on for any police station attendances in their local 
police stations.’15 Even before the pandemic it was rare for solicitors to attend police stations 
in person in Scotland. As JUSTICE Scotland reported, ‘the majority of requests for advice are 
concluded with the telephone call to a solicitor’ and ‘just 9% of people in detention received 
the advice and assistance of a solicitor present in person in the police station.’16 Guidance 
by the Law Society of Scotland had encouraged solicitors to consider attending police 
 
11 See Vicky Kemp, ‘Covid-19 and the Dangers of Providing Police Station Legal Advice in England and 
Wales’, April 2020, https://www.fairtrials.org/news/commentary-covid-19-and-dangers-providing-police-
station-legal-advice-england-and-wales. 
12 Interview Protocol between the National Police Chiefs Council, Crown Prosecution Service, Law Society, 
the Criminal Law Solicitors’ Association and the London Criminal Courts Solicitors’ Association, 24 April 
2020, https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/advice/articles/coronavirus-covid-19-interview-
protocol/. 
13 Ian Kelcey, ‘Criminal Justice in a Pandemic: The Courts’, Cambridge University Law Faculty, 28 May 
2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tXMJzCTAVAs&feature=youtu.be. 
14 Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], Apps. nos. 50541/08, 50571/08, 50573/08 and 
40351/09, 13 September 2016, § 274; Beuze v. Belgium [GC], App. no. 71409/10,  9 November 2018, § 
150; Sitnevskiy and Chaykovskiy v. Ukraine, Apps. nos. 48016/06 and 7817/07, 10 February 2017, §§ 78-
8. 
15 Scottish Legal Aid Board, ‘Covid-19: Custody courts and duty solicitors’, 26 March 2020, 
https://www.slab.org.uk/news/covid-19-custody-courts-and-duty-solicitors/. 
16 JUSTICE Scotland, ‘Legal assistance in the police station,’ 2018, 4, https://justice.org.uk/justice-
scotland/our-work/legal-assistance-in-the-police-station/. 
 210 
 
stations in person but, except for children or vulnerable adults, this was not binding.17 Indeed, 
it seems that, having advised clients by telephone to remain silent in the interview, solicitors 
frequently discourage them from requesting the lawyer’s in-person attendance during those 
interviews.18 Therefore, it is possible that Covid-19 has not had as significant an impact on 
mechanisms for providing legal advice and representation in police stations in Scotland as it 
has South of the border. 
 
Many pragmatic considerations seem to favour remote access to lawyers in police stations 
becoming - or in the case of Scotland, remaining - the norm. Lawyers have understandably 
long complained about the level of legal aid paid for police station attendance (which requires 
travel and often anti-social hours). It would not be surprising if demotivated and underpaid 
lawyers wanted to retain the increased efficiency of advising accused remotely from their 
homes or offices, perhaps even utilising centralised call centres. There may also be rights-
based reasons for the long-term retention of suitable remote technologies to help suspects 
exercise their rights in the police station. Perhaps, in Scotland, videoconferencing might come 
to replace telephone consultations and encourage more solicitors to participate in interviews. 
In England and Wales, this could address the worryingly high number of people (around 50%) 
who were waiving their right to free legal assistance before the pandemic,19 and concerns 
about the poor quality of advice provided and reliance on non-lawyer representatives.20  
 
However, if one returns to the underlying rationale of the right to legal representation in the 
police station, it seems clear that attendance in person is the gold standard. Having a defence 
lawyer with you in person is far more effective in building some semblance of equality of arms 
and the physical presence of a lawyer is a more effective safeguard against coercion and ill-
treatment.21 A lawyer who meets clients in person may also be more effective at explaining 
their rights and assessing whether they are vulnerable and in need of medical or other forms 
of specialist support. Beyond this, in-person meetings help to establish effective lawyer-client 
relationships, including by giving the defendant confidence that conversations are confidential 
and that the lawyer represents their interests and by creating a safe space within which to 
gather the information needed to prepare for trial or argue for pre-trial release.  
 
III. Remote Hearings  
 
The public drama of the courtroom dominates representation of criminal justice in film, TV 
and literature: the austere architecture; the key protagonists brought together (often in 
costume); the grand oratory and gesturing; the high tension when conflicting versions 
 
17 The Law Society of Scotland, ‘Police Station Interviews: Advice and Information from the Law Society of 
Scotland’, https://www.lawscot.org.uk/media/8819/police-station-advice-and-information-march-2015-
section-f-division-advice.pdf. 
18 JUSTICE Scotland (n. 16), p.8. 
19 Layla Skinns, ‘The Right to Legal Advice in the Police Station: Past, Present and Future’[2011] Crim LR 
19, 22. 
20 Cf ‘The Good Lawyer’, Transform Justice, July 2019, p.17; Vicky Kemp Effective Police Station Legal 
Advice - Country Report 2: England and Wales Project Report (University of Nottingham, 2018), 
(http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51145/1/Country%20Report%20England%20and%20Wales%20Final%20.
pdf); Legal Aid Agency, Improving Your Quality: A Guide to Common Issues Identified through Peer 
Review (4th edn) 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/490047
/peer-review-quality.pdf).  
21 See eg Hawkins v HMA [2017] HCJAC 79 where a confession made after only telephone advice not to 
say anything was excluded as the result of police pressure on the accused to change his story.  
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confront each other.22 While there is much dramatic license in these portrayals, hearings 
in open court play a central role in criminal justice. The public (directly or via the press), or 
those who witnessed or were victims of crime, can observe the serious spectacle of the 
rule of law in action and hopefully be satisfied that justice is done, thus legitimising the 
verdict.23 Public hearings also provide important protections to the accused. Indeed, 
according to Bentham, without publicity all other guarantees of truth-finding are insufficient. 
‘Publicity’ he wrote, ‘is the soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion and the surest 
of all guards against improbity.’24 It is also thought to render witnesses less inclined to 
falsify,25 especially if they have to face the gaze or questions of those who know the truth.26 
Moreover, having the accused physically brought to court soon after arrest, allows judges 
to see visible signs of mistreatment. Being physically present in court also allows the 
accused to better exercise their right to be heard by participating in the proceedings - 
seeing, hearing and responding to what is being said.27 It also makes it easier for the 
accused to consult their lawyer and receive support from friends and family.  
 
The dangers posed by Covid-19 place obvious obstacles in the way of normal courtroom 
hearings. Consequently, emergency legislation was passed permitting a wide range of 
court hearings to take place without the physical attendance of the accused, prosecution, 
defence or witnesses.28 Much of the work of Crown Courts in England and Wales, for 
example, has been done remotely including sentencing hearings, urgent applications 
(such as applications for bail and to extend custody time limits) and pre-trial preparation 
and case management hearings. In Scotland, one key area in which remote attendance 
has increased has been hearings to determine whether suspects should be detained or 
released pending trial.29 More generally in the UK, there has also  been a huge increase 
in the use of video-link and telephone during court hearings. For example, the number of 
cases heard each day in England and Wales which use remote technology increased from 
under 1,000 in the last week of March 2020 to approximately 3,000 by mid-April (1/3 using 
video and 2/3 audio).30  
 
In both England and Wales and Scotland, the question of what to do about jury trials during 
the pandemic posed particular problems. The large number of people involved in such 
trials (accused, judges, jurors, lawyers, witnesses, the public and press) make social 
distancing highly challenging.  In Scotland, the Government initially proposed to move to 
 
22 See Donald Nicolson, Evidence and Proof in Scotland: Context and Critique (Edinburgh Univ Press, 
2019), 165ff. 
23 Cf Anthony Duff, et al. The Trial on Trial: Volume 3 – Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial 
(Hart Publishing, 2007). 
24 Quoted by Adrian Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2nd edn, 2006), 88-9. 
25 See Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
vol. 6, 435. 
26 See eg. Coy v.Iowa 487 US 1012, 1019 (1988). 
27 Murtazaliyeva, v. Russia [GC], Application no. 36658/05, 18 December 2018. 
28 Coronavirus Act 2020, Schedules 23 to 26 and Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020, Schedule 4, para 2. 
29 Cf Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service, ‘Guidance in relation to Remote Hearings – Attendance by 
Electronic Means for Custody’, 4 June 2020, https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/default-
document-library/attendance-by-electronic-meansa5cacaa7898069d2b500ff0000d74aa7.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
30 Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, ‘Courts and Tribunals Data on Audio and Video Technology 
Use During Coronavirus Outbreak’, 14 April 2020, last updated 30 April 2020, 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals-data-on-audio-and-video-technology-use-during-
coronavirus-outbreak). 
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judge only trials as an emergency measure for up to 18 months,31 but the proposal was 
quickly withdrawn following a backlash by the legal profession and opposition parties.32 
Instead, as happened in England and Wales, jury trials were put on hold for several 
weeks.33 With the gradual relaxation of lock-down restrictions, jury trials have resumed, 
but at a much lower volume. To allow for social distancing each trial is spread across 
several court rooms.34 This has had a significant impact on backlog and delays. In 
Scotland, for example, the Chief Executive of the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service 
has warned that there could be a backlog of 3,000 trials by March 2021.35 In England and 
Wales, the Criminal Bar Association warn of a backlog of 40,000 cases, which will not be 
solved even if all Crown Courts are brought into service under physical distancing rules.36 
There has been some consideration of the feasibility of moving to online jury trials37 but, 
while the use of technology in jury trials has increased, the wholesale move online for trials 
has not happened.  
   
But even though the iconic jury trial has - so far at least38 - been retained, the significant 
shift to the use of remote technologies is changing the way courts operate. This has 
succeeded in preventing the criminal justice systems grinding to a halt completely but at 
the expense of maintaining traditional safeguards for protecting suspects and accused. 
Research suggests that defendants in remote hearings are more likely to be unrepresented 
 
31 Kate Wallace, ‘Jury-less trials are an opportunity to put victims at the centre of Scotland’s justice 
system’, Holyrood, 27 April 2020, https://www.holyrood.com/comment/view,juryless-trials-are-an-
opportunity-to-put-victims-at-the-centre-of-scotland_15426.htm. 
32 Tom Peterkin, ‘Legal profession and opposition vow to fight emergency plans to hold trials without juries 
in Scotland’, The Press and Journal, 31 March 2020, 
https://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/fp/news/politics/scottish-politics/2114473/as-a-row-erupts-over-non-jury-
trials-heres-your-guide-to-the-coronavirus-emergency-legislation-being-rushed-through-holyrood. Space 
constraints prevent detailed discussion; suffice to say that based on his recent study of evidence and proof 
the first named author is not convinced that this proposal should have been dropped so quickly: (See, 
Nicolson (n. 22), esp. at 172-4, 339-40). Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that juries are superior fact-
finders to judges: the benefits of having wider social backgrounds are arguably counterbalanced by the 
apparent greater tendency of jurors to be swayed by persuasive stories lacking logical coherence. 
Similarly, the relatively strict control exercised by the courts and law over jurors means that they do not 
often act as safeguards against state tyranny and corruption, or to democratise and inject “lay acid” into 
adjudication by bringing an element of common sense, equity, flexibility, popular and community justice, 
and a human face to the austerity and harshness which may emanate from the strict application of law. 
Admittedly, from a due process perspective, jurors acquit slightly more frequently than judges. However, 
this needs to be balanced against the possibility that judges (and lay adjudicators who might be appointed  
to sit with them) can be better educated than jurors as to the problems with perception, memory and recall 
of observational witnesses and the unreliability of many forms of scientific evidence. 
33 Severin Carrell, ‘Scotland Drops Plans to Suspend Jury Trials during Coronavirus Crisis’, The Guardian, 
1 April 2020.  
34 Jemma Slingo, ‘Socially-distanced Jury Trial Went Like Clockwork, Says Chambers’, Law Society 
Gazette, 29 May 2020. 
35 Reevel Alderson, ‘Coronavirus: Covid-19 Could Lead to Court Backlog of 3,000 Trials”, BBC, 19 May 
2020. 
36 Owen Bowcott, ‘England and Wales Face Backlog of 40,000 Criminal Cases Due to Coronavirus’, The 
Guardian, 20 May 2020. 
37 Linda Mulcahy, Emma Rowden, and Wend Teeder, ‘Exploring the Case for Virtual Jury Trials During the 
COVID-19 crisis: An evaluation of a pilot study conducted by JUSTICE’, April 2020, 
https://justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Mulcahy-Rowden-Virtual-trials-final.pdf. 
38 The Lord Chief Justice in England and Wales has suggested that it may be necessary to move to 
juryless trials in respect of less serious, “either way” offences or to consider reducing the number of jurors, 
Owen Bowcott, ‘Drop juries for less serious crimes in England and Wales, judges say’, The Guardian, 16 
June 2020.  
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and to receive a prison sentence or remand.39 The ability of suspects and accused to follow 
the trial and meaningfully participate though video-link can be significantly impaired due to 
malfunctioning equipment, isolation, fragmented view of the proceedings, and the absence 
of a lawyer by their side to help navigate the proceedings. The effects of isolation, 
increased complexity of the procedure, and risks of not being able to understand the 
process are increased for unrepresented suspects or accused persons or those with 
special needs.40  
 
Long before the pandemic, authorities in both jurisdictions had been looking to increase the 
use of technology in the courts to allow for remote attendance.41 In England and Wales, for 
example, there had been a gradual move towards defendants participating in hearings via 
videolink from prisons and police stations, such that between June 2018 and March 2020 
over 10,792 first appearance hearings took place remotely.42 Despite the many concerns 
about the impact on fairness, many within the legal professions have celebrated how the 
move to remote technologies has been accelerated during the pandemic. As with remote 
attendance at police stations, the question which inevitably arises (or will do so) is whether 
these changes should remain in place after the pandemic. The Lord Chief Justice of England 
and Wales has already indicated that ‘[t]here will be no going back to where we were’.43  
 
As with remote attendance at the police station, there may well be legitimate practical and 
principled reasons to facilitate more remote participation in hearings. Before doing so, 
however, it is crucial to fill the significant gaps in knowledge about the impact of remote 
attendance on outcomes and on procedural fairness. Is an accused person more or less likely 
to be detained or convicted if they appear in court via videolink? How many potential 
participants have the necessary technology and ability to use it? What happens when internet 
connections are slow or unstable? How does one ensure that witnesses giving evidence 
remotely are not intimidated or coached by those not in view?  
 
IV. Hearsay Evidence in Scotland 
 
By contrast to the situation with remote hearings, there is a much longer history of practice to 
draw upon in evaluating the justifiability of the Scottish Government’s changes to the hearsay 
rule. This has been defined as ‘[a]n assertion other than one made by a person while giving 
evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted.’44 The common 
law has long recognised a number of exceptions to this, including those caused by witness 
unavailability  In 1995, s. 259 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act (Scotland) codified and slightly 
 
39 For example, Penelope Gibbs, ‘Defendants on video – conveyor belt justice or a revolution in access?’, 
Transform Justice, October 2017; Legal Education Foundation ‘Briefing: Coronavirus Bill, Courts and the 
Rule of Law’, 18 March 2020; Anne Wallace ‘Courts and Coronavirus: Is Videoconferencing a Solution?’, 
18 March 2020, https://courttechbulletin.blogspot.com/2020/03/courts-and-coronavirus-is.html; Advocates 
Gateway ‘Planning to question someone using a remote link’, 20 March 2017, 
https://www.theadvocatesgateway.org/images/toolkits/9-planning-to-question-someone-using-a-remote-
link-2017.pdf.  
40 ‘Court Hearings Via Video 'Risk Unfairness For Disabled People’, The Guardian, 22 April 2020.  
41 See Scottish Courts and Tribunals Digital Strategy 2018-2023, available at 
https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/aboutscs/reports-and-data/reports-data/scts-digital-
strategy---final.pdf?sfvrsn=4. 
42 Monidipa Fouzder, ‘Open Justice Campaigner Calls for Video Remand Data to be Published”, Law 
Society Gazette, 30 March 2020. 
43 Select Committee on the Constitution, Uncorrected oral evidence: Constitutional implications of Covid-
19, Wednesday 13 May 2020 (Q6). 
44 Rupert Cross and Colin Tapper, Evidence (Oxford UP, 7th edn, 1990), 42.   
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extended the latter exceptions to include the situations where witnesses are dead, unfit or 
unable to give evidence or outside the UK, unidentifiable, have been advised that they might 
incriminate themselves, or refuse to take the oath or give evidence. This provision has now 
been amended to include the situation where requiring the witness to attend the court would: 
 
(a) …give rise to a particular risk to — 
(i) to the person's wellbeing attributable to coronavirus, or 
(ii) of transmitting coronavirus to others, and 
 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable for the person to give the evidence in any other 
competent manner.45 
 
If these circumstances apply and other conditions are met46, the court can admit documents 
prepared by the witness or allow hearsay testimony from those who had the relevant facts 
reported to them.  
 
Where such evidence is admitted, many of the traditional safeguards for ensuring the truth 
and accuracy of testimony are obviated without an alternative reason to trust the evidence, 
as applies in some of the common law exceptions to the hearsay rule.47 But there are no 
reasons other than expediency to justify removal of the truth-supporting role of the oath, 
observation of witness demeanour, and dialectic immediacy and the cross-examination of 
those who observed the facts in question. Of these truth-supporting mechanisms, the first 
three may only operate to prevent dishonesty which is far less common than witness 
inaccuracy through problems of perception, memory and recall, and in any event are not 
uniformly supported by empirical evidence of their effectiveness.48 By contrast, cross-
examination can be used to challenge both witness honest and accuracy. Admittedly, it can 
be used to make ‘the true look false and the false look true’.49 Nevertheless, in the absence 
of effective lie detectors, better means for evaluating witnesses or the emergence of “smoking 
gun” evidence which self-evidently reveals true facts (in which cases there are likely to be 
guilty pleas), it seems that Wigmore was only slightly exaggerating when he said that cross-
examination is the ‘greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’50 Indeed, 
its value extends beyond its instrumental “truth-certifying” role. By allowing those who face 
allegations an opportunity to test their veracity, cross-examination upholds principles of 
natural justice and makes participants more likely to accept adverse outcomes as 
legitimate.51 As a result, the failure to allow cross-examination may breach article 6 of the 
ECHR, at least when the witness was the sole or determinant source of evidence supporting 
 
45 Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020, Schedule 5, Part 5.  
46 Out of court statements can only be “first hand” hearsay, their maker must have been competent at the 
time and that proof of their having been made would not itself require hearsay evidence, whereas notice 
must be given if they are going to be led. 
47 For instance, the unlikelihood of people manufacturing evidence in the heat of the moment justifies the 
res gestae exception.  
48 See Nicolson, (n. 22),134, 283-6. 
49 Murray Schwarz, ‘On Making the True Look False and the False Look True’ (1988) 41 Southwestern Law 
Journal 1135.  
50 A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 5, (1974), para. 
13672. For supporting anecdotal and empirical evidence: see, respectively Francis Wellman, The Art of Cross 
Examination (Prentice Hall, 1903); Gwynn Davis, Steven. Cretney, and Jean Collins, Simple Quarrels 
(Clarendon Press, 1994), 246ff. 
51 See e.g., Genevra Richardson and Hazel Genn, ‘Tribunals in Transition: Resolution or Adjudication’ [2007] 
Public Law 116, 131. 
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the conviction and only when the authorities have not made all reasonable  effort to produce 
the witness for cross-examination.52 
 
Given this, while it is clearly not in anyone’s interest to require witnesses to attend court if 
they have Covid-19 or are particularly vulnerable to succumbing to its effects, it is less clear 
why courts cannot always require remote testimony which will then be subject to cross-
examination. Recovery times are not unduly long and in the sad cases where witnesses die, 
there is already an exception to the hearsay rule. There is also a danger that courts will not 
appropriately interrogate assertions of coronavirus health risks or assertions that remote 
testimony is not reasonably practicable,53 for instance by requiring positive tests and 
medical certificates. While, the Scottish Government understandably felt that it needed to 
act quickly, we are not sure that the hearsay provision was necessary or adequately 
considered.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
There are many ways in which societies have changed in response to Covid-19 and the same 
is true of criminal justice systems. The three areas of change discussed in this chapter raise 
questions about whether these changes are, in fact, justifiable and whether, even as 
temporary fixes, they offer appropriate protections for defence rights. Some of the 
contemporary impetuses towards a more crime control, rather than due process, orientation 
towards criminal justice suggest some Covid-19 measures might become permanent. This is 
especially so given that there will be serious backlogs to clear and even less public money 
available to invest in due process protections. We would strongly argue that any decisions 
about long-term changes to criminal justice systems (and, indeed, the safety of convictions 
imposed during Covid-19, which may have life-long consequences for convicted people) are 
not based on convenience or cost-savings but on evidence, including on how the criminal 
justice systems in England and Wales, and in Scotland work in practice.  
 
 
  
 
52 Van Mechelen and Others v Netherlands, 1997-III; Artner v Austria (1992) A 242-A, paras 19-24.  
53 See Eamon Keane, ‘Alarm Bells Ring Over Hearsay Proposals’, Scottish Legal News, 1 April 2020, 
https://www.scottishlegal.com/article/eamon-keane-alarm-bells-ring-over-hearsay-proposals.  
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Abstract 
The Covid-19 pandemic has the potential to spell the demise of access to justice for all but 
a select few. Prior to the crisis, the infrastructure for free and low-cost legal advice had 
been severely weakened by UK government policy and austerity-era budget cuts. Now, as 
solicitors are on furlough, law centres are on the brink of collapse and lockdowns have led 
to widespread service closures and restrictions, the legal needs of many members of 
society are set to multiply and may remain unmet.  
 
In the face of other crises (9/11, Bushfires, Grenfell), members of the legal support sector 
(legal aid providers, law centres, pro bono practitioners) worked together. This resulted in 
much needed help in the form of free legal advice to the affected communities.  
 
This paper surveys the lessons learned from such interventions. It explores the extent to 
which these experiences may serve as guidance to address the legal needs arising from 
the current crisis posed by the pandemic. It also highlights the unique features of the Covid-
19 crisis. This suggests the need to look beyond ad hoc and technologically based 
measures (which worked in the past) to assert a more prominent role for the state in the 
legal advice sector.    
 
Keywords: Legal Advice; Social Welfare Law; Solicitors; Covid-19; Access to Justice 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In England and Wales the term “social welfare law” has been defined as the law concerning 
‘asylum, community care, education, employment, debt, housing, immigration and welfare 
benefits.’1 It is likely that the Covid-19 pandemic will impact vastly upon individuals in all of 
these areas of life. Those who advise upon social welfare law (referred to here, collectively, 
as the ‘legal support sector’ or more simply ‘the sector’), will play a key role in ensuring 
that individuals experiencing health, economic and others impacts from the pandemic are 
aware of their legal rights and how they may be enforced.  
 
However, the reality is that following a decade of austerity the sector is in a weakened 
position to assist. Historically, legal aid played a central role in enabling the provision of 
social welfare legal advice. However, after the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of 
Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) came into force, the scope of advice that was able to be 
funded under the legal aid scheme was dramatically limited.2 As a result, many legal aid 
 
* Thank you to Eugenio Vaccari, Lucy Davies and Carla Ferstman for comments on an earlier version of 
this piece. Any errors remain the responsibility of the author.  
1 The Low Commission, ‘Appendix 2 – Social Welfare Law Contextual Issues’ in Final Report of the Low 
Commission, < https://www.lag.org.uk/about-us/policy/the-low-commission-200551 > accessed 11 June 
2020, 1. 
2 Those areas of law that remain within scope are set out in Schedule 1 of LASPO. These include 
community care (para. 6); welfare benefits appeals to the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal or Supreme 
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providers and law centres closed or had to refocus their business upon more commercially 
viable areas of law.3  
 
From this weakened position the legal support sector must now mobilise to respond to the 
Covid-19 crisis. In forming its response, consideration may be given to how the sector has 
responded to other crises, whilst taking stock of the unique features of this current health 
and economic crisis. 
 
In this paper, consideration will be given to three crises from the UK and abroad. The three 
crises considered are the: 
 
• 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, USA in 2001 and their 
aftermath,  
• Bushfires in Victoria, Australia in the Summer of 2009 and the more recent 
Australian bushfires of 2019/20 and their aftermath, and 
• The Grenfell Tower fire in Kensington, London, UK in 2017 and its aftermath. 
 
One of the purposes of this comparative study is to investigate how the legal support sector 
responded to these crises, and to highlight the lessons that may be drawn and applied to 
the current Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
II. Legal Needs Arising from the Covid-19 Pandemic 
 
There has not yet been time for a systematic study of the legal needs arising from the 
Covid-19 pandemic in England and Wales.4 One report has indicated an initial increase in 
demand ‘particularly around employment / redundancy issues and claiming Universal 
Credit’.5 This was said to be followed by a drop in demand below normal levels presumably 
as people take time to adjust to a new reality and deal with other more urgent matters.6 
Requests for assistance are expected to re-emerge at a later point, perhaps when 
lockdowns are relaxed; this has been predicted to include ‘a large new cohort of people 
with Covid-19 legacy issues.’7 
 
It should also be noted that people in need of legal support may already be in a vulnerable 
position prior to this Covid-19 crisis taking hold. This situation has been exacerbated 
through benefit cuts and other reductions in public funding in recent years.8 This raises a 
 
Court (para. 8); family matters for victims of domestic violence (para. 12); housing where there is a risk of 
the loss of home (para. 33); homelessness (para. 34) risk of safety in a rented home (para. 35). 
3 The closure of Brent Community Law Centre was announced on 6 March 2020: Legal Action Group, 
‘Brent Community Law Centre closes its doors’ Legal Action March 2020; Legal Action Group, ‘Lambeth 
Law Centre Closes Down’ Legal Action July 2019; Owen Bowcott, ‘Legal advice centres in England and 
Wales halved since 2013 – 14,’ The Guardian, 15 July 2019.  
4 On 5 June 2020 the Civil Justice Council on the impact of COVID-19 on Civil Court Users recognised a 
reduction in the ability to access advice and an increase in the general need for legal advice. See,  Civil 
Justice Council, ‘The impact of COVID-19 measures on the civil justice system,’ May 2020 [4.4 – 4.6],  < 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CJC-Rapid-Review-Final-Report-f.pdf > accessed 12 
June 2020. 
5 Lindsey Poole, ‘A Quick Appraisal of the Impact of Covid-19 on the Advice Sector’, Administrative Justice 
Council Webinar, 29 April 2020 < https://ajc-justice.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ASA-Report-COVID-
19-.pdf accessed 11 June 2020. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8  Ibid, 2. 
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broader question beyond the scope of this paper of whether the re-emergence of a welfare 
state may increase society’s resilience in the face of such crises in the future. 
 
One can expect employment, debt, housing and welfare benefits issues to emerge from 
the pandemic together with legal issues connected to the bereavement of family members. 
There are also reports of increased incidents of domestic violence as families spend more 
time together in lockdown which give rise to the need for legal interventions.9 
 
There are also some available sources of data on the types of issues being queried on the 
Citizens Advice webpages. Out of 2.8 million webpage views about welfare benefits for the 
period 16 March – 6 May, 1 million were on universal credit.10  There were also 2.3 million 
views on employment issues which included a 77% increase when compared to the same 
period in 2019.11 Traffic to the website also shows increased concern about reloading of 
prepayment meters, debt issues and self-employment.12  
 
What emerges from this cursory analysis is the need for a rapid assessment of the legal 
needs arising in the current crisis. This must be done to enable legal advice organisations 
and governments to allocate resources in an informed matter, to meet the needs of the 
population.  
 
Lessons can be learnt on how to carry out this assessment. For instance, an analysis of 
the Australian Government’s response to the 2009 bushfires in Victoria, Australia showed 
that the sector can valuably participate in predicting, to the extent that is possible, legal 
needs that may arise as effects of a crisis. Such an approach should be factored into 
emergency management planning both for the current and any future crises.13 
 
III. Immediate Impacts of Covid-19 on the Sector in England and Wales 
 
As has been noted above, law centres were already in a vulnerable position as a result of 
the changes brought about by LASPO. Following those changes several law centres have 
been forced to close. Recently in 2019 this included Lambeth Law Centre after almost 40 
years of providing services to the local community of Lambeth in London. It is to be 
expected then that as the Covid-19 crisis hit, the Law Centres Network (LCN), which is the 
peak body for Law Centres in England and Wales, was concerned. The very survival of 
remaining law centres that had successfully managed to see off LASPO was under threat 
by this crisis. In response to these circumstances the UK Government has channelled £3 
million to law centres with grants being distributed by the LCN.14 The announcement also 
 
9 Carol Storer, ‘Editorial – We are Working to Ensure Access to Justice during the Covid-19 Crisis and 
Beyond’ Legal Action May 2020 (Legal Action Group). See also, the paper by Jo Harwood in this 
publication. 
10 Carol Storer, ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Gemma Byrne, Senior Policy Researcher at Citizens Advice tweeted a graph with this data represented 
on 1 April 2020, < https://twitter.com/gbyrne03/status/1245421387076042758/photo/1 > accessed 11 June 
2020. 
13 Victoria Legal Aid, ‘Legal assistance and Community Recovery after the 2009 Victorian Bushfires,’ 
March 2010. < https://www.probonocentre.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NA2JPBC2010-
BushfireLegalHelpReport-36.pdf > accessed 11 June 2020.  
14 Ministry of Justice, ‘£5.4 million to support legal advice sector during the COVID-19 pandemic,’ 4 May 
2020, < https://www.gov.uk/government/news/5-4-million-to-support-legal-advice-sector-during-the-covid-
19-pandemic > accessed 11 June 2020. 
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includes new funding in the amount of £2.4 million for other organisations providing 
specialist social welfare legal advice to be distributed from the Community Justice Fund 
by the Access to Justice Foundation who is also conducting an ‘Emergency Advice Appeal’ 
for donations to the fund.15 
 
A significant proportion of legal aid solicitors have been placed on furlough.16 The Legal 
Aid Agency (LAA) has also announced a series of changes to their policies. This includes 
for example changes to policies on remote working, processing and payments, working 
with clients and contract management and assurance. The LAA states that its aim ‘is to 
make it as easy as possible for legal aid firms to continue to provide advice to their 
clients.’17 
 
As a result of LASPO a significant amount of expertise in social welfare law has been 
drained out of the system. Practitioners who had dedicated their working lives to supporting 
the most marginalised and disadvantaged members of our society to navigate a complex 
legal system have been made redundant or otherwise redeployed. With this loss of 
expertise there is a decreased capacity to respond effectively in the current crisis. 
 
In concluding this section, it should be noted that many of the organisations mentioned 
above play a key role in responding to such crises due to the proximity with the people 
most badly affected by them. Law centres, for example, are based within and known by 
their local communities. This suggests the need for a stronger sector backed by increased 
support from the state.18 
 
IV. The Sector’s Response to the Australian Bushfires 
 
In the Australian summer of 2019-20 the country experienced a massive uncontrolled 
bushfire season. On this occasion people affected by these fires were well served by 
dedicated legal services Disaster Legal Help Victoria and the Disaster Response Legal 
Service NSW.19 These services stem from an earlier initiative responding to bushfires 
which occurred in the Australian summer of 2009 in the state of Victoria. There the local 
 
15 Ibid; Access to Justice Foundation, ‘Emergency Advice Appeal’ < https://atjf.org.uk/emergencyappeal > 
accessed 12 June 2020. 
16 13.5% of young legal aid lawyers have reported being furloughed. See, Young Legal Aid Lawyers, 
‘Second YLAL Covid-19 Report,’ 25 May 2020, < 
http://www.younglegalaidlawyers.org/secondcovid19report > accessed 12 June 2020. 
17 Legal Aid Agency, ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19): Legal Aid Agency contingency response,’ 18 March 2020, 
last updated 21 April 2020 < https://www.gov.uk/guidance/coronavirus-covid-19-legal-aid-agency-
contingency-response > accessed 11 June 2020. 
18 See e.g., the Report of the Bach Commission which recommends the introduction of a legally 
enforceable right to legal aid modelled on the enforceability mechanisms of the Human Rights Act (1998): 
Fabian Society, ‘The Right to Justice – The Final Report of the Bach Commission,’ September 2017; For a 
bolder vision of socialised access to justice see Tom Cornford, ‘The Meaning of Access to Justice,’ In Ellie 
Palmer, Tom Cornford, Audrey Guinchard and Yseult Marique (eds), Access to Justice: Beyond the 
Policies and Politics of Austerity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) 27–40. 
19 Disaster Legal Help Victoria, ‘Submission to the Inquiry into the 2019–20 Victorian Fire Season,’ 20 April 
2020, < https://www.disasterlegalhelp.org.au/sites/www.disasterlegalhelp.org.au/files/dlhv-submission-
inquiry-into-2019-20-victorian-fire-season.pdf > accessed 11 June 2020; Disaster Legal Help Victoria, 
‘Submission to the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements,’ 8 May 2020, < 
https://www.disasterlegalhelp.org.au/sites/www.disasterlegalhelp.org.au/files/dlhv-submission-royal-
commission-into-national-natural-disaster-arrangements.pdf > accessed 11 June 2020. 
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legal aid authority, Victoria Legal Aid, co-ordinated with pro bono organisations and 
community legal services to provide a dedicated service to the public.  
 
In 2009 the programme was set up as Bushfire Legal Help (BLH). Partners moved quickly 
to set up ‘The Bushfire Legal Help Hotline’. This operated as a single port of call.20 There 
was an existing infrastructure that partners were able to tap into - Victoria Legal Aid’s 
telephone advice line.21 Having a similar single port of call in the Covid-19 crisis could 
make it easier for people to find the help they need.  
 
BLH also set up face to face advice clinics at relief centres across bush fire affected areas. 
By situating themselves at relief centres, lawyers had a ‘visible presence at the frontline 
services alongside other agencies such as Centrelink, health services, and local 
governments.’22  
 
An analysis has been conducted of the initial queries received at the centres. These 
included ‘insurance issues, fencing, business, rental property, statutory declarations, 
family law issues and Wills.’23 Many of these queries are pertinent to the Covid-19 crisis. 
 
Subsequently, BLH also co-ordinated the development of information and resources 
including factsheets ‘on topics such as insurance, fencing, coronial processes and the 
2009 Bushfires Royal Commission’.24 Again, a co-ordinated approach to the development 
of the public legal information materials related to Covid-19 is warranted and this should 
be informed by the sector’s assessment of the important areas of legal need arising from 
the crisis. 
 
Following the immediate aftermath of the bushfires, Victoria Legal Aid established a 
‘Bushfire Insurance Unit’ comprised of four lawyers. They assisted clients with insurance 
and banking issues and were able to undertake ongoing casework and advocacy on behalf 
of clients.25 There are likely to be ongoing legal issues arising in the aftermath of the Covid-
19 pandemic and now is the time to begin to plan for a dedicated casework service such 
as what was set up by Victoria Legal Aid, who can build up specialist knowledge in the 
area. 
 
In 2010 Victoria Legal Aid together with project partners undertook a detailed evaluation 
and report on the initiative which included key recommendations and learnings from the 
intervention. These included: 
 
1. The need to integrate legal services into emergency disaster strategies and 
planning;26 
2. The need to develop collaborative and multidisciplinary service models in order to 
best meet the complex and diverse issues that arose.27 Such an approach will make 
 
20 Victoria Legal Aid, ‘Legal assistance and Community Recovery after the 2009 Victorian Bushfires,’ 
March 2010, < https://www.probonocentre.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NA2JPBC2010-
BushfireLegalHelpReport-36.pdf > accessed 11 June 2020.  
21 Ibid, 7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid, 9. 
26 Ibid, 32. 
27 Ibid, 33. 
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it ‘easier for clients to navigate their way through the complexities of the problem 
they are facing’;28 
3. The need for proactivity in the legal assistance sector in order to recognise legal 
and social problems stemming from the emergency (including longer term 
problems) and the need to bring these to the attention of government and planning 
bodies. 29 
 
This analysis also showed that the following factors contributed to the success of the 
partnership. First the creation of a strong single entity. Second, the quick mobilisation of 
existing resources. And third, the need for effective and existing resources.30 The 
similarities in the nature of the bushfire and Covid-19 crises suggest that these elements 
should be taken in consideration even in England and Wales. 
 
However, there is nothing in England and Wales to compare with the existing infrastructure 
and considerable size of Victoria Legal Aid, a singular organisation able to achieve 
economies of scale, with approximately 1500 lawyers employed at various locations 
around the State. This clearly enabled the organisation to play a key leadership role in 
establishing a service collaboratively with other stakeholders. This casts doubts on the 
ability of a fragmented sector in England and Wales to provide the same support as is 
evidenced in Australia.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the English and Welsh legal support sector can organise 
itself in response to the Covid-19 crisis in the way that the Australian profession was 
commendably able to achieve in response to the bushfires of 2009 and 2019/20.  
 
V. The Sector’s Response to the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks 
 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington DC on 11 September 2001 gave rise to legal needs in the areas of benefits, 
landlord and tenant, insurance, consumer law and wills and estates.31 Over 4,000 persons 
affected by this event received pro bono support through a scheme co-ordinated by the 
New York Bar.32  
 
As we saw in response to the Australian bushfires, a successful element of the sector’s 
response to the 9/11 fallout is that of collaboration with a number of legal support 
organisations contributing, including ‘bar associations, leading law firms, pro bono, public 
interest, and legal services organisations, community groups, and other social service 
providers’.33 
 
A key measure taken was the ‘facilitator project’ in which pro bono practitioners (800 took 
part) were matched with a victim or family to provide legal support across the broad range 
 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Association of the Bar of the City of New York Fund Inc, The NALP Foundation for Law Career Research 
and Education and Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University School of Law, ‘Public 
Service in a Time of Crisis,’ 2004, < https://www.citybarjusticecenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/10/public-service-time-crisis.pdf > accessed 11 June 2020, 12. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Deborah Rhode, ‘Pro Bono in Times of Crisis: Looking Forward by Looking Back’ (2003-4) 31(4) 
Fordham Urban Law Journal 1019. 
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of legal issues that might have arisen.34 Lawyers as ‘facilitators’ would ‘conduct a legal 
inventory, prioritize the client/family’s needs, act as a problem solver to represent or refer 
the client in an exemplary and expeditious manner, and find other experts to assist with 
special legal needs.’35 
 
As issues would inevitably arise outside of practitioners’ expertise, training was provided 
by experts co-ordinated by the New York Bar.36  
 
An interesting insight that followed from the pro bono response was the way the crisis 
acted as a driver for members of the profession to engage in pro bono services.37 These 
services may represent at least a partial solution to meet the legal needs arising from the 
Covid-19 epidemic in England and Wales. Whereas public funding may provide long term 
solutions to deal with future crises, pro bono interventions may at least help to prop up the 
system in the immediate term. 
 
Consideration may be given to whether there are new volunteers who may be utilised 
amidst the current Covid-19 crisis. LawWorks, a pro bono charity for solicitors in England 
& Wales provides training and has advised that solicitors on furlough are still able to 
engage in pro bono activities.38 
 
One negative point that has been observed was that pro bono practitioners involved in the 
9/11 legal assistance projects had a less than fully satisfying experience.39 It would be 
valuable to explore why this was so, so that pro bono practitioners may be better supported 
in future. Accordingly, a lesson for the current crisis is to obtain detailed feedback from pro 
bono volunteers on their experience in providing assistance to people impacted by the 
Covid-19 crisis and to consider in depth the support and supervision that is provided.  
 
It has been recognised in the context of this post 9/11 work that there was an absence of 
‘systematic quality control and evaluation of lawyer assistance.’40 Pro bono services often 
have an ‘inadequacy of evaluation’ as pro bono providers are said to have constrained 
resources.41 Again, it is important to integrate evaluation into  any Covid-19 response as it 
will allow for timely improvements to service provision, and for lessons to be learned for 
ongoing or future interventions. 
 
It is also noted that whilst the 9/11 terrorist attacks provided an opportunity to mobilize the 
New York Bar it also laid the foundations for broader change, inviting: ‘focus on the 
strategies necessary to engage greater numbers of lawyers in public service on a 
sustained basis’.42 In addition to this there is emphasis on the need for there to be an 
 
34 ‘Public Service in a Time of Crisis’ (n. 31), 11. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid, 15. 
37 Rhode (n. 33), 1014. 
38 LawWorks, ‘COVID-19: Legal pro bono and volunteering while on furlough,’ April 2020, < 
https://www.lawworks.org.uk/solicitors-and-volunteers/resources/covid-19-legal-pro-bono-and-volunteering-
while-furlough > accessed 11 June 2020. 
39 Rhode (n. 33), 1016. 
40 Ibid, 1018. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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existing ‘corps of committed volunteers and adequate support structures should already 
be in place.’43  
 
It is interesting that there may be a greater emphasis in the USA on the need for pro bono 
services, where commentators may have all but given up hope that such provision will ever 
be catered for by the government. In contrast, in England  and Wales there is clear 
recognition of a role for pro bono services but the role of pro bono may be more limited in 
its scope as it is only in recent times that the government has largely withdrawn from legal 
aid provision and there is considerable pressure for this to be reinstated.44 
 
VI. The Sector’s Response to the Grenfell Tower Inferno 
 
This paper so far looked at international answers to crises that present significant 
similarities with the Covid-19 epidemic. This comparative analysis evidenced the value of 
sectoral collaboration in response to a crisis and to the support that pro bono practitioners 
may also provide. However, it is also possible to look at the English response to the 
Grenfell Tower fire to draw important lessons. 
 
On 14 June 2017 the Grenfell Tower Fire occurred resulting in 72 deaths and the 
destruction of the tower block. In addition to legal concerns connected to bereavement of 
the deceased and injuries of survivors, all remaining residents numbering over 200 had to 
be relocated creating housing and homelessness issues.  
 
A collaborative response to the crisis was led by North Kensington Law Centre (NKLC). 
NKLC is a law centre with a 50-year history of providing social welfare law services to the 
local community. NKLC collaborated with Shelter, the Housing Law Practitioners 
Association, Citizens Advice and pro bono members of the Collaborative Plan for Pro 
Bono. The pro bono response was significant with many commercial and city firms getting 
involved. In the aftermath of the event they ran daily drop-in sessions at premises 
neighbouring the Grenfell site.45  
 
The NKLC’s own response was constrained by the backdrop of austerity – it had to rely on 
public donations, charitable grants and pro bono volunteering in order to be able to provide 
a service to those who were affected. Legal aid had largely been taken out of scope in 
many of the areas of law where legal advice was needed.46  
 
The law centre undertook policy advocacy as well, highlighting for example the ongoing 
problems with rehousing of residents.47 This emphasises an important aspect of law centre 
activity. Drawing on their direct service provision, they are able to provide advice to 
government on the areas of law that are in need of reform or policies that are being poorly 
 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, 1021. 
45 Mondipa Fouzder and John Hyde, ‘Grenfell Tower fire: lawyers step up pro bono efforts’ Law Gazette, 12 
June 2020, < 
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/grenfell-tower-fire-lawyers-step-up-pro-bono-efforts/5061613.article > 
accessed 12 June 2020. 
46 John Robins, ‘Underfunded and overstretched: the lawyers seeking justice for Grenfell’ The Guardian, 24 
July 2017.  
47 North Kensington Law Centre, ‘Rehousing Grenfell Survivors’, 2018, < https://www.nklc.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/130/2018/06/Rehousing-Grenfell-Survivors-One-Year-On.pdf > accessed 12 June 
2020. 
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implemented. In the Australian context this has been recognised as a unique feature of 
law centre work and can be contrasted with the weaker or less coordinated contributions 
made to public policy debates by others such as legal aid providers.48 In the UK, Shelter 
is both a large legal aid provider and campaigning organisation and was able to undertake 
campaigning work after Grenfell. Such a strength in the public policy sphere should be 
factored into the sector’s response to the current crisis. 
 
The pro bono response by the profession to Grenfell led the Australian Pro Bono Centre 
to suggest development of a ‘pro bono emergency response plan’ as a way ‘for the legal 
profession to contribute to our country’s resilience and assist in these times of need.’49 
Again such an approach is also suggested following on from the Australian bushfires 
experience and is a key lesson that should inform future planning. 
 
A focus of discussion has been on the shortcomings in the law leading up to Grenfell,50 
and how the residents were poorly served in terms of their access to legal services prior 
to the fire.51 There has been more limited discussion of victim’s access to legal services 
after the fire. The first phase of a public inquiry into the Grenfell fire has concluded, with 
the second phase set to continue in 2020. The second phase of the inquiry is not due to 
cover issues of access to justice arising before and after the inferno.52 When the terms of 
reference were being proposed NKLC made detailed submissions as to why access to 
legal aid should be included.53 It would have helped the sector if the post disaster legal 
response had been considered, this might have provided valuable learning of relevance to 
the current Covid-19 crisis and for future emergency response planning for the profession.  
 
The co-ordinated response by the NKLC demonstrates the value of having community-
based organisations respond to local crises. Even in a world-wide pandemic, community-
based legal service organisations are able to understand the needs of their communities 
and employ effective strategies to reach them. Investment in such organisations will also 
improve the sector’s resilience in the face of future crises.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
Social welfare law touches upon the most basic needs of individuals including their rights 
to safety and decent treatment at work, to a minimum level of income through work or 
benefits, to education and shelter. The importance of access to advice about such matters 
is magnified in times of a public health crisis. Until a recent cash injection, the legal support 
 
48 Nicole Rich, ‘Reclaiming Community Legal Centres: Maximising our potential so we can help our clients 
realise theirs,’ Victoria Law Foundation Community Legal Centre Fellowship 2007-8 Final Report, 
December 2008, https://victorialawfoundation.org.au/sites/default/files/attachments/VLF%20-%20CLC-
report-08.pdf accessed 12 June 2020. 
49 ‘Legal Assistance in the UK Supports Grenfell Victims’ (August 2017) 120 Australian Pro Bono News < 
https://www.probonocentre.org.au/apbn/legal-assistance-supports-grenfell-victims/ > accessed 12 June 
2020. 
50 See e.g., Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Following Grenfell : Access to Justice,’ January 
2019, < https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/following-grenfell-briefing-access-to-
justice.pdf > accessed 12 June 2020. 
51 E.g., Sir Henry Brooke, The LASPO Review: My Recent Talk about the Bach Commission's Report on 
the Right to Justice (2018) 6 Birkbeck L. Rev. 1, 13.  
52  Chapter 34 of the Phase 1 report of the public inquiry into the Grenfell tower fire, available at: 
https://assets.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/GTI%20-%20Phase%201%20full%20report%20-
%20volume%204.pdf. 
53 The Housing Law Practitioners Association also made such a submission.  
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sector had been starved of public funding leading to it being in a weakened position to 
handle this Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
As this paper has shown, the sector regularly responds to situations of crises.  
 
There are keys lessons drawn from each response that are of relevance to the current 
crisis: 
 
The Australian sector worked in partnership in response to bushfires and demonstrated 
the value of having a single port call for people affected by crisis. This also highlighted the 
value of a co-ordinated approach to the development of public legal information materials. 
The initiative also showed the benefit for the sector and its clients in predicting legal needs 
in the context of emergency response planning. Finally, the Australian response showed 
the leadership that a strong legal aid authority with an army of public-facing lawyers was 
able to provide.  
 
The USA sector’s partnership in response to 9/11 showed the role that pro bono can play 
where the government is unwilling or unable to fulfil its obligation to provide access to legal 
advice. The USA example also provides a model of assistance (‘lawyer as facilitator’ role) 
that is worthy of consideration in the current crisis. Finally, this USA programme poses 
broader questions of more fundamental change to the profession and its pro bono ethos 
suggesting the value of readily available corps of volunteers who may be deployed in the 
face of a crisis.  
 
In the UK following Grenfell we have seen the importance of a community-based service 
operating in coordination with stakeholders. We have also observed the significant role for 
the sector in relying on their frontline experience to provide input into policy and law reform 
debate arising in and out of the crisis.  
 
Looking forward, a further study should examine how other countries have mobilised legal 
aid in response to the pandemic. It would also be useful to explore how the collaborations 
highlighted in this piece have led to new and similar initiatives under the current public 
health crisis. In England and Wales there are early signs of some such collaborations at 
least on a sectoral basis (that is to say within distinct areas of law).54 
 
What has ultimately figured in the background to this current study is the role of the state 
in providing public funding for social welfare law advice. Across the three jurisdictions 
considered, the extent of public funding in the legal support sector has varied from low 
(Australia, England and Wales) to virtually non-existent (USA).   
 
The unique crisis that we face in public health and in our economy warrants a greater 
emphasis upon the role of the state in the funding and support of public services. The 
economic assumptions that underpinned the recent neo-liberal agenda of reduced 
 
54 For example the Housing Law Practitioners Association (HLPA) and Shelter have campaigned 
throughout the current pandemic on housing issues and coordinated with law centres. HLPA were 
interveners in the case of Arkin v Marshall & Anr [2020] EWCA Civ 620 where the Court of Appeal upheld a 
practice direction postponing all possession actions during the crisis (PD51Z). The HLPA used evidence 
that had been gathered from legal aid practitioners and law centre housing lawyers: < 
http://www.hlpa.org.uk/cms/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Arkin-v-Marshall-HLPA-evidence.pdf > accessed 
12 June 2020.  
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investment in public services is likely to be proven wrong by the current crisis and its 
economic aftershocks. A broader debate will shortly follow on the resilience that a 
reinvigorated welfare state provides in a time of crisis. In that discussion practitioners of 
social welfare law should be towards the front of the queue in arguing for sustainable public 
investment in the sector.  
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Making Do or Brave New World? 
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I. Introduction 
 
For some time now, university law clinics have played an important role in filling the gap 
between those who qualify for legal aid and those who can afford to pay for legal services. 
This is a need which continues to grow as legal aid is inexorably cut back in terms of both 
those who qualify and those issues it covers.1 More recently there have been calls for 
lawyers and more latterly law clinics and other not for profit organisations to use the rapidly 
evolving capacity of the internet and digital computing facilities to expand the ability of 
service providers to both assist their clients and to develop ways, through technology, to 
help clients help themselves.  
 
Indeed, more than thirty years2 ago Richard Susskind3 began to argue that the digital 
revolution, which was only beginning to show itself, would and should also lead to a 
revolution in legal services, and suggested that such development could even mean, the 
end of the profession as we know it.  While he has had to adjust his prediction about the 
timescale in which this revolution would take place, there are now visible signs of the legal 
profession embracing a wide range of digital means to deliver legal services, ranging from 
the very mundane such as computerised case management systems, digital document 
storage and search tools to online platforms allowing clients to create their own legal 
contracts. Equally, courts have also begun to get in on the act, for instance by enabling 
court documents to be filed online and encouraging online dispute resolution.4  Moreover, 
as the papers in this publication show, the Covid-19 crisis, has caused those responsible 
for delivering legal and courts services to turn to the internet and digital computing to try 
as far as possible to maintain “business as usual”.  
 
A similar trajectory describes the role of digital services in the law clinic sphere. Thus, as 
we show in this paper, law clinics which had slowly begun to embrace new digital 
technologies, have been forced by Covid-19 to bring this means of delivering services to 
the fore. However, it is important to examine whether such forms of services are merely a 
necessary response to the Covid-19 crisis or whether they herald a “brave new world” for 
law clinics. Do digital services enhance or detract from the values of law clinics in helping 
to fill the access to justice gap? Before turning to this question, however, it is useful to have 
an idea of the clinical landscape prior to the Covid-19 crisis (the Pre-Covid or PC world!).  
 
1 See Paul McKeown and Elaine Hall, ‘If We Could instil Social Justice Values Through Clinical Legal 
Education, Should We?’, (2018) 5(1) J Intl & Comp L 143, 147.  
2 Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law - A Jurisprudential Inquiry (Oxford University Press, 1987).  
3 Richard Susskind, The Future of Law: Facing the Challenges of Information Technology (Oxford University 
Press, 1996); The End of Lawyers?: Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Tomorrow's Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (Oxford University Press, 2013). See also, Daniel 
Susskind and Richard Susskind, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work 
of Human Experts (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
4 See, Emma Jones, Francine Ryan and Hugh Mcfaul,  ‘Connectivity, Confidentiality and Confidence: Key 
Issues in the Provision of Online Pro Bono Activities’ (2018) 25 Intl J Clinical L Ed 48, 54-57.  
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II. Digital Legal Services in the PC World  
 
There has been considerable interest throughout the world in the potential of the internet 
and digital computing to enhance access to justice. Thus both worldwide5 and in the UK,6  
conferences and “hackathons” have brought together those in the tech world with those at 
the access to justice coalface. But, anecdotally it seems that there has been far more 
interest from the former than the latter, and that many ingenious apps have been imagined 
but very few if any developed.7 This has also been the pattern in the UK law clinic world. 
Indeed at a recent conference on the use of lawtech in law clinics, the advice of one of the 
lawtech pioneers was to stop trying to invent the perfect app and instead translate what is 
currently done in “real time” into simple digital format.8   
 
In fact some law clinics have been doing this for some time Thus, six years ago the 
University of Strathclyde9 used email advice to develop a useful triage system which 
allowed it to concentrate its energies on the more complex live-client cases. Thus, having 
the benefit of the services of some very tech-savvy students who first developed a 
relatively sophisticated website and then an even more sophisticated case management 
system, Strathclyde developed a system whereby clients who access the website are first 
directed to a series of questions and answers on their problem. If the Q and A’s do not 
solve their problems, which is likely to be the case, they are invited to send an email 
explaining their problem. If it is felt that their query can be dealt with by email because it is 
of general nature not requiring detailed facts or complex law (such as how can I challenge 
a parking “fine” imposed by a supermarket?), a student produces advice via email within 
five days which is checked by a supervisor, with the option retained of escalating the case 
to full representation if felt necessary. 
 
Somewhat differently, Essex Law Clinic (henceforth ELC) has begun work to develop an 
app to allow the public in England and Wales to create their own will. More relevantly, as 
far as the Covid-19 situation is concerned, ELC began in January 2020 to offer face to face 
interviews with clients via Zoom. Admittedly, this was not done with a pandemic in mind 
but to respond to a serious geographical problem. Like some clinics in the UK, ELC is not 
situated conveniently for clients. Essex does not have a city and its university is situated a 
long-ish bus ride from the nearest large town. Consequently, for the last three years ELC 
has developed outreach clinics in the community so that clients who are unable to travel 
to campus, whether due to poor or expensive public transport or because campus is seen 
as an ‘alien world’, can also access advice. However, as some journeys remain too far and 
too expensive whether for the clients or students or both, the ELC has turned to Skype. 
This augmentation of services stemmed from an exciting new initiative involving the 
creation of a “holistic” law clinic involving clients being interviewed on Skype by law 
students whilst supported by social work students. Given the demographic of likely clients, 
 
5 Hague Institute for Innovation of Law (HIIL), ‘Innovating Justice Forum 2019 - From Justice Innovation to 
Scale’, 10 February 2019, https://www.impactcity.nl/innovating-justice-forum-2019-from-justice-innovation-
to-scale/. 
6 See, e.g., https://www.legalhackathon.london/. 
7 Exceptions include an app developed by Compassion in Dying to help people to write their own power of 
attorney/living will. See, https://compassionindying.org.uk/services/.    
8 Alex Hamilton from Radiant Law, speaking at Legal Tech and Clinics, University of Manchester, 10 
January 2019. 
9 https://www.lawclinic.org.uk/annual-report-2014-2015.  
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who might not have access to computers or the experience of using video conferencing, 
and the fact that the social work students already have a placement in the Southend 
community, this meant that law students from the Colchester campus could advise clients, 
who are supported generally and in relation to tech by social work students, in Southend. 
This process was piloted with cases in both family and housing law with positive feedback 
from clients. For example, a family law client at the end of the interview reflected that she 
had been far less daunted by the interview as she was not sitting across a desk facing an 
adviser. Unknown to us at the time, this highly successful experiment provided the proto-
type for our response to the Covid lockdown.  
 
For other university law clinics, geography has played a somewhat different role in 
motivating the establishment of what many call “virtual law clinics” (VLCs).  Thus without 
an actual campus, the Open University has always operated online,10 whereas the fact that 
BPP is spread over various campuses meant that the provision of online services was 
useful.11 However, for other universities, there have been more direct reasons for 
establishing a VLC. Thus, the University of Cumbria’s VLC seems to have been motivated 
by a desire to introduce students to the way that law is likely to be increasingly practised 
in the future, in this way enhancing their tech skills and employability.12 
III. The Digital Response to the Covid Crisis 
 
However, in the current situation, using the internet to advise and perhaps also represent 
clients seems to be, not just a way of enhancing access to justice, but a necessity.  
Consequently many law clinics have or are planning to set up VLCs.13  
 
As is usual with law clinics, different institutions adopt different models, while the 
competitive nature of the IT market means that there are various platforms to choose from 
for the “virtual law clinic ” (VLC). Choices about platforms are often determined by the 
licence held by the university. Thus the ELC uses Zoom, whereas others have responded 
to concerns about zoom bombing (which should be easily avoided by the use of codes and 
waiting rooms) or instead have chosen Adobe Connect Microsoft Teams.14  There are also 
differences in VLC models as to whether supervisors are present throughout the video 
interview (VI), come in at the end or only speak to the students afterwards. In addition, 
some clinics provide advice on the spot – at least as in the case of the ELC by the 
supervisor but possibly, in appropriate circumstances, also by students in the presence of 
a supervisor who can make real-time corrections. Where supervisors are not available, 
some clinics have chosen to record interviews,15 but this raises data protection issues 
regarding where and how long recordings are stored and for this and other reasons (such 
as detracting from students learning the important skill of simultaneous note taking), most 
clinics do not record interviews.  A final important difference relates to the extent of the 
service offered to the clients – advice only or some form of subsequent assistance – but 
 
10 See generally, http://law-school.open.ac.uk/open-justice. 
11 See, https://probono.bppuniversity.ac.uk/. 
12 See, Ann Thanaraj and Michael Sales, ‘Lawyering In A Digital Age: A Practice Report Introducing The 
Virtual Law Clinic At Cumbria’ (2015) 22(3) Intl J Clinical Legal Ed 334.  
13 All but two of 23 respondents to a question at a recent CLEO workshop (https://www.cleo-uk.org/); and 
one was not sure. 
14 BPP began with Skype but given that clients must have an account or be prepared to set one up, they 
are now also moving to Microsoft. In any event Skype for Business is being ‘retired’ online in July 2021 and 
all new customers from September 2019 are automatically set up with Teams.  
15 Swansea.  
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here, as with many of the above differences, much depends on the particular model used 
by the clinic generally rather than just in their VLC.   
IV. VLCs in the Future 
 
While the implementations of VLCs has not necessarily been smooth and many staff and 
even students, not to mention clients, have had to negotiate a steep learning curve, the 
“lawtech turn” in the clinical world appears to have been a success. This leads to the 
inevitable question of whether this suggests that clinics should retain their VLCs or return 
to the face to face delivery of legal services which dominated the PC world, and in turn to 
a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of VLCs.  
 
Video interviewing (VI) allows students (and staff) to see clients and to respond to what 
they can see of their facial and body language. While not quite as effective as face to face 
contact, this goes a long way to establish the emotional connection which is so important 
for a good working relationship, trust and hence fuller disclosure of facts and client 
concerns.16 Certainly, it is better in this regard than contact by phone and much better than 
email. Also as with a phone, VI allows for immediate response in terms of advice. As such, 
there are obvious advantages for clients after lockdown – those with mobility issues and 
other disabilities,17 those who are put off by hassle, expense and anxiety from travelling 
especially onto campuses which, as already noted, can be seen as an alien and 
intimidating domain populated by the social elite. Moving from the “demand” to the “supply-
side” of clinic services, there are also huge advantages both for the students involved and 
for the overall effectiveness of clinic services. If lockdown or social distancing continues 
into future academic years, students can continue to be involved even if they are not on 
campus and law clinics can remain open (as some already do) out of term and particularly 
over the summer. Where law clinics require real-time supervision of interviews, supervisors 
and students need not be in the same locality and clinics can thus make better use of pro 
bono lawyers who often struggle to get to campus during office hours or even early evening 
because of traffic, late meetings, etc. It may even help if those students who suddenly have 
to cancel have a colleague on hand to take over at short notice.  
 
Thinking more widely, the ability of clinics to extend their services beyond their 
geographical environs to anyone in or outside the country (or at least jurisdiction) means 
that clinics as a whole or those within particular regions could begin to specialise in one or 
two areas, while referring all other cases to their partners. However, while this may work 
well for clients and clinics in allowing the latter to play to their strengths and for the even 
greater development of special expertise, it may be less attractive to students who, 
anecdotally, seem to want to gain a wide range of skills and knowledge and “try out” 
different areas of law before making a career choice.  
 
One advantage for student learning and indirectly for clinics is that virtual interviews may 
(with client permission) allow for more students to learn and gain experience through 
shadowing rather than conducting interviews. Surprisingly, while it is early days, students 
at ELC reported preferring video interviewing to campus interviews, citing feeling more 
confident by being in the comfort of their own home with a lesser degree of tension than 
being in the same room as a client. Likewise clients, as mentioned in our early findings, 
 
16 Cf Jones, et al (n. 4).  
17 Open University clients report that VI may ensure that “you see the person first not the disability” : 
Francis Ryan, personal communication (1 June 2020).   
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have reported that not being in the same physical room as an adviser meant they felt far 
less anxious about talking about their legal issues. 
 
A final advantage is also more beneficial to clients and clinics as an institution rather than 
just for students. As the University of Strathclyde has shown, being able to answer more 
simple queries via email prevents time being wasted setting up and conducting interviews 
when there is no need to interview (and by extension even more so in case of clients who 
are served by looking at FAQs) - though there is always the danger that information or 
nuances are not conveyed by email. Also, of course, students may lose out from their 
valuable educational experience of practising their interviewing skills. Furthermore, an 
email service does depend on a client being able to sufficient articulate their issue as, so 
often in client interviews, it becomes apparent that what clients think their legal issue is, is 
in reality very different. 
 
Nevertheless, VLCs clearly offer opportunities for directly enhancing access to justice. At 
the same time, it cannot be denied that there are downsides to VLCs. Some are minor and 
relatively easy to overcome. For instance, they pose risks for the leak of confidential 
information via insecure emails and to a much greater extent via VIs in that conversations 
might be overhead at the locality of the client, student and/or supervisor. But the sort of 
advice that can be given by email is far less likely to involve confidential information and if 
it does then the level of details suggest that clinics should in any event consider using face 
to face or interviews or video conferencing). As regards the latter, while there will always 
be risks clinics can take steps to minimise risks of confidential conversations being 
overheard such as students and advisers using headphones and prohibiting using client’s 
names during the call and indeed the discontinuation of any VI once it is thought that 
confidentiality might be compromised.  
 
Other problems also have partial solutions at least. Thus, notwithstanding the number of 
people who do have access to the internet and computing facilities for email and video 
conferencing there is inevitably a substantial group who do not18 and there will be a large 
overlap with this groups and the socio-economic group which clinics serve (or in our view 
should serve).19 Less extreme than this problem of “internet poverty” is that of “computer 
illiteracy”20 whereby those who do have access to the internet and computers do not have 
the skills to utilise what might seem daunting video-conferencing platforms. Here, one 
solution for both problems is for clinics to collaborate with community groups or other 
service providers (as in the case of the ELC’s holistic clinic) who can provide clients with 
access to and help with setting up interviews and dealing with problems if they arise. 
Computer illiteracy can be also overcome by taking clients through the necessary steps to 
get connected via phone either just before the interview or some time before hand. Of 
course there is likely to still a small group of people who cannot access these 
“workarounds” or who are daunted by anything other than face to face interviews,21 
 
18  7% of the UK population do not have access to the internet. See, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics.  
19 For example, 64% of disabled people have access to a tablet/PC/laptop compared with 85% of non-
disabled people. See, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/132912/Access-and-Inclusion-
report-2018.pdf.  
20 This could be due to age. For example, 100% of 16-24 year olds use the internet daily whereas 55% of 
over 65 year olds do. Also people with low income are less likely to have used the internet in the last 3 
months than those with greater income. See , https://www.ons.gov.uk 2018.    
21 ELC clients reported that they felt anxious about how to connect to Zoom notwithstanding that full 
information is provided before each interview. 
 234 
 
suggesting that whatever the benefits of VLCs for expanding access to justice, clinics need 
to retain old school forms of service delivery. 
 
Indeed, it is arguable that while VLS may enhance the quantity of clients served, they may 
also reduce its quality. Arguably, better rapport and hence fact-finding can be achieved in 
an actual room where subtle changes in atmosphere can be detected22 and demeanour 
detection is not limited to the face and upper body but extends more widely.23 Unwarranted 
interruptions, poor internet connection, technical issues and silences while these problems 
are sorted may also detract from the atmosphere and unnerve clients.24 It is also far better 
to show empathy towards angry or upset clients, for instance by handing over a glass of 
water, offering tea and coffee at the beginning of the interview which may help settle and 
show care towards clients.  Being in different localities, where this occurs, may also detract 
from the subtle signals and possibly also the passing of written notes between students 
interviewers, and between them and supervisors if they are present, which may be useful 
in alerting students to problems, such as unwanted questions, or prompting lines of 
questions which might otherwise be overlooked.25 For this reason and also to reduce 
problems of confidentiality leaks, having two way video-conferring where possible is better 
than multiple localities. On the other hand, whether follow up work is likely to be affected 
by virtual contact between students and them and staff is a moot point.  
 
Also moot is whether VLC will have a negative impact on the indirect role clinics may play 
in enhancing access to justice. Thus, by contrast to the direct enhancement of access to 
justice through providing the public with legal services, law clinics can indirectly enhance 
access to justice by inspiring law students to go on to play some role in redressing social 
injustice after they graduate. Thus a study by the Open University, revealed that students 
at their virtual clinic ‘developed new perspectives on access to justice and the value of pro-
bono work’26 This could be via career choice, engaging in pro bono work,  making 
donations, providing training or other forms of assistance to organisations which promote 
access to justice or social justice more widely.27 If so, given that this may translate into 
years of pro bono or financial assistance or even a career devoted to helping those most 
in need, the indirect role of law clinics in promoting social justice may in the long run be 
even more important than their direct role.28 Thus, drawing on educational theory, many 
clinicians claim that student exposure to clients may cause ‘disorienting moments’29 
whereby their pre-existing assumptions about the world clash with their observation of 
social deprivation, unequal access to justice and substantive legal injustice, especially 
 
22 Cf the comment of one ELC supervisor that it “is obviously not possible to capture all the nuances of 
behaviour/reactions etc. by video but it is a pretty good approximation.” 
23 On the other hand, research does not suggest that even trained interviewers are likely to be good at 
at least determining lies from demeanour. See, Donald Nicolson, Evidence and Proof in Scotland: 
Critique and Context (Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 282-6.  
24 Our thanks to Francine Ryan (personal communication, 1 June 2020) for this insight.  
25 Again a factor raised by one ELC supervisor: “The interview was less formal and I slightly felt that the 
students took it less seriously. There was some insensitivity from one of the students and I found it more 
difficult to raise this than I would have in a face to face interview.” 
26 Francine Ryan ‘A Virtual Law Clinic: A Realist Evaluation of What Works for Whom, Why, How and in 
what Circumstances?’ (2019) The Law Teacher (early access).  
27 See Donald Nicolson, ‘Our Roots Began in (South) Africa”: Modelling Law Clinics To Maximise Social 
Justice Ends’ (2016) 23 Intl J Clinical Leg Ed 87. 
28 Steven Wizner and Jane Aiken, ‘Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in Enhancing 
Access to Justice’, (2004) 73 Fordham L Rev 997, 1005. 
29 Fran Quigley, ‘Seizing the Disorientating Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social 
Justice in Law School Clinics’, (1995) 2 Clinical L Rev 37.  
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when repeated exposure reveals that these problems are endemic rather than 
exceptional.30 According to adult learning theory,31 learning from experience rather than 
abstract teaching is likely to make these lessons particularly profound. And, when the 
experience is that of someone in dire need and it is realised that they may have no other 
source of assistance, knowledge may be transformed into empathetic care. Furthermore, 
Aristotelian theories of moral development32 teach that satisfaction at helping others (or 
regret at not being able to do so), particularly if accompanied by guided reflection on 
experience and the example of positive role models, may convert knowledge about social 
injustice and empathetic concern for its victims into an ongoing commitment to contribute 
to social justice.  
 
In this regard, all forms of digital justice, except for VI are far less likely than direct contact 
with the client to play this indirect role. Thus, if email advice is confined, as it should be, to 
requests for general information, there is far less likely to be a “disorienting moment” and 
no learning from experience. As regards students who develop apps and other internet 
sources as forms of public legal education and capacity building to support other providers 
or help members of the public to help themselves, any learning about disadvantage and 
injustice is not likely to be more vivid and impactful than that gained from more traditional 
forms of education. This suggests that law clinics who want to have a long term impact on 
access to justice via their graduates should ensure a “blended learning” approach whereby 
students gain both direct experience of the lives of actual clients at what can be called a 
“retail level”  as well as involvement in “wholesale” methods designed to expand the 
number of people served but without personal contact33 - with perhaps the former coming 
before the latter in terms of the student’s chronological experience. This though  might 
clash with other needs such as to get those with tech skills working on digital wholesale 
work as soon as possible and the benefits of testing students on and training them while 
engaged in non-client facing work before letting them loose on members of the public.   
 
By contrast, to the extent that clinics only provide advice to clients, the amount of learning 
about the client’s lived experience of hardship and injustice is likely to be less than if 
students try to resolve their problems, whereas there obviously can be no learning from 
success or failure. At the same time, however, such learning of justice is not likely to be 
much less in VLCs than advice giving after face to face interviews. So here any marginal 
loss of an indirect impact of clinic work is more than outweighed by the possible gains in 
direct enhancement.  
 
 
 
30 See, e.g., Jane Harris Aiken, ‘Striving To Teach “Justice, Fairness, And Morality”,’ (1997) 4 Clinical L 
Rev 1; Stephen Wizner, ‘Beyond Skills Training’, (2000-1) 7 Clinical L Rev 327, 327-8; Donald Nicolson, 
‘Education, Education, Education: Legal, Moral and Clinical’, (2008) 42 Law Teacher 145; Juliet M. Brodie, 
‘Little Cases on the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community 
Lawyering Clinics’, (2008-9) 15 Clinical L Rev 333, 379-83.  
31 Quigley (n 29); Frank Bloch, ‘The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education’, (1982) 35 Vanderbilt L 
Rev 321. 
32 See e.g.,  Richard Stanley Peters, Moral Development and Moral Education (London: George Allen & 
Unwin 1981), ch. 2; Joel Kupperman, Character (Oxford Univ Press, 1991); Hubert L. Dreyfus and Stuart 
E. Dreyfus, ‘What is Morality? A Phenomenological Account of the Development of Ethical Expertise’ in 
David. Rasmussen (ed), Universalism Versus Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1990). 
33 See Nicolson, (n. 27), section 3.2.6.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
Indeed it is arguable that the biggest question which clinics should face is not whether legal 
advice should be delivered face to face but how to take the next step to provide clients 
with the representation they need to put their advice into effect. Using the internet to 
provide advice via video-conferencing and/or email has as many – and in some cases such 
as with clinics suffering a geographical deficit more – advantages as disadvantages. 
Where however what many law clinics – including our own – should be urged to consider 
is how they develop both digital and non-digital means of enabling clients to put advice 
into effect. This is not to question the need for such advice, not least as it may help clients 
realise that they do not have any legal rights or remedies. However, where they do, but 
are left without the ability to vindicate these right and remedies, clients may in fact feel 
worse off. In addition, the ongoing engagement with clients through representation and the 
intimate contact with the workings of the (in)justice system does far more to motivate 
students to become “justice warriors”34 than the brief encounters in interviews even if face 
to face rather than video conferencing. Nevertheless the brave new digital world may offer 
a way to have one’s cake and eat it too. Where it is possible to deliver advice via email or 
VI, this may speed up the time taken to inform clients of their rights and remedies and this  
in turn can free up time for clinics  to devote to representation or at least capacity building 
so that clients can be helped to help themselves. In this way, it can be argued that VLCs 
are on balance far more of a permanent opportunity than a temporary necessity in the Post 
Covid world of law clinics.  
 
 
  
 
34 Donald Nicolson, ‘Legal Education, Ethics and Access to Justice: Forging Warriors for Justice in a Neo-
Liberal World’ (2015) 22 Intl J Leg Profession 1.  
 237 
 
Domestic Abuse and Covid-19: The Legal Challenges 
 Jo Harwood, Lecturer, School of Law [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_030] 
 
 
Abstract 
At a time when the home is presented as a place of safety in the face of Covid-19, there 
are major concerns that forced confinement is exacerbating the risks posed to victims of 
domestic abuse. Increased isolation, coupled with more limited opportunities to seek 
support, are presenting unprecedented challenges for victims and for the law in responding 
to domestic abuse. This paper takes as its focus these legal challenges, focusing 
particularly on the situation in the UK. It opens by addressing the implications for domestic 
abuse victims of the restrictions in movement. It then assesses the capacity of the criminal 
offence of coercive or controlling behaviour to respond to the rise in domestic abuse. It 
also explores the recent move to remote hearings within the family justice system, and 
associated access to justice concerns. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The increase in domestic abuse in response to Covid-19 has been described as the 
‘shadow pandemic’.1 In the UK, it has been reported that fourteen women and two children 
were killed in the first three weeks of the lockdown.2 Calls to Refuge’s domestic abuse 
helpline rose by 25%,3 with a 120% increase in calls and contacts in a single day following 
media coverage of the support available.4 Traffic to Refuge’s website also increased by 
700%.5 Despite these statistics, Covid-19 is not the cause of the rise in domestic abuse. 
Responsibility for domestically abusive behaviour belongs solely to the perpetrator. 
Nevertheless, the pandemic appears to be aggravating pre-existing domestically abusive 
behaviours and posing barriers to victims accessing safety. 
 
The home has never been a place of sanctuary for victims of domestic abuse, and 
domestic abuse has always posed unique challenges for the law. With domestic abuse 
being both a matter of intense public concern and taking place predominantly in private, 
the role of the law in responding to domestic abuse is complex. The pandemic has brought 
 
1 UN Women, ‘Press Release: UN Women Raises Awareness of the Shadow Pandemic of Violence 
Against Women During COVID-19,’  27 May 2020, 
https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2020/5/press-release-the-shadow-pandemic-of-violence-
against-women-during-covid-19.  
2 ‘Domestic Abuse and Risks within the Home,’ accessed 12 June 2020, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmhaff/321/32105.htm.  
3 Refuge, ‘25% Increase in Calls to National Domestic Abuse Helpline Since Lockdown Measures Began,’  
6 April 2020, https://www.refuge.org.uk/25-increase-in-calls-to-national-domestic-abuse-helpline-since-
lockdown-measures-began/.  
4 Refuge, ‘Refuge Sees Calls and Contacts to National Domestic Abuse Helpline Rise by 120% Overnight,’  
9 April 2020, https://www.refuge.org.uk/refuge-sees-calls-and-contacts-to-national-domestic-abuse-
helpline-rise-by-120-overnight/.  
5 Refuge, ‘Refuge Sees Online Traffic to its National Domestic Abuse Helpline Rise by 700%,’  9 April 
2020, https://www.refuge.org.uk/refuge-sees-700-increase-in-website-visits/.  
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the dangers posed by the home, and the challenges facing the law, into even sharper 
focus, as well as shedding further light on the cracks within existing legal structures.  
 
This paper explores the challenges in responding to domestic abuse in the light of Covid-
19. It starts by addressing the implications of the restrictions on movement brought about 
by the lockdown for victims of domestic abuse. It moves on to explore the potential for the 
criminal offence of coercive and controlling behaviour to respond to a rise in the 
perpetration of abuse. It then turns to access to civil law protection and family proceedings 
in the light of the court system having moved online at unprecedented speed, and 
associated access to justice concerns. It highlights the action that needs to be taken 
urgently in response to the current pandemic and argues for long-term reform of the law’s 
treatment of domestic abuse. 
 
II. Restrictions on Movement 
 
The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 introduced 
extraordinary restrictions on movement. Whilst we are now seeing a relaxation of these 
restrictions, movement continues to be regulated, social distancing measures look set to 
be the “new normal” for some time and there remains the possibility of a second wave of 
the virus, which could cause the re-introduction of the tightest controls. The risks posed by 
these restrictions for victims experiencing domestic abuse need little articulation. Women’s 
Aid has warned that ‘social distancing and self-isolation will be used as a tool of coercive 
and controlling behaviour by perpetrators’.6 Victims might be unable to work, or have to 
work from home, losing the face-to-face support that may be provided by employment, as 
well as having more limited opportunities to leave the home. Access to support networks 
are likely to be restricted. If victims and perpetrators are living together, perpetrators’ 
physical presence in the home will be intensified if they are unable to work or are working 
from home. As the lockdown eases, there is also the risk of abuse escalating, as 
perpetrators resist the loss of control. 
 
Even at the point of the strictest restrictions on movement, victims have always been 
permitted to leave their homes to seek safety and engage with protective services.7 It 
hardly needs to be said, however, that the opportunity to seek support is by no means the 
same as actually being able to access that support, and the current pandemic has further 
exposed the underfunding of the infrastructure needed to support victims of abuse. Refuge 
and outreach services were facing a funding crisis prior to the pandemic.8 Emergency 
funding is being made available,9 but this needs to be sustained. The consequences of the 
restrictions in access to legally aided representation brought about by the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 also continue to cut deep. Whilst legal 
 
6 Women’s Aid, ‘The Impact of COVID-19 on Women and Children Experiencing Domestic Abuse, and the 
Life Saving Services that Support Them,’  17 March 2020, https://www.womensaid.org.uk/the-impact-of-
covid-19-on-women-and-children-experiencing-domestic-abuse-and-the-life-saving-services-that-support-
them/.  
7 See in particular Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020, reg 6(2)(h), (i) 
and (m) (as originally enacted).   
8 See for example, Women’s Aid, ‘Funding Crisis for Domestic Abuse Sector with 64% of Refuge Referrals 
Denied,’  28 January 2020, https://www.womensaid.org.uk/funding-crisis-for-domestic-abuse-sector-with-
64-of-refuge-referrals-declined/.  
9 Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government and Luke Hall MP, ‘Over 100 Frontline Domestic 
Abuse Charities Given Government Funding,’ 5 June 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/over-
100-frontline-domestic-abuse-charities-given-government-funding.  
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aid was retained for cases involving domestic abuse, the means test and evidence 
requirements have, in practice, severely restricted access to legally aided representation.10 
The ability of victims to access the evidence required to qualify for legal aid is likely to be 
further limited during the period of the lockdown, with it being harder to access, for 
example, physician support. This will impact the availability of legal representation in 
proceedings such as child arrangements disputes. The Law Society has called for the 
provision of non-means tested legal aid, as well as relaxations in the evidence gateway to 
allow solicitors to identify abuse victims.11 
 
It is well-known that victims of domestic abuse very often do not report abuse. Whilst there 
are reports of an increase in abuse during the period of the pandemic, it is also likely that 
much abuse is going unreported. For victims who come forward, the importance of a well-
funded and comprehensive network of support is abundantly clear. This is particularly so 
given that separation is often the trigger for the escalation of abuse,12 and the point at 
which the victim tries to leave is when they are at heightened risk of serious injury or 
death.13 There is no room for the law to fall short in providing a range of accessible and 
robust protections. This paper now turns to the protections afforded by the current legal 
framework. 
 
III. Responding to an Increase in Coercive and Controlling Behaviour – the Serious 
Crime Act 2015  
 
Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 criminalised patterns of controlling and coercive 
behaviour for the first time. The significance of the new offence was that it was intended to 
move the law away from a focus on the perpetration of specific incidents of violence to 
recognise the cumulative harm caused by domestic abuse, and in particular of non-
physical forms of abuse. As outlined below, the offence is likely to be of particular 
significance during the current pandemic in the light of the increased opportunities for the 
perpetrator to exert power and control. 
 
The national picture of the implementation of the offence does not point to a 
transformational shift in the criminal law’s response to domestic abuse. The conviction rate 
has been consistently low, and average custodial sentences have been significantly below 
the maximum five year term.14 Whilst still low, the most recent figures suggest that 
 
10 See recently, Public Law Project, ‘Domestic Violence: Challenge to Legal Aid Means Regulations,’  10 
June 2020, https://publiclawproject.org.uk/latest/domestic-violence-challenge-to-legal-aid-means-
regulations/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=domestic-violence-challenge-to-legal-aid-
means-regulations. See also Joanna Harwood, ‘‘We Don’t Know What It Is We Don’t Know’: How Austerity 
Has Undermined the Courts’ Access to Information in Child Arrangements Cases Involving Domestic 
Abuse,’ (2019) 31(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly  321. 
11 Law Society, ‘COVID-19 Lockdown Puts Domestic Abuse Victims at Risk,’ 8 April 2020, 
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/news/press-releases/coronavirus-covid-19-lockdown-puts-domestic-abuse-
victims-at-risk/.  
12 See for example, Maddie Coy et al., Picking Up the Pieces: Domestic Violence and Child Contact 
(London: Rights of Women, 2012), 27. 
13 See for example, Julia Long, Keshia Harper and Heather Harvey, The Femicide Census 2017 Findings: 
Annual Report on UK Femicides 2017 (London: Women’s Aid 2018), 9. 
14 Office for National Statistics, ‘Domestic Abuse in England and Wales: Year Ending March 2018,’ 22 
November 2018, 12 and 40; Office for National Statistics, ‘Domestic Abuse and the Criminal Justice 
System, England And Wales: November 2019,’ 25 November 2019, 26. 
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prosecutions and convictions are increasing year on year.15 It is possible, therefore, that 
we will continue to see higher conviction rates as the offence becomes more embedded 
into professional practice. 
 
Research pre-dating the pandemic highlighted the potential for the offence to capture a 
range of behaviours that might not have fallen within the then-existing offences prior to the 
reform.16 These behaviours included economic abuse, the use of digital surveillance 
technologies, isolation tactics and deprivation, including denying access to medication, 
telephone and internet usage.17 The current pandemic creates an environment in which 
these forms of abusive behaviour are likely to intensify, in particular in relation to 
surveillance and isolation. For example, victims who are shielding may have to rely on the 
perpetrator for access to medication and food. There are risks that perpetrators will deny 
access to medical treatment to victims who become unwell. Opportunities for the 
perpetrator to restrict access to the telephone and internet are likely to be higher if both 
parties are confined to the home during a period of lockdown. There are also emerging 
concerns surrounding perpetrators using remote hearings as a weapon, as well as 
perpetrators being able to isolate further their victims. Indeed, 67% per cent of respondents 
to Women’s Aid’s recent Survivor Survey reported that the abuse experienced has 
worsened since the outbreak of Covid-19 and 72% reported the perpetrator exerting 
greater control over their lives.18 
 
The importance of the “coercive control” offence is clear, but much of its effectiveness 
inevitably rests on the evidence available to support prosecutions, and the lockdown 
measures are likely to impact the collection of that evidence. Crown Prosecution Service 
guidance pre-dating the pandemic emphasises the need to focus on the ‘wider pattern of 
behaviour’ and its ‘cumulative impact’, with examples of relevant evidence including text 
messages, records of interaction with support services, witness testimonies, GPS tracking 
and victims’ diaries.19 The challenge for the law has always been that non-physical forms 
of abuse are less visible than physical violence. The current lockdown presents risks that 
patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour will become even less visible. The 
restrictions on day-to-day movement could result in abuse becoming more confined to the 
home, with the perpetrator changing the strategies used to exert power and control. In 
response, practical measures are emerging to support victims’ collection of evidence. The 
‘Bright Sky’ app offers a secure platform on which victims can log diary entries, without 
these being saved on the device itself.20 Police forces are encouraging neighbours and 
workers visiting houses to be alert to domestically abusive behaviour.21  
 
 
15 Office for National Statistics, ‘Domestic Abuse and the Criminal Justice System, England And Wales: 
November 2019,’ 25 November 2019, 26. 
16 Charlotte Barlow, Kelly Johnson, Sandra Walklate and Les Humphreys, ‘Putting Coercive Control into 
Practice: Problems and Possibilities,’ (2020) 60 British Journal of Criminology 160. 
17 Ibid, 168.  
18 Women’s Aid, ‘Survivors Say Domestic Abuse is Escalating Under Lockdown,’ 28 April  2020, 
https://www.womensaid.org.uk/survivors-say-domestic-abuse-is-escalating-under-lockdown/.  
19 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Coercive or Controlling Behaviour in an Intimate or Family Relationship,’ 
last modified 30 June 2017, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/controlling-or-coercive-behaviour-
intimate-or-family-relationship. See also, Home Office, ‘Controlling or Coercive Behaviour in an Intimate or 
Family Relationship: Statutory Guidance Framework,’ December 2015. 
20 https://www.hestia.org/brightsky, accessed 12 June 2020.  
21 See for example, Cumbria Police, ‘Police Appeal to Neighbours and Workers to Help Victims of 
Domestic Abuse,’ 25 March 2020, https://www.cumbria.police.uk/News/News-Articles/2020/March/Police-
appeal-to-neighbours-and-workers-to-help-victims-of-domestic-abuse.aspx.  
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The evidential problem is even more acute given that research has highlighted pre-existing 
problems with police responses to coercive and controlling behaviour. The findings from 
Barlow et al’s study into the use of the coercive control offence by one police force in the 
North West of England, based on data from 2016-17, highlighted a series of failings.22 In 
common with the national picture, use of the offence was limited, due in part to ‘missed 
opportunities’ to identify and investigate patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour.23 
Police officers were found to focus on specific incidents and place their emphasis on the 
existence of ‘hard’ evidence, such as photographic evidence, which in turn impacted case 
outcomes.24 Victims’ accounts were minimised, seen as ‘one word against the other’, and 
‘unverifiable’ or ‘weak’ as a result.25 Cases involving physical violence were ‘significantly 
more likely’ to be classified as high risk than those without.26 
 
The conclusion from this research conducted prior to the current pandemic was that further 
funding and training are needed to support the implementation of the offence at ‘all points 
of contact within the criminal justice process – from call handlers, up to and including the 
Crown Prosecution Service’.27 As awareness grows of the long-term economic impact of 
the pandemic, the risk now is whether responses to coercive and controlling behaviour are 
likely to improve during a period of increased budgetary constraints. The challenge, moving 
forward, is going to be to maintain pressure on the importance of funding and training at a 
time when resources are likely to be limited. Training and guidance to achieve a shift from 
the focus on specific incidents to patterns of abusive behaviour must also take into account 
the impact of the lockdown measures on the evidence available. The criminal offence is 
one arm of the law’s protection against domestic abuse, and we turn now to the 
accessibility of civil law remedies and family proceedings in the light of the shift to remote 
hearings. 
 
IV. Access to Civil Law Protection and Family Proceedings – the Shift to Remote 
Hearings 
 
The Family Law Act 1996 houses two principal remedies: occupation orders and non-
molestation orders, both of which are accessed through the family court. Occupation 
orders can remove the perpetrator from the home and the surrounding area.28 Non-
molestation orders prohibit the perpetrator from ‘molesting’ the victim.29 Prior to the 
lockdown, remote hearings were not a regular occurrence within family justice 
proceedings. In response to Covid-19, access to these remedies, along with other family 
proceedings, moved online at unprecedented speed.  
 
22 The data were collected in two stages between January 2016 and June 2017. See, Barlow, Johnson, 
Walklate and Humphreys, ‘Putting Coercive Control into Practice,’ (n. 16) 164. 
23 Ibid, 172. See also, Andy Myhill and Kelly Johnson, ‘Police Use of Discretion in Response to Domestic 
Violence,’ (2016) 16(1) Criminology & Criminal Justice 16; Amanda L. Robinson, Gillian M. Pinchevsky and 
Jennifer A. Guthrie, ‘A Small Constellation: Risk Factors Informing Police Perceptions of Domestic Abuse,’ 
(2018) 28(2) Policing & Society 200. 
24 Barlow, Johnson, Walklate and Humphreys, ‘Putting Coercive Control into Practice,’ (n. 16) 170. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 171. See also: Cassandra Wiener, ‘Seeing What is “Invisible in Plain Sight”: Policing Coercive 
Control,’ (2017) 56(4) The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 503-504.  
27 Barlow, Johnson, Walklate and Humphreys, ‘Putting Coercive Control into Practice,’ (n. 16) 175. See 
also, Charlotte Bishop and Vanessa Bettinson, ‘Evidencing Domestic Violence, Including Behaviour that 
Falls Under the New Offence of “Controlling or Coercive Behaviour”,’ (2018) 22(1) The International 
Journal of Evidence & Proof 23. 
28 Family Law Act 1996, ss 33-40. 
29 Ibid, s 42. 
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To cope with this shift, HM Courts & Tribunals Service issued a list of court priorities. The 
granting of non-molestation and occupation orders remained within the family court’s ‘work 
that must be done’.30 The expectation was that hearings would take place primarily via 
video or telephone. It is now anticipated that it will be the end of 2020 or Spring 2021 before 
the family justice system will return to anything resembling normality.31 As a result, we can 
expect some expansion of cases heard remotely.32 Whilst remote hearings  are likely to 
remain the most common, all family courts will be open, at significantly reduced capacity, 
by early July.33 There will be increased scope, therefore, for cases to be heard fully in 
person, and others through a ‘hybrid’ arrangement, in which some parties attend in person 
and others remotely.34 
 
This is not the roll-out of a new system that has had the benefit of robust prior testing. The 
family court is having to find its way in intensely challenging circumstances against the 
backdrop of an already unmanageable pre-Covid caseload.35 Guidance has been issued 
to support the navigation of these challenges.36 In response to the ‘overwhelming view of 
the judiciary and legal profession’, further ‘directive or proscriptive’ case management 
guidance will not be issued.37 Instead, we will see ‘bespoke case management decisions’ 
being taken on a ‘case by case basis’.38 
 
The shift to remote hearings presents opportunities to review the experience of victims 
within the family justice system, but also significant immediate risks. We are at a stage 
when the data are only just emerging on the operation of the remote family court. At the 
request of the President of the Family Division, the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory 
(‘FJO’) conducted a rapid review of the use of remote hearings within family justice in 
response to Covid-19.39 The consultation ran from 14 to 28 April 2020, with over 1,000 
responses received.40 The vast majority of responses were from professionals working 
within family justice.41 Data on the experience of remote hearings from parents’ and family 
members’ perspectives are being collected by the Transparency Project through an online 
 
30 HM Courts & Tribunals Service, ‘Summary of Family Business Priorities Previously Agreed with the 
President of the Family Division: 21 April 2020,’ last accessed 12 June 2020, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/880307/
Ops_update_-_family_court_business_priorities_21_April_2020_FINAL.pdf.  
31 Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘The Family Court and COVID 19: The Road Ahead,’ 9 June 2020, 
https://www.judiciary.uk/announcements/the-family-court-and-covid-19-the-road-ahead/, para. 5. 
32 Ibid, paras. 11 and 17. 
33 Ibid, para. 19. 
34 Ibid, para. 14. 
35 Ibid, para. 42. 
36 Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘COVID 19: National Guidance for the Family Court 19th March 2020,’ 19 March 
2020, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Presidents-Guidance_Covid-19-2.pdf; Mr 
Justice MacDonald, ‘The Remote Access Family Court: Version 4,’ 16 April 2020, 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-Remote-Access-Family-Court-Version-4-Final-
16.04.20.pdf. 
37 Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘The Family Court and COVID 19,’ (n. 31) para. 16. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, Remote Hearings in the Family Justice System: A Rapid 
Consultation (London: Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, 2020).  
40 Ibid, 2 and 5. 
41 Only 3% of respondents were parents: Ibid, 5. 
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survey.42 The sample size is small, with 50 responses received by 28 April.43 Fifty-eight 
per cent of respondents were parties to proceedings, with the remaining respondents 
‘supporters’ of those parties.44 
 
The data collected to date have already made an important contribution to understanding 
the operation of the remote family court, despite their collection under intense time 
pressure. We do not yet, however, have comprehensive data on victims’ experiences of 
the new system. Understanding victims’ experiences is further complicated by the lack of 
a detailed breakdown in the findings to date of the specific hearings to which the findings 
relate. Work is needed as a matter of urgency to continue to invest in understanding these 
experiences. The analysis below is based on what is known now, drawing out three access 
to justice themes that should inform future research: safety; participation; and 
confidentiality. Current findings, and the attendant access to justice concerns, suggest that 
best practice guidelines to support the conduct of hearings involving domestic abuse 
allegations might become necessary, both to ensure consistency and that victims are fully 
supported to participate within proceedings, even if these are not ‘directive or proscriptive’. 
 
a) Safety 
 
There are severe restrictions on victims’ capacity to access legal proceedings when living 
in the same house as the perpetrator, and attendant safety risks. As discussed above, 
controlling access to internet and telephone usage are strategies used by perpetrators to 
exert power and control. If the hearing goes ahead, some victims will face the prospect of 
having to conduct that hearing in the same physical space as the perpetrator. It is 
encouraging that the President of the Family Division has given general guidance that lay 
parties should be supported to engage with the remote court outside of their homes, such 
as in solicitors’ offices,45 but particular support is needed for the increased number of self-
representing litigants, who have to navigate the system without legal assistance. 
 
In the cases in which the perpetrator is not living in the same physical space as the victim, 
remote hearings might represent some improvement on previous practice. Concerns about 
the inadequacies of court facilities in protecting victims of domestic abuse in civil and family 
proceedings long pre-dated the pandemic.46 Small trials took place last year to allow 
victims applying for domestic abuse injunctions to appear by video link, to save having to 
face the perpetrator in person in court, with positive results.47 Some respondents to the 
FJO’s consultation also reported positive experiences of obtaining non-molestation orders 
remotely, including accessing ex-parte non-molestation orders by telephone helping to 
 
42 Transparency Project, ‘Justice on the Altar,’ 29 April 2020, http://www.transparencyproject.org.uk/justice-
on-the-altar/.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. These ‘supporters’ included lawyers, lay advocates, McKenzie friends and family members. Twenty-
two cases concerned non-financial remedy private law proceedings and three concerned domestic abuse. 
45 Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘The Family Court and COVID 19,’ (n. 31) para. 28. 
46 For example, Coy et al., Picking Up the Pieces, (n. 12) 43-44; Jenny Birchall and Shazia Choudhry, 
“What About My Right Not to be Abused?” Domestic Abuse, Human Rights and the Family Courts (Bristol: 
Women’s Aid, 2018), 8. 
47 ‘Press Release: Video Hearings Tested in Domestic Abuse Cases,’ 9 May 2019,  
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/video-hearings-tested-in-domestic-abuse-cases. Six cases were held 
using the video link. Independent evaluation is ongoing. 
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avoid the distress of attending court in person and the need to find childcare at the time of 
the hearing.48 
 
Remote hearings, however, also present new opportunities for perpetrators to use the 
hearings as a means to perpetrate coercive control.49 There will, therefore, be new 
challenges for judges in identifying abusive behaviour when conducting hearings remotely, 
with no capacity to observe the physical behaviour of the parties when the hearing takes 
place via telephone and only limited capacity to do so through video. There will also be 
major challenges for judges in understanding victims’ experiences of abuse under intense 
time pressure. The President of the Family Division has been candid that, in order to 
respond to caseloads, there will have to be a ‘very radical reduction in the amount of time 
that the court affords to each hearing’.50 The challenge here is that coercive and controlling 
behaviour cannot be condensed into a few select incidents; time is needed to unpick the 
complex web of abusive behaviour. These challenges are relevant not only to victims’ 
safety but also their capacity to participate within hearings. 
 
b) Participation 
 
To date, most family law hearings appear to be taking place by telephone.51 Work is 
ongoing on the use of video platforms.52 Some alarming examples were given in the FJO’s 
consultation that suggest that victims are not always being supported to participate fully in 
proceedings. Examples included victims being left on phonelines with the perpetrator being 
the only other person on the call,53 and the risk of perpetrators recording proceedings,54 
despite the prohibition of recording remote hearings.55  
 
Broader concerns exist also about victims’ capacity to give their best evidence when they 
are at home on their own during the hearing, with the perpetrator able to see and/or hear 
them through the telephone/video link.56 Inequalities in the location of the parties is also 
significant and suggests the need for caution before proceeding with ‘hybrid’ hearings. 
Examples were given within the FJO’s consultation of the victim having to participate in 
the hearing from home, but the perpetrator being able to be in the same location as his 
lawyers.57 ‘Technical workarounds’ are developing to keep an open line between lawyer 
and client during the hearing,58 but this does not overcome the differences in what the 
judge and the parties can see when some are attending in person and others remotely. 
The challenges for victims navigating remote hearings without a lawyer will be even more 
acute. Ensuring access to court papers for litigants who are either unrepresented, or who 
are attending the hearing in a different physical space to their lawyer, is also a significant 
issue that is likely to shape victims’ participation in proceedings.  
 
 
48 Family Justice Observatory, Remote Hearings in the Family Justice System, (n. 39) 14 and 47. 
49 Ibid, 16. 
50 Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘The Family Court and COVID 19,’ (n. 31) para. 43. 
51 Within the Transparency Project’s survey, 73% of hearings were conducted using this platform: 
Transparency Project, ‘Justice on the Altar’ (n. 42). 
52 Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘The Family Court and COVID 19,’ (n. 31) paras. 22-26. 
53 Family Justice Observatory, Remote Hearings in the Family Justice System, (n. 39) 14. 
54 Ibid, 15-17. 
55 See further, Mr Justice MacDonald, ‘The Remote Access Family Court,’ (n. 36) para. 5.20. 
56 Family Justice Observatory, Remote Hearings in the Family Justice System, (n. 39) 16-17. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Sir Andrew McFarlane, ‘The Family Court and COVID 19,’ (n. 31) para. 27. 
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c) Confidentiality 
 
Hearings taking place remotely also raise important questions about confidentiality, and in 
particular how judges can police who is in the room at the time of the hearing. The majority 
of respondents to the Transparency Project’s survey did not know who else was present 
during the remote hearing.59 In addition, whilst not having to find childcare was identified 
as a strength of remote hearings by some within the FJO’s consultation,60 the presence of 
children in the home at the time the hearing takes place runs the risk that they will hear the 
proceedings, including accounts of domestic abuse.61  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Covid-19 has created a fertile environment for perpetrators to exert power and control, and 
lockdown measures restrict victims’ opportunities to access support. The pandemic is 
bringing into sharper focus the tensions within the existing legal framework in responding 
to this challenge. The ‘coercive control’ offence has been a crucial development in 
recognising patterns of abusive behaviour, but its effectiveness is undermined by problems 
with implementation. The shift to remote hearings provides new opportunities to review 
how victims’ experiences of the family justice system can be improved, but also raises new 
challenges, with serious access to justice concerns. What is urgently needed is further 
data on victims’ experiences of the remote court system, as well as monitoring how 
domestic abuse can be evidenced in the light of Covid-19. Access to legal advice and 
support will be more crucial than ever for victims navigating the court system, underlining 
once more the critical importance of reviewing the legal aid threshold. Best practice 
guidelines on the conduct of remote hearings in domestic abuse cases might also prove 
necessary, in particular as understanding develops of how victims can be best supported. 
Longer term, pressure must be maintained on the importance of funding and training for 
those on the frontline, if any transformational shift in the treatment of domestic abuse is to 
be achieved. 
 
  
 
59 Transparency Project, ‘Justice on the Altar’ (n. 42). 
60 Family Justice Observatory, Remote Hearings in the Family Justice System, (n. 39) 47. 
61 Ibid, 15-16. 
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Abstract 
Mediation’s claim to legitimacy is based largely on its promise to integrate responsiveness 
to personal needs and values into the process of dispute resolution, offering “personalised 
justice” based on human needs. As face-to-face mediation sessions are not possible 
during the Covid-19 outbreak, mediation service providers are offering video mediation 
services. Before the onset of the pandemic, video mediation was used on a much smaller 
scale. Whilst this article highlights the benefits of video mediation it also identifies 
challenges that must be faced when seeking to incorporate video mediation as an integral 
part of service provision post-pandemic. It emphasises that if mediation is to continue to 
provide high quality personalised justice it is vital that practitioners, when considering the 
appropriate medium for each mediation, give thorough consideration to a wide range of 
factors. Such factors include parties’ need to maintain or reduce distance (geographical 
and psychological), and the rise of a new form of vulnerability that hinders less IT literate 
persons’ access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The author includes 
references to her own personal experience of conducting video mediations in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and recommends the way forward for optimal integration of 
videoconferencing into mediation practice.   
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the same way that court hearings have been conducted virtually as a result of the Covid-
19 outbreak, mediators have also been offering online mediation sessions, using mainly 
video platform mediations. This article argues that although this shift was forced and 
sudden, it offers policy making and mediation practice an exceptional opportunity to 
reconsider service provision and find ways to integrate videoconferencing into mediation 
service provision post pandemic. However, the transition to video mediation, can only be 
capitalised upon if its impact on mediation’s promise to provide access to “personalised” 
justice is explored. 
This article examines mediation’s ability to respond to a range of personal needs, interests 
and values which allows the process to extend beyond the examination of legal rights, and 
it provides initial insights into video mediation’s potential to fulfill mediation’s promise. It 
highlights the lack of attention paid to video mediation by policy makers and the need for 
research into video mediation’s potentials to provide access to personalised justice. It also 
identifies some key benefits of video mediation and underlines the crucial importance for 
mediation parties to be comfortable in engaging with technology if they are to use 
videoconferencing for the process. This is because mediation requires parties to 
progressively deepen their dialogue and open up about personal needs and interests.  
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The rise of a new form of vulnerability in mediation - digital exclusion, is also highlighted.1 
The article cautions that in order to take advantage of what video mediation has to offer, 
mediators must carefully weigh a combination of factors for each individual case.  
II. Background to Mediation: Personalised Justice as Mediation’s Promise 
 
Mediation is a key form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the primary form of dispute 
resolution in the common law world.2 Mediation is practiced in various styles, however, 
mediators are most commonly trained in the facilitative model.3 When facilitative mediation 
(hereinafter referred to as “mediation”) is practiced appropriately, the mediator is an 
impartial third party who does not make suggestions, give legal advice, or exert pressure 
to reach a settlement. Rather, the mediator facilitates the parties’ negotiation, helping them 
move beyond their stated financial and/or legal positions, exploring their underlying 
concerns, needs and interests.  
 
Mediation is often described as an “art”.4 The artistic aspect of the mediator’s practice 
captures the intangible, intuitive and unpredictable angle of their work.5 A key to a 
successful mediation involves the mediator connecting with the parties on a deep and 
empathic level and skillfully guiding them through a powerful and challenging process of 
exploration, which, if successful, leads to parties’ better understanding of their conflict. The 
selection of the right communication channel for mediation is crucial to make the most of 
what mediation offers.  
 
Mediation’s greatest promise is offering personalised or “individualised justice”,6 i.e. a form 
of justice that is responsive to the needs of the parties and what is fair to them, as opposed 
to the strictly regulated, bureaucratic court procedure that offers legalised justice, i.e. 
“justice according to the law”.7 Parties’ experience of empowerment, self-determination 
and control over the outcome overarch the process of mediation. These have been found 
to induce parties’ perceptions of procedural justice and better acceptance of the outcome.8 
This highlights the importance of party control over choice of the type of mediation and of 
the communication channel used in order to allow for the highest possible quality of 
personalised justice.  
 
III. Online Mediation and Where We Have Got To  
 
Initially, mediation was conducted in in-person face-to-face sessions. With the 
development of the internet, however, online forms of mediation and ADR, i.e. online 
 
1 JUSTICE, ‘Preventing Digital Exclusion from Online Justice’, April 2018, 4, https://justice.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Preventing-Digital-Exclusion-from-Online-Justice.pdf. 
2 Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Digital Justice: Technology and The Internet of Disputes, (OUP, 
2017), 44. 
3  Jonathan Dingle and John Septon, Practical Mediation: A Guide for Mediators, Advisers, Lawyers, and 
Students (Law Brief Publishing, 2017), 19. 
4 For example, Bennett D. Mark and Scott Hughes, The Art of Mediation 2nd (NITA: Notre Dame, IN, 2005), 
3. 
5 Donald T. Saposnek, ‘The Art of Family Mediation’, (1995) 11(5) Mediation Quarterly  5. 
6 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Practicing in the Interests of Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Pursuing 
Peace as Justice’, (2001-2) 70 Fordham Law Review 1761, 1769. 
7 Richard Susskind, Online Courts and the Future of Justice (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020), 
72. 
8 Nancy A Welsh, ‘Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social 
Justice Theories’, (2004) 54(1) Journal of Legal Education 52. 
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dispute resolution (ODR), have developed. At first, ODR systems focused on handling 
disputes that arose in e-commerce using text-based communication methods online. 
However, the development of technology and the internet resulted in ODR’s growing use 
to handle conflict in a wide variety of areas, and the use of more developed means, e.g. 
videoconferencing.  Whilst the original idea was to “fit the forum to the fuss”9, ODR and 
online video mediation have been increasingly offered as a convenient “equivalent” to face-
to-face mediation sessions. However, this article cautions that attributing disproportionate 
weight to convenience and/or blurring the distinction between face-to-face and online video 
services when advertising mediation may jeopardise the quality of personalised justice.    
 
a) Video mediation as access to justice during the pandemic 
 
Understandably, the coronavirus pandemic resulted in a surge of mediations conducted 
via videoconferencing as face-to-face encounters had become impossible. For example, 
whilst UK Mediation, a UK-based mediation service provider, generally conducts 
approximately 10% of their caseload using videoconferencing, due to the social distancing 
measures and lockdown they reported a threefold increase in their online video 
mediations.10 Further, the Family Mediators Association, a membership organisation for 
family mediators in the UK, at the time of the lockdown transitioned to offering mediation 
information and assessment meetings (MIAM) and full mediations through 
videoconferencing.11 This is an important prerequisite to maintaining access to justice for 
divorcing couples in two ways: (1) as section 10 of the Children and Families Act 2014 
makes it compulsory for individuals to attend a MIAM before making an application to the 
court, MIAMs through videoconferencing maintain disputants’ access to justice through the 
courts; (2) should the disputants be open to mediation they can get access to the process 
and therefore avoid litigation. In this sense, online video mediation allows mediators to 
remain “gate-openers”12 to the justice system in the extraordinary times of the pandemic. 
However, this article highlights that, when life returns to “normal”, it is essential that 
mediation service providers do not automatically revert to online mediation or simply return 
to face-to-face sessions but skillfully integrate videoconferencing into their practice.  
 
b) Transitioning from online to face-to-face and back: Why is this important 
now? 
 
There are at least three reasons why it is particularly timely to consider the transition 
between the different methods of mediation service provision. Firstly, the only way to 
benefit from the challenging forced shift to video mediation is if mediators pause, reflect 
and carefully redesign their service delivery, taking into account their own and their clients’ 
lived experience of face-to-face mediation and its online counterpart. Their decisions need 
to be monitored and reconsidered in the light of the findings of empirical research that has 
yet to have been conducted. 
 
 
9 Frank E. A. Sander and Stephen B. Goldberg, ‘Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to 
Selecting an ADR Procedure’, (1994) 10 Negotiation Journal, 49. 
10 UK Mediation, ‘Re:connect: The Online Mediation,’ video, https://ukmediation.net/mediation-
services/reconnect-online-mediation-services/, accessed 10 June 2020. 
11 Family Mediators Association, ‘COVID-19 Update’, https://thefma.co.uk/, accessed 29 April 2020. 
12 Lisa Parkinson, ‘The Place of Mediation in the Family Justice System’, (2013) 25 Child & Family Law 
Quarterly, 205. 
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Secondly, finding ways to select the best communication channel for each mediation may 
become more important than ever as the side-effect of the range of preventative practices 
adopted to protect physical health are predicted to bring about severe economic recession 
and downturn in business and family relationships. Mediation, if used appropriately, can 
help repair these relationships. As in China the number of divorce claims rose significantly 
after over a month of stay-at-home measures,13 similar increase can be expected in the 
Western world, because the combined impact of the isolation, the closure of schools, 
business uncertainties and layoffs which impose great strain on families. A growing 
number of commercial disputes seems inevitable, e.g. in the service economy due to 
cancellation of services to consumers, and in case of commercial contracts due to the 
unwillingness or inability of one party to fulfil its contractual obligations. Further, a survey 
that examined the six largest UK property management firms and reported that 25% of 
rents and 31% of service charges that were due for payment in March 2020 remained 
outstanding after 49 days,14 foreshadows a growing number of disputes in the property 
market. Resolving these disputes will be vital for economic recovery and mediation could 
play a critical role in reinstating or healing these relationships leading to a greater and 
speedier economic recovery. This will require the selection of the optimal communication 
channel for each dispute, maximising mediation’s potential to provide good quality justice.  
 
Thirdly, during the pandemic, policy making has so far paid too little attention both to 
mediation and to whether it is conducted in-person or online. While design thinking based 
on empirical research is unfeasible in the current circumstances, this will become essential 
in a few months’ time.  
 
The Coronavirus Act (the Act) came into force on 25 March 2020, introducing new laws 
mainly in order to protect public health. Schedule 25, section 85 of the Act allows for court 
hearings to take place either using video or solely audio facilities and section 89 (1) of the 
Act stipulates that the Act will expire in 2 years’ time. Whilst the Act does not mention ADR, 
it has implications for mediation due to mediation’s embeddedness in civil procedures15 as 
broadly defined.  
 
Importantly, JUSTICE, a law reform and human rights organisation in the UK, in paragraph 
27 of its briefing on the Coronavirus Bill argues that non in-person hearings are only 
appropriate for the emergency situation caused by the pandemic. It notes that at all times 
‘the presumption should be that hearings will be conducted in person’; videoconferencing 
should be used only when in-person hearings are unattainable and it is in the interest of 
justice that the hearing continues. JUSTICE also states that the emergency legislation 
should not be in place longer than the emergency itself,16 which is estimated to be 
considerably shorter than 2 years. This paper posits that the presumption of face-to-face 
sessions would benefit also the mediation arena. Further, the identification of 
circumstances that establish the need for the use of video mediations is also necessary 
and this task should be carried out well before the expiration of the above mentioned 2-
 
13 Cristina Mesa Vieira, Oscar H. Franco, Carlos Gomez Restrepo and Thomas Abel T, ‘COVID-19: The 
forgotten priorities of the pandemic,’ (2020) 136 Maturitas, 40. 
14 ‘COVID-19 Crisis: Minimal Rise in Collection Rates of Quarterly Rent and Service Charge Payments’, 
Remit Consulting, 20 May 2020, https://www.remitconsulting.com/blog.  
15 For example, paragraph 8 of the (CPR) Practice Direction- Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols 2015. 
16 JUSTICE, ‘Briefing on Coronavirus Bill’, March 2020, paras. 6, 8(ii), https://justice.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/JUSTICE-briefing-Coronavirus-Bill.pdf. 
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year period, as soon as it is possible. This will facilitate a more consistent approach to 
mediation service provision and protect disputants’ access to quality justice.  
 
Whilst organisations that specialise in mediation service provision have provided their 
mediators with guidance on conducting video mediations and mediators have been 
exchanging their experiences using various platforms, in the legal arena mediation has 
received only brief coverage in protocols and guidelines issued on conducting dispute 
resolution procedures during the Covid-19 outbreak in the UK. For example, the 
comprehensive guide issued by Outer Temple Chambers to its members makes some 
technical recommendations and warns that client communication is more difficult to foster 
remotely. It goes on to argue that additional separate meetings need to be organised 
between counsel and the client before and after mediation.17 However, whilst this is of 
great importance it is only a starting point to explore the differences between face-to-face 
and video mediation. Guidance issued by the courts is also limited. For example, the 
presidential guidance for the Employment Tribunals in England and Scotland makes only 
a fleeting reference to mediation stating only that judicial mediation may take place via 
either video or telephone conferencing.18 The ‘FAQ arising from the Covid-19 pandemic’ 
document does not provide further details but makes telephone conferencing the primary 
tool for mediation.19 As mediation practice draws on interdisciplinary perspectives including 
legal, psychological, and organisational considerations the guidance issued should reflect 
such interdisciplinarity and differences. This paper argues that for each practice area, e.g. 
family, commercial mediation, interdisciplinary expert panels comprising mediators and 
mediation specialists from various backgrounds should be involved when creating 
guidance on the choice of communication channel. A dialogue between experts from 
different disciplines would help balance various perspectives when considering the 
advantages and drawbacks of different communication channels for mediation. 
 
IV. Video Mediation: An Initial Consideration of Benefits and Challenges 
 
To date, little research is available that addresses specifically video mediation and its 
distinction from in-person face-to-face mediation. The literature most commonly addresses 
ODR as a whole with greater focus on text-based forms of online mediation. However, 
mediation via videoconferencing shares some of the advantages of other methods of ODR.  
 
a) Why mediate using videoconferencing? 
 
Video mediation has a number of undisputable advantages. Whilst allowing parties to see 
each other, videoconferencing helps participants: 
✓ take part in mediation from the safety and comfort of their homes; 
✓ participate in mediation even if there is significant geographical distance between 
the parties and/or the mediator, or if parties live in remote areas; 
✓ save time and money when accessing mediation. 
 
17 ‘The Virtual Conduct of Litigation during COVID-19’, Outer Temple Chambers, 9 April 2020,  
https://www.outertemple.com/2020/04/the-virtual-conduct-of-litigation-during-covid-19-2/.  
18 Paragraph 13 of the ‘Presidential Guidance in Connection with the Conduct of Employment Tribunal 
Hearings During the COVID-19 Pandemic’, Presidents of Employment Tribunals (England and Scotland), 
18 March 2020, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Presidential-Guidance-ET-
Covid19.pdf. 
19 Paragraph 8 of the ‘FAQs Arising From the Covid-19 Pandemic’, The Employment Tribunals in England 
and Wales and Scotland, Presidents of Employment Tribunals (England and Scotland), 3 April 2020.  
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These commonly mentioned benefits of video mediation facilitate parties’ access to 
personalised justice. In some of these cases video mediation is the only option, e.g. 
landlord-tenant disputes when the parties live in different continents, in others it helps all 
individuals meaningfully participate in the virtual mediation whose input is important. For 
example, young people may find interactions online more tolerable than sitting through a 
face-to-face mediation session in an unfamiliar and more impersonal environment. This 
highlights the potentials of online video mediation for example in the case of divorce, family 
conflict, and for mediation in the area of special educational needs and disabilities 
(SEND).20 
 
Mediation via videoconferencing also helps with access to personalised justice when 
✓ parties prefer to and/or it is in their best interest to maintain distance; 
✓ due to reasons of security or safety a face-to-face encounter unfeasible. 
 
Parties may prefer to maintain distance because individuals show different levels of 
tolerance to conflict. People that are conflict avoidant make every effort to prevent conflict 
and, if it exists, avoid it or disengage as quickly as possible, whilst others are more 
comfortable with conflictual interactions.21 People that feel stronger than average anxiety 
about confronting the other party face-to-face may only be willing to mediate when the 
parties are physically separated. Physical separation often helps conflict avoidant 
individuals fully engage in a search for win-win solutions rather than avoiding the conflict 
or concede, making video mediation an excellent tool in enabling access to good quality 
personalised justice for these individuals. Further, individuals who are more able to tolerate 
conflictual interactions but are involved in a conflict characterised by power imbalance, 
may also feel calmer and safer when participating in video mediation, a benefit of text-
based online mediation.22  
 
In relation to facilitating safety, videoconferencing enables dialogue between parties when 
face-to-face communication is literally impossible, e.g. peace processes when it is not 
possible to meet due to security and safety concerns.23 
 
b) Face-to-face and online video mediation: Is there a difference? 
 
The instinctive assumption that video-based and face-to-face communication are largely 
the same poses a great threat to the quality of personalised justice offered in mediation.  
Mediators’ and parties’ better understanding of the differences and similarities of the two 
types of mediations are essential for choosing the optimal communication channel for the 
particular mediation. For example, parties to a conflict who would be open to face-to-face 
mediation may decide to opt for video mediation, if that is offered or recommended, as it 
is more convenient. However, this way they will lose out on the benefits that a “rich” in-
person encounter offers compromising on the quality of justice. On the other hand, parties 
 
20 Margaret Doyle, ‘Going Online, in a Hurry’, UK Administrative Justice Institute, 10 April 2020, 
https://ukaji.org/2020/04/10/going-online-in-a-hurry/. 
21 Bernard Mayer, The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass, 2000), 30-32. 
22 Rebecca Brennan, ‘Mismatch.com: Online Dispute Resolution and Divorce’, (2011) 197(3) Cardozo 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 214-216. 
23 Melissa Conley Tyler and Susan R. Raines, ‘The Human Face of On-line Dispute Resolution’, (2006) 
23(3) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 336. 
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that are not willing or able to take part in mediation face-to-face, may lose access to 
personalised justice if video mediation is not offered or recommended. 
 
Whether online and in-person, in order to conduct a successful mediation, the mediator 
needs to build confidence and have good process skills. As their main confidence-building 
characteristic, the mediator needs to relate to all, convey a sense of caring and have 
chemistry with both parties.24 Further, an interview study on mediation parties’ lived 
experience has revealed that mediation is perceived by parties primarily as a learning 
process in which the mediator skilfully works on building a bridge between the sides. 
Participants felt that this work requires the mediator’s understanding of parties’ 
personalities.25 Face-to-face communication allows both the parties and the mediator to 
experience all aspects of verbal and non-verbal communication in all their richness. 
Therefore, having the parties in the room helps achieve an in-depth encounter, creating 
space for connection and learning. In my own experience with using videoconferencing for 
individual and joint mediation sessions successfully, encounter, connection and learning 
can be achieved, however, understanding which is at the core of personalised justice, 
comes less readily. Therefore, bridging the difference between the parties requires a little 
more work. 
 
As for process-skills, both online and face-to-face, a successful mediator is patient but 
persistent and they should never quit.26 An obvious and commonly addressed difference 
is the necessity that the mediator builds up confidence in the use of technology and 
supports parties if things go wrong. The guidelines issued by the International Council for 
Online Dispute Resolution that specifically address video mediation27 are a useful source 
regarding the technological aspect of the process. However, other angles of process-skills 
require more attention including exploration through empirical research.   
 
The process in video mediation is essentially the same as in-person. However, when 
mediating using video, holding preparatory individual sessions with both parties prior to 
the joint mediation session greatly helps build rapport and ease parties into virtual 
interactions. Therefore, this is good practice even when the mediator normally wouldn’t 
choose to conduct an individual meeting with the parties. Further, whilst the mediator tools 
stay the same in video mediation, as mediators use well-crafted questions, active listening, 
and rewording techniques, in my own experience, mediators often need to check more 
with parties to what extent they have embraced all aspects of what has been said. This is 
to build dialogue, deal with strong emotions and/or help parties overcome resistance. 
 
Another unexplored difference between face-to-face and video mediation is the impact of 
the different information received through the two channels on the human brain. As the 
working (short-term) memory has limited capacity the conscious activity of the brain is also 
limited.28 The cognitive load on the brain increases with videoconferencing since several 
features of video-based communication consume conscious capacity. Further, whilst in 
 
24 Stephen B. Goldberg and Margaret L. Shaw, ‘The Secrets of Successful (and Unsuccessful) Mediators 
Continued: Studies Two and Three’, (2007) 23 Negotiation Journal 398. 
25 Timea Tallodi, How Parties Experience Mediation: An Interview Study on Relationship Changes in 
Workplace Mediation (Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 246, 132. 
26 Goldberg and Shaw, ‘The Secrets,’ (n. 24) 398. 
27 ‘ICODR Video Mediation Guidelines’, The International Council for Online Dispute Resolution, April 
2020, www.icodr.org.  
28 Stewart Martin, ‘Measuring Cognitive Load and Cognition: Metrics for Technology-Enhanced 
Learning,’ (2015) 20(7-8) Educational Research and Evaluation, 592-598. 
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face-to-face communication people process emotions unconsciously and rely on non-
verbal cues to make emotional judgements,29 in a video conversation people have to focus 
and make more effort to process non-verbal cues, and they are also exposed to long 
stretches of constant gaze. As the combined effect of all this, the brain has to work harder 
in videoconferencing, which makes video mediation more tiring than a face-to-face 
session. This needs to be considered when deciding on the length and frequency of 
mediation sessions that the mediator undertakes.  
 
Overall, the most important challenge of the mediator is handling a different non-verbal 
communication in video mediation. The METTA model, which addresses movement, 
environment, touch, tone and appearance in the mediated conversation,30 is a good tool 
to examine the non-verbal challenges of the mediator. For example, as for movement, 
whilst the mediator’s whole body is not visible to the parties, it is important that the mediator 
sits upright and is positioned towards the computer, they occasionally nod and lean forward 
signaling active listening, and that they are neither too far from nor too close to the 
webcam.31 The mediator also needs to work on maintaining eye-contact. This can be rather 
challenging as one needs to look directly into the webcam but at the same time this loses 
sight of the party’s non-verbal cues; also, looking into the camera gives a somewhat 
artificial look. Eber and Thomson recommend to “drag” the video window displaying the 
party close to the webcam,32 however, in my experience, on numerous devices and 
videoconferencing platforms this is not possible. Therefore, for many mediators real eye-
contact is one of the most missed aspects of face-to-face mediation.  
 
It is clear that if mediators study the differences between video-based and face-to-face 
mediation and take the necessary steps, they can conduct successful mediations via video. 
However, not being together in one room, the parties will also miss the sight and feeling of 
the other party’s and mediator’s whole body, not getting a clear picture of their body 
language and micro-signals. Therefore, the above individual factors need to be weighed 
when considering the optimal communication channel for mediation and, in particular, 
when the aim of mediation is to heal a particularly fractured relationship.  
 
c) Digital exclusion: A new type of vulnerability 
 
Access to justice is commonly associated with access to court and the initiatives to create 
a cheaper, faster and simpler legal procedure.33 As an important aim of the ADR movement 
was to help these efforts by promoting cheap and fast alternative methods of dispute 
resolution, lack of access to justice in mediation was not a dominant concern. However, 
with the increase of online service provision mediators and ADR specialists need to 
consider digital exclusion which will become a core component of the changing concept of 
vulnerability.  
 
 
29 Guido Gainotti, ‘Unconscious Processing of Emotions and The Right Hemisphere,’ (2012) 50(2) 
Neuropsychologia 208. 
30 Noam Ebner and Jeff Thomson, ‘@Face Value? Non-verbal Communication and Trust Building in Online 
Video Based Mediation’, (2014) 1 International Journal of Online Dispute Resolution 110-111. 
31 Ibid, 120-121. 
32 Ibid, 122. 
33 Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Digital Justice: Tehcnology and the Internet of Dispute 
Resolution (OUP: Oxford), 40.  
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Digital exclusion, when defined broadly, includes individuals without access either to the 
internet or to a device, or the skills, ability, confidence or motivation to use it, and 
individuals who rely on digital assistance (i.e. assisted digital).34 Overall, more than 11 
million adults lack basic digital skills in the UK.35 Further, in 2019 there were 4 million adults 
who had never used the internet. Whilst the age gap is reducing within this group, more 
than half (2.5 million) of these individuals were aged 75 years and over.36 In 2019, 7% of 
households had no access to the internet in the UK.37 Importantly, digital exclusion is the 
most common amongst otherwise vulnerable groups, including individuals that are older, 
unemployed, disabled, socially isolated, or are of lower educational background.38  
 
Therefore, awareness of digital exclusion is indispensable when offering mediation 
services online as a complete transition to videoconferencing can deprive already 
disadvantaged groups of access to personalised justice. Considerations regarding the 
assisted digital group are vital because when participating in video mediation one needs 
to feel comfortable with video-based communication and technology in order to be able to 
become absorbed in the mediated dialogue. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
Previous research has left video mediation unexplored. However, the lockdown and social 
distancing measures due to Covid-19 provide mediators and researchers an exceptional 
opportunity to test and understand the use of video mediation and its potential to provide 
high quality personalised justice to disputants. The questions about video mediation no 
longer concern its viability, but rather the suitability of a particular dispute for video 
mediation. To this end, this article provides an initial insight into the process in which 
mediation provides personalised justice, which centres on parties’ gradually deepening 
dialogue guided by the mediator, and the benefits and challenges of video mediation in 
this regard. The article argues that, when life gets back to the new normal, mediators must 
pause, reflect and reconsider their practice in order to be able to integrate 
videoconferencing into their service provision. Some key factors have been outlined that 
require consideration by the mediator and the disputants when choosing between in-
person and video mediation. Making the right choice and mastering skills necessary for 
video mediation will allow mediators offer high quality justice via mediation.  
 
  
 
34 JUSTICE, ‘Preventing Digital Exclusion from Online Justice’, April 2018, 4, https://justice.org.uk/our-
work/assisted-digital/. 
35 Ibid, 4. 
36 ‘Internet Users in the UK: 2019’, Statistics from Office of National Statistics (ONS), May 2019, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetusers/2019. 
37 ‘Internet Access: Households and Individuals- Great Britain, 2019’, Statistics from ONS, May 2019, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsocialm
ediausage/bulletins/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividuals/2019. 
38 Ellen J. Helsper and Bianca C. Reisdorf, ‘The Emergence of a “Digital Underclass” In Great Britain and 
Sweden: Changing Reasons for Digital Exclusion’, (2016) New Media and Society, 27. 
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Abstract 
There has been much discussion about the use of technology in the justice system as a 
result of measures introduced by the UK government to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. 
In this paper I articulate my own thoughts on the use of virtual hearings in light of the 
pandemic, specifically focusing on their use in contexts concerning potentially vulnerable 
participants, such as in the Court of Protection. In doing so, I highlight a number of 
challenges, opportunities and reflections on how we might respond to their use. I argue 
that in coming to analyse the use of virtual hearings, we should focus on the extent to 
which open justice is secured, the material differences between the virtual and physical 
court hearings and the participation of those affected by proceedings.   
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Open justice, virtual hearings, participation, Court of Protection 
 
This article first appeared in the UKAJI blog at https://ukaji.org/2020/04/08/virtual-
hearings-participation-and-openness-in-the-court-of-protection/.  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The swift adoption of virtual technology across the justice system of England and Wales 
has been a necessary response to the measures introduced by the UK government to 
respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. As widely publicised, the first fully virtual Court of 
Protection (CoP) trial was carried out by skype in mid-March1 and many other hearings 
have similarly gone ahead virtually. Posts setting out the views of lawyers, of families and 
their supporters, and of researchers have appeared online and research is rapidly being 
undertaken to evaluate how those virtual hearings impact on access to justice.2  
 
In this paper I set out my own views on the use of virtual hearings, focusing on three main 
areas:  open justice, the loss of materiality caused by virtual justice and participant 
involvement in virtual hearings. These three issues must, I suggest, form the basis of 
rigorous and independent analysis of the use of virtual hearings post-pandemic. I 
specifically explore these issues in the context of the jurisdiction of the CoP, highlighting a 
number of challenges, opportunities and reflections. 
 
a) Virtual hearings: A response to a pandemic or the future of justice? 
 
Before I set out my reasons for focusing on the CoP, some context about the use of virtual 
hearings is required. What impact does a virtual hearing have on justice? Do virtual 
 
1 Catherine Baski, ‘First all-skype trial tests crisis working at the Court of Protection’, The Law Gazette, 19 
March 2020, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/first-all-skype-trial-tests-crisis-working-at-cop-
/5103541.article, accessed 6 May 2020.  
2 For example, research by the Civil Justice Council, ‘Rapid consultation: The impact of COVID-19 
measures on the civil justice system’, 1 May 2020, https://www.judiciary.uk/announcements/rapid-
consultation-the-impact-of-covid-19-measures-on-the-civil-justice-system/, accessed 6 May 2020.  
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hearings change the outcome of the case? Does virtual justice provide an equivalent 
experience for participants? Are particular participants disadvantaged by virtual hearings 
compared to others? How do we maintain the majesty and solemnity of the legal process 
through virtual hearings? These are all questions that were raised about virtual hearings 
even before the pandemic. Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) in 
England and Wales has been involved in a major court reform programme since 
September 20163 and a central part of this was the incorporation of technology.4 Virtual 
hearings have been a long time coming and are the inevitable future of justice:5 there is 
greater flexibility of process; no travel time or costs associated with attending a distant 
court; they are arguably less intimidating; and, possibly more comfortable for participants 
as they dial in from their own home. Prior to Covid, though, the pace with which we were 
moving towards virtual justice was, relatively speaking, slow and measured. 
 
Given the scale of the change involved in the movement to virtual justice, the cautious 
approach was the right one. However, the Covid-19 pandemic has changed all of that. 
Notwithstanding some opposition to the use of remote hearings,6 in my view it was the 
right response for the courts to move to the virtual realm. The alternative would have been 
to either stop all but the most urgent hearings completely, or participants in proceedings 
would have been placed at risk of contracting the virus by continuing with in person 
hearings. Neither of these would seem to be an appropriate response in the circumstances. 
The judiciary have, commendably, been flexible and responsive to the needs of different 
participants.7 The challenge, now, is to ensure that the movement towards virtual justice 
because of the pandemic does not undermine the careful and rigorous analysis of the 
potential impact of virtual hearings on the justice system.  
 
b) The Court of Protection  
 
I now turn to the context for my discussion in this paper. The CoP is a court with a lengthy 
history but now deals with disputes that arise under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). 
These cases often concern vulnerable participants (referred to as “P”) and section 2 MCA 
requires ‘an impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ as part 
of the test for a finding of incapacity, highlighting the complex issues at the intersection of 
disability, vulnerability and human rights. I focus on this court for two main reasons. First, 
as the CoP has been the focus of my research on access to justice and courts.8 I am aware 
of the many challenges that will be posed by virtual hearings in this context. From the wide 
 
3 HM Courts and Tribunals Service, ‘The HMCTS reform programme’, last updated 6 February 2019, 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-hmcts-reform-programme, accessed 6 May 2020.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Richard Susskind, Online courts and the future of justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
6 For further discussion of the different perspectives on the use of remote hearings in response to Covid-19 
see Natalie Byrom, Sarah Beardon and Abby Kendrick, ‘The impact of COVID-19 measures on the Civil 
Justice System’, The Civil Justice Council and the Legal Education Foundation, May 2020, 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CJC-Rapid-Review-Final-Report-f.pdf, accessed 12 
June 2020.   
7 See Mr Justice Macdonald, ‘The Remote Access Family Court’, Version 3, 3 April 2020, 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-Remote-Access-Family-Court-Version-3-Final-
03.04.20.pdf, accessed 6 May 2020.  
8 Jaime Lindsey, ‘Testimonial injustice and vulnerability: A qualitative analysis of participation in the Court 
of Protection’, (2019) 28 Social and Legal Studies; Jaime Lindsey, ‘Competing professional knowledge 
claims about mental capacity in the Court of Protection’, (2020) 28 Medical Law Review ; Jaime Lindsey, 
‘Protecting vulnerable adults from abuse: Under-protection and over-protection in adult safeguarding and 
mental capacity law’, Child and Family Law Quarterly (forthcoming). 
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range of professionals involved to participants with disabilities, CoP users are some of the 
most varied and potentially most vulnerable court users. Bringing together a range of 
contributors - professional participants, family members, friends, the person at the centre 
of the proceedings and others – is uniquely challenging.  Second, the cases the CoP hears 
are of fundamental importance. They engage with individual liberty, human rights and 
questions about life and death. Even in times of Covid-19 these cases must go ahead, 
and, in fact, the work of the CoP is arguably even more important now; it is dealing with 
some of the most challenging and sensitive legal and ethical issues directly arising out of 
the pandemic, from decisions about life saving medical treatment to decisions about where 
a person can live and access to family members in care homes.  
 
This includes two very recent cases heard during the pandemic, BP v Surrey County 
Council & RP [2020] EWCOP 20 and VE v AO, The Royal borough of Greenwich and 
South East London CCG [2020] EWCOP 23. BP concerned access by family members to 
a relative in a care home during the pandemic and VE concerned an application that it was 
in VE’s best interests to leave her care home to move in with her daughter. Both cases are 
deeply moving and I set out the facts of the latter case here to provide some context to the 
discussion. AO was an elderly lady, with a history of paranoid schizophrenia, who, in late 
2019, was diagnosed with advanced terminal ovarian cancer. She was at risk of Covid-19 
given both her terminal diagnosis and that she lived in a care home. Had AO remained in 
the care home, due to restrictions in place because of the pandemic, she would likely only 
have been allowed a short visit in her final dying moments from one relative.9 The case 
reached the CoP because AO’s daughter, VE, wanted AO to move in with her. Whereas 
the local authority and CCG thought that further assessments of AO were needed before 
that happened. The case proceeded on the basis of agreement by all that AO lacked the 
mental capacity to make her own decisions about where to live, with the dispute before the 
CoP being about best interests. By all accounts, VE and her family were committed to AO’s 
care and it was said that ‘I have no doubt that AO is happy and content with VE and her 
family and it is highly likely that if she was in a position to express a choice she would want 
to live with them.’10 Ultimately the court held that it was in AO’s best interests to leave the 
care home and to move in with VE. AO did so immediately following the judgment on 20 
April 2020 and, according to the judge, she ‘sadly died on 22 April 2020 with her family 
around her. I do not know what she died of and whether she had, indeed, contracted Covid 
19.’11 The strain placed on families like AO and BP’s during the pandemic is unimaginable, 
but the judgments are important. They highlight that the courts are there to hear these 
disputes and can step in and provide families with protection in their times of need. These 
cases must continue to proceed virtually, but the impact of the virtual on the justice system 
must also be carefully considered.  
 
II. Analysing Virtual Hearings 
 
In this paper I highlight three issues which, I argue, should be the focus of any analysis of 
virtual hearings: open justice; materiality; participation. Whether in the CoP, family, criminal 
or commercial, whether research arising from the pandemic or for research that was 
already underway, these three areas of focus provide a useful starting point for analysing 
the use of virtual hearings in the justice system.  
 
 
9 VE v AO, The Royal borough of Greenwich and South East London CCG [2020] EWCOP 23, para. 35. 
10 Ibid, para. 14. 
11 Ibid, para. 45. 
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a) Open Justice 
 
Open justice means a court, tribunal or decision-maker being transparent and accessible. 
For certain courts, openness may not be absolute, but transparency and accessibility 
should be guiding principles. Even in times of crisis, maintaining open justice should be a 
priority. Yet difficulties are being experienced by the public, press and researchers who 
wish to attend virtual hearings. The courts may wish to be open and accessible, but without 
a physical space that people can attend, courts are struggling to make the virtual hearing 
a ‘destination’. The daily cause list and CourtServe website provide a useful starting 
point.12 However, these websites so far have only provided information on the type of case, 
judge, type of hearing and similar administrative information. They do not provide, for 
example, a link to attend the hearing. In April 2020 I submitted an application to the HMCTS 
Data Access Panel13 and the Judicial Office for consideration of my own research request 
to observe virtual CoP hearings. I have now received approval for this research, but the 
time taken from submitting the application to observing my first virtual hearing was 51 days, 
highlighting that vital research opportunities are potentially being missed because of a lack 
of speed and clarity with which people can get involved.  
 
Furthermore, how can we know whether justice is being done unless it is also seen to be 
done? This involves being able to scrutinise the conduct of hearings. I understand that 
CoP hearings, for example, will be recorded and it will be interesting to see if they will be 
accessible for research purposes in future. The Transparency Project14 has provided 
useful recommendations as to how these recordings might be methodically and carefully 
stored for future analysis, an approach which should be considered by the CoP and other 
jurisdictions too.  
 
Openness does not just serve instrumental ends, though. Open justice reflects the wider 
values of public space, democracy and accountability.15 As Thomas de la Mare has 
recently written ‘the role and exclusivity of the physical courtroom has been embedded as 
a cardinal principle or assumption of English open justice’.16 By keeping our courts open 
and accessible, we uphold these values and enable the public to engage with the justice 
system rather than view it as secret or separate from their shared public space. This 
perception of openness is particularly important for an institution such as the CoP, which 
had a reputation for secrecy and only opened up access to the public (and others) following 
a transparency pilot in 2016 and the subsequent implementation of Practice Direction 4C 
of the Court of Protection Rules 2017. Despite this increased openness in recent years, 
the pandemic has resulted in the suspension of Practice Direction 4C, meaning that CoP 
hearings are, once again, routinely being held in private.  
 
12 HM Courts & Tribunals Service, ‘Daily court lists’, https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/court-lists, accessed 
6 May 2020; CourtServe, https://www.courtserve.net, accessed 12 June 2020. 
13 Further detail on this process is available here: HM Courts & Tribunals Service, ‘Access to courts and 
tribunals for academic researchers’, last updated 19 June 2018, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/access-to-
courts-and-tribunals-for-academic-researchers, accessed 6 May 2020.  
14 The Transparency Project, ‘The remote family court – where does transparency fit in?’, 2 April 2020, 
http://www.transparencyproject.org.uk/the-remote-family-court-where-does-transparency-fit-in/, accessed 6 
May 2020.  
15 See Linda Mulcahy, ‘The unbearable lightness of being? Shifts towards the virtual trial’, (2008) 35 
Journal of Law and Society 464; Linda Mulcahy and Emma Rowden, The democratic courthouse: A 
modern history of design, due process and dignity (London: Routledge, 2019). 
16 Thomas de la Mare QC, ‘Coronavirus and public civil hearings’, 30 March 2020, 
https://coronavirus.blackstonechambers.com/coronavirus-and-public-civil-hearings/, accessed 6 May 2020.  
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As I have made clear in the previous sections, the justice system must continue, even in 
times of crisis. Conceptually, though, the values of privacy and security on the one hand, 
and openness and transparency on the other, will come into conflict as virtual hearings 
become more commonly used. I suggest that the latter must be prioritised over the former. 
When evaluating the impact of virtual hearings, as researchers we must remember to 
reflect on our own experience of how accessible the justice system was, rather than 
focusing solely on the substance of what we discover.   
 
b) The virtual versus the material court room 
 
The virtual nature of remote court hearings raise a number of challenges,17 not least what 
I describe here as the “loss of materiality”. By this I mean that individual interaction with 
the court systems, buildings, processes, and people, has a material effect on that individual 
court user. The intra-action18 between all of the material factors involved in ‘going to court’ 
is different in the virtual contrasted with the physical realm. Virtual hearings change the 
materiality of the intra-action between court and user. Navigating the justice system is often 
a lengthy and complex process, but doing so virtually can lead to a loss of some of the 
material aspects of that navigational experience. The so-called “majesty of the law”, the 
role of judicial awe and prestige, the value that court room spaces hold in our culture, and 
the ritualistic experience of going to court all play a part in this perception of “having your 
day in court”. For many it will involve a metamorphosis, which incorporates the procedural 
history, getting prepared on the morning of the hearing, travelling to the court building, long 
periods of waiting, sitting in the room before the judge enters, hearing and seeing the range 
evidence often only a few metres away, and, ultimately, waiting for judgment. All of these 
aspects materially change a person, maybe only in subtle ways, but many aspects of this 
material process are missing, or at least different, in the virtual hearing. 
 
Furthermore, in the virtual realm, some people are more materially present than others, 
with often only the barristers and judge on screen, unless a person is giving evidence. 
Others attending typically only do so via audio. This limits the visual aspects of their 
involvement and can be contrasted to the physical court room where all of those in 
attendance can at least be physically seen by the judge and each other.  For example, 
Celia Kitzinger has written about her experiences supporting Sarah,19 the daughter of a 
man who was the subject of CoP proceedings. She writes that, for her, ‘there was a marked 
lack of empathy displayed for Sarah throughout this hearing’.  The reason for this, she 
suggests, is that ‘except when Sarah was giving her witness statement and being cross-
examined, she was not visible to other participants … This meant it was easy for lawyers 
to forget that Sarah remained in the virtual courtroom throughout the hearing.’ 
 
17 For further reading see Mulcahy (n. 15); Linda Mulcahy, Legal architecture: Justice, due process and the 
place of law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Emma Rowden and Anne Wallace, ‘Remote judging: The 
impact of video links on the image and the role of the judge’ (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in 
Context 14; Jo Hynes, Nick Gill and Joe Tomlinson, ‘In defence of the hearing? Emerging geographies of 
publicness, materiality, access and communication in court hearings’, Geography Compass (Forthcoming). 
18 Drawing on the work of Karen Barad who has emphasised the material effects that happen when we 
interact with the world around us, see Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist performativity: toward an understanding 
of how matter comes to matter’, (2003) 28 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 815; Karen 
Barad, Meeting the universe halfway: quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning. 
(London: Duke University Press, 2007). 
19 Celia Kitzinger, ‘Remote justice: a family perspective,’ 29 March 2020, available at: 
http://www.transparencyproject.org.uk/remote-justice-a-family-perspective/. 
 262 
 
 
This is a powerful article and one that reminds us of the need to balance more carefully 
judicial and legal perspectives on the justice process against the experiences of the “lay 
user” or those who the case directly impacts. As Linda Mulcahy has articulated, there is a 
‘fear of the laity’20 which can be seen in court room design with the public being restricted 
and contained to ever smaller areas. Such an approach is being replicated, and arguably 
exacerbated, by the virtual hearing, as material spaces are giving way to even smaller (or 
in some cases absent) virtual spaces. Similarly, virtual hearings can change the neutrality 
of that court room space, with each participant having a different set up, backdrop and 
technological savviness. Further, the use of virtual hearings may limit the legal 
representatives’ interactions with their own clients, who, for example, cannot so easily pass 
notes forward or have a quick discussion in the break. These micro-interactions shape the 
social dimensions of our justice system and it is not so easy to replicate these via the virtual 
medium. 
 
The perceived coldness and distance of the virtual space from a human perspective is also 
clear from reading the reflections of non-legal professionals on the recent virtual CoP 
hearing.21 Something material and experiential is patently missing from the virtual court 
room, not least the ability to pick up subtle cues of behaviour which extend beyond audio. 
This resonates with much of the socio-legal research on the social spaces of justice and 
this must be accounted for in any weighing up of the value of the virtual hearing. While 
these challenges are no reason to abandon the virtual hearing altogether during the 
pandemic, they require thinking about the virtual hearing differently and considering the 
implications of this loss of materiality head on.22 In the longer term, technology must be 
seen as an enabling device, rather than an end in itself. Meaning that if it is not enabling 
in a specific case or particular types of case, then it ought to be abandoned.  
 
c) Participation 
 
The final issue I explore here concerns who participates in virtual hearings, and how. Here, 
I focus on the participation of those directly affected by the proceedings. In general civil 
and commercial litigation this will be the claimants and defendants, in CoP proceedings it 
will be the person whose capacity or best interests is in dispute, in criminal proceedings it 
could be the complainant and the defendant, and in family proceedings the child, husband, 
wife or other interested party. In the CoP specifically, research has shown that P’s 
participation in proceedings has been limited, despite rule changes which attempted to 
remedy this.23 I have argued elsewhere that this is a cultural, rather than legal or policy 
problem.24 It is the paternalistic assumptions (which are perhaps heightened at times of 
crisis) about P’s ability to participate, caused primarily by well-meaning concerns about P’s 
welfare.  
 
 
20 Mulcahy, ‘The unbearable lightness of being?’, (n. 15), 95. 
21 Kitzinger (n. 19). 
22 For further discussion see David Tait, ‘Rituals and spaces in innovative courts’, (2018) 27 Griffith Law 
Review ; Mulcahy and Rowden (n. 15). 
23 See, Court of Protection Rules 2017, rule 1.2 and Practice Direction 1A. For further discussion see, 
Paula Case, ‘When the judge met P: The rules of engagement in the Court of Protection and the parallel 
universe of children meeting judges in the Family Court’, (2019) 39 Legal Studies; Lindsey, ‘Testimonial 
injustice and vulnerability’ (n. 8). 
24 Lindsey, ibid. 
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In the context of the virtual hearing, Hayden J has made clear that P’s participation in 
virtual proceedings is something about which ‘[i]maginative ideas are welcome to ensure 
that P participates in their proceedings where they are able to do so safely and 
proportionately’.25 He, perhaps optimistically, goes on to say that once the court returns to 
physical hearings, ‘it will be necessary for the momentum not to be lost and for parties to 
be imaginative about bringing P into the process’. While it is important that the CoP is now 
prioritising P’s participation, what they mean by participation appears to be quite narrow.  
 
Attendance at a hearing is defined as ‘participation… by listening and/or viewing the 
hearing…’. I am surprised that P’s involvement in hearings is viewed so conservatively. 
Would it not be possible to secure P’s direct participation in virtual hearings too? Of course, 
in some cases this will not be appropriate perhaps where, for example, P has a disorder 
of consciousness or does not wish to be an active participant. But in others, P may well 
have something to contribute and want to take a more active role. Furthermore, this 
approach frames P’s involvement in hearings in one direction – that P can listen or view 
the hearing – rather than recognising the benefits to the other participants of seeing or 
hearing P. There is value in judges, lawyers and other professionals seeing P, to hear her 
speak, see her interaction with others or simply understand her embodiment and 
materiality more acutely. These aspects of P’s participation in virtual hearings seems to 
have been missed with the current approach.  
 
Yet now, when Ps are likely to be facing real challenges,26 is when we most need the 
courts to hear the voices of P, as well as her family, friends and those close to her. Across 
all legal proceedings people affected by decision-making ought to be heard,27 a right which 
should not depend on their particular capabilities or willingness to fight to be heard. It is 
commendable that the CoP have provided guidance on the issue of P’s participation and 
the need to secure it. However, it is challenging enough to secure P’s participation at 
‘normal’ times, such that it is questionable whether this aim will be achieved in times of 
crisis.  
 
There are, however, ways of improving the participation of those impacted by proceedings. 
For example, where participants have support needs, the use of communication aids and 
technology specific to their needs can be incorporated if enough time and thought is given 
to the issue. Practical solutions could be adopted such as: the use of virtual break out 
rooms during hearings; simply asking the person if they want to be seen on screen and/or 
speak, and if so, when, without assuming that their silence or invisibility is chosen; 
scheduling hearings at a time of day suitable for individual Ps. There are many ways of 
facilitating participation, but the cultural barriers that existed prior to Covid-19 will simply 
be reinforced and potentially exacerbated by the move to virtual hearings if participation is 
not placed centre of the debate.  
 
III. What Next? 
 
The legal landscape will be changed by our chosen response to this pandemic, and in 
ways that provide many opportunities to incorporate the virtual. We must do so, though, 
with a thought for those people directly affected and for the wider values of the justice 
 
25 All of the guidance issued to date is available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/going-to-
court/family-law-courts/court-of-protection-guidance-covid-19/.  
26 See for example the earlier discussion of recent CoP case law. 
27 See Shtukaturov v Russia [2012] 54 E.H.R.R. 27, paras. 72, 91. 
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system. None of the challenges raised by virtual hearings are impossible to overcome and 
the use of technology is both inevitable and a hugely beneficial enabling device for the 
administration of justice. With thought, time and resources, most of the issues can begin 
to be resolved to harness the positive potential of technology as an aid to the justice 
system.  
 
As with any radical developments, we must be cautious, consistently evaluate, and 
subsequently respond to the weight of evidence. In this article I have emphasised three 
core issues that I think ought to be given priority in analysing the use of virtual hearings: 
open justice; loss of materiality; participation. Researching virtual justice with these factors 
in mind will better enable us to understand the true impact of Covid-19 on the justice 
system. 
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Big Data and Technology 
 
Big Data and Technology: A Discussion 
Elena Abrusci, Antonio Coco, Talita de Souza Dias, Audrey Guinchard and Sabrina Rau  
[DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_033] 
 
Several of the authors in this section took some time to discuss some of the common 
themes that arose in their papers and the synergies between them.  
 
It was recognised that states have an obligation to counter the spread of mis-information 
regarding Covid-19. This stems from their obligations to protect, respect and fulfil the right 
to life and right to health. States’ due diligence obligations are important in this regard, 
particularly when the evidence is insufficient to find states responsible for the outright 
breach of rights; they would nevertheless have obligations for which they could be found 
responsible to exercise due diligence by taking appropriate steps to forestall the abuses.   
 
Whether states will be responsible when individuals follow "fake news" advice, for example 
will depend on who creates and disseminates the fake news. There is a clear connection 
to state responsibility when state leaders are directly responsible for creating and 
spreading the harmful fake news themselves. When non-state actors spread the news, the 
state can be responsible in a secondary sense for failing to exercise due diligence to 
protect against the online spread of fake news which is detrimental to life or health, though 
this may not necessarily extend to liability for the actions taken by private individuals who 
act in furtherance of the fake news. The boundaries between the prevention of mis-
information and censorship will depend on the facts in a particular case. The prevention of 
mis-information about health during a pandemic is perhaps a clear issue, whereas states’ 
role in preventing the spread of other types of mis-information outside of an emergency 
context may be closer to censorship; the boundaries are not always clear. Many of the 
digital platforms are privately owned and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights have a normative framework which addresses such issues, though 
businesses’ engagement with it is voluntary. Nevertheless, it was recognised that few 
states have been willing to go so far as to interrupt tech companies’ business model related 
to paid advertisements – the usual source of fake news. Instead, efforts have so far 
focused, mainly, on calling for greater transparency for political ads.  
 
Discussants recognised the complexities of the due diligence concept which had slightly 
different meanings under the laws of state responsibility and corporate responsibility, and 
depending the types of harms involved. Also, the timeframe as to when due diligence 
obligations are activated may differ, depending on the legal framework. Under human 
rights law, the obligations are activated at an early stage given the focus on preventing 
violations. This is not necessarily the case with other subsets of public international law. 
Clearly, the timing of obligations is important for the prevention of online harms, given the 
fast pace in which information is disseminated. 
 
With respect to the “do no harm” principle, discussants considered whether it was  a 
sufficient basis to foster greater compliance by states and tech companies with their 
obligations. For states, due diligence refers to exercising best efforts. The content of what 
“best efforts” might entail in a given context is less clear. For businesses, there is arguably 
a clearer  meaning of what due diligence means, especially in respect to the procedural 
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steps businesses should be taking to identify and respond effectively to risks, as set out in 
the UN Guiding Principles. Greater clarity on the content of due diligence may be difficult 
to achieve, because it is so context specific. Also, particularly from the Business and 
Human Rights perspective, there is a constant need to balance different rights (expression, 
privacy etc) and a more content-led definition may impede the necessary balancing 
exercises. Also raised was the need for standards to accurately set out the need for 
continual due diligence, to better account for technological advancements after products 
are unleashed, and/or for new circumstances giving rise to new or heightened risks. The 
ongoing research of Coco and de Souza Dias is currently assessing the content of due 
diligence rules within the different sub-disciplines of public international law, to look for 
commonalities, and potentially evidence of any general principles of international law. 
Further consideration of how the principles are applied domestically in different tort law 
contexts may equally be a useful area for further research.  
 
Discussants also considered the important discipline of data protection, an area canvassed 
by Guinchard in her paper and broader research. The interpretation of “personal data” 
within data protection legislation is broad, which provides another avenue for the protection 
of privacy and the policing of online content. Data protection frameworks incorporate the 
balancing of rights and set out detailed procedural rules, however enforcement has been 
weak, so tech companies have often escaped scrutiny. Also, the ways in which the laws 
are enforced country to country differs significantly. There is a lack of transparency from 
companies related to disclosure of what data they own and how they use it, but equally, 
states and public institutions lack political will to press tech companies too hard. This also 
becomes a problem of due diligence, whether states are taking adequate steps to meet 
their due diligence obligations in respect of tech companies.   
 
When states collaborate directly with tech companies, the problems tend to be magnified. 
Neither party has satisfactory procedures in place, and thus the combination simply 
accentuates the unsatisfactory procedures, and the state becomes even less well placed 
to enforce regulations. With respect to data misuse during Covid-19, there is relative 
transparency about the data to be used by the UK’s planned tracing App. What is less 
clear is the data store, and it is also unclear what data the government will be seeking and 
using from private companies.   
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Our Digital Footprint under Covid-19: Should We Fear the UK Digital 
Contact Tracing App? 
Audrey Guinchard, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Essex [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_034] 
 
 
Abstract 
With the objective of controlling the spread of the coronavirus, the UK has decided to 
create and, since 5 May 2020, is live testing a digital contact tracing app, under the 
direction of NHS X, a branch of NHS Digital, and with the help of the private sector. Given 
the lack of details as to what the app will exactly do or not do, there are fears that the 
project will increase government surveillance beyond the pandemic. While I share these 
concerns, I argue that we need to simultaneously tackle one of the most significant, yet 
overlooked, contributors to the problem of government surveillance: our inflated digital 
footprint, stemming from our use of digital technology, and the basis of ‘surveillance 
capitalism’, a business model left largely unchallenged, which results in surveillance, and 
stems from the non-compliance with data protection laws. A systematic enforcement of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on the private sector would disrupt the current 
dynamics of surveillance which are hidden in plain sight. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Confronted with the Covid-19 public health crisis, more than 30 countries have already 
instituted measures to track people’s movements, with the objective of controlling the 
spread of the virus and/or people’s movement.1 Mobile phone apps are central to these 
efforts.2 The UK has decided to create and, since 5 May 2020, is live testing a digital 
contact tracing app, under the direction of NHS X, a branch of NHS Digital, and with the 
help of the private sector. The app has so far attracted a number of concerns,  correlative 
recommendations,3 and a draft Bill.4 Given the lack of details as to what the app will do, 
fears exist that the project will create a huge data trove, without adequate safeguards, in 
violation of data protection laws and human rights, and with the potential to open the door 
to extensive government surveillance beyond the management of the current public health 
crisis.  
 
I share those concerns and agree with the various recommendations put forward but I 
argue that we need to simultaneously tackle one of the most significant, yet overlooked, 
 
1 Andrew Roth and others, ‘Growth in surveillance may be hard to scale back after pandemic, experts say' 
The Guardian, 14 April 2020.  
2 Ada Lovelace Institute, ‘Exit through the App Store? A rapid evidence review on the technical 
considerations and societal implications of using technology to transition from the COVID-19 crisis,’ 20 
April 2020. 
3 Ibid.; academics in: Rachel Coldicutt, ‘Open Letter: Contact Tracking and NHSX,’ Medium, 23 March 
2020; Matthew Ryder QC et al., ‘COVID-19 & Tech responses: Legal opinion,’ 30 April 2020; House of 
Commons Science and Technoogy Committee, ‘Oral evidence: UK Science, Research and Technology 
Capability and Influence in Global Disease Outbreaks’, HC 136, Questions 302-384, 28 April 2020; Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), ‘Human Rights and the Government’s Response to Covid-19: Digital 
Contact Tracing’, 6 May 2020. 
4 Initially, an academic initiative, Lilian Edwards et al., ‘The Coronavirus (Safeguards) Bill 2020: Proposed 
protections for digital interventions and in relation to immunity certificates. Version 5.1,’ 6 May 2020, 
https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/yc6xu/; now a proposal put forward by the JCHR, ‘Committee drafts Bill on 
Covid-19 (Coronavirus) Contact Tracing App’, 15 May 2020. 
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contributors to the problem of government surveillance: our inflated digital footprint, the 
basis of ‘informational capitalism’ or ‘surveillance capitalism’, a set of surveillance practices 
elevated to a business model and left largely unchallenged.5 To do so requires the 
systematic enforcement of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the UK 
Data Protection Act 2018 on the private sector so as to disrupt the current dynamics of 
surveillance which are hidden in plain sight. 
 
After a brief outline of the data protection law framework applicable to the processing of 
personal data in general, I will sketch the main elements of the controversy surrounding 
the app before explaining its context, i.e. the surveillance business model that part of the 
private sector has adopted, in violation of data protection laws. I will thereafter highlight 
the resulting dynamics and why they need challenging, concluding that enforcement by 
the UK data protection regulator, the Information Commissioner Office (ICO) should play 
a central role in altering these dynamics, beyond the Covid-19 crisis. 
 
II. The Backdrop: The Data Protection Law Framework 
 
The GDPR, like the Directive 1995/46/EC it replaced on 25 May 2018, established a 
number of legal requirements for the processing of persona data. The principles are the 
necessity (not just convenience of processing) and proportionality of the processing as to 
the types of data collected, the purposes for which they are used, the time during which 
they are needed for processing, and the legal grounds to justify the processing.6 
Controllers, who decide the purposes and means of processing, should ensure compliance 
with the above principles and demonstrate compliance. Processors acting on behalf of 
controllers have, since the GDPR, a much more pro-active role in ensuring compliance, 
with specific duties, independently of controllers’ own obligations (Article 28 GDPR). 
 
Compliance with data protection laws is not a tick-box exercise to be undertaken after the 
digital technology has been created. In case of high risk processing, such as health data 
processing, data protection impact assessments have become mandatory, so as to 
mitigate risks, and if mitigation is not possible, to decide whether the processing should be 
pursued at all. 7  Compliance with human rights is also central to data protection by design. 
8 Indeed, the ultimate objective of all these rules, in the GDPR (Recital 4) and in the 
Directive (Recital 2), is that ‘the processing of personal data should be designed to serve 
mankind’. The controversy surrounding the digital contact tracing app centres around 
these sets of obligations. 
 
III. The Controversy Surrounding the UK Digital Contact Tracing App 
 
NHS X leads the development of the app, with the help of the private sector. It thus 
determines the purpose and means of processing, and as a data controller, needs to 
ensure compliance with the key principles. The companies it works with are likely to be 
considered as processors, acting on behalf of NHS X which should instruct them to 
 
5 Julie E Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The fight for a 
human future at the new frontier of power (London: Profile Books, 2019). 
6 Articles 5 and 6 GDPR, very similar to Articles 6 and 7 Directive. 
7 Article 35 GDPR. 
8 Recital 4 GDPR; the ICO Elizabeth Denham, JCHR, ‘Oral evidence (virtual proceeding): The 
Government’s response to Covid-19: human rights implications’, HC 265, Questions 10-14, 4 May 2020.  
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implement data protection by design. The little information NHS X has so far provided has 
remained scattered and vague.9 The app processes Bluetooth data to be stored in a 
‘backend datastore’ and aggregated with some data sets, such as the Covid-19 test results 
and the details of the 111 call,10 but without further details beyond the potential or likelihood 
of adding geolocation data in a future iteration of the app.11 This  centralised approach 
allows creating a social graph of individuals’ and their interactions with others to 
understand the spread of the disease and hot spots of infections. Hence doubts as to 
implementing data minimisation.  Furthermore, the exact purposes for which the data will 
be used have not been explained, beyond a vague reference to tracing and research, 
raising issues as to compliance with the purpose limitation. Time limitation is also a 
problem since the Bluetooth data, ‘enmeshed with wider data’, cannot be deleted.12  
 
Regarding the legal grounds to justify processing, NHS X has continuously indicated that 
consent will be sought, presenting consent as an indicator of its commitment to privacy 
and the law.13 It is however extremely unlikely that consent can justify the processing, 
especially for research, in light of the long standing EU guidance on data protection 
consent,14 specifically repeated for Covid-19 tracing apps.15 NHS X seems to confuse the 
voluntary nature of using the app with the legal justification for processing data, despite 
the ICO having expressly pointed out the difference.16 This betrays wider issues as to the 
understanding of the law and the nature of the conversations with the ICO. 
 
To reassure critics, NHS X has finally opened the source code of the app, but not of the 
datastore,17 and published the data protection impact assessment (DPIA),18 voluntarily 
submitted the DPIA to the ICO.19 Nevertheless, since ‘the devil is in the details’,20 
especially with regard to the datastore, suspicions as to the UK government’s surveillance 
capability have not abated. In fact, the JCHR appears to be alarmed by the speed of the 
piloting and intended roll out.21 Data protection by design requires to pause and ascertain 
those risks before the app is rolled out, not afterwards. 
 
9 Only two official statements -of 28 March and 28 April 2020-, with information added when Matthew 
Gould, head of NHS X, testified before the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee on 28 
April 2020, and the JCHR on 4 May 2020. 
10 Matthew Gould, Indra Joshi, and Ming Tang, ‘The power of data in a pandemic,’ 28 March 2020, 
https://healthtech.blog.gov.uk/2020/03/28/the-power-of-data-in-a-pandemic/. 
11 House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q340, 376. 
12 Matthew Gould, Q20, JCHR, ‘Oral evidence (virtual proceeding): The Government’s response to Covid-
19: human rights implications’, HC 265, Questions 10-14.  
13 House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q 326, 340, 341, 364, 366; JCHR, ‘Oral 
evidence (virtual proceeding): The Government’s response to Covid-19: human rights implications’, HC 
265, Q17. 
14 Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679. WP 259 rev.01,’ 2018. 
Now replaced by EDPB, ‘Guidelines 05/2020 on consent under Regulation 2016/679. Version 1.0,’ 4 May 
2020. 
15 EDPB, ‘Statement of the EDPB Chair on the processing of personal data in the context of the COVID-19 
outbreak,’ 16 March 2020.  
16 ICO, ‘COVID-19 Contact tracing: data protection expectations on app development,’ 4 May 2020. 
17 ‘Source code of the digital contact tracing Covid-19 app,’ Github, 7 May 2020, https://github.com/nhsx.  
18 DPIA. 
19 ICO, ‘Statement in response to media enquiries about the Data Protection Impact Assessment for the 
NHSX’s trial of contact tracing app’, https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-
blogs/2020/05/dpia-for-the-nhsx-s-trial-of-contact-tracing-app.  
20 Prof Lilian Edwards, House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 4), Q362. 
21 JCHR, ‘Human Rights and the Government’s Response to Covid-19’ (n. 3), 12; JCHR, ‘Oral evidence 
(virtual proceeding): The Government’s response to Covid-19: human rights implications’, HC 265, Q 17. 
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So far, recommendations have centred on restricting government’s abuse of power. I argue 
that this approach will not suffice. Once we start looking at the digital contact app from the 
perspective of the digital ecosystem and our massive digital footprint,22 the app can hardly 
be seen as ‘something new because this degree of surveillance of members of the public 
has never been contemplated before’.23  
 
IV.  Contextualising the Controversy: A Business Model Resulting in Surveillance 
 
Our society tolerates commercial practices that result in massive and intrusive 
surveillance, which if they had originated from governments, we would be, I submit, up in 
arms. Because they come from the private sector and are more diffused, lost in an 
ecosystem so opaque that we do not know exactly what our digital footprint consists of and 
who has access to it,24 we have not opposed them. Let us look at Bluetooth which the 
digital contact app will use. Bluetooth has been invented for connecting two devices, for 
example a pen to a tablet. Bluetooth’s use was transformed when Apple created in 2013 
the iBeacon for apps to micro-target consumers in stores.25 Bluetooth is now ubiquitous in 
airports, hotels, and shops to ‘customise their experience’, an euphemism that masks the 
tracking of their movements.26 Thus, while Bluetooth has undeniable benefits, it also has 
an inherent capacity for surveillance. 
 
Now, let us imagine the following Covid-19 scenario. The lockdown has eased, an 
employer interviews three different individuals, hiding from each a smartphone with the 
app on.27 Each interviewee has the app; one tests positive for Covid-19; the interviewer 
receives notification. Will the interviewer decide that hiring the interviewee is not worth the 
risk, or on the contrary, in the (false?) belief that herd immunity can be built on, will it favour 
the interviewee who had Covid-19, as employers and slave owners used to do for those 
who contracted the yellow fever in 19th century New Orleans?28 Whichever decision the 
modern employer will take, how will the interviewees know whether the positive testing for 
Covid-19 influenced the decision? The current debate on the Covid-19 digital contact 
tracing app has not really pointed out this inherent risk of misuse, independently of whether 
a decentralised or centralised approach is adopted. 
 
More generally, given the wide use of Bluetooth in the private sector, where are the studies 
on the resulting surveillance? If iBeacon had been invented by a governmental intelligence 
agency, would our reaction have been different? Surveillance in Western countries is still 
 
22 David L. Chaum, ‘Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete,’ 
Commun. Assoc. Computing Machinery 28, no. 10 (1985). The author, at the origins of key elements of 
cryptography and the dark web, is cited in the PEPP-PT project, which is somewhat ironic given the 
criticisms of surveillance for the PEPP-PT project, PEPP-PT (n. 39). 
23 Joanna Cherry, considering the app as something new, Member of the JCHR, ‘Oral evidence (virtual 
proceeding): The Government’s response to Covid-19: human rights implications,’ HC 265, Q4 p10. 
24 See the work of ICSI—UC Berkeley and IMDEA Networks, "The Haystack Project," 21 February 2020, 
https://www.haystack.mobi. 
25 Michael Kwet, ‘In Stores, Secret Bluetooth Surveillance Tracks Your Every Move’ New York Times, 14 
June 2019. Nic Newman. Apple iBeacon technology briefing. J Direct Data Digit Mark Pract 15, 222–225 
(2014). 
26 Ibid.  
27 The scenario is not mine, see (in French) Xavier Bonnetain, ‘Le traçage anonyme, dangereux oxymore. 
Analyse de risques à destination des non-spécialistes (website),’ 23 April 2020 , https://risques-tracage.fr. 
28 Kathryn Olivarius, ‘Immunity, Capital, and Power in Antebellum New Orleans’, (2019) 124 The American 
Historical Review 425. 
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associated with state agencies, but they do not need anymore to directly collect data when 
they have an enormous readily available pool of data collected by others … in the private 
sector. When in 2013, Snowden revealed the PRISM programme, it became clear that the 
NSA focused on building its capacity to aggregate and analyse the data, relying on US 
private companies to give the data.29  
 
We live in a digital ecosystem where many of the innovative digital technologies we use 
have been developed in direct opposition to the core legal principles of data protection by 
design. Instead of minimising processing to what is needed to provide a service, a number 
of businesses have thrived on collecting as much data as possible from consumers, often 
under the disguise of ‘free services’, and by buying and selling the resulting profiling to 
data brokers. The context directly related to the Covid-19 digital contract tracing apps is 
particularly representative of this business model’s approach to data protection and the 
risks it creates. Apps on smartphones, fitbits, smartwatches, now abound that collect 
various health information: the number of steps per day, the speed of the walk/run, weight, 
height, BMI, and/or various medical health information the user can enter. Many of these 
health apps violate the GDPR by collecting far too much data, for too long, without 
transparency, and without securing the data.30  
 
As a result, the private sector has access to a granularity of information that can be 
shocking. Nowadays, an insurer -who acquires supposedly anonymised data from a 
supermarket loyalty scheme to feed into its predictive algorithm- can identify a client who 
buys fennel as a healthy conscious consumer who is unlikely to be of high risk, and who 
thus should be offered a lower premium.31 Fennel in the UK is a luxury vegetable that not 
all supermarkets will sell. Most people from deprived areas cannot afford it. ‘Given the 
correlation between unhealthy lifestyles and lower incomes, the risks are only too clear’ of 
discrimination and of further entrenching the inequalities of our society. 32 Yet, the impact 
on human rights and on the social fabric of our society is barely understood. Over time, 
the surveillance resulting from this business model is proving to be no less dangerous to 
human rights than those of governments.  
 
In light of this context, the concerns as to government surveillance through the building of 
the digital contact tracing app take a different resonance. Undoubtedly, we should ensure 
that it does not happen, and the safest way to do so is to entrench safeguards in primary 
legislation. Nevertheless, we should be equally concerned about the possible actions from 
the private sector and the dynamics that they contribute to. Transparency and 
accountability should be demanded not just of government, specifically here NHS X, but 
also of the private sector involved in the project. This discussion has largely been missing, 
despite data protection laws constituting an excellent starting point to challenge the current 
dynamics of the project.  
 
 
29 Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, ‘NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and 
others,’ The Guardian, 7 June 2013. 
30 As the Belgian Data Protection Authority stated on 31 March 2020, 
https://www.autoriteprotectiondonnees.be/le-covid-19-et-lutilisation-dapplications-de-sante; Norway 
Consumer Council, “Report: Out of Control”, 14 January  2020, 
https://www.forbrukerradet.no/undersokelse/no-undersokelsekategori/report-out-of-control/. 
31 Hannah Fry, ‘Hello World: How to be Human in the Age of the Machine’, Doubleday, 2018, and interview 
at https://www.noted.co.nz/tech/tech-tech/how-algorithms-can-go-rogue-whos-at-the-wheel.  
32 Editorial, ‘The Guardian view on big data and insurance: knowing too much,’ The Guardian, 27 
September 2018.  
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V. Revisiting the Controversy: The Need to Challenge the Dynamics of the Digital 
Contact Tracing App Project 
 
NHS X indicated it works notably (but not exclusively) with Microsoft, Google, Palantir, 
Amazon Web Services and Faculty AI.33 Because the government does not have the in-
house expertise to build these apps, that it resorted to the private sector should not 
surprise. This collaboration however needs to respect the rules set out in the GDPR, 
notably Article 28 GDPR. Controllers have to choose processors who can demonstrate 
compliance with data protection by design (Article 28(1) GDPR); if the processors’ track 
record does not give full confidence, controllers can refuse to choose them.34 Furthermore, 
processors have the duty to assist controllers in fulfilling their obligations, with an 
expectation to be pro-active (Article 28(3) GDPR). The problem is that NHS X has chosen 
companies whose implementation of the GDPR has been recently challenged either 
formally, by a data protection regulator, or informally by academic scientists.  
 
Google has been found twice in breach of data protection laws; 35  and a complaint for its 
use of a tracking ID on Android has just been filed before the Austrian Data Protection 
Authority.36 While Microsoft has a very different business model from Google’s, in 
November 2018, the Dutch Government concluded that its processing of personal data for 
a wide range of its products37 violated the GDPR core principles (data, purpose and time 
limitations). The EU regulator reached the same conclusions in its preliminary 
investigation.38 Has the impact of these findings of non-compliance been assessed on the 
UK contracts in general and on the development of the Covid-19 app in particular? 
Furthermore, in May 2019, Palantir, which business model is based on buying and selling 
huge troves of (personal) data,39 was criticised for selling to the US immigration agency 
tracking software that enables the agency to take decisions in breach of human rights.40  
 
Consequently, doubts as to whether NHS X has complied with Article 28(1) GDPR arise. 
That NHS X could not confirm, a week before the restricted launch of the app, that Apple 
and Google would be forbidden to turn off the app at any point, despite having the power 
to delete the app from their stores, does not give full confidence that NHS X has ensured 
 
33 Gould, Joshi, and Tang (n. 10). House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q302-
384. 
34 EDPS, ‘EDPS Guidelines on the concepts of controller, processor and joint controllership under 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.’ 
35 (in English) CNIL, ‘Deliberation of the Restricted Committee SAN-2019-001 of 21 January 2019 
pronouncing a financial sanction against GOOGLE LLC.,’ 21 January 2019, https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-
restricted-committee-imposes-financial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc, paras. 105, 109. 
36 By the NGO NYOB, 13 May 2020, https://noyb.eu/en/complaint-filed-against-google-tracking-id. 
37 A summary by those who audited the firm is available at Privacy Company, ‘New DPIA on Microsoft 
Office and Windows software: still privacy risks remaining (long blog),’ 29 July 2019, 
https://www.privacycompany.eu/blogpost-en/new-dpia-on-microsoft-office-and-windows-software-still-
privacy-risks-remaining-long-blog. For the full reports: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2019/06/11/data-protection-impact-assessment-
windows-10-enterprise. 
38 Upon referral, EDPB, ‘EDPS investigation into IT contracts: stronger cooperation to better protect rights 
of all individuals,’ 21 October 2019. 
39 Peter Waldman, Lizette Chapman, and Jordan Robertson, ‘Peter Thiel’s data-mining company is using 
War on Terror tools to track American citizens. The scary thing? Palantir is desperate for new customers,’ 
Bloomsberg Business Week, 19 April 2018. 
40 Marisa Franco, ‘Palantir has no place at Berkeley: they help tear immigrant families apart,’ The 
Guardian, 31 May 2019. 
 275 
 
that the companies only act on its instructions.41 Similarly, if the companies hired are not 
already fully compliant, doubts exist as to whether they are in a position, for example, to 
point out to the controller that its instruction may violate the GDPR (Article 28(3) GDPR). 
Has any of companies for example challenge NHS X’s use of consent, when the GDPR 
violation is likely? Willingness to ‘get it right’,42 while laudable, may well not suffice if the 
structures for compliance are inadequate. Trust in the project cannot rest on the hope that 
things will turn out all right, especially at a time of crisis. 
 
To summarise, when each partner of a project experiences their own difficulties in 
complying with data protection laws, their collaboration has the potential to multiply the 
risks of non-compliance and human rights violations. The GDPR provides the tools to 
challenge these dynamics.43 Difficult questions can be asked, but the answers do not have 
to be provided to the general public. It falls therefore on the data protection regulator, in 
the UK the ICO, to question decisions that potentially violate the GDPR. So far the Judicial 
Committee on Human Rights has not been impressed by the ICO’s approach to the NHS 
X’s project. 44 More importantly maybe, the Committee had already noted in 2019 a wider 
trend of not enforcing data protection laws with sufficient vigour. Hence the Committee’s 
recommendation for the Government to review ‘whether there are adequate measures in 
place to enforce the GDPR and DPA in relation to how internet companies are using 
personal data, including consideration of whether the ICO has the resources necessary to 
act as an effective regulator.’45 In May 2020, the recommendation is to create a specific 
monitoring body for real-time auditing. In the long term, is this a viable solution? Lack of 
enforcement leaves a vacuum, where others are forced to take decisions which are not 
within their role46 and which they do not want to take.47 It would be more beneficial to 
strengthen the ICO’s capacity to enforce, not the least by internally separating its roles of 
advisor, investigator and decision-maker, as the Financial Conduct Authority does, to avoid 
inherent conflicts of interests.48   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The pandemic has revived fears of governments creating or extending massive 
surveillance programmes under the cover of fighting the coronavirus and exiting the 
lockdown. I have demonstrated that the NHS X project suffers from enough flaws with 
regard to data protection laws to give substance to these fears: a lack of transparency, the 
recurring vagueness of the little information provided, and the choices made regarding the 
processors when their compliance with data protection laws can be patchy. 
 
 
41 House of Commons Science and Technoogy Committee (n. 3), Q 358, 383 – it is commendable though 
to ask for time to check the answer. 
42 Matthew Gould, JCHR, "Oral evidence” (n. 12), Q18. 
43 But it will not resolve some issues of data sharing facilitated by other legislations, as correctly pointed out 
by Michael Veale, JCHR, ‘Oral evidence (virtual proceeding): The Government’s response to Covid-19: 
human rights implications,’ HC 265, Q13.  
44 JCHR, ‘Oral evidence (virtual proceeding): The Government’s response to Covid-19: human rights 
implications,’ HC 265, Q17.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ada Lovelace Institute, ‘Exit through the App Store’ (n. 2) 10. 
47 Microsoft called for regulation of facial recognition, Joseph Menn, ‘Microsoft turned down facial-
recognition sales on human rights concerns,’ UK Reuters, 17 April 2019. 
48 The ICO did not see the conflict, JCHR, ‘Oral evidence (virtual proceeding): The Government’s response 
to Covid-19: human rights implications,’ HC 265, Q17. 
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Nevertheless, these fears should not mask that part of the private sector indulges into 
building our digital footprint and use it to extensively monitor us, independently of what 
governments do. Fitbits and health apps on smartphones are the latest expression of a 
business model based on little to no compliance with data protection laws. It should be of 
no surprise then that these businesses pay lip service to privacy rights and to the broader 
range of human rights which the technology may or will interfere with. In that sense, 
governments’ surveillance could be seen as the last step of a process that has started in 
part of the private sector. If neither side has an internal culture of compliance, how can 
they be expected to take responsibility to ensure all safeguards are in place? 
 
To their discharge, the poor enforcement of data protection laws has not contributed to 
foster a strong culture of compliance with data protection laws. Time has come for a 
systematic enforcement of the GDPR, which would ultimately bear fruits beyond the 
decisions taken on specific controllers and processors. The minimisation of processing, 
and thus of our digital footprint, would become an entrenched habit for all technology 
developers, with the ripple effect that any deviation would stand out and be easier to 
challenge. Convenience and functionality of digital technologies do not have to trump the 
necessary standards of security, privacy, and human rights. It is time to create an 
environment where developers are rewarded for designs that ‘serve mankind’ rather than 
for those that serve short term interests destructive of the fabric of our society.  
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Abstract 
Technology companies have been playing a key role during Covid-19 from assisting state 
responses to improving quality of life during lockdown. These companies are providing 
means of communication, work, education, social and cultural life that would otherwise be 
impossible. As tech companies are now playing an essential facilitating role in enabling 
human rights in this way, a key question emerges: Should tech companies facilitating 
essential services bear special responsibilities?  
 
This paper argues that tech company obligations are heightened to the extent that the 
means through which they meet their due diligence obligations are amplified. This will be 
demonstrated by first illustrating the unique role that tech companies are playing during 
Covid-19, and second, examining whether special obligations should apply to those 
companies that are facilitating essential services. Third, this paper will recommend 
practical steps in the form of three types of human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) that 
companies should carry out as a starting point to understanding how they can meet their 
responsibility to respect human rights. 
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Tech companies are providing crucial tools to overcome social isolation, promote social 
cohesion and raise awareness of health and safety guidelines during the pandemic.1 Not 
only do they improve quality of individual life, but by assisting states to deliver public 
functions, and helping courts, doctors’ surgeries, counselling and advice centres, schools 
and others to operate through online platforms, they are enabling the enjoyment of human 
rights which would otherwise not be possible due to schools, places of work and public 
spaces being closed during lockdown. 
 
This demonstrates not only the great reliance of individuals and states on technology but 
also the tremendous opportunities that technology  presents. However, not all technology 
and data processing practices bring about positive human rights impacts. In fact, 
technology poses a wide range of risks to human rights. The main human rights risks 
typically associated with technology are the right to privacy, freedom of expression, and 
non- discrimination, but risks go well beyond these and can affect all human rights.2  
 
 
* The Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project is funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council [grant number ES/M010236/1]. 
1 United Nations, ‘Shared Responsibility, Global Solidarity: Responding to the socio-economic impacts of 
COVID-19’, March 2020, 6, available at https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sg_report_socio-
economic_impact_of_covid19.pdf. 
2 Lorna McGregor, Vivian Ng, Ahmed Shaheed, Elena Abrusci, Catherine Kent, Daragh Murray and 
Carmel Williams, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 70: Putting Human Rights at the Heart of 
the Design, Development and Deployment of Artificial Intelligence’ Human Rights, Big Data and 
Technology Project, University of Essex, 20 December 2018, 11-14. 
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Considering this two-fold nature of technology, safeguards must be a priority to ensure that 
advantages may be harnessed without endangering human rights. Safeguards may take 
various forms depending on the enforcing actor. While states are the main duty bearers 
under international law and are required to protect, respect and fulfil human rights, 
businesses under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) 
have a responsibility to respect human rights by preventing, mitigating and remedying any 
actual or potential adverse human rights impacts caused, contributed or linked to their 
business operations and activities. 
 
Recognising that technology companies are serving as sole facilitators of essential 
services in a time when they are inaccessible any other way raises two red flags in regard 
to potential human rights harms. These are (1) harms associated with the use and 
deployment of these tech products and services and (2) harms resulting from a lack of 
access to these services.   
 
To prevent and mitigate both of these harms, it is important to understand what 
responsibilities both companies and states have in regard to human rights. While the role 
of the State is significant in this context, the scope of this paper is limited to the 
responsibilities of tech companies and the safeguards they must put in place to meet their 
responsibility to respect under the UNGPs.  
 
This paper will argue that tech company obligations are heightened to the extent that the 
means through which they must meet their due diligence obligations are amplified. This 
means that policies and processes to identify and address adverse impacts must be 
proportionate to the potential severity of impact of their operations among other factors. 
This will be demonstrated by illustrating the unique role that tech companies are playing 
during Covid-19, examining whether special obligations should apply to those companies 
that are facilitating essential services, and recommending practical steps in the form of 
three types of HRIAs as a starting point to understanding how tech companies can meet 
their obligation to respect human rights. 
 
II. The Role of Tech Companies - Digital Society in Lockdown 
 
Technology is being used in all facets of Covid-19 responses. The Internet of things (IOT) 
market is providing assistance through technology such as drones for sanitation, smart 
thermometers for tracking virus spread, autonomous vehicles for deliveries and various 
wearables that measure vitals.3 Tech companies are also assisting governments in 
digitalising their services, spreading public health and safety information, conducting data 
analysis to track infection rates, and developing contact tracing apps.4 At an individual 
level, communication apps and platforms provide the means of online teaching, video 
conferencing for work, online gaming, and streaming services that enable the enjoyment 
of public and private life online. 
 
3 Alexandra Rehak, ‘IoT impact in the COVID-19 world’, 22 April 2020, 
https://www.omdia.com/resources/product-content/iot-wins-and-challenges-in-the-covid-19-world; Thomas 
Brewster, ‘Palantir, The $20 Billion, Peter Thiel-Backed Big Data Giant, Is Providing Coronavirus 
Monitoring To The CDC’, 31 March 2020, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/03/31/palantir-the-20-billion-peter-thiel-backed-big-
data-giant-is-providing-a-coronavirus-monitoring-tool-to-the-cdc/#4a6619ff1595. 
4 ‘NHS COVID-19 App’, NHSX, https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/covid-19-response/nhs-covid-19-app/, accessed 
14 June 2020. 
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Many of these products and services are not new but already played some role in our daily 
lives pre-Covid-19. The use of the technology itself is, in this way, not novel. What is 
different now is that individuals, businesses and states many times do not have any choice 
but to use technology to enable many parts of ordinary daily life from work to school and 
healthcare. For example, even before Covid-19 there was a high adoption of education 
technology (EdTech), with global investments reaching US$18.66 billion in 2019.5 This 
EdTech however served as a supplementary tool in addition to the main source of 
education through face-to-face learning. During Covid-19 however, as the pandemic 
response measures require school closures in many countries, online/distance learning is 
the only mechanisms through which education is enabled.6 The complete reliance on 
technology and the lack of choice to use the tools both from the side of the individual as 
well as the educational institution, whether public or private, is what makes the difference 
significant. 
 
With many public spaces closed and lock down measures limiting face-to-face interactions, 
trends of increased tech use can be observed in various areas. Tech companies offering 
means of communication are in particularly high demand such as Zoom, Hangouts Meet 
and Google Classroom which experienced significant spikes in their usage (figure 1).7 
According to a survey by Kantar, 
web browsing has  generally 
increased by 70% and social 
media engagement by 61% over 
normal usage rates.8  
Additionally, individual 
companies saw dramatic rises in 
particular apps. Facebook 
reported  that, by 24 March, total 
messenger use increased by 
more than 50% over the 
previous month and, ‘in those 
places hit hardest by the virus’, 
voice and video calling more 
than doubled on Facebook 
Messenger and WhatsApp.9 
See figure 2 for group call 
minutes by Facebook Italy for 
example.10  
 
 
5 Cathy Li and Farah Lalani, ‘The COVID-19 pandemic has changed education forever. This is how’, World 
Economic Forum, 29 April 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/coronavirus-education-global-
covid19-online-digital-learning/. 
6 Laura Bicker, ‘Coronavirus: How South Korea is teaching empty classrooms’, BBC News, 10 April 2020.   
7 Ella Koeza and Nathalie Popper, ‘The Virus Changed the Way We Internet’, New York Times, 7 April 
2020. 
8 ‘COVID-19 Barometer: Consumer attitudes, media habits and expectations’, Kantar, 3 April 2020, 
https://www.kantar.com/Inspiration/Coronavirus/COVID-19-Barometer-Consumer-attitudes-media-habits-
and-expectations. 
9 Alex Schulz, ‘Keeping Our Services Stable and Reliable During the COVID-19 Outbreak’, Facebook, 24 
March 2020, https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/keeping-our-apps-stable-during-covid-19/. 
10 Ibid.  
Figure 1 Daily app usage for popular remote working apps 
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Rising numbers of users and changing public policies may 
indicate new demographics and different operational 
contexts which can alter the effect that services have on 
human rights. While companies are accustomed to 
evolving user bases and spikes in demand, Covid-19 is 
producing unprecedented rapid changes. Zoom CEO Eric 
Yuan, in his public letter, noted that Zoom services were 
built primarily for enterprise customers and that it was not 
designed for every person working, studying, and 
socialising from home with a much broader set of users 
using the services in a myriad a ways.11 Facebook similarly 
reported t hat while its services are built to withstand 
‘spikes during events such as the Olympics or New Year’s 
Eve,’ they are predictable and happen infrequently, unlike 
the spikes experienced during Covid-19.12   
 
The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights has 
explained that ‘some businesses have a special role in this 
situation because of the nature of their products or services’ referring specifically to those 
providing life-saving products.13 Under what category, however, do we put products and 
services which act as the only means of enabling the enjoyment and fulfilment of human 
rights?  With offices, schools, courts and other public services closing or operating at 
limited capacity, some obvious associated rights can immediately be said to be at risk, 
such as the right to education, work, and fair trial. However, thanks to new technology 
allowing for some parts of society to function, many people in the world are still in a position 
to enjoy these rights, at least to an extent. Significant disparities in access to technology, 
often referred to as the digital divide, are however preventing many individuals from 
reaping these benefits and can constitute human rights harm for people who are already 
marginalised.14 The technology does not fulfil or enable the right to life itself, but rather 
enables the enjoyment of other human rights, which cannot be fulfilled in any other way 
during this time.  
 
Following this realisation, one may wonder whether tech companies that provide such 
rights-enabling services should have special responsibilities. If a tech company is, for 
example, the operator of a platform that serves as the only means through which education 
is enabled, should the company bear greater responsibility?  
 
 
 
 
11 Eric S. Yuan, ‘A message to Our Users’, Zoom Blog, 1 April 2020, 
https://blog.zoom.us/wordpress/2020/04/01/a-message-to-our-users/. 
12 ‘How production engineers support global events on Facebook’, Facebook Engineering, 12 February 
2018, https://engineering.fb.com/production-engineering/how-production-engineers-support-global-events-
on-facebook/. 
13 OHCHR, ‘Ensuring that business respects human rights during the covid-19 crisis and beyond: the 
relevance of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’,, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25837&LangID=E, accessed 
14 June 2020. 
14 Lorna McGregor and Dr. Ahmed Shaheed, ‘The COVID-19 pandemic: Five urgent principles for leaving 
no one behind through technology’, 19 May 2020, https://www.universal-rights.org/nyc/blog-nyc/the-covid-
19-pandemic-five-urgent-principles-for-leaving-no-one-behind-through-technology/. 
Figure 2 Facebook statistics from Italy 
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III. Business Respect for Human Rights 
 
Given these changes in function and operational context, understanding the role of tech 
companies in respecting human rights is crucial. Does the essential facilitating, or rights 
enabling, nature of their products and services change their responsibility in regard to 
human rights? This section will demonstrate why the responsibility to respect of tech 
companies remains the same, yet calls for heightened means of meeting that 
responsibility. This will be done by (1) recalling the business responsibility to respect 
human rights, (2) understanding the importance of proportionate means of meeting that 
responsibility and (3) examining why they do not bear special responsibilities, such as 
those of states. 
 
a) Back to basics 
 
Under the UNGPs all businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights. This 
means that they should prevent and mitigate any adverse human rights impact they may 
have caused, contributed to, or are linked to.15 This includes human rights impacts within 
their business operations, supply chains and business relationships, as well as impacts on 
individuals and communities that may be adversely affected by their products and services. 
In this way the UNGPs provide an accountability framework based on prevention, 
oversight, monitoring and remedies for victims. The UNGPs do not create new substantive 
human rights obligations but rather enshrine states’ obligations to protect human rights 
from third party harm and articulate businesses’ responsibilities to respect human rights 
and provide effective remedy.16  
 
Businesses respect human rights by conducting human rights due diligence, which is the 
ongoing process whereby a company assesses its human rights impacts, acts upon the 
findings, transparently reports and provides effective remedies to affected rightsholders.17 
The detailed  process can be seen in figure 3 below. Respecting human rights is not only 
good for rights holders but can also support businesses in building consumer trust and 
mitigating future legal liability. As confirmed by the UN Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights in its Covid-19 Statement: ‘human rights due diligence is key to ensuring 
that any risks to people are identified and mitigated.’18 
 
 
15 UN, ‘Guiding principles on business and human rights: implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ framework’, HR/PUB/11/04, January 2012, Principle 13, p 14. 
16 John Ruggie,  ‘The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights,’ (2017) Working Paper Series, Harvard University, p. 1. 
17 UN. ‘Guiding principles’, (n. 15), Principle 17.  
18 ‘Ensuring that business respects human rights’, (n. 13).  
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The responsibility to respect human rights applies to all businesses regardless of the 
sector, size, operational context, ownership and structure.19 However, ‘the scale and 
complexity of the means through which enterprises meet that responsibility may vary 
according to these factors and with the severity of the enterprise’s adverse human rights 
impacts.’20 This means that companies must have measures in place which are 
proportionate to the factors listed above. Considering this specification, it can be argued 
that due to a significant and rapid change to the operational context of some tech 
companies which change the potential severity of impacts, the means by which they must 
meet their responsibility to respect are heightened.  
 
b) Why businesses don’t bear special responsibilities 
 
According to the UNGPs, it is a company’s responsibility to respect human rights and a 
State’s responsibility to protect human rights. In the case that a company is the sole 
enabler of a right, the State would bear the responsibility to ensure that the company’s 
services are available and accessible to everyone. The company’s responsibility would 
however remain to ensure that the products and services it provides “do no harm” and to 
prevent, mitigate and remedy any adverse human rights impacts. 
 
Whether or not it is a rights enabling service is, therefore, irrelevant to the extent that the 
company must ensure, at all times, that no human rights harms are caused, contributed to 
or linked to its business operations. The means through which the company meets its 
responsibility is heightened however, as potential severity of impact, scale and scope are 
affected by being the sole rights-enabler. The risk may continually change due to a range 
of extraneous factors and therefore ongoing human rights due diligence and impact 
assessments are required in order to ensure harms are prevented and mitigated. 
 
19 UN. “Guiding principles”, (n. 15) Principle 14. 
20 Ibid. 
Figure 3 OECD (2018). OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct. 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf 
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c) Proportionate means of meeting the responsibility to respect 
 
The “means” of demonstrating respect refers to the ‘scale and complexity of the processes 
the enterprise needs to have in place in order to know and show that it is respecting human 
rights’.21 The means of demonstrating this respect is dependent on the size, sector, 
operational context, ownership and structure, but most of all to the severity of a business’s 
adverse human rights impacts. The process must therefore be proportionate to the human 
rights risk of its operations.22 This means that the policies and processes a company has 
must reflect and encompass the severity of impact, size, sector and operational context as 
well as its ownership and organizational structure. For example, a large multinational 
enterprise is more likely to undertake diverse and complex activities than a smaller one 
which increases its human rights risk.23 Their policies and processes for demonstrating 
respect for human right must be reflective of these factors. Similarly, the sector and 
operational context in which a business operates is likely to determine which risks are 
probable in its operations.  
 
While the general sector, ownership and structure of most companies has not changed 
during Covid-19 for tech companies, the operational context and size for most has, as 
illustrated in section II above. It follows that the severity of impact a company has may 
have changed and that therefore enhanced means should be provided to respond to these 
changes to ensure human rights are respected throughout their operations. 
 
This means that businesses must first understand how the new operational context, in this 
case Covid-19, affects their operations and thereby their users through the products and 
services they provide. The only way to achieve this is to conduct human rights impact 
assessments as a first step. 
 
IV. Three Types of HRIAs Tech Companies Should be Conducting 
 
HRIAs are the first step to identifying, understanding, assessing and addressing the 
adverse effects of tech products and services. They provide an opportunity for companies 
to assess and review the types of due diligence they have already undertaken for their 
products, and to reevaluate whether changes are required to ensure they respect human 
rights. Key criteria for a human rights impact assessment process include participation, 
non-discrimination, empowerment, transparency, and accountability, and in terms of 
content should include a benchmark of human rights standards, actual and potential 
impacts caused or contributed to, assessment of the severity of impact, impact mitigation 
measures and access to remedy.24 
 
HRIAs are the only way for companies to identify the adverse human rights impacts their 
products might have before a rights holder is affected. It is the way through which effective 
remedies can be provided and a precautionary approach to new products and relationships 
 
21 UN, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights- an Interpretive Guide’, HR/PUB/12/02, 
January 2012,  19. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Nora Götzmann, Tulika Bansal, Elin Wrzoncki, Cathrine Poulsen-Hansen, Jacqueline Tedaldi and Roya 
Høvsgaard, ‘Human Rights Impact Assessment Guidance and Toolbox’, Danish Institute for Human Rights, 
2016, 22-28. 
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can be ensured. HRIAs should be conducted as early as possible in the lifecycle of a 
project and repeated at regular intervals or “critical gateways” which include project 
expansions and significant changes in social and political circumastances.25 This is 
definitely the case during Covid-19.  
 
For the purposes of this paper HRIAs are divided in three categories of when they are 
needed: (1) when new products are developed, (2) new partnership and collaborations are 
formed, and (3) when a product or service is exposed to a new context. All of these three 
triggers can be observed in the tech sector during Covid-19 and therefore require 
significant attention especially if linked to providing or facilitating access to essential 
services. 
 
a) Baseline HRIAs for new products  
 
For new products and services, baseline HRIA are essential to gather information in order 
to understand the current state of enjoyment of human rights in any particular operational 
context. The process should include all risks throughout the development and deployment 
of any new product, from conceptualisation to design, testing and deployment.26 This may 
be based on knowledge gained from HRIAs for similar products, desk based research on 
socio-economic and political context, expert human rights reports such as from civil 
society, academia and international organizations, and most importantly consultation with 
potentially affected rights holders. 
 
Consultation and meaningful engagement with rights-holders, duty bearers and other 
relevant parties through surveys, interviews, focus groups and other means are primary 
ways to understand actual and potential impact.27 It is from this baseline assessment that 
existing impacts are analysed and future impacts can be predicted. The benchmark for the 
assessment must be international human rights standards. The baseline data should also 
‘inform the selection of human rights indicators, against which predicted change and any 
measures to address the predicted impacts can then be measured and tracked over 
time’.28  
 
Establishing this baseline is crucial to understanding what potential impacts a particular 
technology may have especially if it has not yet been deployed. An example of this is the 
current development of various contact tracing apps around the world which bring about a 
range of human rights concerns, specifically in regard to privacy and surveillance.29 
 
Applying the UNGP framework, companies developing contact tracing apps should 
consider what they know of human rights impacts from assessments of similar products 
both internally and externally, how they may meaningfully consult with potentially affected 
rights holders, and how impacts stand up to the scrutiny of the benchmark of international 
human rights standards and principles. 
 
 
25 Ibid, 12. 
26 Lorna Mcgregor, Daragh Murray and Vivian Ng, ‘International Human Rights Law as a Framework for 
Algorithmic Accountability’, (2019) 68(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 309. 
27 Götzmann et al, (n. 24) 51. 
28 Ibid, 53. 
29 Amos Toh and Deborah Brown, ‘How Digital Contact Tracing for COVID-19 Could Worsen Inequality’, 
Human Rights Watch, 4 June 2020.  
 285 
 
b) Renewed HRIAs for existing products 
 
Many of the products and services that are enabling individuals to overcome isolation, to 
work from home and maintain a social life are possible through already existing products 
and services. These include various social media platforms, communication apps, search 
engines, cloud storage and others. If companies providing such tools have operationalized 
the UNGPs, then a baseline HRIA should already exist prior to the rollout of the particular 
product. This will give the company an understanding of the types of impacts that their 
product is having on human rights in various operational contexts. Many companies may 
not have this in place however, and therefore new baseline HRIAs may be needed. 
 
Products that have been operational pre-Covid-19 but which are facing increasing 
numbers of users, different demographics, and different socio-economic operational 
contexts must consider the effects of these variances on human rights, and/or whether the 
severity of impact has changed. The unprecedented uses of Zoom, as previously 
mentioned, is an illustration of this.30 Understanding that its products are used in new and 
different ways should trigger a renewed impact assessment.  
 
c) HRIAS for new and existing business relationships 
 
The third type of HRIA is needed to assess how existing and new business relationships 
affect human rights. This is significant as companies are responsible not only for the 
human rights impact they cause and contribute to, but also those to which they are linked.31 
This includes direct business partners, suppliers, distributors, government relationships 
and others.32 
 
Particularly when it comes to public private partnerships, it is key that relationships and 
procurement standards are transparent to foster access to information for the public. 
Companies need to consider for whom and how they make particular technologies 
available as some states, for example, may not have sufficient human rights protections in 
place, which could mean that a collaboration would increase risks to human rights. 
Companies such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft have each been criticised for their 
governmental projects, particularly those relating to facial recognition, drone surveillance 
and border policing.33  
 
Key aspects for consideration of human rights impacts of business relationship is whether 
any existing relationships are contributing to human rights harm, whether ending or 
beginning business relationships may cause human rights harm, whether certain actors 
due to their past record of abuse, or use of technology present risks to human rights and 
whether specifically government requests are legal necessary and proportionate. Asking 
these types of questions not only enables respect for human rights but also protects the 
business itself. 
 
30 Yuan (n. 11). 
31 UN, ‘Guiding principles’, (n. 15) Principle 13, 16 (c), 17, 19. 
32 European Commission, ‘ICT Sector Guide on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights’, June 2013, 32, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/information_and_communication_technology_0.pdf. 
33 ACLU, ‘Pressure mounts on Amazon, Microsoft and Google against selling facial recognition to 
government’, 15 January 2019, https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/pressure-mounts-amazon-microsoft-
and-google-against-selling-facial-recognition. 
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VI. Implications Post-Covid-19: Preparing for a Better World  
 
Covid-19 has brought to the forefront the true binary nature of technology. The tremendous 
potential of technology has been demonstrated in facilitating everything from personal 
conveniences, to essential and government services. At the same time, however, all the 
alarm bells have been rung in validating how new and existing technologies and data 
processing practices can affect not only the right to privacy and freedom of expression but 
all human rights.  
 
To enjoy the benefits and keep the harms at bay, safeguards must be the top priority. This 
chapter has demonstrated that the responsibility of companies is to respect human rights 
through means that are proportionate to their severity of impact. For tech companies during 
Covid-19 this means heightened responsibility to have enhanced due diligence measures 
because of the significant and rapid change in operational context and thereby potential 
severity of impact. 
 
While Covid-19 serves as a perfect example of the types of HRIAs that should be triggered, 
it should not take a global pandemic to assess or reassess risk. Moving forward beyond 
the pandemic, ongoing due diligence must be a main concern of businesses. The role of 
technology will presumably not diminish over time and with numerous global challenges 
looming and a rise in tech-solutionism, respect for human rights must become the new 
normal.   
 
Businesses are however not alone in this. States must ensure that all human rights are 
protected, especially when it comes to potential third party harm.34 The safeguards should 
encompass comprehensive regulation, mandatory due diligence requirements, and 
effective oversight to ensure human rights are protected. Only when all actors understand 
their respective responsibilities and do everything within their power to protect and respect 
human rights can the full potential of technology be realised and  sustainable, inclusive 
and resilient growth be ensured. 
 
  
 
34 UN, ‘Guiding principles’, (n. 15) Principle 1. 
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I. Introduction  
 
The UN Secretary-General and the World Health Organisation have described the level of 
misinformation and disinformation surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic as an ‘infodemic’.2 
Misinformation and disinformation are often referred to as ‘fake news’.3 While both involve 
the spread of false or misleading information, misinformation is typically spread by people 
who do not realise that the information is false. By contrast, with disinformation, the person 
sharing the information knows it is false and usually shares it with the intent to cause harm.4 
Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, two major patterns of misinformation and 
disinformation online have emerged. First, racist, xenophobic and hateful messages and 
memes have been shared online, blaming and scapegoating particular groups for the origin 
and spread of Covid-19.5 Second, misinformation has spread on the causes, symptoms 
and possible treatment of the virus.  In this paper, we focus on the effects of the spread of 
misinformation which, if followed, could result in significant harm to health and, in extreme 
situations, life.6  
 
This paper explores the responses that states and social media companies have taken to 
address misinformation on the causes, symptoms, and possible treatment of Covid-19 and 
assesses their compliance with existing obligations under international human rights 
standards and norms, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
Addressing misinformation typically requires a plurality of measures, such as media 
literacy programmes, promotion of good journalism, increased transparency on 
advertising, in some circumstances, content moderation, and supervision by courts and 
regulators.7 For reasons of space, this chapter focuses on the three main approaches 
 
1 The Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project is funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council [grant number ES/M010236/1]. The authors are listed in alphabetical order to reflect equal 
contributions. 
2 ‘UN Tackles ‘infodemic’ of misinformation and cybercrime in COVID-19 crisis’, UN Department of Global 
Communication, https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communications-team/un-tackling-
%E2%80%98infodemic%E2%80%99-misinformation-and-cybercrime-covid-19; World Health Organisation, 
Coronavirus diseases 2019 (COVID-19) – Situation Report-85, 15 April 2020, 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200415-sitrep-86-covid-
19.pdf?sfvrsn=c615ea20_4, 2.  
3 Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, ‘Information Disorder. Toward an interdisciplinary framework for 
research and policymaking’, Council of Europe Report DGI 09-2017, 27 September 2017, 15-17. 
4 Ibid, 20-22. 
5 ‘COVID-19 fears should not be exploited to attack and exclude minorities – UN expert said’, OHCHR, 30 
March 2020, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25757&LangID=E. 
6 Julie Posetti and Kalina Bontcheva, ‘Disinfordemic: Deciphering COVID-19 disinformation’, UNESCO 
Policy Brief 1, April 2020. 
7 Elena Abrusci, Sam Dubberley and Lorna McGregor, ‘Disinformation and Human Rights’, HRBDT Report, 
forthcoming 2020. See also European Commission, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. 
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taken by states and businesses to address Covid-19 misinformation. These are, at one 
end of the spectrum, the actions taken by states and social media platforms to meet their 
obligations under the right to the highest attainable standard of health (right to health) 
through ‘information accessibility’.8 At the other end of the spectrum, the companies’ 
content removal policies and their compatibility with the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights and the states’ application of criminal laws to address misinformation 
and the associated risks to human rights.  
 
II. Information Accessibility 
 
In recent years, there has been a surge in online misinformation, including in the field of 
public health. The Covid-19 pandemic, however, has taken public health misinformation to 
a new level. Incomplete and continuously evolving scientific understanding of this novel 
virus and how it can be effectively treated, as well as the lack of a vaccine, have created 
the conditions for misinformation to flourish. This includes misinformation on possible 
treatments or cures for Covid-19, such as recommendations to eat garlic, drink bleach, 
consume high volumes of alcohol, and use ultraviolet lights.9 Following some of this 
misinformation could have serious health repercussions and at the most extreme, result in 
death. For instance, journalists reported that in Iran, viral online misinformation surfaced 
about the beneficial effects of ingesting methanol and alcohol-based sanitisers to protect 
against the virus. This reportedly led to hundreds of people ingesting large quantities of 
the two substances, causing the death of over 300 people and serious illness.10  
 
The right to the highest attainable standard of health (right to health) includes ‘information 
accessibility’, defined by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as 
‘the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health issues’.11 
Education and public awareness campaigns are widely recognised as a baseline measure 
to address misinformation, although on their own cannot provide a full solution to 
misinformation.12 This is both because of the increasing sophistication of misinformation, 
which makes it more difficult to detect, and because these measures place a too heavy 
burden on the individual, without addressing the root causes of misinformation. However, 
when combined with other approaches, media literacy programmes constitute an important 
and necessary measure for providing individuals with the tools to self-assess the reliability 
of some pieces of information. In the Covid-19 context, meeting this dimension to the right 
 
Report of the independent High level Group on fake news online disinformation, March 2018, available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50271. 
8 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standards of Health (Art. 12)’, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000 (hereinafter CESCR General Comment No.14). 
9 For a detailed list of country-specific coronavirus misinformation see Poynter dedicated web page, 
https://www.poynter.org/ifcn-covid-19-misinformation/. 
10 Christine Roger, ‘Social Media Misinformation that Led to 300 Deaths in Iran Claimed that Drinking 
Methanol was a Cure for COVID-19’, Tech Times, 29 March 2020, 
https://www.techtimes.com/articles/248428/20200329/social-media-misinformation-that-led-to-300-deaths-
in-iran-claimed-drinking-methanol-was-a-cure-for-covid-19.htm. 
11 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n. 7). 
12 See, among others, European Commission, ‘A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. Report of 
the independent High level Group on fake news online disinformation’, March 2018 and Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee, ‘Disinformation and “fake news”: Final Report’ House of Commons, 14 
February 2019. 
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to health is particularly important given the virality of misinformation on Covid-19 on social 
media platforms.13  
 
a) State Action on Information Accessibility 
 
Some states have introduced educational and public awareness campaigns to counter 
misinformation on Covid-19.14 For instance, several countries, such as the UK, have 
partnered with the WHO on the ‘#Stop the spread’ campaign, where they commit to using 
public broadcast channels to counter misinformation and promote public health advice.15 
The UK has also established a ‘rapid response unit’ with health experts, designed to ‘stem 
the spread of falsehoods and rumours which could cost lives’.16 The Indian Government 
has launched a WhatsApp chatbot to counter Covid-19 related misinformation.17  
 
The nature and extent of actions that states are required to take to ensure ‘information 
accessibility’ is not well developed under international human rights law. However, the 
Covid-19 ‘infodemic’ raises a number of interesting questions on the scope of the 
obligation. First, the question arises whether general public awareness campaigns that 
address key myths concerning Covid-19 are sufficient, or whether states are under an 
obligation to tailor their messages to the specific types of misinformation in circulation, 
given that some misinformation on possible treatments is country-specific. Misinformation 
may also relate to particular groups, which, if left unaddressed in public health messaging, 
could raise issues of discrimination.  
 
Second, the question arises whether ‘information accessibility’ entails an expectation of 
timeliness, given that time may be of the essence when health misinformation has gone 
viral. Finally, the means by which states adopt public health awareness campaigns on 
Covid-19 may also be critical as misinformation that spreads online, often then spreads 
offline, including through families and friends. In light of the ongoing digital divide, it is likely 
to be insufficient for states to focus public health awareness campaigns exclusively on 
digital media; other actions may also be required, such as public messaging by post, public 
broadcasting and billboards. It is unclear the extent to which states have taken these types 
of questions into account when developing campaigns to counter misinformation in their 
country.  
 
A particularly serious dimension to misinformation on Covid-19 has been the role of 
political leaders, including heads of state or government, in amplifying misinformation. For 
example, videos and tweets by Brazil’s President Bolsonaro have circulated widely in 
which he claimed that Covid-19 is not more dangerous than a normal flu for people with a 
healthy lifestyle.18 President Trump has been at the centre of several claims that drinking 
or injecting bleach and hitting ‘the body with tremendous ultraviolet or powerful light’ would 
 
13 Scott Brennen and others, ‘Types, sources, and claims of COVID-19 misinformation’, Oxford Reuters 
Institute, Oxford Internet Institute, Factsheet, April 2020.  
14 See, for instance the ‘#Stop the spread’ campaign, coordinated by WHO with national governments 
worldwide, https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/countering-misinformation-about-covid-19. 
15 Ibid. 
16 ‘Government cracks down on spread of false coronavirus information online’, GOV.UK, 30 March 2020, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-cracks-down-on-spread-of-false-coronavirus-
information-online. 
17 As reported by Julie Posetti and Kalina Bontcheva, ‘Disinfordemic: Deciphering COVID-19 
disinformation’, (n. 5) 10. 
18 Ibid, 4. 
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contribute to defeating the virus, against medical advice.19 The involvement of political 
leaders in the spread of misinformation both amplifies it, securing wider reach, and may 
have the effect of validating the misinformation, potentially giving the impression that it is 
‘official’ advice. General Comment 14 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights includes as part of states’ obligations to protect the right to health, a 
prohibition of ‘intentionally misrepresenting health-related information’.20 The question 
therefore arises whether in such contexts, the amplification of misinformation by state 
officials, particularly if repeated once contested by health authorities, violates the right to 
health.  
 
b) Tech Companies’ Action on Information Accessibility 
 
Tech companies and social media platforms have been particularly active in addressing 
Covid-19 mis/disinformation, signaling a distinct approach to how they address other forms 
of mis and disinformation on their platforms. This has included the issuance of a joint 
statement by Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Reddit, Twitter and YouTube in 
which, for the first time, they publicly committed to joining forces to address 
misinformation.21  
 
In the past few years, tech and social media companies have been developing different 
responses to mis- and disinformation.22 They have generally taken a cautious approach 
and have not yet introduced measures to address some of the fundamental enablers of 
these phenomena, such as the business model behind digital advertising; the challenge of 
assessing what constitutes mis- or disinformation; and the extensive protection given to 
freedom of political expression by the US constitution.23 By contrast, in relation to Covid-
19, major tech companies have taken a proactive approach to counter health 
misinformation, partnering with international organisations and national health institutions, 
addressing the issues of monetisation of content and digital ads and introducing new 
definitions of what constitute misinformation for Covid-related content.  
 
A common response by tech companies has been to ‘elevate’ content from the WHO and 
other national health bodies to users searching for information on Covid-19, in order to 
counter misinformation with trusted information from recognised health authorities. This 
has been also supported by the ‘Verified’ initiative launched by the UN to provide a platform 
with trusted and accurate content about Covid-19.24 Google has launched an SOS Alert 
system which makes WHO coronavirus resources more easily accessible when users 
 
19 William J. Broad and Dan Levin, ‘Trump Muses About Light as Remedy, but Also Disinfectant, Which Is 
Dangerous’, The New York Times, 24 April 2020. 
20 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n. 7). 
21 See the statement as reported by Catherine Shu, ‘Facebook, Reddit, Google, Linkedin, Microsoft, Twitter 
and YouTube issue joint statement on misinformation’, TechCrunch, 17 March 2020, 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/16/facebook-reddit-google-linkedin-microsoft-twitter-and-youtube-issue-
joint-statement-on-misinformation/. 
22 David Kaye, Speech Police. The Global Struggle to Govern the Internet (New York: Columbia Global 
Reports, 2019), 84-98. 
23 For a detailed discussion of content governance challenges see Access Now, ’26 recommendations on 
content governance’, Policy Paper, March 2020.  
24 UN, ‘UN launches new initiative to fight COVID-19 misinformation through ‘digital first responders’, 21 
May 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1064622. 
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enter the search terms, “Covid-19” or “coronavirus”.25 YouTube has also added a banner 
redirecting users to the WHO web portal on all videos that reference Covid-19.26 Similarly, 
the search function on Facebook has been altered so that any user searching for topics 
related to Covid-19 on Facebook is shown results encouraging them to look at the website 
of the WHO or national health authorities for the latest information.27 The order of the 
newsfeed has also been changed to prioritise these websites in users' newsfeeds. 
Likewise, WhatsApp has worked with the WHO to create a Health Alert system that is 
designed to answer questions from the public about Covid-19 and provides prompt, reliable 
and official information 24 hours a day and worldwide and in several languages.28  
 
As a general matter, the prioritisation of content can be seen as a less invasive approach 
than content removal.29 However, in some circumstances, where deprioritised content is 
placed so low on a feed that it may never be seen by a social media user, it may have the 
same effect as content removal.30 Content prioritisation can therefore raise questions 
around freedom of expression, particularly if the prioritisation process results in the 
exclusion of particular voices or perspectives from the social media space.31 These wider 
concerns about content prioritisation may be distinguishable from a narrow and temporary 
context of a public health pandemic, where information from national public health 
authorities and the WHO designated as trusted partners is elevated over other content. 
This may be seen as a necessary, legitimate and proportionate restriction over other health 
messages, in order to ensure that social media users see the most up to date health 
information on Covid-19 and to combat misinformation.  
 
Social media companies have also taken the decision to restrict advertising and de-
monetise certain content as a means of deterring users from uploading particularly 
shocking or attractive content on the virus only for getting higher revenues. The business 
model of digital advertising is based on users’ views and, therefore, videos with higher 
numbers of views are more lucrative and ads featured on these videos will generate more 
revenue for the platform. This has been considered as one of the obstacles to effectively 
addressing online misinformation and its human rights impacts.32 YouTube decided to de-
monetise all Covid-19 related videos and does not allow ads on them.33However, after 
pressure from a news agency complaining about significant loss due to these restrictions, 
YouTube has already made some exceptions, such as allowing monetisation on videos 
coming from ‘respectable’ news agencies.34  
 
 
25 Sundar Pichai, ‘Coronavirus: How we’re helping’, Google-The Keyword, 6 March 2020, 
https://www.blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/coronavirus-covid19-response/. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Mark Zuckerberg, ‘update on the steps we're taking to respond to the coronavirus’, Facebook, 4 March 
2020, https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10111615249124441. 
28 WhatsApp, ‘The World Health Organization launches WHO Health Alert on WhatsApp’, 
https://www.whatsapp.com/coronavirus/who.  
29 Article 19, ‘Side-stepping rights: Regulating speech by contract’, Policy Brief 2018,  
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Regulating-speech-by-contract-WEB-v2.pdf, 28-29. 
30 Access Now, ’26 recommendations on content governance’ (n. 22). 
31 UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, ‘Annual Report to the General Assembly’, UN Doc. A/73/348, 29 August 2018, 25. 
32 Nathalie Marechal, Ellery Roberts Biddle, ‘It’s Not Just the Content, It’s the Business Model: 
Democracy’s Online Speech Challenge’, Ranking Digital Rights Report, March 2020. 
33 Pichai, ‘Coronavirus: How we’re helping’ (n. 24). 
34 YouTube Help, ‘Coronavirus diseases 2019 (COVID-19) updates’, 20 May 2020, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9777243?hl=en. 
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Following a similar approach, Facebook has banned ads and listings of any alleged 
alternative cure for the virus (not supported by health authorities), thus reducing its 
potential revenue. At the same time, the social media platform has also granted the WHO 
unlimited free ad space and some free space to national health organisations.35 A similar 
initiative has been also implemented by Twitter, which, despite its standard policy of not 
allowing political ads, decided to let governmental health authorities advertise links to 
trustworthy information.36  
 
III. Content Removal 
 
In addition to elevating content from the WHO and national public health authorities, social 
media platforms have modified their content moderation policies to more effectively fact-
check and/or remove Covid misinformation, with an increased reliance on automated 
systems.37 As a general matter, the main structural problem platforms face with moderating 
misinformation is the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of assessing with objectivity 
and certainty the veracity of information without actually making or being seen to be making 
value, moral or political judgments on particular forms of speech or risking censorship and 
unduly restricting freedom of expression.38 However, social media platforms appear to 
have taken a different approach to health misinformation on Covid-19.39 
 
For instance, Facebook has decided to remove any ‘false claim and conspiracy theory that 
have been flagged by leading global health organisations’ and that causes immediate harm 
to users.40 This is distinct from misinformation that does not ‘directly result in physical harm’ 
which is referred to the fact-checkers and, if rated false, is explicitly labelled as such and 
demoted on users’ news feeds.41  
 
Twitter has taken a similar approach and has also changed its definition of harm and what 
constitutes harmful content. Prior to the pandemic, a post was considered harmful only if 
a user reported it. Once reported, the platform would assess it and take action where it 
deemed necessary. Twitter has now decided to take a more proactive approach to content 
removal. As explained in its blog by Twitter’s Customers and Legal, Policy and Trust & 
Safety leads, any content that ‘goes directly against guidance from authoritative sources 
of global and local public information’ will be assessed and, if needed, removed,42 without 
the need for the users to report it.  
 
 
35 Zuckerberg, ‘update on the steps’ (n. 26). 
36 Twitter, ‘Coronavirus: Staying safe and informed on Twitter’, 3 April 2020, 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#definition. 
37 Google, ‘Actions to reduce the need for people to come into our offices’, 16 March 2020, 
https://blog.google/inside-google/company-announcements/update-extended-workforce-covid-19; Vijaya 
Gadde and Matt Derella, ‘An update on our continuity strategy during COVID-19’, Twitter Blog, 16 March 
2020 (updated 1 April 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-our-
continuity-strategy-during-COVID-19.html. 
38 David Kaye, Speech Police. The Global Struggle to Govern the Internet, 84-98. 
39 Sam Gregory, Dia Kayyali and Corin Faife, ‘COVID-19 Misinformation and Disinformation Responses: 
Sorting the Good from the Bad’, WITNESS, May 2020, https://blog.witness.org/2020/05/covid-19-
misinformation-response-assessment/. 
40 Zuckerberg, ‘update on the steps’ (n. 26).  
41 Ibid. 
42 Vijaya Gadde and Matt Derella, ‘An update on our continuity strategy during COVID-19’, Twitter Blog, 16 
March 2020 (updated at 1 April 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-
our-continuity-strategy-during-COVID-19.html. 
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While these new approaches to dealing with Covid-19 misinformation apply to general 
users, they are limited in application if the person spreading the misinformation is a public 
figure. For example, according to Facebook’s policy on fact-checking, political ads and 
political content is exempt from this check to preserve full freedom of political expression, 
fundamental in a democratic society.43 In line with this, Facebook decided not to remove 
any of Trump’s posts, even those going against WHO recommendations.44 Twitter has 
adopted a different stance by stating that it would add labels correcting misinformation ‘to 
anyone sharing misleading information that meets the requirement of our policy, including 
world leaders’.45 For instance, on non-Covid-19 related posts, Twitter has recently fact-
checked and hidden two posts by Trump that were deemed, respectively, to be false and 
glorifying violence.46 
 
While, on their face, the policies appear to be straightforward, there is very little public 
information on the types of content that social media platforms have deemed to fall under 
these policies. This is particularly important to understand given that the removal of content 
depends on the interpretation of whether a piece of content ‘directly results in physical 
harm’, which is likely to involve a complex and subjective assessment. This is likely to be 
accentuated further considering that the determination is now made mostly through 
automation, due to many of the human content moderators being furloughed or relocated 
to other tasks.47 Without transparency and greater information on how these decisions are 
being made, it is difficult to assess the scale and breadth of their application and their 
compatibility with freedom of expression in practice.48  
 
Internal grievance mechanisms constitute a key safeguard against overly broad content 
removal. Again, however, it is unclear how quickly these processes are able to deal with 
appeals and very little data are available on the nature and outcomes of such appeals, 
thus limiting our understanding of how they protect freedom of expression and the right to 
a remedy under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.49  
 
IV. The Application of Criminal Law 
 
Finally, some states have applied their criminal law, either by using existing anti-
disinformation laws (many of which cover misinformation of the type discussed in this 
chapter) or by adopting new ones. For instance, Singapore is reported to have used its 
existing anti-disinformation law to address the spread of misinformation on Covid-19, 
 
43 Nick Legg, ‘Facebook, Elections and Political Speech’, Facebook Newsroom, 24 September 2019, 
https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/. 
44 Sheera Frenkel and Davey Alba, ‘Trump’s Disinfenctant Talk Trips Up Sites’ Vows Against 
Misinformation’, The New York Times, 30 April 2020.  
45 ‘Coronavirus: Twitter will label Covid-19 fake news’, BBC News, 12 May 2020. 
46 Kate Conger and Mike Isaac, ‘Defying Trump, Twitter Doubles Down on Labeling Tweets’, The New York 
Times, 28 May 2020. 
47 Louise Mtsakis, ‘Coronavirus Disrupts Social Media’s First Line of Defense’, Wired, 18 March 2020, 
https://www.wired.com/story/coronavirus-social-media-automated-content-moderation/ 
48 See, among others, ‘ A Conversation with UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye: COVID-19 and Freedom 
of Expression’, Just Security, 21 May 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/70288/a-conversation-with-u-n-
special-rapporteur-david-kaye-covid-19-and-freedom-of-expression/; UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Expression, ‘Disease pandemics and the freedom of opinion and expression, UN Doc. A/HRC/44/49, 23 
April 2020, 49-53. 
49 Article 19, ‘Viral Lies: Misinformation and the Coronavirus’, Policy Brief, March 2020. See also UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Pillar III, UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 , 2011.  
 294 
 
including false claims on how the virus spread.50 Resort to this law to deal with Covid-19 
raises a number of concerns from a human rights perspective. As the NGO Article 19 
argued when it was first enacted, the definition of disinformation is very vague, which risks 
broad and subjective application.51 The penalties are also particularly severe with up to 10 
years of imprisonment. As a result, the concern is that the law has a chilling effect on 
freedom of expression without actually addressing the spread of misinformation, including 
on Covid-19.52 Thailand is also reported to have applied its anti-disinformation laws to deal 
with misleading information about the spread of the virus.53  
 
In other countries that do not have dedicated anti-disinformation laws, existing criminal 
laws have been interpreted to include misinformation. For instance, in India, one-hundred 
people have reportedly been arrested on charges related to spreading misinformation 
about the virus,54 following a broad interpretation of the existing provisions in the Indian 
Penal Code.55 Individual states have also introduced specific legislation, such as the state 
of Maharashtra that passed an order specifically related to the pandemic of Covid-19, 
reportedly requiring that ‘any information on the virus must be approved by the government 
before dissemination’.56 
 
Other states have approved new legislation that criminalises Covid-19 misinformation. An 
example is that of Hungary, whose ‘coronavirus legislation’ includes a provision that 
‘provides penalties of up to five years in prison for those spreading misinformation during 
the pandemic’.57 The government justifies the provision to prevent ‘distortions that could 
undermine or thwart efforts to protect the public against the spread of the virus’.58 However, 
journalists and NGOs have criticised the measure as a possible gateway for censorship of 
independent journalists and dissenting voices in the country.59 
 
The criminalisation of misinformation through general anti-disinformation laws, specific 
Covid-19 legislation or the application of general criminal law has been criticised for its 
incompatibility with international human rights law.60 Many anti-disinformation laws are 
vaguely formulated, with unclear guidance on implementation and often with excessive 
 
50 Ibid and Shibani Mahtani, ‘Singapore  introduced tough laws against fake news. Coronavirus has put 
them to test’, The Washington Post, 16 March 2020; Kirsten Han, ‘Coronavirus: How effective Is 
Singapore’s Anti-Fake News Law?’, The News Lens, 8 April 2020, 
https://international.thenewslens.com/article/133521 
51 See, for instance, Article 19, ‘Singapore: New law on “online falsehoods” a grave threat to freedom of 
expression’, 9 May 2019, https://www.article19.org/resources/singapore-new-law-on-online-falsehoods-a-
grave-threat-to-freedom-of-expression/ and ‘Singapore fake news law a 'disaster' for freedom of speech, 
says rights group’, The Guardian, 9 May 2019. 
52 Ibid. 
53 ‘Stop using “fake news” laws in battle against coronavirus, MP say’, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human 
Rights, 12 February 2020, https://aseanmp.org/2020/02/12/stop-fake-news-laws-coronavirus/ 
54 Bhavya Dore, ‘Fake News, Real Arrests’, Foreign Policy, 17 April 2020, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/17/fake-news-real-arrests/ 
55 Ibid. 
56 ibid. 
57 Shaun Walker, ‘Hungarian journalists fear coronavirus law may be use to jail them’, The Guardian, 3 
April 2020. 
58 Comment made by Orban’s spokesman, Zoltan Kovacs, as reported in ibid. 
59 See, for instance, Reporters Without Borders, ‘COVID-19 and press freedom: Europe must oppose 
measures proposed by Viktor Orban’, 26 March 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/covid-19-and-press-freedom-
europe-must-oppose-measures-proposed-viktor-orban. 
60 Access Now, ‘Fighting misinformation and defending free expression during COVID-19: recommendation 
for states’, Policy Report, April 2020; Article 19, ‘Viral Lies: Misinformation and the Coronavirus’. 
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sanctions. As such, they can infringe freedom of expression directly, as enshrined in Article 
19 UDHR and ICCPR, and can produce a chilling effect, where users refrain from 
exercising their freedom of expression because of the fear of the possible punishment.61 
Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, these laws were already criticized as posing 
disproportionate limitations to individuals’ freedom of expression while placing little 
responsibility on the platforms.62 
 
Anti-disinformation laws remain a problematic measure, even under the exceptional 
circumstances of a pandemic.63 As repeatedly warned by Access Now and Article 19, 
‘under no circumstances should any government allow people’s fundamental rights to fall 
victim to this pandemic’64 and states should use criminal penalties only ‘as a last resort 
and in the most severe cases’.65 Indeed, according to Access Now, criminal law is not an 
appropriate tool to fight misinformation and ‘broad criminalisation of speech can contribute 
to the worsening of the ongoing health crisis’.66 Rather, they recommend addressing the 
issue through different responses that do not pose further threats to human rights, such as 
media and digital literacy and stronger data protection laws. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has illustrated the serious impact misinformation can have on 
individuals and society, both directly by threatening the rights to health or life of the 
individuals who believe the misinformation and act upon it, and indirectly, by undermining 
public health initiatives.  
 
The approaches adopted by states and tech companies underscore the ongoing need to 
identify the parameters of human rights-compliant approaches to dealing with 
misinformation. This is a continuing challenge as many approaches are necessary but 
insufficient while others are overly broad and introduce new challenges.  
 
At one end of the spectrum, the critical importance of access to media pluralism and 
accurate and reliable information as a baseline for addressing misinformation has been 
underlined by both states and tech companies’ approaches to Covid-19 misinformation. 
This aligns with the plea by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression67 and 
the work that UN agencies such as UNESCO are undertaking to enhance digital and media 
literacy and ‘good journalism’ more generally.68 In this regard, social media platforms have 
adopted new approaches to elevating content in order to ensure that users are exposed to 
 
61 UN SR on Freedom of Expression, ‘Disease pandemics and the freedom of opinion and expression’ (n. 
47), 42. 
62 Ibid. See also, Joint Declaration on ‘“Fake News,” Disinformation and Propaganda’, The United Nations 
(UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American 
States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (3 
March 2017), https://www.osce.org/fom/302796.  
63 UN OHCHR, ‘Emergency Measures and Covid-19: Guidance’, 27 April 2020. 
64 Ibid and Access Now, ‘Fighting misinformation.’ (n. 59) 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid, 3. 
67 67 UN SR on Freedom of Expression, ‘Disease pandemics and the freedom of opinion and expression’ 
(n. 47), 58-63. 
68 UNESCO, ‘Combating the disinfodemic: Working for truth in the time of COVID-19’, 
https://en.unesco.org/covid19/disinfodemic.  
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accurate and reliable information. Questions arise, however, on whether this type of 
approach is contained to public health misinformation, particularly due to the possibility of 
partnerships with national public health authorities and the WHO, or whether it can – or 
should - be replicated in other contexts. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the Covid-19 pandemic has underscored the wider risks 
to human rights posed by approaches to counter misinformation through overly broad 
content removal processes, the adoption of dedicated anti-disinformation laws and the 
extension of the criminal law to deal with misinformation.69 In particular, the over-reliance 
on automated systems to remove content and not simply flag it can raise significant 
problems as well as the definition of which kind of political speech should be subject to 
content moderation rules. As these approaches have serious consequences for human 
rights, the ‘infodemic’ raises the urgent need to identify measures that are compatible with 
international human rights law, so that mis and disinformation can be effectively addressed 
without introducing new risks to human rights in the process. This can only be achieved 
through increased transparency, thorough human rights due diligence, meaningful multi-
stakeholders engagement and accountability for states and companies. 
 
 
  
 
69 UN SR on Freedom of Expression, ‘Disease pandemics and the freedom of opinion and expression’ (n. 
47), 41-53. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the internet has become part of our daily lives. As the Covid-
19 outbreak unfolds, our dependence on cyberspace has become even greater. Health 
systems are operated partially through information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), policymakers share vital and often confidential ideas through digital channels, and 
public information is disseminated by the media on their websites and mobile apps. The 
crisis has also forced us to move significant aspects of our personal and professional lives 
online. Parliaments around the world are holding sessions via video-link, medical 
appointments are now conducted online, and those who can work from home rely on their 
internet connections to hold online meetings, send and receive messages.  
 
Whilst cyberspace has become a fertile field for malicious operations that may compound 
an existing health crisis, it also offers countless opportunities to respond more effectively 
to such crises. States are bound by several rules of international law requiring them to 
behave diligently in order to prevent, halt or redress harmful cyber operations — what we 
call ‘cyber due diligence duties’. In this contribution, we explore how compliance with such 
obligations must be part of States’ responses to epidemics and other health crises. On the 
one hand, failure to implement protective measures of due diligence or reasonable care in 
cyberspace can have disastrous consequences in the fight against Covid-19 and other 
diseases — especially when harmful cyber operations target critical infrastructure, such as 
the healthcare sector. In particular, the inability or unwillingness to prevent or halt cyber 
operations against hospitals or research facilities can hamper efforts to test and treat 
patients or to develop a vaccine. On the other hand, cyber due diligence measures can 
proactively bolster the capacity and resilience of States’ online networks and systems, 
enabling a more rapid recovery from health crises. For instance, with the necessary 
safeguards in place, contact tracing apps and the dissemination of accurate public health 
information on social media can help contain the spread of the disease.      
 
The international community already benefits from a suitable — if patchy — international 
legal and policy framework laying down States’ duties to act diligently in preventing, halting 
and remedying harmful cyber operations against systems and infrastructures which are 
essential during health crises. States must implement those obligations, inter alia, by 
adopting measures aiming at: establishing an adequate national legal framework; 
monitoring cyber threats; enhancing the security and resilience of relevant systems and 
infrastructure; engaging in constructive international cooperation and dialogue. By 
behaving diligently in cyberspace, States will more likely be able to contain the spread of 
Covid-19, prevent further harm and pursue an effective recovery from the outbreak. 
 
II. States’ Reactions to Cyber Operations against the Healthcare Sector 
 
In its ‘initial pre-draft report’ issued in April 2020, the UN Open-Ended Working Group on 
cybersecurity (OEWG) reaffirmed the need to implement, at all times, strong protective 
measures for critical infrastructure against the malicious use of ICTs. Even though the 
concept of ‘critical infrastructure’ may vary across States, it is generally understood to 
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include, at the very least, medical facilities and other healthcare services, electricity grids, 
water and sanitation systems,1 as well as financial and electoral services. Interference in 
the networks and systems of these vital activities could have disastrous consequences not 
only on a State’s national security but also its social, political and economic stability and 
development.2  
 
The risk and impact of malicious cyber operations against such infrastructure are 
heightened during a public health emergency. For cyber criminals and hacker groups, 
many of which are notorious State proxies, the public distress and vulnerability caused by 
the Covid-19 outbreak are an opportunity that can be exploited for personal or political 
gain.3 For instance, attempts have been made to steal the results of vaccine clinical trials 
from Oxford University’s database, leading to increased cybersecurity measures.4 
Likewise, hospitals and laboratories in the Czech Republic were targeted by ransomware 
attacks, forcing delays in scheduled operations.5 There have also been reports of Covid-
19-related phishing messages and fraudulent websites worldwide, whose content has 
ranged from fully-fledged disinformation campaigns to sales of inexistent medical 
equipment.6 The potentially destabilising impact of such operations has prompted strong 
reactions from several States. 
 
As part of the UK’s response, the Secretary of State for Health recognised that ‘the network 
and information systems held by or on behalf of the NHS [National Health Service] in 
England or those bodies which provision public health services in England must be 
protected to ensure those systems continue to function to support the provision of services 
intended to address coronavirus and COVID-19’.7 For this purpose, executive directions 
were adopted to enable the National Cyber Security Centre to strengthen the ability of 
those networks and systems ‘to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that 
compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored or 
 
1 Czech Republic, ‘Comments submitted by the Czech Republic in reaction to the initial “pre-draft” report of 
the Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the 
context of international security’, April 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/czech-
republic-oewg-pre-draft-suggestions.pdf.  
2 UN Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in 
the context of international security (OEWG), ‘Second “Pre-draft” report of the OEWG’, 27 May  2020, 
https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/200527-oewg-ict-revised-pre-draft.pdf, § 22. 
3 Davey Winder, ‘Cyber Attacks Against Hospitals Have ‘Significantly Increased’ As Hackers Seek To 
Maximize Profits’, Forbes, 8 April 2020; John E Dunn, ‘DDoS attack on US Health agency part of 
coordinated campaign’, Naked Security (Sophos), 18 March 2020, 
https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2020/03/18/ddos-attack-on-us-health-agency-part-of-coordinated-
campaign/amp/; Sean Gallagher, Andrew Brandt, ‘Facing down the myriad threats tied to COVID-19’, 
SophosNews, 14 April 2020 https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/04/14/covidmalware/. 
4 Jamie Grierson, Hannah Devlin, ‘Hostile states trying to steal coronavirus research, says UK agency", 
The Guardian, 3 May 2020.  
5 Catalin Cimpanu, ‘Czech hospital hit by cyberattack while in the midst of a COVID-19 outbreak’, ZDNet, 
13 March 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/czech-hospital-hit-by-cyber-attack-while-in-the-midst-of-a-
covid-19-outbreak/.  
6 Catalin Cimpanu, ‘State-sponsored hackers are now using coronavirus lures to infect their targets’, 
ZDNet, 13 March 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/state-sponsored-hackers-are-now-using-
coronavirus-lures-to-infect-their-targets/.  
7 UK Department of Health and Social Care, ‘The Consent to Activities Related to the Security of NHS and 
Public Health Services Digital Systems (Coronavirus) Directions 2020’, 24 April  2020, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-of-nhs-and-public-health-services-digital-systems-
coronavirus-directions-2020, 1. 
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transmitted or processed data or the related services offered by, or accessible via, those 
network and information systems.’8  
 
In the same vein, referring to recent cyber threats against health and research facilities in 
the UK, Europe and the US,9 the UK Foreign Secretary recalled that ‘[i]nternational law 
and the norms of responsible state behaviour must be respected and all states have an 
important role to play to help counter irresponsible activity being carried out by criminal 
groups in their countries.’10  Similar calls for compliance with the “norms of responsible 
state behaviour” and international law applicable to cyberspace to protect the healthcare 
sector came — among others — from Australia,11 the Czech Republic,12 Estonia,13 the 
Nordic countries14 and the US.15  More tellingly, the European Union, upon condemning 
‘malicious cyber activities targeting essential operators […] including in the healthcare 
sector’, ‘call[ed] upon every country to exercise due diligence and take appropriate actions 
against actors conducting such activities from its territory, consistent with international 
law’.16   
 
It emerges from those declarations that many States believe in the existence of a legal and 
policy framework to increase cybersecurity and resilience, made up of binding rules and 
principles of customary and conventional international law; and ‘non-binding norms of 
responsible state behaviour’.17 Central to such a two-pronged framework is the idea that, 
as a corollary of their sovereignty, States must exercise “cyber due diligence”, that is, act 
to the best of their abilities to prevent, halt and redress a range of harmful cyber operations 
emanating from their territory. This, together with the above statements, suggests that, in 
times of public health emergency, States ought to exercise due diligence in cyberspace. 
 
8 Ibid, Section 2. 
9 UK National Cyber Security Centre, ‘Cyber warning issued for key healthcare organisations in UK and 
USA’, 5 May 2020, https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/warning-issued-uk-usa-healthcare-organisations.  
10 UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), ‘UK condemns cyber actors seeking to benefit from global 
coronavirus pandemic’, 5 May 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-condemns-cyber-actors-
seeking-to-benefit-from-global-coronavirus-pandemic.  
11 Stilgherrian, ‘Australia and US call out cyber attacks on hospitals during COVID-19 pandemic’, ZDNet, 
27 April 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/australia-and-us-call-out-cyber-attacks-on-hospitals-during-
covid-19-pandemic/. 
12 Czech Republic,  (n. 1). 
13 ‘Reinsalu condemns cyber attacks against Czech critical infrastructure’, ERR News, 20 April 2020, 
https://news.err.ee/1080058/reinsalu-condemns-cyber-attacks-against-czech-critical-infrastructure.  
14 ‘Joint statement from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway by Ambassador Mona Juul at the 
Arria-meeting on Cyber stability and conflict prevention’, 22 May 2020, 
https://www.norway.no/en/missions/UN/statements/security-council/2020/arria-cyber-stability-and-conflict-
prevention.  
15 US Department of State, ‘The United States Concerned by Threat of Cyber Attack Against the Czech 
Republic’s Healthcare Sector’, 17 April  2020, https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-concerned-by-threat-
of-cyber-attack-against-the-czech-republics-healthcare-sector/.   
16 Council of the European Union, ‘Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell, on behalf of the 
European Union, on malicious cyber activities exploiting the coronavirus pandemic’, 30 April 2020, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/30/declaration-by-the-high-
representative-josep-borrell-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-malicious-cyber-activities-exploiting-the-
coronavirus-pandemic/. See also the recent call by over 120 academics and experts, ‘The Oxford 
Statement on the International Law Protections Against Cyber Operations Targeting the Health Care 
Sector’, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, May 2020, https://elac.web.ox.ac.uk/the-
oxford-statement-on-the-international-law-protections-against-cyber-operations-targeting-the-hea.  
17 ‘Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’, UN Doc. A/70/174, 22 July 2015, § 13. 
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Without measures of prevention, control and crisis response, overburdened healthcare 
facilities around the world risk collapsing, and full recovery may be slow if not impossible.   
 
III. Cyber Due Diligence between International Law and Policy 
 
Due diligence has recently gained prominence in the cyber domain as a way to hold States 
indirectly accountable for hams caused by third parties. Responsibility arises from a failure 
to prevent or redress harms originating from or transiting through their jurisdiction, without 
the need to factually or legally attribute the conduct to the State in question.  Thus, several 
States and scholars have supported a customary rule or principle requiring States to 
exercise due diligence in cyberspace, in what has been termed ‘cyber due diligence’.18 
According to one iteration of this rule, States ‘must exercise due diligence in not allowing 
[their] territory […] or cyber infrastructure under its governmental control, to be used for 
cyber operations that affect the rights of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, 
other states.’19 However, some governments have been reluctant to accept this formulation 
as a binding rule of customary international law.20 Instead, a very similar articulation of 
cyber due diligence has been recognised by the UN Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) on cybersecurity as well as the UN General Assembly as a voluntary, non-binding 
norm of responsible State behaviour. It affirms that ‘States should not knowingly allow their 
territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs.’21  
 
The confusion surrounding the concept of cyber due diligence seems to result from its 
treatment as a standalone obligation or principle.  It may well be that a cyber-specific due 
diligence rule is emerging,22 but this claim should not detract from the fact that international 
law in its entirety applies by default to cyberspace — or, more accurately, to ICTs — and 
States have unanimously and explicitly recognised as much.23 Thus, the pre-existing range 
of international obligations of due diligence requiring States to prevent, stop or redress 
certain harms are already applicable to harmful cyber operations. These include two rules 
of general application in international law, covering all fields of State activity, as well as 
rules found in specialised international legal regimes.  
The first comes from the 1949 Corfu Channel case between the UK and Albania. There, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that ‘it is every State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.’24 This 
 
18 Michael N. Schmitt, 'In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace,' (2015) 125 Yale LJ Forum 68. 
19 Michael N. Schmitt, (ed) Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2017), Rule 6, 30 (emphasis added).  
20 Liisi Adamson, 'Recommendation 13(c),' in UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, Voluntary, Non-Binding 
Norms for Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of Information and Communications Technology: A 
Commentary (New York: United Nations, 2017), 55, § 12. 
21 UN GGE Report (n. 17), § 13(c) (emphasis added). 
22 See, e.g., France, Ministère des Armées, ‘Droit International appliqué aux opérations dans le 
cyberspace’, 2019, 10; Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ‘Australia’s 
International Cyber Engagement Strategy — Annex A: Australia's position on how international law applies 
to state conduct in cyberspace’, 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-
relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/annexes.html#Annex-A; Organization of 
American States, ‘Improving Transparency – International Law and State Cyber Operations: Fourth Report 
(Presented by Prof. Duncan B. Hollis)’, CJI/doc. 603/20 rev.1, 5 March  2020, §§ 56ff.; Republic of Korea, 
‘Comments on the pre-draft of the OEWG Report’, 14 April 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/200414-rok-comment-on-pre-draft-of-oewg.pdf, 2. 
23 See, e.g., UN GGE Report (n. 17), §§ 26-28. 
24 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania), Merits, 9 April 1949, ICJ Reports (1949) 4, 22 
(emphasis added). 
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particular obligation seems to apply with respect to “acts contrary to the rights of other 
States”, without there necessarily being a violation of a particular rule of international law.25 
It imposes on States a standard of diligent behaviour, i.e. to employ their best efforts, to 
prevent or stop such acts.26 It is triggered by actual or constructive knowledge that the acts 
in question are being or will be committed and  limited by a State’s capacity to act.27  
 
The second rule of international law establishing a due diligence duty of general application 
is the “no-harm” or “good neighbourliness” principle. Although this principle has gained 
most prominence in the environmental context, its origins go far back to nineteenth century 
State-to-State disputes about the treatment of aliens abroad.28 The rule was most clearly 
articulated in the 1941 Trail Smelter award, where the arbitral tribunal held that a State 
‘owes at all times a duty to protect other states against injurious acts by individuals from 
within their jurisdiction.’29 The principle is now embodied in the ILC’s 2001 Articles on 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities,30 which are deemed to 
reflect customary international law, at least in significant part.31 Article 3, in particular, 
acknowledges that States have a duty to ‘take all appropriate measures to prevent 
significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof.’ The ICJ 
sanctioned the customary nature of this duty in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion,32 while the ILC itself recognised its applicability beyond the environmental 
realm.33 Unlike the rule articulated in Corfu Channel, the no-harm principle requires States 
to prevent transboundary harm even if caused by activities that are lawful or not contrary 
to the rights of other States.34  As it explained, this is an obligation of due diligence, not 
 
25 The Tallinn Manual 2.0, going beyond the ICJ reasoning, argues that such acts are limited to  
internationally wrongful acts by a State, or acts committed by other entities that would have been 
internationally wrongful if committed by the State from where the harm originates or through which it 
transits. See Schmitt, Tallinn Manual (n. 19) 39, § 34; 34, § 14, 35–36, § 21. 
26 See e.g. Schmitt, Tallinn Manual  (n. 19) 30; Karine Bannelier-Christakis, 'Cyber Diligence: A Low-
Intensity Due Diligence Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?,' (2014) 14 Baltic Y Intl L 5; 
International Law Association (ILA), 'Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, Second Report,' 
July 2016, 2.  
27 Robert Kolb, 'Reflections on Due Diligence Duties and Cyberspace,' (2015) 58 GerY Intl L 123–24; 
Schmitt, Tallinn Manual (n. 19) 44–45, §§ 7-9; 47, §§ 16-18; Russell Buchan, 'Cyberspace, Non-State 
Actors and the Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm,' (2016) 21(3) J Confl & Sec L441–42.  
28 See, e.g., Alabama Claims Arbitration (USA v UK) (1872) 29 RIAA 125, 127, 129, 131-132; Wipperman 
Case (USA v Venezuela) (1887), reprinted in John Bassett Moore, History and Digest of the International 
Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party, vol. 3 (1898–1906), 3041; Neer Case (USA v 
Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60, 61-62. See also Trail Smelter Case (USA v Canada), (1941) 3 RIAA 1911, 
1963-1965. 
29 Trail Smelter Case, ibid, 1963. 
30 ILC, ‘Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries’, 
in ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April–1 June and 2 
July–10 August 2001)’, UN Doc. A/56/10, 144-170. 
31 Timo Koivurova, 'Due Diligence,' Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, February 2010, § 
10. 
32 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ GL No 95, [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 
para 29. 
33 ILC, Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm (n. 30), 148-149. See also Jutta Brunée and 
Tamar Meshel, 'Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: International Environmental Law Lessons for 
Cyberspace Governance,' (2015) 58 Ger Y Intl L 134–35; Koivurova (n. 31), §§ 16, 23, 44-45. 
34 Failure to exercise the requisite diligence leads to liability to redress the harm by compensation, once it 
materialises — with international responsibility arising if the State fails to effect such redress.ILC, Draft 
articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm (n. 30), 150.  
 302 
 
requiring States ‘to guarantee that the harm would not occur’ but ‘to exert [their] best 
possible efforts to minimize the risk’ thereof.35   
 
Duties of due diligence can also be found in specialised bodies of international law, which, 
as noted earlier, apply by default to ICTs in the absence of carve-outs. With respect to 
Covid-19, it is helpful to recall that international human rights law (IHRL) imposes on States 
positive obligations to safeguard the enjoyment individual human rights, including civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, online and offline.36 These positive 
obligations entail a range of due diligence duties requiring States to adopt all reasonable 
measures to protect and ensure the human rights of individuals subject to their jurisdiction 
against threats posed by private or public entities or external circumstances, such as 
natural disasters or epidemics.37 Due diligence, in this context, describes the standard of 
conduct against which State compliance with those obligations is measured.38 Covid-19-
themed or related cyberattacks, such as those described in Section II above, have the 
potential to harm inter alia individuals’ rights to life, health, privacy and freedom of 
expression.39 Accordingly, States must do their best to prevent, stop and remedy such 
cyber operations — to the extent that they occur within a State’s territory or jurisdiction — 
whether or not they are perpetrated by State agents, private individuals or simply result 
from an accident.40 In this respect, one should recall that identifying the scope of a State’s 
jurisdiction for IHRL purposes is particularly problematic in respect to cyberspace or 
ICTs,41 given their transboundary nature and the different ‘layers’ of which they are made 
— physical, logical and personal.42 Although this issue is beyond the scope of this 
contribution, it suffices to note that any model of extraterritorial jurisdiction over human 
rights online43 is subject to a State’s the capacity to act, as well as the foreseeability of the 
harm or threat.  
 
35 Ibid, 154. 
36 See also UN Human Rights Council, Resolution 32/13, ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of 
human rights on the Internet’, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/13, 31 July 2016, § 1. 
37 Bărbulescu v. Romania, Appl. no. 61496/08,  5 September 2017, § 110, with respect to the right to 
privacy. 
38 HRC, General Comment No. 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, § 8; Samantha 
Besson, 'Due Diligence and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations – Mind the Gap!,' ESIL Reflections 9, 
no. 1, 28 April 2020, 4–5. 
39 Marko Milanovic and Michael N. Schmitt, 'Cyber Attacks and Cyber (Mis)Information Operations during a 
Pandemic,' J Natl Sec L & Pol, forthcoming, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612019. 
40 In the context of cyberspace, see Schmitt, Tallinn Manual (n. 19) Rule 36, 196–201; Milanovic and 
Schmitt, (n. 39), 22. See generally Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras (Merits), Ser. C. No. 4, 29 July 1988, 
§§ 172-173; Öneryıldız v. Turkey, Appl. No. 48939/99, 30 November 2004, §§ 89-90, 97-110; Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia, Appl. No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, §§ 218-223; M. Özel and Others v. Turkey, Appl. 
nos. 14350/05, 15245/05 and 16051/05,  17 November 2017, §§ 173-174.  
41 Marko Milanovic, 'The Murder of Jamal Khashoggi: Immunities, Inviolability and the Human Right to Life,' 
(2020) 20(1) Hum Rts LR 21–24,. 
42 Clare Sullivan, 'The 2014 Sony Hack and the Role of International Law,' (2015-16) 8(3) J Natl Sec L & 
Pol 454, fn 88. 
43 Different human rights bodies and scholars have oscillated between different models of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction: a) spatial, requiring control over physical infrastructure (e.g. a server or satellite; see e.g. 
Banković v. Belgium (Admissibility), App no 52207/99, 12 December 2001, §§ 74-82); b) personal, 
requiring control of the individual victim/right-holder (see e.g HRC, General Comment 31 (n. 38), § 10); c) 
activity-based, whereby control must be exercised over the activity in question (e.g. the acts hacking a 
computer; see e.g. HRC, ‘General Comment No. 36: Right to Life (Art. 6)”, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, 3 
September 2019, § 22); or d) functional, requiring control over the enjoyment or exercise of the rights in 
question, broadly defined (e.g. HRC, General Comment 36, ibid, § 63; Yuval Shany, 'Taking Universality 
Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law,' (2013) 7(1) Law 
& Ethics of Hum Rts 47. 
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International humanitarian law (IHL) also establishes a range of due diligence 
obligations.44 Cyberwarfare has become a common feature of modern armed conflicts. 
Malicious cyber operations have the potential to intentionally or indiscriminately render 
civilian infrastructure dysfunctional, disrupting the provision of services essential to the 
civilian population.45 Thus, during armed conflict and even in peacetime, States must 
behave diligently in adopting measures to protect civilians against the effects of violent 
cyberattacks.46 Likewise, they have a general duty to act with due diligence to ensure that 
parties to an armed conflict do not violate IHL, including in cyberspace.47  
 
Crucially, the applicability of this comprehensive, yet multifaceted and patchy framework 
in cyberspace has received support from several States, especially in times of Covid-19.  
For instance, France,48 Austria,49 Australia,50 and the Czech Republic51 have not only 
expressed concern for cyberattacks against health and research facilities but also explicitly 
recognised the binding nature of due diligence obligations under international law, IHRL 
and/or IHL.   
 
The “voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour”, first outlined in the 
2015 GGE Report and reaffirmed in the context of the pandemic,52 also seem to embrace 
a preventive and precautionary approach in respect of harmful cyber operations. They 
send a message that resonates even more clearly during a public health crisis: States 
should take reasonable steps and appropriate measures to protect their critical 
infrastructure from ICT threats, especially those that can compound the crisis or hinder an 
effective response to the outbreak. Of particular importance in this context are the following 
measures that States are encouraged to take: enactment of domestic legislation,53 
monitoring,54 confidence-building,55 and international cooperation and capacity-building.56 
 
44 See e.g. Marco Longobardo, 'The Relevance of the Concept of Due Diligence for International 
Humanitarian Law,' (2020) 37(1) Wisc Intl LJ 44. 
45 ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations during Armed Conflicts — ICRC position 
paper’, 28 November 2019, , 5. 
46 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I), 8 June 1977, Art. 58; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005), Rules 22-
24. 
47 Geneva Conventions of 1949, common Art.1; AP I, Art. 1(1). 
48 France, ‘France’s response to the pre-draft report from the OEWG Chair’, April 2020, https://front.un-
arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/contribution-fr-oewg-eng-vf.pdf.  
49 Austria, ‘Pre-Draft Report of the OEWG - ICT: Comments by Austria’, 31 March 2020, https://front.un-
arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/comments-by-austria.pdf.  
50 Australia, ‘Australia’s comments on the Initial “Pre-draft” of the report of the UN Open Ended Working 
Group in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG)’, 
16 April 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/final-australia-comments-on-oewg-pre-
draft-report-16-april.pdf.  
51 Czech Republic, (n. 1).  
52 See, e.g., n. 48, 49, 50 above. 
53 See, e.g. "Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security", UN Doc. A/68/98, 24 June 2013, § 
32(a).  
54 See, e.g., ‘Regional Consultations series of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing 
Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security’, December 2019, 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/collated-summaries-regional-gge-
consultations-12-3-2019.pdf, 17. 
55 UN GGE Report (n. 17), §§ 16-18. 
56 Ibid, §§ 19-23. 
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But the responsibility to adopt those measures arises not only from voluntary commitments 
made in that report, the OEWG and other fora, or the resulting social expectation. These 
various measures may be required in different circumstances by the range of international 
obligations of due diligence outlined earlier — to the extent that such measures would be 
a way to prevent, halt and redress harmful cyber operations.  
 
IV. Cyber Due Diligence Measures and their Impact on the Pandemic 
 
The general thrust of due diligence obligations is to require States to do what they can do. 
Such duties do not impose pre-determined measures, but demand from States reasonable 
efforts to prevent, stop or redress harm, subject to their capacity to act in the circumstances 
and their knowledge or foreseeability of the harm or risk. Thus, their extent varies on the 
basis of available resources, the degree and type of harm or risk they seek to avert, as 
well as a State’s capacity to influence the behaviour of the perpetrators. In this way, due 
diligence obligations afford a degree of flexibility and deference to States, but they are 
accompanied by a core procedural obligation of result to put in place the  necessary 
governmental capacity to fulfil applicable obligations.57 This means that, beyond this 
minimal threshold, each State may be required to adopt different due diligence measures 
depending on the circumstances. As the ICJ recalled in the Bosnian Genocide case, due 
diligence calls for an in concreto or contextual assessment of State behaviour.58 Also, any 
cyber due diligence measures must be consistent with other international obligations that 
a State may have, especially their negative and positive obligations in respect of human 
rights affected by adopted measures. 
 
The following measures are particularly suitable, if not essential, to any attempt at 
preventing, halting and redressing online harms that may either compound ongoing health 
problems or jeopardise the effective recovery therefrom. 
 
a) National legal framework 
 
Any plan of action to implement cyber due diligence measures ought to begin with the 
establishment of an adequate national legal framework.59 An adequate national legal 
framework in this sense would include, first and foremost, the prohibition or criminalisation 
of harmful cyber conduct. Likewise, the availability of civil remedies alongside provision for 
effective investigations and prosecutions of malicious cyber behaviour are instrumental in 
deterring, preventing and redressing ensuing harms.60 In a context where most ICT 
infrastructures are owned, controlled or operated by multinational or foreign corporations, 
States must also pass appropriate national legislation regulating their human rights impact 
and imposing relevant corporate due diligence standards. Such measures should address: 
online disinformation, whether through content moderation or counter-speech; internet 
security and availability; as well as software vulnerability — all of which depend on 
 
57 ILC, Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm (n. 30), 155-156, in particular commentary to 
Article 3, § 17 and commentary to Article 5. See also Koivurova (n. 31), § 21; Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 
'The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States,' (1992) Ger Y Intl L 
26–27; Kolb (n. 27), 117, 127. Koivurova, para 21; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, 26–27; Kolb, 117, 127. 
58 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, [2017] ICJ Reports 43, 26 February 2007§§ 430-431. 
59 HRC, General Comment 31, (n. 38), §§ 7, 13; HRC, General Comment 36,  (n. 43), §§ 4, 13, 22. 
60 Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania, Appl. no. 41720/13,  25 June 2019, § 127; HRC, General Comment 
31, ibid, §§ 8, 18; HRC, General Comment 36, ibid, §§ 13, 19, 27-28. 
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corporate action. Other legislative measures of particular relevance in a health crisis 
include the provision of response and preparedness plans for cyber emergencies, along 
with an effective system for monitoring compliance with the law by State officials and third 
parties, to the extent permitted by international law.61 
 
b) Monitoring  
 
This brings us to the second type of cyber due diligence measures that States should and 
often must — to the extent practicable — adopt at all times, including during health crises: 
effective monitoring or surveillance of cyberspace. To be sure, obligations of due diligence 
do not necessarily require States to do the impossible to anticipate all possible online 
harms by ostensibly policing the internet and seeking information about potential threats. 
But they do require States to use their existing technical and financial resources to halt or 
prevent malicious cyber operations which they know or should have known about, again, 
to the extent possible and permitted by other rules of international law — in particular, the 
human rights to privacy and freedom of expression.  
 
Notably, in light of recent cyber threats facing the healthcare sector, Australia urged all 
States to “exercise increased vigilance to ensure their territory is not a safe haven for 
cybercriminals.”62 In the same spirit of vigilance, the UK Health Secretary put the 
Government Communications Headquarters (GHCQ) in charge of monitoring “any 
information relating to the security of any network and information system held by or on 
behalf of the NHS or a public health body during the period ending on 31st December 
2020.”63 Digital technologies may also be used to monitor spaces and individuals to contain 
the spread of Covid-19, consistently with international law. Examples include video 
surveillance, contact tracing technologies and crowdsourcing systems.64        
 
c) Confidence-building 
 
The implementation of methods to enhance cybersecurity and mutual trust among States, 
also known as “confidence-building” measures,65 may also be necessary to counter and 
prevent harmful cyber operations against the healthcare sector and other critical 
infrastructure during the Covid-19 outbreak and other public emergencies. Such measures 
may be required to the extent that they can address existing security vulnerabilities, such 
as data breaches or software flaws, or increase resilience in the recovery from harmful 
cyber operations, such as the creation of 24/7 Cyber Emergency Teams.66  
 
These measures may also be required, moreover, to comply with the IHL rule stipulating 
that ‘[t]he civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against 
 
61 HRC, General Comment 36, (n. 43) § 21. 
62 Australia, DFAT and Australian Cyber Security Centre, ‘Unacceptable malicious cyber activity: Joint 
Statement’, 20 May 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/news/unacceptable-malicious-cyber-activity; 
Stilgherrian, (n. 11). 
63 UK, Coronavirus Directions 2020, (n. 7), Section 4. 
64 Josh Toussaint-Strauss, Alex Hern, Simon Roberts, Joseph Pierce, Paul Boyd and Ryan Baxter, ‘How 
Covid-19 contact tracing can help beat the pandemic’, The Guardian, 8 May 2020; Nancy Fiesler, 
‘Crowdsourcing COVID-19’, Harvard Medical School: News & Research, 
https://hms.harvard.edu/news/crowdsourcing-covid-19.  
65 UN GGE Report (n. 17), §§ 16-18. 
66 Ibid, § 17(c). 
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dangers arising from military operations.’67 Precautionary measures are particularly 
important in cyberwarfare, given the co-dependency and interconnectivity between civilian 
infrastructures and lawful military objectives.68 Thus, they may play a key role in preventing 
cyberattacks directed against military targets from spilling over onto civilian systems, 
including hospitals and other critical infrastructure.69  
 
d) International cooperation and capacity-building 
 
As neither the internet nor the pandemic knows territorial boundaries, international 
cooperation and institutional dialogue are crucial to prevent further outbreaks, contain the 
spread of the disease and eventually eliminate it. As the 2015 GGE report rightly 
acknowledges, ‘[i]nternational cooperation and assistance can play an essential role in 
enabling States to secure ICTs and ensure their peaceful use.’70  
 
Thus, it not surprising that several governments have recently called upon other States to 
cooperate with each other as well as with international institutions, particularly the World 
Health Organisation, in the context of the pandemic. The Czech Republic, for example, 
noted that “[t]he rising number of cyberattacks on medical facilities worldwide reinforce 
[sic] the need for coordinated global action to protect [the] public health care sector from 
malicious ICT activities.”71 Similarly, Estonia affirmed that ‘[t]he international community 
should urgently address cyberattacks against hospitals and other essential medical 
services that threaten already strained healthcare entities.’72 Likewise, facing questions 
about its response to such threats, the UK reminded that it is ‘working closely with [its] 
allies to hold the perpetrators to account and deter further malicious cyber activity around 
the world.’73  
 
Such calls for increased cooperation are not merely hortatory but may be required under 
existing international law. In particular, the Corfu Channel and no-harm principles may 
require States to alert or notify third States about the risk of malicious cyber operations 
emanating from or transiting through their territory. During armed conflict, States must 
cooperate with other States and with the UN to ensure respect for IHL.74 
 
Importantly, State cooperation may also be necessary to build the technical and financial 
capacity of less developed States to prevent, stop and redress online harms. In an 
interconnected world, security vulnerabilities in one State may compromise the integrity of 
systems beyond national borders.   
 
 
 
 
 
67 AP I, Art. 51.  
68 Ibid, Art. 52(2). 
69 Laurent Gisel, Tilman Rodenhäuser, ‘Cyber operations and international humanitarian law: five key 
points’, Humanitarian Law & Policy, 28 November 2019, https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2019/11/28/cyber-operations-ihl-five-key-points/.  
70 UN GGE Report (n. 17), § 19. 
71 Czech Republic, (n. 1).  
72 ‘Reinsalu condemns cyber attacks against Czech critical infrastructure’ (n. 13).  
73 FCO, ‘UK condemns cyber actors’, (n. 10). 
74 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (n. 46), Rule 144: Practice, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule144.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
As essential services are now more than ever connected to the internet and other digital 
networks, measures of cyber due diligence are necessary to contain the spread of Covid-
19, prevent further outbreaks and ensure a full recovery from the current crisis. Such 
measures are not only required as a matter of policy and good governance, but also by 
existing international law. Whether or not a standalone principle or rule of “cyber due 
diligence” exists, the international community already benefits from a comprehensive legal 
and policy framework to tackle online harms in times of Covid-19 and other health crises, 
even if it is spread across different international legal regimes. This framework — a true 
patchwork of different obligations — includes at the very least the Corfu Channel and no-
harm principles, and positive State obligations under specific bodies of law such as IHRL 
and IHL. Their interpretation and implementation are guided and complemented by the 
norms of responsible State behaviour and other voluntary commitments made by States. 
Accordingly, States cannot reasonably invoke the absence of a specific binding 
international rule governing of cyber harms as an excuse for inaction in the fight against 
Covid-19 and other health crises.  
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Accountability: A Discussion 
Antonio Coco, Panagiota Kotzamani, Tara Van Ho and Meagan Wong [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_038] 
 
The discussants considered the different framings of accountability and legal responsibility 
and how these related to a range of contexts brought about by Covid-19. However, 
because of the limitations of existing frameworks of legal responsibility, it was recognized 
that it will not always be possible for them to link to the various contexts and factual 
scenarios which arise from Covid-19; necessarily, there will be gaps. 
 
Legal responsibility is a narrower subset of what is a much wider or diffuse understanding 
of accountability, the latter concept including also notions of political or moral blame. There 
is often a wish to find some kind of moral or political blame for what one or more actors did 
or did not do, or to recognise formally that what was done was insufficient or failed in some 
way to respond effectively to individuals’ or groups’ needs or rights.  Often it will be difficult 
for frameworks of legal responsibility to respond to these calls for accountability. 
 
State responsibility as a legal concept is not about blame. It’s focus is on the breach of an 
international obligation; if a breach is determined, a new legal relationship emerges which 
results in an obligation to crease the wrongful act and make full reparations for injury 
caused by the internationally wrongful act. Furthermore, as a secondary rule of 
international law, state responsibility is fully dependent on whether what can be considered 
a primary rule, has been breached. Thus, the process of determining and apportioning 
state responsibility says little about the underlying breach of the primary rules which will 
be situation specific, and is not about apportionment of blame, though determinations of 
legal responsibility will inevitably still carry some moral apportionment of right and wrong, 
at least from the perspective of public perceptions.  
 
Similarly, criminal law, and international criminal law in particular is quite restricted in its 
ability to address the various contexts arising from states’ and other actors’ responses to 
Covid-19. This is because of the narrow set of acts or omissions which may be understood 
to fall within the definitions of crimes, but also because of the need for some personal 
culpability,  in most if not all, instances. 
 
The discussants considered some of contexts arising from Covid-19, to illustrate these 
points, but also to think through some potential openings for responsibility, for further 
exploration. For example, several of the papers in the collection explore what has been 
recognised as a truism – that Covid-19 discriminates; individuals from certain communities 
are more likely to contract the disease and have a lower likelihood of surviving it, because 
of the social determinants of health. The policies behind the responses to the pandemic 
may also exacerbate these social determinants of health and indeed some of these appear 
to sacrifice the weakest in society. There is a need to consider how this impacts on 
responsibility.  
 
Thus, if Covid-19 discriminates, do states’ and others’ actions and in-actions (or under-
actions) have implications for legal responsibility? International law does not cater well for 
this type of scenario. There are a number of ways in which responsibility can be argued, 
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though none of these are easy arguments to make or foolproof. For instance, some of the 
subordinate forms of criminal responsibility such as aiding or abetting or complicity  (before 
even arriving at superior responsibility) aid in assisting to capture some aspects of the 
factual contexts relevant to Covid-19 health responses. However, there will still remain 
challenges with respect to individual culpability and the degree to which the actions and 
omissions fit within the narrow definitions for international crimes.   
 
Also, one might consider how Covid-19 may exacerbate international crimes which are 
already taking place. For instance, in Syria, the ongoing attacks against health workers 
and hospitals may constitute a war crime. If these are done with the knowledge of the 
pandemic and the risks to local populations, the Covid-19 facts may extenuate the crimes 
even though there may not have been a specific intention to spread Covid-19; further 
spread of Covid-19 impacting on the health and lives of local populations was however the 
natural and necessary outcome of the attacks. Thus, there could be an argument to be 
made about responsibility which may derive from the act of continuing the attacks with the 
knowledge of the pandemic.  
 
In general, the point was made that international law does not deal well with widely diffused 
impacts, particularly where there are multiple actors acting in parallel, though not 
necessarily in a coordinated fashion. Perhaps one area which merits further exploration is 
the framing used by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights recognize 
that businesses owe responsibility for the harms they “cause or contribute to”. The Guiding 
Principles do not clarify what this phrase “cause or contribute to” means, however the early 
interpretations suggest that one can contribute to a harm even if what one is doing is not 
in itself illegal, so long as the act is going to further the crimes of others. The Guiding 
Principles do not set out a framework for criminal responsibility; they are more concerned 
with a corporate or similar standard of responsibility. Nevertheless, the Guiding Principles 
may be helpful in thinking through how principles of responsibility that concern a multitude 
of actors can be conceived of.  
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Failure to Act in Times of Pandemic: Is There a Role for the 
International Criminal Law Doctrine of Superior Responsibility? 
Panagiota Kotzamani, Lecturer, School of Law [DOI: 10.5526/xgeg-xs42_039] 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the responsibility of military or civilian superiors in international 
criminal law for their failure to act in relation to a potentially lethal virus epidemic or 
pandemic. In this direction, two different angles of the issue are discussed. The first 
focuses on the responsibility of individuals in positions of power for their failure to prevent 
the spread of the virus or provide adequate health support to an epidemic or pandemic 
affected population, when this population is used as a target group for the commission of 
crimes against humanity, war crimes or even genocide. The second refers to the 
responsibility of these superiors for their failure to prevent their subordinates to use such 
an epidemic or pandemic as a mean to commit crimes against humanity or war crimes. It 
is argued that, in order for superior responsibility to be attributed in these circumstances, 
a careful consideration on the theory of omission and the nature of superior responsibility 
is required. 
  
Key words:  
International criminal law, civilian and military superiors, commission by omission, 
deliberate failure to exercise control, due diligence 
  
 
 
I. Introduction  
 
This paper considers the international criminal law issues epidemics and pandemics raise 
with reference to the responsibility of specific individuals for the commission of international 
crimes.1 The discussion on how pandemics/epidemics are linked to international criminal 
responsibility has been prompted by the current Covid-19 situation, but it can relate to 
similar scenarios of other lethal viruses’ propagation in various parts of the world.2 In order 
to explain the focus of the paper, it is useful to clarify first how an epidemic or a pandemic 
is linked to international criminality. By their construction, international crimes cover a 
limited number of human rights violations. These limitations are two-fold: in terms of their 
elements, international crimes have a specific actus reus and a specific mens rea.3 In 
 
1 The international criminal law analysis of this paper focuses primarily on the Statute and case law of the 
International Criminal Court, which is currently the only permanent international criminal tribunal, with 
potential universal jurisdiction - subject to state membership.  
2 Since 2016, Yemen is facing the world’s largest cholera epidemic, with more than 1 million cases so far, a 
situation that has created a humanitarian crisis in this war-torn country.  The 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic in 
West Africa was, according to the WHO ‘the largest and most complex Ebola outbreak since the virus was 
first discovered in 1976’. In 2009, a H1N1 outbreak in North America led to a pandemic, while, by 2010, 
most countries in the world had confirmed infections, See, WHO, ‘Yemen: WHO continues efforts in the 
fight against cholera’, 27 February 2020, http://www.emro.who.int/yem/yemen-news/who-continues-efforts-
in-the-fight-against-cholera.html; WHO, ‘Ebola virus disease’, https://www.who.int/health-
topics/ebola/#tab=tab_1; WHO, ‘What is the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus?’, 24 February 2010, 
https://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/frequently_asked_questions/about_disease/en/, accessed 7 May 
2020.  
3 See Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) for the actus reus of 
the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; and Article 30 for the mens 
rea of international crimes, which as a general rule is intent of the first or second degree-excluding dolus 
eventualis/recklessness and negligence. 
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terms of their scope, international crimes require specific “conditions”: genocidal acts need 
to be conducted under the specific genocidal intent;4 crimes against humanity have to be 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population;5 and war crimes require a belligerent nexus, i.e. to be closely related to the 
hostilities of an international or non-international armed conflict.6  
 
As a result, many of the potential human rights implications of a lethal virus’ spread will not 
reach the level of international crimes. In terms of the current Covid-19 pandemic, a 
number of governments have been accused of policy failures leading to mass unnecessary 
deaths, posing the question of whether their leaders can be accused for the commission 
of crimes against humanity.7 Leaving aside the mens rea requirements of international 
crimes - and even in the rare scenario that a government has intentionally allowed the 
spread of Covid-19 in the country -, it is this author’s view that these deaths cannot form 
the basis of a crime against humanity. This is because there is a lack of a widespread or 
systematic attack against civilians, with knowledge of this attack: inadequate measures 
against the spread of Covid-19 in a country (even if the inadequacy is intentional) cannot 
be considered as a purposeful attack of the state mechanism against the whole population 
of this country. The relatively high standard of widespread or systematic attack 
distinguishes crimes against humanity from human rights violations, and its fulfilment 
requires attack against a specific civilian group -instead of the whole civilian population of 
a country in general -, without this creating a “discriminatory ground” requirement8 for 
crimes against humanity in international law.9  
 
Exploring further the notion of attack, another possibility arises, even though it is not a 
Covid-19 feature: the scenario of a state unleashing a deadly virus against the population 
of another state as an act of aggression.10 Aggression is considered an international crime 
under the ICC Statute, which however is very strictly construed: ‘“act of aggression” means 
the use of armed force by a State and, in particular, the invasion or attack by the armed 
forces of a State of the territory of another State.11 Even though an interpretative expansion 
of the ‘armed forces’ definition in order to include biological weapons may be possible, it 
exceeds the scope of this paper. By applying, hence, strictly, the elements of the crime of 
 
4 Article 6 of the ICC Statute: "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. 
5 Article 7 of the ICC Statute. 
6 Prosecutor v Kunarac et al. (Trial Chamber Judgment), ICTY, IT-96-23 & 23/1, 22 February 2001, para. 
402. 
7 See, for example, Carli Pierson, ‘Trump Could Face International Human Rights Law Consequences for 
his Coronavirus Pandemic Response’, The Independent, 10 April 2020;  Brazilian Association of Jurists for 
Democracy, ‘Bolsonaro Denounced for Crimes against Humanity before the International Criminal Court’,  
3 April 2020, https://peoplesdispatch.org/2020/04/03/bolsonaro-denounced-for-crimes-against-humanity-
before-the-international-criminal-court/; Isabelle Khurshudyan, ‘Coronavirus Spreads Rapidly in Belarus as 
Leader Denies Pandemic Exists’, The Independent, 2 May 2020.  
8 With the exception of persecution as a crime against humanity, see Prosecutor v Kupreškić et al (Trial 
Chamber Judgment), ICTY, IT-95-16, 14 January 2000, para. 606. 
9  A more extended discussion on the nature of crimes against humanity and of international crimes in 
general, however, is out of the scope of this paper and is not fit for the purposes of this collective 
publication. 
10 Dan Kaszeta, ‘No, the coronavirus is not a biological weapon: There are many reasons to be skeptical of 
conspiracy theories about the origins of the disease’, The Washington Post, 27 April 2020.  
11 See, Article 8bis (2)(a) of the ICC Statute, as well as the remaining sub-paragraphs (b-)(g), all of which 
refer to ‘traditional’ modes of warfare, requiring the use of armed forces. 
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aggression, a leader of a country cannot be found criminally responsible in international 
law.  
 
For these reasons, the analysis of this paper focuses on scenarios of a state’s or an armed 
group’s deliberate failure to provide adequate health care to a specific population, either 
as part of a(n) (state) ethnic cleansing campaign, or in order to gain military advantage in 
the armed conflict by targeting civilians. These scenarios fulfill the elements and conditions 
of the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, as 
previously presented. More specifically, the paper explores the potential responsibility of 
superiors - state leaders and military commanders - for the commission of these 
international crimes by taking advantage of an outbreak of an epidemic or pandemic. Such 
incidents are already taking place when epidemics strike, and this is a reality international 
criminal law needs to seriously take into consideration. In the ongoing hostilities in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, armed groups have refused access of humanitarian 
and medical personnel and their supplies to specific populations amidst the Ebola 
epidemic. The extent of these incidents and their links to crimes against humanity and war 
crimes led to the adoption of UN Resolution 2439 (2018), where the Security Council warns 
of the illegality of such practices and requests the responsible parties to cease this 
practice.12 Since the beginning of the war in Yemen, the parties to the conflict have been 
attacking humanitarian and medical personnel fighting against the cholera outbreak. They 
have also banned medical supplies and denied the affected population access to 
treatment.13 In any case, targeting a civilian population by preventing their access to 
medical help is a common war tactic, and a violation of international humanitarian law.14  
 
Discussing the responsibility of superiors in these circumstances, the article establishes a 
distinction between responsibility of a superior as a participant to the international crime 
and as a perpetrator of a separate crime of dereliction of duty. Identifying a clear theoretical 
framework for this distinction is important, as a superior who is considered a wilful 
participant to an international crime will, naturally, be more severely punished than a 
superior who is a perpetrator to a dereliction of duty crime due to their negligent failure to 
supervise their subordinates adequately. In this direction, it has to be noted that a well-
justified application of the rules of individual criminal responsibility is even more important 
when it comes to international criminal law. International crimes are usually the product of 
collective criminality, where there are individuals in hierarchical positions who are remote 
from the crime scene but are, nevertheless, responsible for ordering or allowing their 
commission. Having in place an international criminal law theory to link these individuals 
to the international crimes is of utmost importance for international justice. 
 
II. Direct and Indirect Superior Responsibility in International Criminal Law  
 
In international criminal law, an individual, who has a position of authority can be 
responsible for the commission of an international crime, as a superior and/or together with 
the physical perpetrator(s). In this sense, the superior is a perpetrator when they have 
 
12 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 2439 (2018), UN Doc. S/RES/2439 (2018), 30 October 
2018. 
13 See Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2019: Yemen’, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-
chapters/yemen, accessed 30 April 2020,.   
14 In the war in Syria, for example, deliberate deprivation of medical aid to the ‘opponent’ civilian population 
has been a widespread tactic by both parties to the conflict. See Jonathan Whittall, ‘My enemy’s doctor is 
my enemy’, The Huffington Post, 10 April 2013. 
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control over the criminal outcome, as any other individual, or, due to their position, when 
they have control over the will and acts of their subordinates.15 In the latter case, the 
concepts of ordering, soliciting or inducing the commission of an international crime are 
also relevant.16 This type of superior responsibility is called ‘direct superior responsibility’ 
because the superior becomes responsible for their participation in the crime through their 
own deliberate acts or omissions.    
 
When it comes to omissions, it has to be noted that criminal law recognises the commission 
of international crimes not only through actions, but also through omissions. Law is a 
normative pursuit and, thus, its rules are not limited to a mere description of physical acts.17 
Criminal responsibility is attached to the individual for his or her conscious contribution to 
the crime committed. This means that, in certain circumstances, a lack of action in the 
sense of omission can contribute to the criminal outcome in the same way as an act of 
commission.18 Such an omission assimilates to an ‘active’ contribution to the crime, which 
leads to what the common law jurisdictions refer to as ‘commission by omission’19 and the 
continental law jurisdictions as ‘perpetration through an inauthentic omission’.20 
 
Nevertheless, the omissions of a superior can also entail criminal responsibility for them 
under a different concept: “indirect” superior responsibility21 or the “superior responsibility 
doctrine” as it is commonly called.22 In the case of indirect superior responsibility, 
responsibility attaches to the superior, not for their own omissions leading to the criminal 
outcome, but for their failure to prevent the acts of their subordinates who eventually 
committed the crime. In other words, the superior responsibility doctrine refers to the 
responsibility of the superiors - regardless of whether they are military commanders or 
civilian leaders - for their failure to effectively control their subordinates and take 
reasonable and adequate steps to prevent the commission of the crime, or to punish them 
after the crime has been committed. 
 
This latter type of superior responsibility - failure to prevent or punish - has led to significant 
uncertainty in international criminal law regarding the attribution of criminal responsibility 
to the superior.23 This is because the duty of the superior to supervise their subordinates, 
 
15 See Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Pre-Trial Chamber II), 
‘Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor 
Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo’, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, 15 June 2009, para. 347; Prosecutor v 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Pre-Trial Chamber I), ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’, ICC-01/04-01/06, 
29 January 2007, paras. 326-341; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I), ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges’, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008, paras. 480-
86. 
16 See Article 25(3)(b) of the ICC Statute. 
17 Kai Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol I: Foundations and General Part (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 180-81. 
18 See, George Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 51. 
19 Regarding English law see, for example, R v Stone & Dobinson (1977) QB 354; R v Gibbins & Proctor 
(1918) 13 Cr App Rep 134, where it has been discussed how crimes of active conduct can be committed 
by omission. 
20 In German criminal law, for example, this is the concept of “unechtes Unterlassung” established in 
section 13 of the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB). 
21 See, Commentary of the International Law Commission on Art. 6 of the Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996), para. 1.  
22 See Article 28 of the ICC Statute. 
23 Volker Nerlich, 'Superior Responsibility under Article 28 ICC Statute: For What exactly is the superior 
held responsible?' (2007) 5(3)  Journal of International Criminal Justice 665; Otto Triffterer, ‘Command 
responsibility – crime sui generis or participation “as otherwise provided” in Art. 28 Rome Statute’ in Jörg  
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which would have enabled them to prevent their crimes in the first place, can give rise to 
a different type of responsibility as well: that of commission of a separate crime of 
dereliction of duty.24 Indeed, in criminal law, there are certain crimes that can be committed 
only through an omission: there are situations, where an individual by omitting to act allows 
for a certain outcome to take place, a behaviour which the law feels should be punishable. 
One such example -which is criminalised by several, but not all jurisdictions- is when an 
individual fails to save someone who finds themselves in danger, when the act of saving 
can be done without the individual risking their own life.25 In these type of crimes, the 
perpetrator is responsible not for the outcome but solely for their inaction, which allowed 
the outcome to happen. Thus, these crimes have been characterised as “authentic 
omission” crimes,26 where the individual becomes the perpetrator of a special crime of 
dereliction of duty - a duty that has been created by each particular authentic omission 
crime.  
   
After explaining this distinction, the next section analyses the responsibility of military 
commanders and civilian leaders, based on Article 28 of the ICC Statute, in order to apply 
the suggested theoretical framework to Covid-19 related scenarios in the last section. 
 
III. Analysing the Responsibility of the Superior in Article 28 of the ICC Statute   
 
In contrast to the ad hoc criminal tribunals, which approached the notion of superior in a 
unified approach, Article 28 of the ICC Statute distinguishes between the responsibility of 
military commanders (subparagraph(a)) and the responsibility of civilian superiors 
(subparagraph (b)). The main difference is that military commanders can be found 
responsible, not only for the intentional failure to prevent the crimes of their subordinates 
or to punish them, but also for their negligent failure (should have known standard). On the 
contrary, a civilian superior can be found responsible only when their failure has been 
intentional, or they were wilfully blind to the crimes of their subordinates (must have known 
standard).  
 
Based on the analysis of the previous section on the types of omissions in criminal law, it 
is suggested that the different levels of mens rea of the superior regarding their control 
over the crimes of their subordinates can lead to different types of superior responsibility. 
When a superior, either a military commander or a civilian leader, knows that their 
subordinates are about to commit a crime and they purposefully refrain from intervening, 
then this omission is, in fact, an act in disguise, in other words an inauthentic omission, 
leading to commission (of the crime) by omission. Therefore, the intentional omission of 
the superior to prevent the crime of others constitutes participation in the crime, under the 
same principles governing perpetration and/or ordering. It is proposed that this type of 
superior responsibility can be interpreted as covering the situation where an individual 
 
Arnold and others (eds), Menschengerechtes Strafrecht: Festschrift für Albin Eser zum 70 
Geburtstag(München: C.H. Beck, 2005); Chantal Meloni, Command Responsibility in International Criminal 
Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010); Kai Ambos, ‘Superior Responsibility’, in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, 
and John R.W.D. Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Maria L. Nybondas, Command Responsibility and its 
Applicability to Civilian Superiors (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2010). 
24 See, for example, Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law, (n. 17) 231. 
25 See, for example Art. 223 of the French Criminal Code; Section 323(c) German Strafgesetzbuch. 
26 Kai Ambos, ‘Omissions’, in Ambos et al. (eds) Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 
Volume 1: Anglo-German Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2020), 20-21. 
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capable of exercising control over others, intentionally fails to do so.27 Under the proposed 
framework, the notion of control is crucial because it provides the causal link between the 
inauthentic omission of the superior and the criminal outcome by the acts of the 
subordinates. Such a causal link is required to establish principal participation in the 
crime.28 The individual who has effective control over others and consciously allows them 
(or fails to take reasonable steps to prevent) to commit a crime is, without a doubt, linked 
to the criminal outcome as much as the physical perpetrator is.29 
 
In the case of military commanders, however, Article 28(a) of the ICC Statute renders them 
responsible for negligence as well. In this case, there is no doctrinal basis for commission 
by omission, as explained in the previous section. A superior should not be responsible for 
the crime of others if he/she was not aware of them, even if he/she neglected in his/her 
duty to supervise them properly. Arguing otherwise would create a type of vicarious liability, 
where the individual lacks the appropriate mens rea for the commission of the crime. Such 
a liability contrasts, nevertheless, with the criminal law principle of personal culpability, 
which ‘lies at the heart of the criminal law paradigm’.30 As in national criminal law,31 an 
individual should be found responsible only for their specific share to the commission of 
an international crime.32  
 
It is proposed, in the latter case, that the military commander should be responsible for a 
separate dereliction of duty crime, for neglecting to properly supervise his or her 
subordinates. This due diligence duty emanates from the superior-subordinate 
relationship, as the outcome of the superior’s effective control over their subordinates.33 
The same conclusion can be drawn regarding the responsibility of both military 
commanders and civilian leaders when it comes to their failure to punish their subordinates 
after the crime commission. As the superior cannot be a perpetrator to a crime that has 
already been committed, their omission to punish their subordinates can only be 
punishable as a separate crime of dereliction of their relevant superior duties. 
 
The dualistic interpretation of Article 28 of the ICC Statute proposed in this article has a 
clear advantage in the context of the attribution of responsibility in international criminal 
law. It incorporates the superior responsibility doctrine in the general theoretical framework 
 
27 See also, Meloni (n. 23), 197-98. However, she limits the responsibility of the superior in such a case to 
accomplice liability and excludes principal liability, 198.  
28 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Trial Chamber II), ‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute’, ICC-
01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014, para. 767. 
29 In the same direction, Triffterer argues that ‘[i]ntentionally omitting an act presupposes that the person 
has the factual possibility and is aware that he can step out of his or her passivity and become active in a 
way demanded by the situation as the case may be’. See, Triffterer (n. 23), 911. 
30 Allison Danner and Jenny Martinez, 'Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enerprise, Command 
Responsibility and the Development of International Criminal Law', (2005) 93(1) California Law Review 75, 
134. 
31 See Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder, Principles of criminal law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013) 182. 
32 According to the Appeals Chamber in Tadic, ‘[t]he basic assumption must be that in international law as 
much as in national systems the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: 
nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged 
or in some way participated (nulla poena sine culpa)’, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgment) ICTY, 
IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1995, para. 186. 
33 Under this perception, the English courts, for example, have recognised control as a ‘pro-duty factor’: 
which establishes a specific relationship between two parties and, thus, certain duties of the one towards 
the other. See Sutradhar v Natural Environment Research Council [2006] UKHL 33, paras. 38, 48. 
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on the modes of responsibility. Attributing responsibility to the superior in relation to 
subordinates’ crimes is not, anymore, a peculiar, sui generis doctrine of individual criminal 
responsibility, constituting an exception to the modes of participation in international 
criminal law.34 Instead, it follows the basic criminal law rule of personal culpability, 
according to which, an individual becomes criminally responsible when their own acts and 
minds are sufficiently linked to the criminal outcome.35  
 
IV. How does superior responsibility relate to pandemic-affected international 
crimes? 
 
As explained in the introduction, the spread of a virus such as Covid-19 and the 
consequent outbreak of an epidemic or a pandemic can be used as a tool or provide the 
context for the commission of international crimes. In such a case, international criminal 
law can attribute responsibility to military commanders or superior leaders, either for crimes 
committed via their own omissions or for failure to prevent the crimes of their subordinates.  
 
Based on the doctrinal analysis of omission and superior responsibility in the previous 
sections, the following scenario may occur. In the middle of a state campaign to eliminate 
a specific minority group within a certain geographical area, the civilian leader of the state 
deliberately omits to prevent the spread of a deadly virus among this population or 
deliberately omits to adopt the required health measures in order to fight the pandemic or 
epidemic. Such a deliberate omission is considered as an act in disguise, an inauthentic 
omission, according to the analysis provided in the first section. Thus, the superior can be 
responsible for the commission of a crime against humanity by omission, i.e. extermination 
by deprivation of access to medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 
population36 and/or persecution by intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental 
rights,37 as is the right to health.38 This is the case of direct superior responsibility,39 as the 
superior is in a position to effectively control the state apparatus and deliberately refrains 
from ordering the state services to introduce the appropriate measures against the virus. 
If this state campaign has also a genocidal intent against a specific population – the intent 
to destroy a group as such40 - then the superior can be found responsible for the 
commission of genocide, in addition to crimes against humanity and/or war crimes, 
depending on the facts.  
 
This scenario can be linked to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar, where the Rohingya 
population is facing a widespread/systematic attack by the Myanmar security forces.41 In 
this direction, the state deliberately refrains from providing health care to the Rohingya 
and/or prevents their access to it.42 Under the current Covid-19 pandemic, this would mean 
 
34 Otto Triffterer and Roberta Arnold, ‘Article 28: Responsibility of commanders and other superiors’, in Otto 
Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, 
Article by Article (3rd ed. Beck-Hart-Nomos, 2016), 1060. 
35 Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment), (n. 32), para. 186. 
36 See Articles 7(1)(b) and 7(2)(b) of the ICC Statute. 
37 See Articles 7(1)(h) and 7(2)(g) of the ICC Statute. 
38 See Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A 
(XXI),16 December 1966. 
39 See Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute. 
40 See Article 6 of the ICC Statute. 
41 Global Conflict Tracker, ‘Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar’, 10 June 2020,  https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-
tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-myanmar.  
42 Human Rights Watch, ‘Rohingya Crisis’, https://www.hrw.org/tag/rohingya-crisis, accessed 2 June 2020.  
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that the Rohingya community is left unprotected against the spread of the disease.43 In 
case of a Covid-19 death toll in the Rohingya area, the deliberate omissions of the state 
leaders could render them responsible as perpetrators of crimes against humanity: 
extermination by deprivation of access to medicine, calculated to bring about the Rohingya 
population destruction; and/or persecution of this group by intentional and severe 
deprivation of their right to health. It has to be also noted that there are allegations of the 
Rohingya persecution having reached the level of genocide.44 If the genocidal intent of 
destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, is 
proved, then the omissions of the state leaders regarding the protection of the Rohingya 
against Covid-19 can be considered as ‘deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part’.45 If this is the case, 
then the leaders can be responsible for the commission of genocide by omission. 
 
A similar scenario can apply regarding detention centres and forced labour camps in 
oppressive states. In Eritrea, for example, it is estimated that there exist more than 200 
detention facilities for political prisoners arbitrarily detained by the state. The sanitary 
provisions and medical aid to prisoners are almost non-existent, while torturing and killing 
of prisoners is a common practice. In these conditions, it can be argued that the state 
seeks to exterminate or, in any case, persecute these detainees in a systematic way. Due 
to the current spread of Covid-19 around the world, NGOs warn that the refusal of the 
government to provide adequate health care renders the detainees defenceless against 
the pandemic.46 If there is indeed a spread of Covid-19 in these detention centres, then 
the deliberate omissions of the state leaders to provide medical aid to the infected can be 
characterised as extermination by deprivation of access to medicine or persecution via 
deprivation of their right to health. Based on the theoretical framework developed in the 
previous section of this paper, these leaders can be responsible as perpetrators of 
inauthentic omission crimes against humanity. 
 
The situation described in the previous scenarios is rather straightforward, as long as the 
(inauthentic) omissions of the superior are sufficiently linked to the criminal outcome and 
can be, thus, treated as acts. The issues arise when we turn to analyse a similar scenario 
under the umbrella of indirect superior responsibility (Article 28 of the ICC statute). 
Consider the following scenario: in a war-torn country, a belligerent group is in control of a 
particular area, which includes villages with a “hostile” civilian population. The 
epidemic/pandemic that is already present in the country reaches these villages. The 
soldiers of the belligerent group use the presence of the virus to their advantage and 
prevent the affected population from seeking health care and/or do not allow NGOs access 
to the village in order to provide it. As a result, the majority of the civilian population dies. 
Willful killing of civilians and impediment of humanitarian relief to civilians in need are 
 
43 See also Leah Carter, ‘Myanmar: Armed Conflict Puts Brakes on COVID-19 Response’, discussing how 
the armed conflict in Myanmar leaves the persecuted ethnic minorities unprotected against the coronavirus 
pandemic, Deutsche Welle, 7 May 2020. 
44 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64, 12 September 2018. 
45 Article 6(c) of the ICC Statute. 
46 Amnesty international ‘Eritrea: Detainees in Overcrowded and Unsanitary Conditions Defenceless 
against COVID-19’, 21 May 2020, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/eritrea-detainees-in-
overcrowded-and-unsanitary-conditions-defenceless-against-covid19/.  
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considered grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the customary humanitarian 
law resulting in the commission of war crimes.47  
 
This scenario can materialise in Yemen where there is a long-standing conflict between 
the state forces and belligerent groups. Humanitarian organisations in the country report 
that the armed groups involved in the hostilities continue to target health care facilities and 
block access to humanitarian aid, despite the pleas of the international community to 
protect civilians from Covid-19 infection and prevent the spread of the virus in the region.48 
In this direction, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued an appeal for a global 
ceasefire so that populations most vulnerable to the spread of Covid-19 can have access 
to humanitarian aid.49  
 
Following the analysis of Article 28 in section III above, it is apparent that in case there is 
spread of Covid-19 in Yemen, the armed groups’ superiors can be found liable under two 
different sets of circumstances. This depends on the mens rea of the individual who 
exercises effective control over the physical perpetrators. If the military commander is 
aware or wilfully blind of the acts of their subordinates leading to the commission of war 
crimes and they deliberately refrain from stopping them, then their omission is in any case 
a disguised act, an inauthentic omission. Indeed, if the military commander decided to 
intervene and stop the subordinates under their control, then the crime would not have 
been committed. Therefore, in case of their inaction, the military commander should be 
found responsible- alongside with their soldiers- for commission of war crimes, as a 
perpetrator who is in control of the criminal outcome.  
 
However, if the military commander does not know about the acts of their subordinates, 
because they have been negligent in their duty to supervise them properly, they cannot be 
considered as participants to the war crime, due to the lack of intent towards the crime.  In 
this case, Article 28 (a) establishes a new crime, that of dereliction of duty, which the 
military commander can be found responsible for. As the military commander is not 
responsible for an international crime his/her sentence should be considerably shorter than 
that of his/her soldiers who committed the war crime. Finally, responsibility for the 
dereliction of duty crime of Article 28 is attached to the military commander if he/she also 
omits to punish their subordinates after he/she finds out that they have committed the war 
crime. This is because a responsible commander has also a duty to punish his/her soldiers 
when they violate the laws of war50 and Article 28 incorporates this duty in the ICC Statute.   
 
The advantage of this approach cannot be ignored. Establishing the commission of 
international crimes amidst a humanitarian crisis is complex enough as it is, but it presents 
even more difficulties when it is escalated by the chaos an epidemic outbreak can create 
in volatile conditions. Having a solid theory to rely upon when it comes to the contribution 
of superiors in the crime commission is an undeniable asset for their successful 
prosecution under international criminal law and their final conviction.  
 
47 See Article 8(2)(a), (b)(xxv), (c)(i), (e)(iii) of the ICC Statute, depending on whether there is an 
international or non-international armed conflict. 
48 Afrah Nasser, ‘COVID-19 in Yemen – A Perfect Storm’, Human Rights Watch, 14 April 2020, 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/14/covid-19-yemen-perfect-storm. 
49 UN News, ‘COVID-19: UN Chief Calls for Global Ceasefire to Focus on “the true fight of our lives”,’ 23 
March 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/03/1059972. 
50 See, for example, Art 86 and 87 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.  
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V. Conclusion  
 
This article has explored international criminal law’s contribution to the global response 
against an epidemic or a pandemic, when a virus outbreak is used for or aids the 
commission of international crimes. In these circumstances, the omissions of the superiors 
- military commanders and civilian leaders - to prevent the spread of the virus or their 
failure to control their subordinates can render them responsible in international criminal 
law. The superior’s ability to exercise effective control over the criminal outcome and/or 
over the physical perpetrators can establish their responsibility either for commission of an 
international crime by omission or for a separate crime of dereliction of duty, depending on 
the superior’s mens rea for the underlying international crime.   
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I. Introduction  
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has raised questions of international responsibility of States; in 
particular, whether States can be internationally responsible for the failure to prevent and 
the spread of the outbreak internally and externally across international borders;1 and other 
matters pertaining to international health law.2 Also, as highlighted in earlier contributions 
in this publication, the Covid-19 pandemic raises tensions and questions in domestic and 
international law. These draw to light questions of State responsibility for acts – or 
omissions – by States for various conduct that may come into question. This is particularly 
so when States are unable to perform obligations owed under international law to other 
States, international organizations or individuals, as a result of their domestic policies and 
actions to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic.  
 
This contribution provides an overview of the rules of international law concerning the 
responsibility of States for their international wrongful acts, and how these rules are 
relevant in the Covid-19 pandemic. The international law of State responsibility, as 
formulated by the International Law Commission in the 2001 Articles on the responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful acts (“2001 ILC Articles”),3 depicts the general 
conditions under international law for a State to be responsible for wrongful acts and the 
legal consequences that flow by operation of law. These general conditions are understood 
as the secondary rules of State responsibility, which result from the breach of primary rules, 
i.e. rules of customary international law or treaty law that provide international obligations 
on States.  
 
With regard to primary rules, States have very different obligations under various 
international legal frameworks which play an especially significant role during the 
pandemic, e.g., international health law; international human rights law; international 
refugee law; international investment law; international trade law; international 
environmental law and  international water law. Thus, this contribution does not look at the 
primary rules, of which there are many under the aforementioned legal frameworks, and 
some have been examined in detail elsewhere in this publication; but rather focuses on 
the secondary rules under international law that apply when a State has acted in breach 
of any obligation arising from one or more of these primary rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
1 Article 2, International Health Regulations 2005.  
2 Pedro A. Villarreal, ‘Covid-19 Symposium: “Can they really do that?” States’ Obligations under the 
International Health Regulations in Light of Covid-19 (Part I),’ 31 March 20, available at: 
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/31/covid-19-symposium-can-they-really-do-that-states-obligations-under-the-
international-health-regulations-in-light-of-covid-19-part-i/. 
3 ILC, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ‘Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session’ (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001)  UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [2001 ILC Articles]. 
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This contribution will be structured as follows:  
 
(i) the general principles of State responsibility that govern the concept of an internationally 
wrongful act of a State will be explained. Within this analytical framework, the complexities 
of various factual situations that pertain to the Covid-19 pandemic will be drawn out. As 
will be elaborated upon, the attribution of conduct to a State and the finding of a breach of 
an international obligation cannot be established in the abstract, but needs to be 
characterised on the basis of factual situations that arise.  
 
(ii) Due to the unprecedented and extraordinary nature of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is 
relevant to examine whether States may rely on circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
as a defence so to speak for not complying with their international obligations in times of 
the Covid-19 pandemic. Three grounds appear plausible: force majeure, distress and 
necessity. 
 
(iii) In the event that there is a breach of an international obligation, plausible – or not so 
plausible - inter-State claims may arise. In light of these developments, the content (or 
substance) of State responsibility will be discussed from the premise that international 
responsibility flows from the breach of the international obligation and that a new legal 
relationship arises from the internationally wrongful act. The legal consequences of an 
internationally wrongful act give rise to an obligation on the responsible State to cease the 
wrongful conduct, and make full reparation for the injury caused by the international 
wrongful act.  
 
(iv) Lastly, the practical aspects of the invocation of the responsibility of a state will be 
explained in the context of who is entitled to bring a claim. Ultimately, as will be shown, 
forms of invocation vary, and will depend on the circumstances surrounding the 
internationally wrongful conduct and available fora.    
   
Before engaging in the present inquiry, a point of clarification must be made from the outset 
that the international law of State responsibility provides default rules for determining the 
existence and consequences of internationally wrongful acts. These rules are expressed 
in customary law so are applicable generally, whether or not the particular instrument 
refers to them, but are also mostly dispositive, so can be suspended by lex specialis 
(special or more precise law) in particular instruments and institutions.4 For example, the 
World Trade Organization’s dispute settlement mechanism partly replaces rules on 
implementation, by substituting countermeasures with treaty-based suspension of 
concessions; and partly replaces rules on reparation, by removing the possibility to claim 
compensation. In some international tribunals, issues governed by the law of State 
responsibility will be articulated in a substantially similar manner but without relying on their 
technical terminology; the treatment of rules on attribution in some of the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights is one example.5 In short, State responsibility has 
potentially very broad coverage but may sometimes be under-appreciated by specialists 
in particular fields of international law, either because of lex specialis or the development 
of specialist terminology.  
 
4 Article 55, 2001 ILC Articles, ibid. See also, Bruno Simma and Dirk Pulkowski, 'Of Planets and the 
Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law,' (2006) 17(3) Eur J Intl L 483. 
5 James Crawford and Amelia Keene, 'The Structure of State Responsibility under the European 
Convention on Human Rights,' in Anne van Aaken and Iulia Motoc (eds) The European Convention on 
Human Rights and General International Law:, Online Journal (Oxford University Press, 2018) 178. 
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II. The Internationally Wrongful Act of a State  
 
Article 1 of the 2001 ILC Articles stipulates: ‘Every internationally wrongful act of a State 
entails the international responsibility of that State.’ This is the underlying premise of the 
law of State responsibility, for which the remainder of the 2001 ILC Articles follows from.6  
Thus, in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, every internationally wrongful act of a State 
would entail international responsibility.   
 
Perhaps the most obvious point of departure when discussing State responsibility and the 
Covid-19 pandemic, without apportioning blame,7 would be questioning whether  State(s) 
could be held internationally responsible for not preventing the spread of the virus outbreak 
internally or externally beyond their borders.8 To adopt a black-letter analytical framework 
premised on the 2001 ILC Articles, the inquiry would need to formulate the aforementioned 
conduct of a State as an internationally wrongful act. Accordingly, Article 2 of the ILC 
Articles stipulates:  
 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission:  
 
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and 
 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.  
  
Thus, on a general level, conduct in relation to not preventing,9 protecting against, 
controlling,10 the spread of the virus internally or externally would have to be identified in 
line with the nomenclature of ‘an act’ or an ‘omission’ depending on the primary rule in 
question.11  
 
6 ILC Commentary to Article 1, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries 2001, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two 
(hereinafter “ILC Commentary”) 32. 
7 See Commentary to Article 2, ILC Commentary. 
8 Gian Luca Burci, ‘The outbreak of the Covid-19 Coronavirus: are the International Health Regulations fit 
for purpose’ 27 February 2020, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-outbreak-of-covid-19-coronavirus-
are-the-international-health-regulations-fit-for-purpose/; Caroline Foster, ‘Justified Border Closures do not 
violate the International Health Regulations 2005’ 11 June 2020, available at 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/justified-border-closures-do-not-violate-the-international-health-regulations-2005/. 
9 See the three Part entry by Antonio Coco and Talita de Souza Dias on due diligence and Covid-19: Part I: 
Due Diligence and COVID-19: States’ Duties to Prevent and Halt the Coronavirus Outbreak, 24 March  
2020, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-due-diligence-and-covid-19-states-duties-to-prevent-and-
halt-the-coronavirus-outbreak/; Part II: Due Diligence and COVID-19: States’ Duties to Prevent and Halt 
the Coronavirus Outbreak; 25 March 2020, available at:  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ii-due-diligence-and-covid-19-states-duties-to-prevent-and-halt-the-
coronavirus-outbreak/; Part III: Due diligence and COVID-19: States’ Duties to prevent and halt the 
Coronavirus outbreak, 25 March 2020, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-iii-due-diligence-and-covid-
19-states-duties-to-prevent-and-halt-the-coronavirus-outbreak/. See also, their co-authored paper in this 
publication.    
10 Article 2, International Health Regulations (2005).  
11  In the Corfu Channel case, the Court observed that the laying of the minefield which caused the 
explosions ‘could not have been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian government’ and […] 
‘the obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in 
general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British 
warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them.’ It further observed that Albania 
neither notified the existence of the minefield, nor warned the British warships of the imminent danger and 
held that ‘nothing was attempted by the Albanian authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave 
omissions involve the international responsibility of Albania,’ Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 
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A point can be made here about the aforementioned general principles of State 
responsibility in relation to the determination of an international wrongful act of a State: 
that the meaning and content of these secondary rules cannot be interpreted in their 
abstract, but rather the inquiry shifts towards the application of these rules, i.e. whether a 
particular set of facts can amount to conduct that is an act or omission attributable to the 
State and that would constitute a breach of an international obligation.   
 
As mentioned in my introduction, different primary rules under various legal frameworks 
under international law govern different conduct. Thus, it is likely that different obligations 
are called into question and when determining whether there is a breach of an international 
obligation, the principal focus should be on the primary obligation concerned. Pursuant to 
Article 12 of the 2001 ILC Articles, a breach of an international obligation exists ‘when an 
act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless 
of its origin or character.’ Accordingly, the law of State responsibility does not differentiate 
between treaty law or customary international law and is not concerned with the origin of 
the obligation breached.  
 
Drawing upon a more specific context, allegations have been made that China has acted 
in breach of obligations under the International Health Regulations (2005), an 
internationally binding agreement between 196 countries including all members of the 
World Health Organization (WHO); particularly Article 6 (notification) and Article 7 
(information-sharing during unexpected or unusual public health events).12 Not wanting to 
comment here on the validity of these allegations, the point I wish to elucidate is that these 
are specific obligations which speak to obligations to notify and share information 
respectively. These primary rules differ from other primary rules that may also be 
applicable in the context of conduct to not prevent the spread of the virus outbreak 
internally or externally, e.g. the no-harm rule in a transboundary context and the 
concomitant obligation of due diligence that stems from this primary rule;13 or obligations 
in relation to conditions of detention;14 or port denials and restrictions.15 Thus, the point is 
that State responsibility for acts or omissions that amount to conduct that did not prevent 
or contain the virus outbreak need to be determined on a rule by rule basis in accordance 
 
1949: ICJ Reports 1949, p.4, at p.22 and 23. Also, in the Consular Staff in Tehran case, the Court held that 
the Iranian Government failed altogether to take any "appropriate steps" to protect the premises, staff and 
archives of the United States' mission against attack by the militants, and to take any steps either to 
prevent this attack or to stop it before it reached its completion. They also show that on 5 November 1979 
the Iranian Government similarly failed to take appropriate steps for the protection of the United States 
Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz. In addition they show, in the opinion of the Court, that the failure of the 
Iranian Government to take such steps was due to more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate 
means.’, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, p.3, at 
para.63.  
12 See Peter Tzeng, ‘Taking China to the International Court of Justice over Covid-19,’ 2 April2020, 
available at:  https://www.ejiltalk.org/taking-china-to-the-international-court-of-justice-over-covid-19/. 
13 Attila Tanzi, ‘State liability’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para.3; see also the 
earlier contribution by Antonio Coco and Talita de Souza Dias in this publication on ‘Cyber due diligence in 
public health crises’.  
14 For example, see the earlier contribution by Carla Ferstman in this publication on ‘Detention and 
pandemic exceptionality.’ 
15 See Alina Miron, ‘Port Denials and Restrictions in Times of pandemic: Did International Law lose its 
North Star’,  20 April 2020, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/port-denials-and-restrictions-in-times-of-
pandemic-did-international-law-lose-its-north/. 
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to whether the conduct is attributable to the State under international law and constitutes 
a breach of the obligation arising from the primary rule in question.   
 
Another aspect which merits further consideration pertains to the internal measures and 
restrictions in relation to responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, i.e. broadly speaking, 
lockdowns which entail severe restrictions of movement and retail trade. Indeed, 
“lockdown” measures raise discussion as to their legality under domestic law;16 but in any 
event, Article 3 is of the 2001 ILC Articles is clear that when determining a breach of an 
international obligation by a State, the characterisation ‘of an act of a State as 
internationally wrongful is governed by international law.’17 Thus, if the conduct in question 
is lawful under domestic law, this does not affect the characterisation under international 
law that the act is internationally unlawful.18 However, what may affect the characterisation 
is the nature of the primary rule itself as some primary rules have restrictions or 
derogations,19 e.g. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.20 Thus, when determining 
whether there is a breach of an international obligation the principal focus should be on 
the content of the primary obligation concerned. 
 
Whilst continuing down the inquiry pertaining to internal measures imposed by States in 
dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic, it may be of particular interest to think about the 
structural and capacity-building measures,21 and strategies of States in providing a public 
health response to Covid-19,22 and also the standards and decisions of States within the 
sphere of domestic health law.23 Obviously, infrastructure for capacity-building, as well as 
healthcare systems differ in every State, and whether States commit an internationally 
wrongful act in this regard is dependent on the primary rule in question which applies. 
Here, the Commentary to Article 2 of the 2001 ILC Articles may be helpful that there is no 
general rule pertaining to standards for breach of an obligation: 
 
whether they involve some degree of fault, culpability or want of due diligence. Such standards vary 
from one context to another for reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the 
treaty provision or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the articles lay down any 
 
16 See Jeff King, ‘The Lockdown is Lawful’, 1 April 2020, available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/04/01/jeff-king-the-lockdown-is-lawful/; Jeff King ‘The Lockdown is 
Lawful: Part II’, available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2020/04/02/jeff-king-the-lockdown-is-lawful-part-
ii/. 
17 Article 3, 2001 ILC Articles (n. 3).  
18 Ibid.  
19 See, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of 
Emergency, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 31 August 2001. 
20 See Alessandra Spadaro, ‘Do the containment measures taken by Italy in relation to COVID-19 comply 
with human rights law?’, 16 March 2020, https://www.ejiltalk.org/do-the-containment-measures-taken-by-
italy-in-relation-to-covid-19-comply-with-human-rights-law/; Mariel Morales Antoniazzi and Silvia Steininger, 
‘How to protect human rights in times of Corona? Lessons from the Inter-American Human Rights 
Systems’, 1 May 2020, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/how-to-protect-human-rights-in-times-of-
corona-lessons-from-the-inter-american-human-rights-system/. 
21 See Giulio Bartolini, ‘Are you ready for a Pandemic? The International Health Regulations Put to the Test 
of Their ‘Core Capacity Requirements’, 1 June 2020, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/are-you-ready-
for-a-pandemic-the-international-health-regulations-put-to-the-test-of-their-core-capacity-requirements/. 
22 Lorna McGregor, ‘Contact-tracing Apps and Human Rights’, 30 April 2020, available at  
https://www.ejiltalk.org/contact-tracing-apps-and-human-rights/.  
23 For example, see the earlier contribution by Sabine Michalowski in this publication, ‘The use of age as a 
triage criterion.’ 
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presumption in this regard as between the possible standards. Establishing there is a matter for the 
interpretation and application of the primary rules engaged in the given case.24    
      
 III. Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness  
 
Under the law of State responsibility, there are circumstances that a State may plead to 
preclude the wrongfulness of conduct that would otherwise be a breach of the international 
obligations of the State concerned.25 In a manner of speaking, this would provide a 
“defence” against a claim for the breach of an international obligation. According to the ILC 
Commentary, ‘they do not annul or terminate the obligation; rather they provide a 
justification or excuse for non-performance while the circumstance in question subsists.’26 
Three circumstances have been identified as being potentially relevant:27 force majeure, 
distress and necessity. Before examining each respective circumstance in more detail, 
three points can be made from the outset. First, whether or not a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness may apply, is dependent on the nature of the primary rule, e.g. some 
obligations under human rights treaties which are subject to derogations may exclude the 
plea of necessity. Second, the ILC had drafted these circumstances to have a high 
threshold in the sense that it would not be easy for States to rely on them to preclude 
wrongfulness for conduct which would ordinarily be in breach of an international obligation. 
Third, the relevance or appropriateness of these circumstances would depend on each 
State for the particular obligation concerned. There is no “blanket” circumstance that would 
apply to all States for all the breach of all international obligations during the Covid-19 
pandemic.  
 
With regard to force majeure, Article 23 stipulates:  
 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or 
of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the 
circumstances to perform the obligation.  
 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in 
combination with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) the State has assumed 
the risk of that situation occurring.28  
 
It would appear that force majeure strikes at the capacity for States to do something, i.e. 
emphasis on “materially impossible” in the circumstances for the State to perform the 
obligation. States who are unable to comply with their international obligations during the 
Covid-19 pandemic would have to prove the material impossibility of performance. Further, 
 
24 Commentary to Article 2, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.35.  
25 Note that Article 26 stipulates: ‘Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State 
which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.’  
26 Commentary to Chapter V, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p. 71. 
27 Federica Paddeu and Freya Jephcott, ‘Covid-19 and Defences in the Law of State Responsibility: Part I’, 
17 March 2020, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-state-
responsibility-part-i/. 
28 Paddeu and Jephcott have identified five criteria for a successful claim for force majeure: A successful 
claim of force majeure must fulfill 5 conditions: (i) there must be an unforeseen event or an irresistible force 
(the ‘triggering event’); (ii) the event or force must be beyond the control of the State; (iii) the event must 
make it ‘materially’ impossible to perform an obligation; (iv) the State must not have contributed to the 
situation; and (v) the State must not have assumed the risk of the situation occurring. Each of these will be 
assessed in turn, except for (v) which is likely to depend on the specific language of particular treaty 
commitments. Ibid. 
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according to the ILC Commentary to Article 23, force majeure differs from a situation of 
distress or necessity because ‘the conduct of the State involved which would otherwise be 
internationally wrongful is involuntary or at least involves no element of free choice.’29 It is 
likely that the failure of performance by a State of an international obligation as a result of 
restrictive measures or a nation-wide lockdown is not involuntary.  
 
Distress under Article 24 stipulates:  
 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of 
distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care.  
 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: (a) the situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination 
with other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or (b) the act in question is likely to create 
a comparable or greater peril.30  
 
According to the Commentary to Article 24, distress may only be invoked where ‘a State 
agent has acted to save his or her own life or where there exists a special relationship 
between the state organ or agent and the persons in danger. It does not extend to more 
general cases of emergencies, which are more a matter of necessity than distress.’31  It is 
difficult to imagine how States would be able to establish there is a special relationship 
between the State organ or agent that committed the breach of an international obligation 
and persons in danger (presumably the entire human population within the State).  
  
This brings the analysis to Article 25:  
 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act 
not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:  
 
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril;  
and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.  
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:  
(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the 
State has contributed to the situation of necessity.32  
 
According to the ILC Commentary to Article 25, ‘the term “necessity” is used to denote 
those exceptional cases where the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest 
threatened by a grave and imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other 
 
29 Commentary to Article 23, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.76.  
30 Paddeu and Jephcott suggest the following criteria for a successful claim of distress: the State would 
need to prove that: (i) threat to life; (ii) a special relationship between the State organ and the persons in 
question; (iii) that there was no other reasonable way to deal with the threat; (iv) that it did not contribute to 
the situation; and (v) that the measures were proportionate.,’  ‘Federica Paddeu and Frey Jephcott, ‘Covid-
19 and Defences in the Law of State Responsibility: Part II’, 17 March 2020, available at: 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/covid-19-and-defences-in-the-law-of-state-responsibility-part-ii/. 
31 Commentary to Article 24, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p. 80. 
32 Paddeu and Jephcott (n. 30) suggest the following criteria for a successful claim of necessity: the State 
would need to prove that: (i) threat to life; (ii) a special relationship between the State organ and the 
persons in question; (iii) that there was no other reasonable way to deal with the threat; (iv) that it did not 
contribute to the situation; and (v) that the measures were proportionate.  
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international obligation of lesser weight or urgency.’33 It is also stated that necessity ‘arises 
where there is an irreconcilable conflict between an essential interest on the one hand and 
an obligation of the State invoking necessity on the other. These special features mean 
that necessity will only rarely be available to excuse non-performance of an obligation and 
that it is subject to strict limitations to safeguard against possible abuse.’34 States wishing 
to rely on the plea of necessity would thus have to prove that the obligation in breach was 
irreconcilably incompatible with an essential interest. This is likely to be very difficult, as 
intended by the drafters.  
 
In a similar vein to the preceding analysis, whether a State can make a successful plea of 
force majeure, distress or necessity needs to be determined in accordance with whether a 
particular set of facts that arise from the circumstances surrounding the primary rule can 
fit into the content of the respective secondary rules of State responsibility.    
 
IV. Content of International Responsibility  
 
Upon the finding of an internationally wrongful act by a State – the next point of inquiry, 
which may find increasing relevance in the Covid-19 pandemic landscape, is one of legal 
consequences under the regime of State responsibility.35 Indeed, under the black-letter 
nomenclature of the 2001 ILC Articles, the content (or substance) of international 
responsibility is the new legal relationship that arises upon the commission by a State of 
an internationally wrongful act. State responsibility also extends towards breaches of 
international law where the primary beneficiary of the obligation breached is an individual 
or an entity other than a State.36 There is also a plurality aspect to the content of State 
responsibility in accordance with Article 33 that ‘the obligations of the responsible State 
set out in this Part may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the international 
community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and content of the 
international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach.’  
 
Although there may be an inclination to understand reparations for an internationally 
wrongful act as entitlement for damages from the injured State (or individual or other entity) 
for the wrongful conduct,37 the regime of State responsibility situates legal consequences 
as obligations that arise from the breach of an international obligation. Stemming from the 
breach of an international obligation, the core legal consequences under the regime of 
State responsibility are the obligations of the responsible State to cease the wrongful 
conduct (Article 30) and to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally 
wrongful act (Article 31). It should be emphasised that these are new obligations that stem 
by operation of law from the breach of an international obligation; and thus reparations are 
not an entitlement by the injured State, individual or entity but rather an obligation from the 
wrongdoing State to make full reparation.  
 
 
33 Commentary to Article 25, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p. 80. 
34 Ibid. 
35 This is not to say that a State may not face legal consequences of conduct which is internationally 
wrongful outside of State responsibility, e.g. under the law of treaties framework. See ILC Commentary (n. 
6), p.86.  
36 Article 33, 2001 ILC Articles (n. 3).  
37  Helen Davidson and Alison Rourke, ‘Trump says China could have stopped Covid-19 and suggests US 
will seek damages’, The Guardian, 28 April 2020; Tim Walker, ‘First thing: Trump’s latest coronavirus take 
– sue China’, The Guardian, 28 April 2020. 
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The forms of reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act can take 
the form of ‘restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.’38 
We are reminded that ‘blackletter does not call for reparation of any and all consequences 
flowing from the wrongful act’ and that ‘it is only damage for injury caused by the wrongful 
act […] in breach of the particular primary rule that has to be repaired.’39  
 
In the similar vein as the foregoing analysis on general principles of State responsibility, 
the content and form of reparation for internationally wrongful conduct during the Covid-19 
pandemic would need to be brought out to light through the international process of claims 
by States depending on the availability of fora.  
 
V. Implementation  
 
The inquiry now takes on a more practical consideration, i.e. the implementation of State 
responsibility. This refers to how the obligations to make reparations towards a beneficiary 
of the obligation can be invoked under international law; and who is entitled to claim. The 
most obvious starting point is that an injured State is entitled pursuant to Article 41 of the 
2001 ILC Articles to invoke the responsibility of another State if: (a) the obligation breached 
is owed to that State individually; or (b) a group of States including that State, or the 
international community as a whole; and the breach of the obligation: (i) specially affects 
that State; or (ii) is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other 
States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the 
obligation. According to the ILC Commentary to Article 42, invocation should be 
understood as ‘taking measures of a relatively formal character for example, the raising or 
presentation of a claim against another State or the commencement of proceedings before 
an international court or tribunal.’40  
 
In practice, Article 43 of the ILC Articles stipulates ‘an injured State which invokes the 
responsibility of another State shall give notice of its claim to that State.’ The Commentary 
to this provision elaborates that ‘although State responsibility arises by operation of law on 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act by a State, in practice it is necessary for 
an injured State and/or other interested State(s) to respond, if they wish to seek cessation 
or reparation. Responses can take a variety of forms, from an unofficial and confidential 
reminder of the need to fulfil the obligation through formal protest, consultations, etc.’41 
Obviously in practice, invocation would take different forms depending on the States 
involved and the availability of fora.   
 
A final note is that in the event that the breach of the international obligation has an erga 
omnes character,42 Article 48(1) allows a State other than an injured State to invoke 
responsibility if: (a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that 
State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the 
obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. According to Article 
 
38 Article 34, 2001 ILC Articles (n. 3).  
39 Martins Paparinskis, ‘COVID-19 Symposium: COVID-19 and the foundations of international law’, 31 
March 2020, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2020/03/31/covid-19-symposium-covid-19-and-the-
foundations-of-international-law/.  
40 Commentary to Article 42, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.117. 
41 Commentary to Article 43, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.119. 
42 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3, paras.33-
34. 
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48(2), a State other than an injured State that is entitled to invoke responsibility may claim 
from the responsible State: (a) cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with article 30; and (b) 
performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in 
the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.43 Notably, 
the invocation of responsibility pertains to the obligation of reparation to the injured State 
and the beneficiaries of the obligation breached and not to the State making the claim.  
  
Suffice to say, these practical steps with regard to invoking the content of responsibility for 
wrongful conduct committed during the Covid-19 pandemic, i.e. obligations of the 
responsible State to make full reparations depend on many other factors such as the 
particular set of facts and circumstances, availability of fora and evidence pertaining to the 
breach of the international obligation.   
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
This contribution has provided an overview to how the secondary rules of State 
responsibility apply to internationally wrongful acts by States during the Covid-19 
pandemic. I have pointed out that the determination of an internationally wrongful act, i.e. 
the attribution of conduct to a State and the finding of a breach of an international obligation 
is entirely premised on the nature of the underlying primary rule. I have also pointed out 
how the Covid-19 puts forward complex factual situations – of which – there is no simple 
cut and paste approach of applying the black-letter rules of State responsibility, but rather 
the inquiry pins on which set of facts and circumstances may amount to a finding of an 
internationally wrongful act. Likewise, the legal consequences that flow from operation of 
law for the breach of an international obligation, i.e. forms of reparations, depend on the 
nature of the primary rule which is breached and the circumstances surrounding the 
wrongful act; and remain to be seen depending on the availability of judicial process. Be 
that as it may, it is important to understand that entitlement to a claim is not an entitlement 
of damages as such, but rather an entitlement to invoke the responsibility of a wrongdoing 
State, to fulfil its obligations to cease the wrongful conduct (Article 30) and to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act (Article 31). A legal 
relationship arises between a wrongdoing State and an injured State (or other beneficiaries 
of the obligation) which entitles the latter to invoke the international responsibility of the 
former. Ultimately, claims whether plausible or not so plausible will depend on the primary 
rule that has been breached. In light of the factual complexity of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
and the plethora of primary rules of international law that apply to States, it is likely that 
new and interesting questions of State responsibility will arise during the international 
process of the application of the black-letter rules in claims to come.   
  
 
43 See Commentary to Article 48, ILC Commentary (n. 6), p.126-128.  
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